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Reflections on the Quarter

The Geneva Economic Conferences

GENEVA has been the scene of two major trade conferences this year, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the so-called Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations. The UN Conference was not a negotiating session in the same sense as the GATT meeting. Instead, it provided a forum for UN members, particularly the new states, to air their views on international trade. Many of the participants were also GATT members, so that proposals made at one meeting undoubtedly influenced the other, particularly since the two were held in the same city.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gave the President authority to cut U.S. tariffs by as much as 50 per cent if comparable concessions were made by trading partners, launched the Kennedy Round. After a year of preliminary negotiations, sixty-two GATT members met with the objective of negotiating tariff reductions of 50 per cent across the board. The issues which confronted conferees at the GATT negotiations may decisively influence political as well as economic relations among the nations of the Free World. The principal negotiators at the Kennedy Round were NATO members. Upon their ability to reach economic agreement may rest to a considerable extent the political future of the Atlantic Alliance.

Trade relations between the United States and the Common Market countries have undergone changes in recent years. The future of this relationship is at issue in Geneva. Both sides fear a recurrence of the "chicken war" of 1963 in which the Common Market raised tariffs on frozen poultry and caused a decline in U.S. exports of chickens to Europe from $50 million annually to less than $15 million. The United States retaliated by raising tariffs on trucks, buses, wine and a variety of other goods which Europe regularly exports to the United States. Fortunately, a full-scale tariff war did not develop, even though non-EEC members such as the United Kingdom suffered from the action taken by the United States.

The Johnson Administration has sought linear reductions of 50 per cent in tariffs. Initially, U.S. negotiators had support in Great Britain and in several EEC countries. Subsequently, however, the Six changed their official position to take greater account of French interests. According to French spokesmen, 50 per cent reductions provided a "working hypothesis" for the negotiators. France was willing to negotiate tariff reductions of 50 per cent as part of a tariff package including exceptions and

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disparities, but would not commit itself to such a general goal. Although the United States and Britain accepted the French wording for the formal statement of the negotiators, it is extremely doubtful that they accepted its literal meaning.

The GATT negotiators were confronted with three major problems. The disparity issue arises from the differences between the U.S. and EEC tariff structures. Over the past several years, EEC members have striven to achieve a uniform external tariff. As a result, practically all EEC tariffs are no higher than 25 per cent. In contrast, some U.S. tariffs are as high as 80 per cent. The EEC negotiators contended that if the U.S. tariff was 80 per cent and the Common Market tariff was 20 per cent on a given category, a 50 per cent cut would still leave the United States with a protective barrier while the EEC would have none. The Six insisted that, where a disparity exists, the United States, as the high tariff country, should make greater cuts than nations with lower tariff levels. The Europeans advanced a formula whereby a disparity might be claimed if a U.S. tariff was at least twice that of the Six, provided the difference was at least ten percentage points. Thus the EEC, claiming disparities, could make fewer reductions, while the United States would cut many of its tariffs by 50 per cent. The EEC contended that disparities could be claimed for 700 items in industrial tariffs, covering only about 9 per cent of U.S.-EEC trade. But the Six indicated their willingness to negotiate substantial reductions in this figure.

The United States accepted the EEC formula with reservations. Items upon which tariffs below 40 per cent are levied would be exempted, and the disparity rule would be waived in cases where a country imports large quantities of an item despite disproportionately high tariffs. In instances where a "third country," other than a member of the Common Market, the United States or Great Britain, is the major exporter of an item subject to a disparity, the disparity rule would be waived. The United States also favored a rule under which tariff reductions would be applied automatically to all items included in an agreed category. The EEC, however, wanted item by item consideration in order to provide for bargaining in the case of items of particular sensitivity in domestic politics. Thus far the United States has agreed that the EEC may reduce by only 25 per cent those industrial duties that are half or less than half the U.S. tariff rate. The final outcome is uncertain.

Another question yet to be resolved concerns the list for which each country will seek exceptions to tariff reductions. GATT, approving a French suggestion, selected September 10 as the date for the publication of each country's list of exceptions. Should the United States, or any of the negotiating countries for that matter, present an extensive list of exceptions the result might well be the

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failure of the Kennedy Round to achieve linear reductions. Then the participants might be forced to return to item by item negotiations, thus failing to achieve a basic objective of the conference. However, both sides are aware of domestic political pressures. Hence the list which a given nation can be expected to submit will not come as a complete surprise.

Perhaps the least promising of all the issues in question at Geneva has been agricultural products. The United States proposes that the question of liberalization of trade in agricultural products be included in this round of negotiations in order to assure its farmers a continued share in the growing market of Europe. Presently, the United States exports approximately $1.2 billion worth of farm goods annually to the EEC, including $400 million worth of grain. If this market were closed, farm surpluses in the United States would increase substantially.

The Six proposed the organization of agricultural trade rather than its liberalization. The EEC contended that, in any case, the year 1964 should be devoted to exploration of the problem of trade in agriculture and that decisions should be deferred until 1965. The Common Market countries suggested that agricultural protection should be held at present levels for three years. The basic reason for the Common Market's attitude toward liberalizing agricultural trade is to be found in the domestic situation in EEC countries. In the last decade West European agriculture, spurred by modernization, has increased output so rapidly that Europeans may soon have their own farm surpluses. Increasingly, the EEC faces the problem of competition between its own farmers and those of countries outside Europe. More immediate, however, is the question of grain prices within the EEC itself. The EEC members had originally intended to achieve a gradual adjustment toward uniform grain prices. However, the Trade Expansion Act has put pressure upon them to accelerate their timetable. Without agreement among themselves on pricing, the EEC countries are unable to plan future output of grain. Thus they cannot estimate accurately the size of the market which would be left to imports from outside Europe. Discord within the EEC must be reduced before agreement between the EEC and the United States can be reached.

Another problem still to be considered, namely that of non-tariff trade barriers, promises to present difficulties: Included are such measures as the French "health" regulation against hormone-fed animal products which effectively bars U.S. frozen chickens from France. Moreover, in some countries quota systems permit only certain quantities of a product to be imported regardless of price. Such provisions form barriers to trade equally as formidable as those created by tariffs. The German internal tax on coffee, while not a tariff in the strict sense, has the effect, nevertheless, of severely limiting the domestic sale of coffee

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and hence restricts imports. Such measures provide means of evasion for countries wishing to adhere to the letter of free trade while, in fact, yielding to domestic pressure.

Although the GATT conference devoted much of its deliberations to major issues among the "rich" nations of the world, there was a growing awareness of the problems of the "poor" nations. The less developed nations now control two-thirds of the votes in GATT. Therefore, they may be expected to play a major role in the organization. GATT, cognizant of the changes taking place in the underdeveloped areas of the world, is preparing a trade program to be announced in November of this year. It will call for the industrial countries to allow duty-free entry of tropical products, to establish no new trade barriers, to eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports, and to remove special taxes and duties on primary products from the less developed countries. In effect, this program would subject certain Indian exports to substantially lower tariffs than exports of the same products from an industrialized country.

The adoption of this new trade program would require a major revision of GATT principles. Except for those agreements which had been in effect prior to the creation of GATT, such as those providing for British Commonwealth preferences, GATT rules require equal treatment of all members by any given member. While the former French and Belgian colonies in Africa enjoy associate membership in the Common Market and hence a relatively protected market for their exports, they must contend on an equal footing with the EEC in the world market. The extent to which the EEC countries, particularly France, would be willing to open their markets to all of the underdeveloped world while at the same time attempting to maintain their special relationship with former colonies is uncertain. In view of continuing French investment and interest in former colonies in Africa, President de Gaulle cannot be expected to end preferential terms of access to European markets provided by associate membership in the Common Market. Except for the EEC, all of the participants at the GATT meeting agreed in principle to lower their trade barriers against imports from underdeveloped countries.

The measures proposed by GATT to assist the "poor" countries are indicative of the growing awareness among the developed countries that increasing trade is the key to economic growth. A worsening in a country's terms of trade may more than offset foreign exchange received from foreign aid.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development served to point up the sentiments of less developed states. The East-West confrontation was overshadowed by differences between the rich countries of the Northern Hemisphere and the poor countries of the South. The significance of the conference lay not so much in its

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economic accomplishments as in the unity displayed by the seventy-five participating delegations from states in the Southern Hemisphere. African, Asian and Latin American states strove to advance their own welfare by obtaining concessions from the developed nations. Their immediate goal was to achieve tariff reductions which would allow them to sell more of their goods to the Western nations. They also sought compensation for losses in foreign exchange resulting from a worsening in terms of trade. The less developed states, forming the voting majority, pushed several proposals through the UN Conference which were unacceptable to both the industrialized states of the West and the Soviet Union.

The conferees agreed to request the World Bank to study the possibility of creating a new fund which would assist nations whose export earnings showed a steady decline. However, there was little agreement among the rich nations, and less between the rich and poor nations, about steps to be taken to resolve the problems of commodity price stabilization. Understandably, the poor nations wish to narrow the gap between themselves and the rich nations through development and industrialization. In relative terms this gap is widening: the rich nations are increasing their living standards more rapidly than the poor nations. While only 8 per cent of the U.S. economy is dependent on foreign trade, the underdeveloped countries derive a major portion of their income from international commerce and, in particular, from primary products. Since their receipts from exports amount to $27 billion annually, while capital imports are $8 billion annually, export earnings determine import capacity and hence development. Thus the benefits of foreign aid are readily erased by a drop in the price of primary products.

Despite the unity displayed by less developed states at Geneva, it is unlikely that countries in the Southern Hemisphere will become a cohesive bloc. Many of the less developed states are members of other alignments and groupings which include Western nations. Such groupings appear vital to the economic future of the new states, since only the West can provide trade and aid in amounts necessary for economic growth. Moreover, the poor nations compete for markets in the West and trade more with the industrialized world than among themselves.

The conferences held in Geneva represent but a beginning toward a resolution of the problems confronting the Western powers in relations with each other and the new states. It is difficult to see how the Atlantic Community can be built unless the Geneva negotiators can agree upon the liberalization of Atlantic trade. It is unlikely that the Atlantic peoples can speed the process of modernization in Africa, Asia and Latin America until they have dismantled their respective restrictive systems.

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Presidential Authority and Nuclear Weapons

One of the most important issues to arise in U.S. politics in recent months is the nature of Presidential control over nuclear weapons. It has been suggested, on the one hand, that a higher degree of authority over the use of nuclear weapons should be granted to the Supreme Commander of NATO. The objective of such a measure would be to increase the capabilities of troops stationed in Europe for self-defense.

It has been alleged, on the other hand, that any transmittal of nuclear authority to the NATO commander is "irresponsible," since it would increase the danger of war. This argument is based on the contention that, during a crisis, the commander of NATO or an officer of lesser rank might be inclined to use nuclear weapons before the President authorized him to do so. If this were to happen, a conflict could quickly escalate; in order to keep escalation under control, the authority of the President must not be diminished in any way.

Nuclear weapons might be used in the defense of NATO in Europe in two different situations. In the case of a Soviet nuclear strike against Western Europe or in the case of a massive conventional assault, present U.S. policy calls for an immediate nuclear response which would, of course, be authorized by the President. In the event of hostile probes or ambiguous attacks whose scope and intent cannot be quickly determined, U.S. doctrine calls for a selective response—one in which tactical nuclear weapons might or might not be employed. Both types of Soviet attack might take place with little or no warning.

By the time the circumstances of a Soviet attack were transmitted to Washington and debated; a decision to use nuclear weapons was made and relayed to the NATO commander; and the weapons were released to the troops and the order given to use them, it might be too late to contain the Soviet thrust. This complex problem has not yet been fully resolved in Washington. One possible solution is to pre-plan the response to a variety of contingencies and provide some *limited prior delegation to the NATO commander of Presidential authority to employ nuclear weapons.*

Under present defense arrangements, only the President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Should an attack take place, news about enemy operations would be flashed to the President, and, thereupon, the President might authorize the use of nuclear weapons for defense or retaliatory purposes. Were there sufficient warning, the President might order the readying of nuclear weapons *before* the enemy strikes; but a specific supplementary order to fire those weapons would still be necessary. (If he so chooses, the President may issue both the release and permission-to-fire orders simultaneously.) In case there should be no early warning, the procedure through which nuclear weapons can be released for firing would be

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initiated only after bombs had fallen on either the United States, Western Europe or both. Similarly, steps would be taken to release nuclear weapons only after a major hostile penetration on the ground had begun.

Undoubtedly, this procedure tempts an enemy to take advantage of its very complexity. Thus, it contains a built-in deficiency which could reduce the chances of a successful defense of Europe and trigger general nuclear war—the very danger which it is supposed to reduce.

Many contingencies could cause the failure of established procedures of command and control. Enemy action could produce a breakdown in our communications system. For lack of information, the President might be unable to decide, at a crucial time, upon the use of nuclear weapons. In the event of a nuclear attack it might take some time to ascertain the whereabouts of survivors included in the chain of Presidential succession and "marry them up" with effective command post communications. An even more difficult problem is to make certain that all Presidential successors are fully apprised of the intricacies of the very complex and vital decisions they might have to make. Systems of training alternative Presidential successors have been considered, but it is doubtful that any real solution to this problem has been fully worked out. The United States must guard against dangers of this kind. An adversary must not be tempted to strike whenever he believes American forces cannot respond effectively *and in time.*

In the absence of a capability for instant response, the United States might be unable to defend itself. Our troops in forward deployments could be defeated. Since, under conditions of nuclear war, victory or defeat in the initial battle may be decisive for the overall conflict, the war might be lost. Moreover, a strategy which seeks to impose a "pause" on the aggressor can be managed effectively *only* within the theater of operations. Since such a strategy applies largely to continental NATO, it must be managed in Europe.

Should the United States fail to prepare itself for the initial battle, it would, in effect, have renounced the strategy of deterrence which, thus far, has stood us in good stead. The failure of deterrence would probably cause the collapse of NATO. In such an eventuality, nations other than France would have an incentive to acquire their own nuclear capabilities.

A proposal to give supplementary nuclear authority to the Supreme Commander of NATO, notably for the employment of small tactical weapons, would provide a partial solution to the problem of ensuring an appropriate response to an attack against Europe. However, a longer-range problem would remain. American forces in Europe, while they possess nuclear weapons for ground battle and for the interception of subsonic aircraft, lack anti-missile defenses and weapons to intercept supersonic bombers. In the continental United States,

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American forces are also deficient in anti-missile capabilities and modern air defenses. Hence, there is at present not much point in proposing command and control procedures for the use of weapons which we do not possess. Nuclear weapons of the kind necessary for quick response are available. NATO urgently needs more command flexibility to ensure the defense of Europe. Thus, the proposal provides one method of overcoming a particular current difficulty.

The legal situation is quite clear: the President is the Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces. Furthermore, according to legislation, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons must be determined by the President and cannot be delegated to a foreign officer. Such authority cannot be delegated to the NATO Supreme Commander unless, as is the case today, this officer is an American. If he were a European, this authority would have to be reassigned to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces in Europe (CINCEUR).

Legally, the President *must* make the crucial nuclear decisions. But, there is *no* reason why he should be constrained to wait until such decisions may be too late.

There are many methods by which Presidential decisions could be planned ahead of time, while ensuring against the unauthorized use of weapons. Prearranged orders would make unnecessary, except in unforeseen situations, the hasty improvisation of orders by persons exposed to heavy stress. The President would issue advance orders specifying the particular type of situations in which our forces would be authorized to use nuclear weapons in self-defense and he would stipulate precisely under what conditions the contingent authority might be invoked. These orders would specify the timing of the nuclear defense, the types of weapons which might or might not be used in the initial engagement, preferred and forbidden targets, and limits on numbers of weapons to be employed. If no contingency arises which would necessitate the immediate employment of nuclear weapons, the President would retain all the *direct* authority which he desires in order to manage a slow-moving crisis situation. Moreover, any authority which the President may delegate to a subordinate commander can be withdrawn whenever the President wishes to take direct control of operations.

The possibility that nuclear weapons might be used for offensive purposes may be reduced by restricting the authority exercised by persons other than the President to certain types of weapons.

These arrangements would not resolve all of the major problems confronting NATO. The United States should invite its European allies to share in planning for contingencies in which certain types of nuclear weapons would be employed. European desires for a greater voice in U.S. policy formulation on matters of direct concern to the Alliance might thus be met, at least in part. Moreover, European doubts about the willingness

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of the United States to invoke its military power in Europe's defense might be stilled. Last but not least, the United States would have provided a solution to one of the vexing problems posed by the ever shrinking time for responding to an enemy attack.

The Rumanian-Soviet Quarrel

During the last year grave differences appear to have cast a dark shadow over the once so intimate relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union. Recent manifestations of discord stand in bold relief to the master-serf relationship that existed in Eastern Europe during the latter years of Stalin's rule. In fact, satellite leaders began to differ with Moscow soon after Stalin died. Khrushchev sought to obtain agreement more by the consent than by the coercion of the East European communist regimes.

Rumania's present difficulties with the Soviet Union seem to be primarily economic in nature. They are tinged with political implications only insofar as Rumania has sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift as a means for enhancing its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. At issue is the application of the principle of the "international socialist division of labor," a plan under which Rumania, in her industrial development, would specialize in certain kinds of production, principally in the field of petroleum, agriculture and light industry, while leaving it to other countries in the communist world to specialize in heavy industry.

Rumania's decision to oppose Soviet policy was undoubtedly motivated by the fact that her economy has enjoyed in recent years a rate of growth which has averaged about 15 per cent annually. To close down industries, to shift capital, resources and human skills from one economic sector to another, might have created dislocations which would have jeopardized Rumanian growth. Therefore, the government decided not to alter plans for economic development which the Soviets opposed.

Friction such as that generated by Rumania's decision is not new either to COMECON or to communists. COMECON has been rent by discord ever since Khrushchev decided to put in operation his plan for an international division of labor which would tighten the Soviet economic hold on the satellites. However, the autarchic Stalinist patterns of the late forties and early fifties still prevail. The supranational planning authority which Rumania has rejected so emphatically has received only the reluctant approval of other satellite leaders. In 1962 Czechoslovakia and Poland allegedly resisted efforts to create a supranational council for effecting economic specialization in the communist world. Partly because of satellite opposition to economic integration, COMECON remains an organization where agreement is reached by the negotiation of bilateral accords.

Thanks to his adroit tactics, Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, has improved his position in the

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communist world. Publicly asserting his benevolent neutrality toward both contestants in the Sino-Soviet dispute, he harasses an already preoccupied Soviet leadership. By failing, on two separate occasions within a year, to attend meetings of satellite leaders with Khrushchev he avoided the embarrassing position of becoming a minority of one. Nonetheless, Gheorghiu-Dej has taken pains to allay possible Soviet fears that Rumania was about to defect from the communist camp. In June at Timisoara, President Tito reportedly advised Gheorghiu-Dej against pushing too far his dispute with the Soviets. In July, a more conciliatory atmosphere seemed to prevail between the Soviets and Rumanians.

Rumania's feud with the Soviet Union unfolds in the midst of a new Soviet campaign of "peaceful coexistence" which, among its objectives, aims at an expansion of trade on long-term credits with the West. Khrushchev appears to have enhanced his prospects for achieving this objective. Trade between Western Europe and the communist bloc has been increasing for the last several years. Rumania has shared in this growth. Well endowed with oil resources but relatively backward industrially, Rumania is said to have good potential for economic development. It is reported that 500 Western technicians now reside in Rumania, assisting, for example, in the construction of a $22 million British tire factory, a $30 million West German iron and steel complex, and two British cellulose plants. In June Rumania announced the lifting of many restrictions on travel by Western tourists. The Rumanians, seeking to acquire foreign currency for trade with the West, decided to grant tourists especially favorable exchange rates and discounts on goods purchased in Rumania. Such concessions, however, were not to be extended to visitors from other communist countries.

Slowly the pressures of expanding markets to the East have forced West European governments to lift embargoes upon strategic goods and financial credits to communist countries. The United States, too, has begun to alter its policies toward Eastern Europe. Officials in Washington have watched happily the dispute between Rumania and the Soviet Union. Rumania's defiance may have contributed to the recent U.S. approval of modification of the NATO strategic goods list and to U.S. interest in extending credits to bloc countries.

In September 1963 a group of American oil company executives visited Rumania to discuss the possibility of cooperation between the petroleum industries of the two countries. In October, the United States granted a license to an American company to provide technical data for the construction and operation of a steel mill in Rumania. More recently, the United States has allegedly given favorable consideration to Rumania's request to purchase a synthetic rubber plant. Such developments prepared the way for the lengthy bilateral negotiations conducted

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from May 18 to June 1, 1964 which resulted in an agreement to restore economic and diplomatic relations between Washington and Bucharest.

According to the communiqué issued after these meetings, the United States agreed to set up a licensing procedure "under which most commodities may be exported to Rumania without the necessity for individual export licenses." The United States also acceded to Rumania's request that she be permitted to buy industrial plants, possibly including a nuclear reactor, and equipment for oil refineries, the petrochemical industry and steel mills. The Export-Import Bank is to extend credits to Rumania. Offices to promote trade are to be established in each country.

The Rumanian delegation followed up its talks with U.S. officials with an inspection tour of U.S. industries. Included in its itinerary was an atomic electric power plant in Massachusetts. According to Rumanian sources, the delegation was satisfied with the amount of technical information which this visit yielded. Undoubtedly, other such tours will produce data for which the Rumanians will have paid little or nothing.

Not too long ago Khrushchev was boasting that the Soviet bloc would overtake the West economically by the end of this decade. More recently he has fallen silent on this topic. Instead, he has expounded eloquently the mutual advantages to be derived from East-West trade. The Soviet economy appears to have hit obstacles to greater productivity in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. The Soviets have found themselves hard-pressed to extend aid to other communist countries while continuing their own programs of expansion. Both the Soviets and satellites need capital goods and industrial know-how, available only in the West. The supply of plants and equipment, together with technical advisers, will enable East European countries to develop at a faster rate than they otherwise could. Yet it appears unlikely that the inflow of capitalist goods will cause the communist leaders in Bucharest to change their ideological outlook. Instead, they may point to whatever gains they achieve with Western aid as proof of the worth of the communist system.

The U.S.-Rumanian communiqué explicitly stated that commodities purchased from the United States may not be re-exported by Rumania, but the agreement said nothing about the re-export of the knowledge, the blueprints and the skills that could find their way to the Soviet Union and other communist countries. In July, the Chinese and the Rumanians signed a protocol on trade expansion. Bucharest agreed to exchange scientific information on oil, chemical and agricultural production with the Chinese communists. It is difficult to see how the Rumanians will resist the temptation to share their newly gained knowledge with Peking.

Conceivably, there are positive advantages to be gained by the

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United States in fostering closer relations with Rumania and, for that matter, with other bloc countries. Undoubtedly, Rumania desired this agreement more than did the United States, and might have paid a considerable price for it. More recently, the Rumanian government announced that amnesty would be granted to all political prisoners by the end of this year. Although the Western press has reported a gradual relaxation of terror, the internal policies of the Rumanian communist regime are still more oppressive than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

After almost twenty years the communist regime in Rumania now feels secure enough to alter its internal policies without undue risk. Apparently, it need no longer fear insurrection, particularly since its people no longer look to the West for the overthrow of their masters. Undoubtedly Gheorghiu-Dej's emphasis on nationalism within the bloc has won him, as well as the Rumanian Communist Party, a measure of popularity in his own country.

Similarly, the Soviet Union apparently is sufficiently certain of the fealty of the Rumanian government to acquiesce in Bucharest's demands for economic development. The Soviets can forbear Rumania's self-willed gestures precisely because they do not threaten communist power. The Soviets need not cavil at Rumania's closer commercial ties with the West since economic improvement may strengthen the hold of Rumania's communist party and, for good measure, relieve the Soviets from furnishing Rumania with products in short supply in Russia.

Revolution in Brazil

In the fall of 1961 many, if not most, responsible Brazilians felt that Vice President João Goulart was unacceptable as a successor to Janio Quadros, who resigned the presidency in August of that year. Goulart's efforts to enhance his political position by attracting the support of the communists, as well as his interest in social revolution rather than social reforms, frightened democratically-oriented Brazilians. Before he took office, the Brazilian National Congress, under the pressure of moderate factions, passed a series of laws designed to limit his power. During his tenure of nearly three years, Goulart failed to resolve any of the basic problems confronting Brazil, and instead brought Latin America's largest country to the brink of economic disaster.

Inflation, by no means novel to Brazil, raged almost beyond control. The cost of living rose 40 per cent in 1961, another 50 per cent in 1962, and nearly 80 per cent in 1963. The rate of growth of the GNP fell to 2½ per cent in 1963 and thus did not keep pace with the rate of Brazil's population increase. Gold and foreign exchange holdings declined rapidly. Governments—state and federal—placed restrictions on the remittance of profits to foreign investors, arbitrarily decreed wage increases, and expropriated foreign property. The value of the Brazilian monetary

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unit, the *cruzeiro,* had fallen to nearly 2,000 per dollar by 1964.

Politics, not economics, led to Goulart's downfall. From its inception the Goulart Administration attempted to strengthen the position of the far left in Brazil. Communists and communist sympathizers received cabinet and civil service appointments. Early in 1964 Goulart requested the National Congress to repeal the constitutional ban preventing him from serving another term as president, to legalize the communist party, and to drop literacy requirements for voting. He also proposed that oil refineries as well as large estates be nationalized. He supported his demands with threats to dismiss the National Congress and rule by means of presidential decree.

This reach for dictatorial power precipitated the coup which deposed Goulart. During the first week in April most army commanders and state governors joined to oust the president. In a week of conflict, Goulart's leftist coalition disintegrated. A general strike led by unions under communist control failed completely. In Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and other cities the people swarmed into the streets, not to block Goulart's ouster, but to rejoice at his downfall. The president and his wife slipped across the border into exile in Uruguay.

Following Goulart's departure, Congress chose Ranieri Mazzilli as temporary chief executive and then, in accordance with the terms of the Brazilian constitution of 1946, elected General Humberto Castelo Branco as interim president to guide the nation through the transition period until a new president can be chosen in national elections. The selection of a general as interim president, together with the presence of military officers in the Branco Government and restrictions upon the political activities of several thousand former Brazilian office holders, including a score of Congressmen and former President Juscelino Kubitschek, has prompted some observers to view the revolution as a typical Latin American military coup.

During the final months of his tenure, President Goulart had taken a series of actions which led large numbers of civilians to oppose his administration. Business leaders in Rio and São Paulo supplied the organizational core for anti-Goulart activity which culminated in a series of large-scale demonstrations against the leftward swing in Brazil. In response, the government used public funds to stage a mass meeting in support of Goulart.

In this tense situation it was the civilian opponents of Goulart who called upon the military to defend the constitution. Governor Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais State touched off the coup by declaring military forces within his state in open revolt against Goulart. The next day the governor of São Paulo State joined him and placed his forces under the Commander of the Second Army, who marched on Rio. Within a few days the Goulart regime had been overthrown with scarcely any fighting.

The revolution has provided Bra-

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zil with an opportunity to resume the progress which was interrupted in the early sixties. Brazil, with half the land area of Latin America, common borders with every South American nation but two, and more than a third of the people of the Western Hemisphere outside the United States, holds a pivotal position in inter-American affairs. Castelo Branco gave indications soon after assuming office that he would bring inflation under control, the *sine qua non* for economic growth in Brazil. The Goulart-sponsored law restricting the remittance of earnings by foreign investors will probably be allowed to lapse, or at least will be substantially amended. Moreover, the Castelo Branco Administration has announced that it is prepared to punish tax evasion, a chronic cause of budgetary deficits and inflationary financing.

The new government has undertaken to free the labor movement from communist influence. In return for communist support, President Goulart had permitted the communists to entrench themselves in key unions to the extent that the entire labor movement was placed in jeopardy. The hemisphere regional organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) considered the situation so serious that it supported the rebellion against Goulart. The Branco Castelo Government has now placed anti-communist leaders in those trade unions which in Goulart's time had fallen under communist domination.

Brazil's new government quickly began to reverse the pro-communist drift of foreign policy under President Goulart. In May, Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and condemned the Castro regime for interfering in the internal affairs of Brazil, and in July Brazil supported sanctions imposed by the OAS upon Cuba. This reduced to four (reduced in September to one: Mexico) the number of Latin American nations which still maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba, with only Mexico City linked directly by air service to Havana. The end of diplomatic relations with Brazil may severely hamper Havana's subversive efforts in South America.

Thus by mid-1964, Brazil appeared to have come full circle: Having been in imminent danger of becoming, in the heartland of Latin America, infiltrated, if not dominated, by the communists, Brazil now supports collective hemispheric action to thwart communist initiatives in the Americas.

Disunity and Conflict in the Congo

In the chaos which followed the attainment of independence by the Congo on June 30, 1960, the United Nations undertook the difficult task of restoring order while also attempting to prevent famine and disease and to restore transportation and social services. In pursuance of two UN resolutions approved in 1961, calling for the unification of the Congo under the central government in Leopoldville, the organization expended $381,505,000 in support of its police

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force and peace-keeping operations and another $433,050,015 on the civilian program. On June 30, 1964, the last contingent of UN troops left the Congo. To what extent has this most expensive UN operation contributed to the restoration of order in that troubled land and what are the problems which now confront the central Congolese government, as well as the United States and its allies?

In their only major display of armed strength, UN forces succeeded in January 1963 in crushing the secessionist movement of the pro-Western Katanga leaders. However, new secessionist revolts, largely inspired by international communism and timed to coincide with the departure of UN forces, have erupted in several provinces. To date, the central government has not been able to put down these movements. Secretary-General U Thant, in his report to the UN Security Council on June 30, observed that "fatal division and conflict" were features of the Congo's political structure. He attributed the country's main difficulties to "the absence of a genuine and sufficiently widespread sense of national identity among the various groups composing the population. . . ." The Secretary-General concluded that the future of the nation would depend on (1) the achievement of national reconciliation among the political leaders, and (2) the training and reorganization of the army.

In an effort to attain the first objective, President Kasavubu recalled Moise Tshombe from exile to become premier in a transitional government which will hold power until elections can be held nine months after the new constitution takes effect. Thus far, Tshombe appears to have had little success in his attempt to establish a "government of reconciliation." Antoine Gizenga, a leading left-wing politician and the political heir to Patrice Lumumba, has expressed his willingness to support the Tshombe Government. Yet Gizenga probably also realizes that this cooperation may contribute to his alienation from the Babunda tribe (involved in the Kwili revolt) and cut him off from his base of political support. It would be risky to assume that Tshombe and Gizenga, long-time political rivals with conflicting ideological orientations, will be able to cooperate in creating a viable political structure for the Congo.

The problem of reconciling diverse interests is further exacerbated by the existence of the National Liberation Committee (NLC), a communist-backed group, which has supported and guided the revolts in the provinces. Tshombe's attempt to bring this group into the Cabinet may not prove successful. Christophe Gbenye, the NLC leader in the Congo (Brazzaville), repudiated Andre Lubaya, an NLC member, when the latter joined Tshombe's Cabinet as Minister of Health. The fact that the Committee is based in two countries, Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi, makes it even more unlikely that Lubaya will be able to speak authoritatively for

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the NLC. Conceivably, Tshombe might be able to exploit the territorial division of leadership in the NLC to his own political advantage. Much will depend upon the support which the Chinese communists are prepared to give to the NLC rebels.

Although an editorial in *Jen-min Jih Pao*, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, denied that Peking was supplying weapons to rebel groups in tropical Africa, it nonetheless expressed sympathy for their cause. The Chinese communists have compared the Congo situation to that in Vietnam. It is in their interest to promote separatist movements and anarchic conditions in order to oust the West from the African continent and destroy efforts to build democratic practices in these new nations. Appeals to racism provide the Chinese communists with a ready tool for exploitation of African frustrations and grievances. Should they prove capable of exploiting tribal differences in the Congo, the prospects are dim for a settlement between the rebel groups and the central government. At present, Tshombe's best means of controlling the divisive tendencies within his transitional government appears to lie in concentrating key posts in his hands and those of a few trusted advisers. Thus he has taken charge of four key posts: the Premiership, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Information and Economic Coordinator.

While Premier Tshombe has been preoccupied with the consolidation of his power in the capital, the rebel groups have continued to gain ground in the provinces. Of these, the revolt in Kivu represents perhaps the most serious immediate threat. Bands under the leadership of Malandura-Moussat, a former provincial deputy and follower of the late Premier Lumumba, have succeeded in gaining control of an important crossing into Burundi. This route will make it easier for the Chinese to move arms and supplies into the province from Bujumbara, where the head of the NLC, Gaston Soumialot, has his headquarters. Thus far, the Congolese Army under General Joseph Mobutu has been unable to put down these rebel movements. Although the army now has more than 300 trained officers, they are inexperienced in combat; the rank and file remain undisciplined and torn by tribal loyalties. Perhaps the best hope for strengthening the central government forces lies in obtaining the assistance of white mercenaries, a step the Tshombe Government took in August.

The UN must accept at least part of the responsibility for the Congolese government's inability to control its territory. Some UN members had called for the complete disbandment of the Congolese Army while others felt its power should be greatly restricted. Thus once the removal of the UN force had created a partial vacuum, the central government was unable to maintain order. During the years of UN intervention, the Congolese Army had not been built into a cohesive force, capable of effectively serving the central govern-

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ment. In order to remedy this situation President Kasavubu has entered into agreements with Belgium to train Congolese troops. In the meanwhile, however, the rebels will probably continue to consolidate their control over the eastern border areas, creating a new "Yenan" in the strategic heart of Africa.

Political instability in the Congo is likely to present the United States with difficult policy choices. The return of Tshombe and his elevation to power presents the Administration with the embarrassing prospect of dealing with a leader it helped to depose. The original U.S. objective, namely to strengthen the central Congolese government, has not been achieved. If the United States still intends to promote this objective, it will have to cooperate with Tshombe; it may have to help him put down the revolts in the provinces and avert its eyes from the recruitment of that mercenary force which, only two years ago, it found so distasteful in Katanga. Should central control break down, the possibility of the leftist groups gaining predominance in the government will increase.

Problems which confronted the Congo in 1960, when the United Nations intervened, remain for the most part unresolved. The resolutions on the Congo passed by the United Nations continue in effect. Another UN force could be dispatched there, yet it seems unlikely that the UN would again undertake such an operation. Not only did the financial burden of the operation seriously threaten its structure and stability, but its inability to bring about a solution satisfactory to all parties has created disillusionment about the impartiality of the international organization as an enforcer of law and order.

In June the Administration expressed embarrassment about the actions of a group of U.S. civilians who, while under contract to the Congolese government to train pilots to fly U.S.-supplied T-28's, conducted sorties against rebel forces. In the prevailing unstable situation, the Administration seems unwilling to supply more military equipment to the central government for fear that it might be charged with intervention or that the equipment might ultimately fall into the hands of a leftist regime. At the same time, if the United States does not now commit itself to support the present leaders in Leopoldville, its inaction might hasten the very results it fears. Moreover, the economic progress of the Congo depends upon the creation of conditions of political stability. U.S. aid to the Congo during fiscal 1962-63 totaled $43.3 million in development grants, together with $39.4 million through the UN. This assistance should be continued, if not increased.

There have been a few hopeful economic trends in the Congo. On March 20, 1964, the Congo and Belgium reached an agreement to settle their financial dispute on the disposition of the Leopoldville pre-independence debt. In November 1963, the Congo initiated monetary reforms. At the same time, the Belgian government extended a $20 million credit for the purchase of

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consumer goods and capital equipment. But such measures will have been to little avail if the central government is unable to quell leftist uprisings and to disperse insurgency forces.

A majority of African leaders look with disfavor upon the return of the pro-Western Tshombe to power. In particular, Holden Roberto, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (NFLA), has expressed fear that Tshombe will prevent Angolan rebels from using the military base at Kinkouzou as a staging point for guerrilla operations in Angola. In the light of the friendship which reportedly exists between the former Katangese president and Portuguese Premier Salazar, such a fear appears reasonable. In fact, Tshombe's attitude toward the Angolan rebels may have contributed to his decision not to attend the conference of the heads-of-state of the OAU in Cairo in July. Apparently, he announced this decision after learning that Angola would be one of the main topics of discussion. The Congo remains dependent upon rail links which carry Congolese goods across Angola for shipment to the outside world.

Tshombe and the Congo face difficult problems in the next few months. Confronted with internal dissension and the possibility of external opposition from other African leaders, Tshombe must seek to extend the writ of the central government over the entire country and to obtain foreign support for its pressing needs. The United States and West European powers recognize that the establishment of a communist or a pro-communist regime in the Congo would immediately endanger several neighboring African states, while providing the communists with a base for other "wars of liberation." It is therefore the task of the West to assist the Congo in the maintenance of its independence.

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THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND WESTERN STRATEGY*

by F. O. Miksche

THE "Byzantine" discussion on nuclear strategy has spawned a host of half-truths and downright fallacies. More often than not, the discussants repeat over and over again what has already been said many times before. Easy and uncomplicated problems are made to appear difficult and complex. It is as if strategy were a game of chess played according to rules made up by two academics deeply averse to the unsettling intrusion of the unexpected. Thus we are faced with a so-called "science" based on unrealistic formulae and tenuous hypotheses whose validity cannot be demonstrated.

This intellectual game, an exercise in military alchemy, does not consist in making judgments based on the true substance of things but takes at face value the statements of dilettantes which are then publicized by the press and other communication media. To this publicity, the interests of "Big Business" are by no means averse. We can hardly be surprised, therefore, that those who are not taken in by these "modern Clausewitzes" are criticized as being "unable to understand the spirit of the age." It has even been suggested that, because of the doubts which they voice, these "old fogies" are helping to undermine the foundation of Western security, namely, the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. It remains for the modernists to explain how, by threatening to commit suicide, one can credibly deter one's foe from doing his worst.

In order to understand the real problem of nuclear weapons, it would be better to study the psychology of "homo technicus" than to be carried away by the intricacies of nuclear technology. The most striking example of "homo technicus" which we have before us is undoubtedly the American. In the first place, so-called "nuclear" strategy is a product of his imagination. It is a product of American pragmatism. This pragmatism is symbolized by an

*The first four articles in this issue present widely divergent points of view on various aspects of the debate in the West concerning military strategy and force postures.

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excessive faith in technical solutions, by a passion for the new as an end in itself, and by an enthusiasm for spectacular, record-breaking exploits. Now we should bear in mind that prosperity and technical progress are closely entwined. The perfecting of new weapons systems encourages technical advances in many other fields. Hence nuclear war is viewed as a special, a privileged, kind of war. One has to be affluent to prepare it. But an affluent nation prefers to enjoy its prosperity, content to follow events rather than determine them by political initiative. This is the road taken by governments which recoil from tapping the sources of national energy. Thus those who believe they can safeguard their own vital interests by a passive posture clutch the illusory hope of safety through nuclear strategy—and studiously ignore changes taking place in the world around us.

The puritan ethic is an exacting and high-minded ethic. Perhaps it is because of its very high-mindedness that it finds distasteful the ambiguous lessons of history. To many Americans, military power represents a means of deterrence against a would-be aggressor rather than an indispensable instrument of policy. Thus we arrive at a psychological explanation for the theory of massive retaliation: Aggression is a crime, and all crimes must be punished. Yet most wars are clashes over different conceptions of right. The historian knows no "just wars." He only knows of wars in which one country or the other, for right or wrong reasons, fights for what it holds to be its own right. How could leaders ask their peoples to fight if they were not convinced of the righteousness of their cause? Nuclear strategy is not only a technical phenomenon but also the expression of complex psychological forces.

The Americans, on the one hand, claim that they will never use their nuclear potential in a preventive way; the Soviets are careful not to provoke the Americans into using these final, all-too-powerful weapons. If this is the case, how can a nuclear war break out? On the face of it, the stalemate cannot be broken. Yet the danger of nuclear war is greater than one might think, for we no longer dare to suppress small conflicts in their germinal stage. Even to suggest this *modus operandi* risks the charge of being a "war criminal." For a long time, the West has pursued ineffectual policies for handling crises. It has mustered neither the strength nor the resolve to enforce realistic solutions. Compromises, which satisfy no one, are like so many smoking volcanoes ready to erupt.

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Is it not senseless, in order to attain short-range goals, to consent to concessions which, in effect, mortgage our future? There is an unbridgeable gap between yielding important positions and ensuring real peace. It is complacent pacifism which threatens to unleash the greatest bloodbath in history. The danger exists that one day the United States, enmeshed in its own contradictory and passive policies, will try to free itself from its entrapment by a nuclear attack. This danger is very real, notwithstanding the fact that so suicidal a strategy would do nothing to resolve the problems relating to nuclear conflict.

Technique and Form

"Homo technicus," with his accelerated pace of life and his excessive tendency to reason schematically, finds little time to ponder the really important problems of the day, e.g., the long-term evolution of human society or the true nature of the threats to it. While we should certainly do all we can to discover the secrets of the universe and to harness technology to social improvement, should we not also ask ourselves whether technical advances made in this field can be applied at all to enhancing our military security? For example, is it reasonable to think that all "strategy" will henceforth be decided in space and that the struggle on our planet is purely "tactical?" Can we really conceive of defending ourselves against aggressions from some other celestial body used as a base for counterattack?

Enormous sums are being invested in whimsical projects to the detriment of realistic arms programs. In this way, we will risk losing our place in the sun without even having the consolation of one day conquering the moon. It is suggested that the new weapons systems by their very existence exert such deterrent force that they make war an impossibility and that their *raison d'être* must be sought precisely in their inhibition. Also in other ages, men have tried to make of war something that war cannot be. Some military theoreticians of the eighteenth century labored hard and fruitlessly at reducing the art of war to scientific formulas. The purpose of these conceits was to dissuade the enemy from engaging in battle simply by confronting him with a series of maneuvers. This exercise, which was injurious to no one and intellectually satisfying, anticipated computerized war gaming by 200 years. *Nihil sub solem novum.* A deterrent strategy is not so new an

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idea. But we should beware lest, as in former times, its elegant formulations simply beget a new failure.

It is certainly easier to launch rockets to the moon than to resolve the incomparably more complicated problems of our earthly existence. It will be neither a future sputnik nor a Mercury project which decides the fate of the West but events which will develop independently of technical exploits. Space spectaculars, though admirable in themselves, cannot overcome or solve the problems of war and peace. Certainly one should not underestimate the role of technical development in our age. Yet at the same time one should question whether the evolution of technology should be allowed to dominate the science of war and politics to the degree that it actually does. We are witnessing a process of saturation in many technical fields. Some armaments lose their usefulness because of their huge destructive power, the danger of retaliation that they might provoke, or because of the tremendous expense which they entail.

"De quoi s'agit-il?" Marshal Foch used to ask himself when confronted with a problem. Universal chaos, a product of our headlong technological progress veiled by ideological confusion, makes for a world in which quite a few problems threaten to become insoluble. We brush aside lightly things learned by experience only to rush headlong toward the unknown, the new. The soldier tries to integrate into his calculations the most atrocious means of destruction that have ever existed, without stopping to consider that the inevitable retaliation unleashed by their use will cancel out his initial success. The very technical perfection of the military system makes it useless as a means of enforcing policy.

It is as if technological progress were running in advance of intellectual development, and technical man, having lost his sense of perspective, were showing himself to be incapable of assimilating new concepts of time and space—even though he himself created these concepts. Caught in the toils of his own devising, he fancies that he can disregard the eternal laws which govern the existence of mankind. We cannot turn the clock back. But we can give technology its proper place in the natural order of things instead of making it an end in itself. Man is still the limit of his undertakings—a simple truth discerned by Protagoras more than 2000 years ago.

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The Nature of War

"The first, the greatest and the most decisive of the acts of judgment of a statesman or a military leader is to recognize war for what it is, and not to take it or want to take it for what, by the nature of things, it cannot be." These words of Clausewitz are still, and with good reason, true today. Let us penetrate the lair of the atomic strategists to see whether their plans correspond to reality. Let us start with the extreme positions, namely the non-use of nuclear weapons no matter the issue, as suggested by Bertrand Russell's aphorism, "Better Red than dead," and the inevitable use of nuclear weapons simply because they exist. For all practical purposes, there is no difference between them: both land us in a dead-end alley. Despite all technological progress, war remains a conflict of interests, i.e., a struggle for existence. Strategy is bereft of all sense when the winning of the war can no longer be attained without the risk of self-destruction. Since all strategic plans are necessarily based on the calculation of the chances for success, a nuclear war would no longer be a war but simply a technological contest, devoid of political significance—a contest, moreover, which the West, because of its more vulnerable social and psychological structure, must fear more than the East. Granted that war is the continuation of policy by other means, weapons whose use is devoid of political sense can no longer be considered as instruments of war from a military or a political point of view.[1]

Thus the question is simply this: given the enormous power of nuclear weapons, is a nuclear strategy really conceivable? It is not only the state of technology that determines the character of war; the circumstances in which conflict arises, the interests at stake, the ends pursued, the strategic and economic significance of the areas where political tension has been generated, are at least as important.

Erroneous military calculations do not transform themselves miraculously into correct political decisions. We are told that nuclear weapons are only political weapons. It is not clear what this statement precisely means. Confronted by an adversary likewise possessing nuclear weaponry, it is not very meaningful to declare that a nuclear exchange is inevitable, even in the

[1]Before the last war the Great Powers possessed gas for military use, as well as means of protection against gas attack. Neither side had recourse to this form of war because it could not see in it any practical advantage.

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event of aggression by conventional forces. This would be the same as saying: "If you attack me, we will both be blown up!" On the other hand, it is equally illusory to maintain that nuclear threats necessarily will overawe small countries which do not possess nuclear weapons. If this were the case we would be left with the need to explain why, in every part of the world, the influence of the West has been declining in an alarming manner; and why ever more serious crises have arisen in such places as Algeria, Cuba, South Vietnam, Panama and Cyprus. The local leaders do not seem to have been unduly impressed by the existence of nuclear weapons. As the events of the last few years have shown, the Great Powers back down in the face of the unforeseeable chain reaction which the use of their nuclear weapons would provoke—and they back down even in situations in which they need not fear direct nuclear retaliation.

Because of the saturation potential inherent in nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy eludes precise definition. As military systems of greater and greater technical perfection are developed, the fact that policy and not technology is the basis of all strategy is often forgotten. This is not the first time in history that man has launched himself upon a course contrary to the natural order of things. Now he has created a nuclear *fait accompli*. At this juncture, this Frankenstein must be taken seriously because distorted imagination has invested it with, so to speak, a life of its own. If, one day, despite all efforts to the contrary, a nuclear war should break out, our determinist thinkers would argue that the ensuing calamities were the result of inevitable evolution and not of bad judgment or faulty reasoning.

From a logical point of view, nuclear weapons are not really weapons. They are weapons neither in a military sense nor in a political one. Certainly they "work." They are fashionable and thus "necessary." They have acquired symbolic value which confers a certain prestige—that of being admitted to membership in the "Atomic Club" and counted among the "Greats." Would it, therefore, be more correct to speak not of a nuclear strategy but of a nuclear "psychosis" to which other states, whether they like it or not, must adapt themselves?

The Inconsistencies of the Nuclear "Clausewitzes"

The policy of the Atlantic Alliance is bogged down in nuclear immobility. A good many of the panaceas suggested by the nuclear

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"Clausewitzes" are, in effect, attempts to break out of this deadlock. But these nuclear oracles will fail if they do not rid themselves of a fair number of errors which afflict their thought. This is not an easy task, for prestige and powerful business interests are at stake.

As long as nuclear weapons remained in the possession of one power, they constituted the most dangerous offensive weapons of all time. The situation changed when the United States lost its monopoly. Since then, nuclear weapons have ceased to be offensive weapons. The threat of inevitable retaliation precludes their defensive use, except when one is attacked with them first. This being the case, it is difficult to conjure up a political situation in which one power could be driven to unleash an action which, at best, would win it a Pyrrhic victory. What interest could the Soviets have in attacking Washington, knowing that they risked, two hours later, the total destruction of Moscow? This is not to say that nuclear weapons are useless: their possession furnishes the one and only effective defense against nuclear attack, for only he who possesses nuclear weapons can neutralize the adversary's arsenal. Thus their deterrent force, and hence their military importance, rests solely in the power to discourage the adversary from using his own nuclear weapons. However, this power alone is not great enough to nourish an active foreign policy.

Instead of drawing the logical conclusions from this state of affairs, which has already lasted more than ten years, the West has continued to base its strategic thinking on nuclear means. In the hope of breaking the nuclear stalemate, the miniaturization of nuclear charges has been undertaken, plunging us still deeper into the nuclear paralysis. It is unrealistic to divide the use of nuclear weapons into two spheres, one called tactical and the other strategic, for these two areas are, in essence, inseparable. While a fairly sharp line can be drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons, in a nuclear spectrum the colors pass from one to another without any real transitional stage. The idea of being able to limit nuclear war by using only small nuclear charges evokes the image of a desperate man trying to save himself from a burning building by jumping from the tenth rather than from the twelfth floor; in either case, the risk is practically the same.

Yet the nuclear "Clausewitzes" seek to remedy this dismal situation by the use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons rather than

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of conventional forces. They assert that the threat of escalation, i.e., the gradual employment of ever more destructive nuclear warheads, can force the enemy into negotiating for a cease-fire while the hostilities continue. But it is one of the salient features of war that the combatants endeavor to improve their respective negotiating positions by bringing to bear increasingly more powerful military means. In a nuclear war, this tendency must inevitably trigger the very chain reaction that the advocates of tactical nuclear weapons propose to avoid. In addition, how likely is it that the victim of a first strike by low-yield projectiles will believe that he will *not* be attacked by more powerful nuclear weapons, this ruse having always been one of the methods of waging war? A graduated game such as this further presupposes that the powers involved have in their possession at all times and places the full range of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that even the leading nuclear powers can ever meet this condition.

The strategies of "counterforce" and "countercity" are two notions no less naïve than tactical nuclear war. The first sanctions the removal of the enemy's aggressive capacity by the destruction of his nuclear forces; the second aims at bringing the enemy to his knees by the annihilation of his large cities and industrial centers. Small nuclear powers may be tempted into "countercity" strategy, for they must unleash whatever nuclear weapons they possess against cities; a counterforce strategy, calling only for attack on the enemy's airfields and launching sites, entails possession of a quantity of nuclear weapons so great that only a great power can afford it. If "countercity" seems excessively inhumane, "counterforce" appears excessively implausible. How can one be sure that some of the bombs and missiles that must be launched against military targets will not fall on nonmilitary installations? And how is an enemy to identify this "accident" as being part of a counterforce strategy rather than the prelude to a "countercity" attack which calls for "countercity" retaliation?

In contrast to all other arms, nuclear weapons are absolute because of the following reasons: (1) the use of the smallest nuclear weapon risks unleashing a chain reaction that could not be stopped; (2) the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons is much greater than is necessary for purely military purposes; and (3) there cannot be, either now or in the near future, any effective protection against the disastrous effects of nuclear retaliation.

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There is no sure defense either against planes (flying at 3 Mach per hour) or against missiles. Anti-missile defense, even were it technically feasible, would require a diversity of systems of prohibitive economic cost. It follows that no nuclear power, not even the strongest one, can be certain of its ability to annihilate, by a surprise attack, all the retaliatory weapons of an enemy even when the latter possesses a relatively weak nuclear arsenal. In all likelihood, those nuclear weapons which were left undestroyed by the first strike would be sufficient to inflict severe damage upon the aggressor. If we accept the argument that a defense against nuclear weapons is not possible and that, on the other hand, these weapons, by reason of their destructive power, are absolute, it is not possible to speak of the nuclear superiority of one side or the other. Thus it is unnecessary to possess as many or as effective nuclear weapons as the other side in order to count among the nuclear powers.

There is no such thing as large or small nuclear powers; there is only nuclear power pure and simple, starting from a minimal threshold which is not easy to determine and which varies depending on the geographic position of the countries under consideration. The ability to destroy twenty-five of the most important enemy targets should be enough to dangle a sword of Damocles over the enemy and to neutralize his nuclear potential. The use of nuclear weapons, whether large or small, elevates neither the art of war nor that of policy, but signifies the negation of all the rules of classic strategy. Consequently it is sheer nonsense to argue about "escalation" and about "counterforce" and "counter-city" strategies. People who advance these notions either are taken in by their own pernicious abstractions or take other people to be imbeciles.

Comparison Between Strategic Conceptions of East and West

For both material and psychological reasons, nuclear war is "one and indivisible." Certainly, if the USSR maintains colossal armaments it is not because she fears being attacked by a few Western divisions. The difference between the military thought of the East and that of the West is striking. The communist powers have adapted their strategy to a changing world situation; the West, primarily relying on technological progress in the weapons field, has built a rigid system of defense which does not square with

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the requirements of a flexible policy. In the East, nuclear weapons constitute only a cover for conventional forces. They do not form the principal military instrument. The reason for the existence of 140 Soviet divisions is to ensure the *offensive* mobility of communist policy and permit the communists to exert military pressure in a variety of situations. Thus Moscow has at its disposal a wide range of action. Western strategy is based on arms which are too powerful and on armies which are not powerful enough, while the East has both large bombs and large battalions. To use a metaphor, whereas the Western powers can only play the bass notes on the keyboard, the Soviets enjoy the full range of both high and low notes, with the possibility of playing chords. Strategy has always been the art of harmonizing the action of forces and matériel in time and space. The West has lost this art. Western defense suffers from the defect of having no other choice than recourse to measures which are, in themselves, far too extreme.

This is an absurd situation, for the Atlantic Alliance, though it cannot deploy more than twenty-four divisions, i.e., four divisions less than Poland and Czechoslovakia combined, in the defense of Central Europe, is richer in material goods and population than the Eastern bloc countries and maintains 1,000,000 more soldiers under arms than the USSR with its European satellites. The West has made the serious mistake of letting itself be diverted by technological progress from heeding objective political factors and the military thinking of the probable adversary. Armed for a kind of war which is improbable, it neglects its defenses against actual and dangerous threats. The East, militarily more flexible, is incomparably more active on a political level and enjoys the advantage of having held the political initiative for many years. Without the reorganization of Atlantic strategy, every effort to hold our own *politically* against so adroit an adversary will be doomed to failure.

Furthermore, Moscow does not talk simply of "coexistence" based upon the political and social status quo, but of "competitive" coexistence enlivened by a revolutionary struggle in many parts of the world. It is hard to see how the West can protect itself against such tactics with nuclear weapons. Our "hypermodern" and immensely costly weapons systems do not vouchsafe us the security we so greatly desire.

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NATO's Crisis

In 1952, the NATO powers met at Lisbon. They agreed to field forty-three active divisions and fifty reserve divisions. They did not live up to this undertaking. But is it surprising that the West European governments have been reluctant to spend money for the production of conventional arms which have so often been declared "out of style?" If our defenses are inadequate and if we naïvely hope that the United States will protect us while exposing itself to the risk of nuclear destruction, then we can only say that we, the Europeans, are not entirely to blame. Ever since 1956, when the United States found itself within range of Soviet rockets, the thesis "There is no alternative to peace" has been gaining ground in America. The Americans told us that NATO's military power would exercise political pressure upon the Soviets, forcing them to withdraw from Central Europe. Of late, American voices calling for such a dynamic use of NATO power have fallen silent. Instead, we hear of "neutral," "demilitarized" or "denuclearized" zones, and of a "nonaggression pact" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. These formulas have one common denominator: the West, wearied of the Cold War and failing in its efforts to provide an effective military counterweight to the East, is tempted to insure its defense by political concessions. Such a policy can lead only to one result, namely, the recognition of the status quo—that is, the perpetuation of the very condition which renders the West's situation so precarious and which argued for the creation of the Atlantic Pact in the first place.

Certainly the problem of disarmament which the West now seeks to solve without having succeeded in *rearming* itself is closely linked to the problem of a European political settlement. How are we to understand the thought processes of statesmen who consider armament an obstacle to peaceful agreements? They are putting the cart before the horse: the arms race is the effect, and not the cause, of political rivalry. In order to arrive at lasting agreements on disarmament we must first straighten out our political differences with the Soviets. This we cannot do while our diplomacy remains unsupported by adequate military instruments. As long as this preliminary condition to any satisfactory agreement has not been met, present and very real difficulties not only will perpetuate themselves but will grow worse.

Even supposing that the antagonism between East and West

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could be overcome, which seems unlikely in the near future, dark clouds are gathering over Asia and Africa. Were a great storm to break over these continents, what would be the position of the West if it had been talked into dismantling its present and far from complete military defenses? Would it be possible to persuade Western peoples to rearm themselves when the hopes they now pin on disarmament are shown to have been chimerical? On the other hand, can the Soviets, faced with the problem of China, seriously consider reducing their military potential?

In spite of these facts the West, tired of the Cold War, has already gone far toward disarming itself psychologically. Loath to meet the sacrifices which would be needed to extricate NATO from its political and military dilemma, the West seeks to sidestep this exacting task by negotiating a *modus vivendi* with communism. Having failed to put our own house in order, we rejoice at the political and economic difficulties of the communist bloc and the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking. All will be well with the world when the Soviets have developed a middle class and have settled down to bourgeois prosperity. But this easy answer to our problem—a problem that we ought to solve ourselves—may be but the figment of our wishful dreams.

In 1854 Karl Marx wrote in the *New York Tribune:* "The policy of St. Petersburg, with its tradition of trickery, hoodwinks the European courts." The Soviets are both Marxists and Russians; they are also masters at chess. Their strength resides in an innate cunning and a talent for conspiracy which baffle Western diplomacy, burdened by overly theoretical concepts. American statesmen in particular, vaunting themselves to be practical men, believe they can deal with problems of foreign policy as if they were those of a business deal writ large. This is a dangerous illusion, for the Soviets do not propose to conclude a deal for a global settlement but to impose their control upon the earth, deal or no deal. Strangely enough, hand in hand with this confidence in a reasonable give-and-take arrangement with the Soviets goes a penchant for overestimating the power of the Soviet Union which owes its present eminence largely to the divisions within the democratic world. Notwithstanding some undoubtedly admirable programs for economic improvement, the USSR is still today an underdeveloped country,

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No Valid Strategy Without Integration

Nuclear paralysis must inevitably result in the undermining of Atlantic solidarity, for it has become unlikely that a nuclear power would risk exposing itself to disastrous retaliation in the defense of nonnuclear states. In the last analysis, the nuclear powers will decide which country is to be defended or which is to be abandoned to his enemy. Therefore countries which refuse to submit to the unforeseeable verdict of today's nuclear powers cannot relinquish their own autonomous military establishments. These military forces must include a certain number of nuclear weapons. No one can predict what is going to happen ten years hence in a world in such turmoil as ours. A nuclear arsenal cannot be had for the asking. It is no wonder that those who want to safeguard themselves against unpleasant surprises have launched long-range, expensive undertakings rather than waiting for someone else or for the beneficial workings of history to rescue them in the hour of national need.

France is doing exactly that. Even were she to abandon her efforts, other states would not renounce theirs. In a few years' time, no industrial country will be able to do without nuclear energy and, as is the case in many other fields, it is not easy to distinguish between the peaceful and military applications of this new form of energy. Thus the extension of the Nuclear Club is inevitable. For the United States, the best course would be to accept, as soon as possible, the consequences of nuclear proliferation rather than obstinately persist in opposing a natural evolution.

Since it is unlikely that a nuclear power would expose itself to the risk of nuclear retaliation in the defense of a nonnuclear state, the creation of a joint European nuclear force would relieve the United States of obligations which one cannot reasonably expect her to honor. As long as the present situation persists, it is illusory to count on the unfailing solidarity of the Atlantic powers. But if the security of the West, based on the interdependence of Western Europe and North America, could be shared between them in such a way as to form two autonomous elements—Europe on one hand and America on the other—then the current rigid policies of the West would undoubtedly gain in flexibility. Such a transformation will appear still more urgent when the United States, faced with growing difficulties in Latin

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America and in the Pacific, will have no choice but to reduce its commitments in Europe.

On the other hand, a European nuclear power will be faced with problems as thorny as those which confront the United States. France's *force de dissuasion* is no exception to this rule. Governments possessing nuclear weapons and no others will see themselves inevitably in the position of a chess player who has lost his pawns. With his remaining pieces he cannot stalemate the adversary unless he is willing to risk losing his king. It is impossible to conduct grand strategy independently without being covered by the nuclear *ultima ratio*. Conversely, a flexible policy cannot be based exclusively on a pure nuclear strategy. Hence, as in the past, conventional forces of sufficient strength will still be indispensable in the future. At present, no European state is ready to field both conventional and nuclear forces. Despite her commanding geographical position, France, third in Western Europe industrially and fourth demographically, can never attain military autonomy by herself. France could pursue a "grand strategy" only if she possessed, aside from the *force de dissuasion*, a strong air force and navy, at least twelve full-strength army divisions, twelve reserve divisions, a territorial and civil defense organization and an expeditionary force for the overseas theater of operations.

Without these forces, what mission is to be assigned to the *force de dissuasion*? Who has to be dissuaded and dissuaded from doing what? Can one reasonably anticipate a political situation in which France could be provoked into launching her striking force except in case she were attacked first with nuclear weapons? A strategy which serves a political purpose entails a balanced military posture which, in Europe, can be created only by European integration. Without such integration, it is *forever* impossible, if only for financial reasons, to develop a meaningful European strategy. Since military integration presupposes integration at the political level, we should strive first of all, toward the creation of Europe as a great power—a Europe capable of arming itself with conventional as well as nuclear arms and thus capable of regaining its political freedom of action.

A Strategy for the West

Despite the West's economic miracles, the world today hardly presents a reassuring picture. We live amidst changes without precedent. For many problems, especially those posed by the

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population explosion in Asia and Africa, no satisfactory solution is in sight. Consequently, the revolutionary struggle is spreading simultaneously on four continents, giving rise to a situation previously unknown in history. To view the threat which confronts Western Europe only as that of a direct Soviet attack launched across the plains between the Baltic and the Alps leads to a grotesque simplification. Today the Near East and Africa constitute the geopolitically most dangerous storm-centers for Europe. What happens in these areas has a more or less direct bearing on all European peoples. It is as though the poisonous atmosphere of the Balkans, which prior to 1914 threatened all of Europe, now pervades these other regions of the globe. The evolution of the Arab world will determine the future not only of the Mediterranean region but also of Africa south of the Sahara. In the manner of the Cyprus crisis, tensions arising in these areas could well unleash more than one Sarajevo and thus set off dangerous world crises.

The dangers of a nuclear holocaust, terrible as they are, are not terrible enough to dam the passions which nourish world tensions. *The belief that the invention of nuclear weapons henceforth renders war impossible is as false as the belief that vital interests can be safeguarded by inaction.* The events of the last few years, in particular the West's irresponsible retreat from positions essential to its security, have furnished new proof for the validity of an old axiom: a foreign policy without military backing cannot attain its goals, for without adequate military forces one can neither negotiate from strength nor ensure that treaties be respected. Algeria and Cyprus signed agreements which were violated in a matter of a few years. *"Oderint dum metuant,"* said the Romans. (Let them hate me, provided they fear me!) Indelicately but succinctly, Lenin called those who do not understand this truth "idiots useful to the cause of communism."

Small fires stoked by small countries have often led to world conflagrations. A situation might well arise in which the West could not react except by an act of aggression to snuff out the danger of an eventual world conflict. Thus the West's pusillanimity in the face of insolent violation of solemn treaties, committed by small states, might land it in the worst of all dilemmas: to have one's hand forced when international legality is *not* on one's side.

Deep are the roots of many of today's problems. Since the time of Napoleon III, the "oriental question"—Russia's push toward the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles—has been the source

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of many diplomatic headaches. For more than a century, Czarist sabre-rattlers called for "protection of fellow members of the Orthodox faith" in the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey and the Holy Land. True to the historic pattern, the Soviets have sought to exploit the Cyprus crisis and to exacerbate tensions between Greece and Turkey, employing the Greek Orthodox Bishop Makarios and the communist-controlled Cypriot trade unions as convenient proxies. It is an ambiguous situation of this kind, and not a frontal attack in Central Europe, which confronts NATO with the most likely challenge. To meet it, nuclear weapons are of little use. Conventional forces, properly equipped and plentiful, are needed to cope with issues such as Cyprus today and, perhaps, Israel, Algeria, Iran and the Suez Canal tomorrow. It is clear that, in such confrontations, a Power capable of reinforcing its arguments at the negotiating table by a strategy which is sufficiently flexible to be both offensive and defensive, with or without atomic weapons, will have a decisive advantage over its adversary. To exploit an adversary's weakness to one's own advantage—this is the very essence of diplomacy.

A force posture which is militarily ineffectual is politically valueless. What would happen in a situation where, relying on nuclear strategy, we would decide to resist Soviet blackmail in Europe? Faced with the superior ground forces of the Eastern bloc, the NATO divisions would find themselves in a tight spot. If the invader is not confronted with a major obstacle—whether or not it is in the form of a continuous front—he will not be compelled to concentrate his forces for a breakthrough. What would happen if the Soviets pass over the Iron Curtain in two or more sectors on a wide front of several hundred kilometers, advancing in dispersed order and well echeloned in depth? Such a wide deployment of forces would not present either easy or worthwhile targets for nuclear weapons. Within a short period of time, battles would be raging between the Elbe and the Rhine. Crowds of refugees and millions of vehicles jamming the highways would create an uncontrollable situation. The ensuing confusion would inhibit the use of small nuclear weapons. Yet these are the trump card of Western defense, whereas the success of the adversary depends much less on recourse to nuclear weapons. Certainly NATO's divisions could, thanks to their miniaturized nuclear weapons, carve deep holes in the enemy's forces and could proceed to the merciless destruction of thousands of square miles of terrain. Yet it remains doubtful that they could stem the

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tide of invasion. The West's use of small nuclear weapons would provoke the Soviets into using theirs. They would find this decision comparatively easy to take, for they would be in enemy territory and among the refugees of a foreign country. Without any doubt the outcome of the campaign would be decided between the Elbe and the Rhine and, in all likelihood, the defenses of Western Europe would collapse like a pack of cards. It is a far-fetched assumption that, on the heels of such a disaster, it would be possible to wage guerrilla warfare in the French countryside in the best style of Mao Tse-tung, as suggested by certain French strategists.

Those who condemn large armies as obsolete and deem the number of divisions irrelevant to foreign policy are out of touch with reality. Do they really believe that it is possible to safeguard our interests by a simple act of passive nuclear deterrence while the world order is breaking up? The threat of a nuclear holocaust can be diminished only by the presence of conventional forces in sufficient number and their use, when necessary, under cover of a nuclear umbrella. As the need to have recourse to nuclear weapons diminishes, so increases the chance of limiting the enemy's political freedom of action.

Just as it is impossible to fight with nuclear weapons, so it is impossible to rely on them exclusively to ensure peace. Nuclear strategy is a rigid, a lifeless, strategy. He who bases his plans on it exposes himself to the full fury of the Cold War. The much vaunted theory of nuclear deterrence is an absurd theory, for (1) it signifies the renunciation of all active policy, and (2) it forsakes the initiative without which one cannot pursue a flexible policy and, consequently, attain successfully one's political ends.

As has been demonstrated, there are many ways of outflanking the nuclear Maginot Line established by the West. The old adage, "offense is the best defense," still is pertinent. Only an offensive political strategy can constitute an effective deterrent. This does not mean to say that here and now we should attack the Soviets. It means that we should assure ourselves of a wide range of political maneuver by creating the military forces necessary to support such a flexible Western policy. Only a military posture based on conventional forces—which depend on suicidal nuclear weapons only as a cover for nonnuclear operations—will make plausible the resolution of the West to seize the political and military initiative. For the West, it is high time to develop such a strategic force posture. Otherwise the future will be grim indeed.

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THE McNAMARA GENERAL WAR STRATEGY*

by Harland B. Moulton

VIRTUALLY from the day the Kennedy Administration took office in January 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, at the President's behest, began the search for a coherent and flexible general war strategy, which would afford the United States a wide range of options between the extremes of national humiliation and nuclear holocaust. The Secretary, in developing such a strategy, could choose among several schools of thought. One strategy bore the label "minimum deterrence," and its advocates argued in favor of a relatively small, largely invulnerable missile force aimed at Soviet cities. Such a force would ostensibly deter a nuclear attack by a rational enemy. Secretary McNamara also considered the "optimum mix" or "full counterforce" strategy, which recommended buying sufficient forces to crush Soviet society and destroy enemy bombers and missiles on the ground in one massive strike. A third strategy, probably best described as "limited counterforce," recognized that there were finite limits to the number of forces which should be procured because of the factor of high cost and the law of diminishing returns.

The general war strategy eventually chosen by the Kennedy Administration was based upon a limited and controlled counterforce capability. This required a posture which would enable the United States (1) to mount deliberate and discriminate attacks against enemy bombers and missile sites, (2) to retain reserve forces for attacks against enemy cities, if that proved necessary, and (3) to convince an enemy of our superiority as a basis for terminating a war short of mutual devastation under conditions acceptable to the United States. The rationale for what became popularly known as "the McNamara strategy" rested on the following premises:

(1) Deterrence might fail despite all rational efforts to prevent a conflict. Thus it was important to determine how the United States should fight a general nuclear war if overriding national interests required it.

(2) A strategy must take into account the number of fatalities

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of any government department or agency.

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and the amount of damage which would result from various kinds of nuclear attacks, and it should seek to limit to the greatest possible extent the destruction which an enemy could wreak on the United States and its allies in wartime. This could best be achieved by attacks on enemy bombers and missiles, and by providing this nation with an adequate fall-out shelter program.

(3) A strategy should provide an enemy with strong incentives to avoid wanton destruction of cities. This might be accomplished by announcing that it would be U.S. policy to concentrate attacks on military targets, while holding forces in reserve as a deterrent. Such a strategy would be worth the additional effort and investment on the gamble that the adversary would find it in its own self-interest to adopt such a strategy as a means of ensuring its own survival.

In its first two years the Kennedy Administration made a number of important evolutionary changes in U.S. general war strategy, none of which, viewed separately, could be described as a major departure from past policies. Together, however, the changes promised to lessen the destructiveness of general nuclear war in the event deterrence failed. The Administration sought first of all to reduce dependence upon weapons systems which were both highly vulnerable, particularly to a ballistic missile attack, and dependent for their survival on a hair-trigger response to the first warning of an attack. President Kennedy directed Secretary McNamara to design a strategic force posture capable of surviving a surprise first-strike attack and retaliating with superior forces in a controlled and discriminating manner in order to terminate hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies. To make such a capability feasible the Administration began the development of a survivable command-control system which would ensure civilian control over all military forces at all times under any imaginable attack. Since it was conceivable that thermonuclear war might occur, and it was a prime objective to limit the damage to the United States, McNamara laid the groundwork for a national fall-out shelter program capable of saving millions of lives if the enemy avoided indiscriminate attacks on cities.

By the end of 1961 the myth of the "missile gap" had been exploded; confidence was restored among the American people and our West European allies in the superior general war military strength of the United States. During 1962 the Administration

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continued the accelerated build-up of relatively invulnerable forces, putting the Soviet Union at an even greater numerical and qualitative disadvantage than during 1961. The development of war plans by the Strategic Air Command contained additional options affording the President greater flexibility of choice in crisis or conflict. In a bold but abortive effort McNamara sought to discourage the proliferation of national nuclear forces among the NATO allies by declaring at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962 that a general war target system was indivisible, and that the best hope in the event of nuclear war lay in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against enemy targets, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled. In this now famous discourse the Secretary clearly enunciated the "no cities" option, which offered the Soviet Union an incentive not to plan attacks against cities during the initial phases of general nuclear war. Thus, as 1962 drew to a close, the basic tenets of the McNamara strategy of controlled counterforce general war had been fully articulated to the American public and the West European allies, and preparations were underway to provide an adequate military posture for the strategy.

The "no cities" option and the requirement to fund and deploy sufficient forces to conduct a controlled counterforce general war became the targets during 1963 of both minimum deterrent and full counterforce advocates. The latter group criticized the McNamara strategy on grounds that it replaced the doctrine of nuclear deterrence with one of nuclear stalemate.[1] The acceptance of a nuclear stalemate was interpreted by the critics to mean that the United States was abandoning any hope of "winning" a general nuclear war, and was headed on a course of acquiescing in nominal or real parity of strategic nuclear strength with the Soviets. One critic bade "Farewell to Counterforce" less than one year after McNamara had enunciated his strategy at Ann Arbor.[2] There were elements of plausibility in some of the accusations leveled against the Secretary, and serious inaccuracies in others, depending on how various passages from McNamara's speeches and testimony were interpreted.

[1]See, for example, John F. Loosbrock, "Strategic Retreat from Reality," *Air Force/Space Digest,* January 1963, p. 28ff; Claude Witze, "Farewell to Counterforce," *Air Force/Space Digest,* February 1963, pp. 27-29; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part I, February 1963; U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Military Procurement Authorization FY 1964,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, February-March 1963.

[2]Witze, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

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II

Secretary McNamara resumed his efforts to clarify the Administration's general war strategy in January and February of 1963 in open hearings before both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Mahon Appropriations Subcommittee of the House. Beginning his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 30, the Secretary said:

> Last year I told this Committee "there is no question but that, today, our Strategic Retaliatory Forces are fully capable of destroying the Soviet target system, even after absorbing an initial surprise attack." This statement is still true. We have a total of about 650 manned bombers on 15-minute ground alert and over 200 operational Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman missiles on launchers and about 144 Polaris missiles in submarines. And this force is rapidly expanding as additional Minuteman and Polaris enter our operational inventory.
>
> Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack and attrition en route to target, we calculate that our forces today could still destroy the Soviet Union without any help from the deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces or Thor or Jupiter IRBM's.[3]

It would be difficult to imagine anyone in a responsible position stating the facts of our nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union in a more confident or peremptory manner.

Having given the Committee his estimate of the then existing balance of nuclear power, McNamara turned to a consideration of the strategic problems of the future, arising from observed trends in Soviet military preparations. The Secretary spoke of the increasing evidence that the Soviet Union was hardening and dispersing its ICBM forces and making efforts to acquire a number of missile launching submarines. From this evidence the Secretary concluded that "it is even more important today than it was last year that we concentrate our efforts on the kind of strategic offensive forces which will be able to ride out an all-out attack by nuclear-armed ICBM's or submarine-launched missiles in sufficient strength to strike back decisively."

Speaking of observable Soviet military trends, and their portent for the United States, the Secretary declared:

> A very large increase in the number of fully hard Soviet ICBM's and nuclear-powered ballistic missile-launching submarines would considerably detract from our ability to destroy completely the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. It would become increasingly difficult, regardless of the form of the

[3]U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, February-March 1963, p. 29. All quotes in this section are taken from pages 29-31 of this document.

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attack to destroy a sufficiently large proportion of the Soviet's strategic nuclear forces to preclude major damage to the United States, regardless of how large or what kind of strategic forces we build.

It would not be enough, continued McNamara, for the United States to double and triple its forces, because even such a large force would not ensure the destruction of all or almost all Soviet hardened ICBM sites. Even if the ICBM sites were knocked out, no way is known at present to destroy simultaneously all of the enemy's missile launching submarines. What is more, the Secretary stressed, "We do not anticipate that either the United States or the Soviet Union will acquire that capability in the foreseeable future." In order to minimize damage to the United States, a projected force would have to include extensive missile defense systems and a far more elaborate civil defense program than is now contemplated. "Even then," the Secretary concluded, ". . . we could not preclude casualties counted in the tens of millions."

Secretary McNamara continued his statement by reiterating the essential purpose of the second-strike strategy: the United States should have the capability to strike the entire Soviet target system simultaneously, or to strike back first exclusively against military targets and then, if necessary, to attack the Soviet urban and industrial complex in a controlled, selective and deliberate way. He conceded that Soviet leaders have always threatened to strike our entire urban-industrial complex at the outset of general war, but if they did so the United States would have no choice but to retaliate in kind. It seemed reasonable to the Secretary, as a basis for our defense planning, to assume that the Soviet Union might prefer to limit the terrible consequences of an all-out nuclear exchange by a rational decision to avoid initial attacks on American cities. Thus, McNamara emphasized,

By building into our forces a flexible capability, we at least eliminate the prospect that we could strike back in only one way, namely, against the entire Soviet target system including their cities. Such a prospect would give the Soviet Union no incentive to withhold attack against our cities in the first place.

Referring specifically to projected U.S. force capabilities over the next five years, McNamara declared:

In planning our second strike force, we have provided throughout the period under consideration, a capability to destroy virtually all of the "soft" and "semi-hard" military targets in the Soviet Union and a large number of their fully hardened missile sites, with an additional capability in the form of a protected force to be employed or held in reserve for use against urban and industrial areas.

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Nonetheless, the Secretary cautioned,

> We have not found it feasible, at this time, to provide a capability for ensuring the destruction of any very large portion of the fully hard ICBM sites, if the Soviets build them in quantities, or of missile launching submarines. Fully hard ICBM sites can be destroyed but only at a great cost in terms of the numbers of offensive weapons required to dig them out. Furthermore, in a second strike situation we would be attacking, for the most part, empty sites from which the missiles had already been fired.

On the assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to make an ever larger proportion of its strategic nuclear forces relatively invulnerable to attack, McNamara questioned the value of trying to provide in the future a capability to destroy a very high proportion of the Soviets' hard ICBM sites or their missile-launching submarine forces. In partial justification of this view the Secretary added:

> Although we are investing very large sums in research and development in the anti-submarine warfare and anti-ballistic missile areas, it is not very likely that our efforts will produce enough of an increase in our capabilities during the period under consideration [1963-1968] to change the prospects significantly.

III

In 1962 the Kennedy Administration had convinced the world of the overwhelming superiority of United States strategic nuclear strength. In 1963 Secretary McNamara went before Congress and the public to examine thoroughly the implications for the future of a large, relatively invulnerable Soviet strategic missile force. Was the world entering an era of mutual deterrence despite all efforts on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to the contrary? Was it conceivable that this nation would in the not-too-distant future reach a point of diminishing returns in the procurement of additional increments of strategic missiles because of the excessive cost entailed in achieving a high "kill" probability against relatively invulnerable Soviet missile forces? Under such circumstances what would be the future of U.S. nuclear superiority? Was the approach to parity an inevitability? And, finally, was the United States really prepared to accept a nuclear stalemate as an inevitable fact of life? The answers to many of these questions were provided by Secretary McNamara during the cross-examination by the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees.

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Undoubtedly the most controversial issue McNamara had to deal with during his testimony before Congress in early 1963 was whether in a sense the United States was unilaterally opting out of the quantitative arms race with the Soviet Union and was therefore disposed to accept the fact of a "nuclear stalemate." The Secretary expressed some doubt about the value of trying to provide a capability to destroy the essentially invulnerable elements of the Soviet strategic forces, suggesting the possibility that such an effort had already begun to approach the point of diminishing returns. Immediately, the Secretary's statement was interpreted in some circles to mean a voluntary relinquishment of present U.S. nuclear superiority and acquiescence in the weakened position of "nuclear stalemate."[4] What, then, did McNamara actually say regarding the U.S. general war strategy of the future?

During the cross-examination by the Mahon House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Secretary McNamara was asked whether he meant to imply at all in his statement before the committee that he recognized the existence at this time of a nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secretary McNamara replied: "No, I at no place used the word stalemate. I have said, and I believe it is true, that the Soviet nuclear forces, particularly their strategic forces are increasing in size, that as they increase they will become increasingly capable of achieving severe damage by an attack on the United States."[5]

As part of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, McNamara was asked whether, if a point of nuclear stalemate is reached, the United States would in any way have a decisive margin of superiority and if so, in what form and of what significance would it be. Again the Secretary replied: "I do not consider that a point of 'nuclear stalemate' will be reached but rather that both sides will continue to improve their capabilities to damage one another." He envisaged that, in the absence of effectively verified arms control agreements, both sides would constantly strive to exploit their respective weapons technologies. In the Secretary's judgment, however, "the prospect that remarkable new weapons can provide a sudden change in a margin of superiority is not . . . likely."[6] Finally, in response to another question concerning the possibility of a "nuclear stalemate," McNamara

[4] *Washington Post-Times Herald,* February 1, 1963, p. A 10; March 12, 1963, p. A 1.
[5] U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964, op. cit.,* p. 224.
[6] *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964* (Senate), *op. cit.,* p. 89.

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again emphasized that the issue of a nuclear stalemate was not genuine, and that in reality a dynamic relationship existed between the communist state system and the Free World.

Some of the committee members expressed dismay and disagreement with the Secretary over his predicted course of future events. McNamara was asked when he felt the United States would reach a condition of mutual deterrence. The Secretary rejoined that it was impossible to specify a date, partly because deterrence was a state of mind. The Secretary then amplified his statement, saying that the point he was trying to make was simply this: "We are approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force."[7] Why, he was then asked, must we assume that this situation is going to come to pass? McNamara replied: "Well, I have not assumed it. I have said, 'We are approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable.' I do not assume it is coming to pass. I believe we are approaching that era." The questioning continued: "Is it conceivable that this nation so lacks imagination, skill and diligence, to permit this to be upon us relatively soon?" To this McNamara replied:

I do not believe we are either unimaginative, or lacking in skill, but I believe that a careful assessment of the probable increases in the Soviet nuclear power as estimated by the experienced intelligence evaluators in our Government indicate that power will increase in such ways, particularly in such types, that there will not be a possibility for us to build a force that can destroy that power to such a degree that there will not remain elements so large as to cause severe damage to our Nation in retaliation for our destructive effort directed against that power.

The Secretary's reply did not satisfy at least one member of the committee, who refused to accept the idea that the competence, the quality, and technical skill of the American people as a whole was insufficient to prevent this grim prospect from taking place. McNamara replied:

If by that you mean you refuse to believe that with the ability and imagination which we possess we cannot develop a sure means to destroy the missile launching submarines, then I can only disagree with you, because I have carefully considered this problem with the best minds and the best brains in the Defense Department, with the best minds and the best brains in the scientific community, on which the Defense Department draws for technical assistance and counsel, and I have found no one who states that they anticipate it will be possible in the next several years!

[7] *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964* (House), *op. cit.*, p. 312. The following quotes are all taken from pp. 312-313 and 340-341 of this document.

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. . . yesterday, you quite properly pointed out the danger of underestimating one's opponent. I would simply emphasize today that I share your sentiments. I think you seriously underestimate our opponent if you believe that between now and the period we are talking about the ingenuity of the American people can develop certain techniques and systems such as to destroy the Soviet nuclear forces to such an extent as to leave surviving such a small force that it could not accomplish severe damage when directed against this Nation. I know of no responsible person, including our leading military advisors, and including our leading scientific and engineering consultants, who would share your conclusion.

Later in the course of the questioning, a committee member warned that many people would make out of McNamara's testimony a thesis of nuclear stalemate. The Secretary repeated again his disbelief in the relevance of the word "stalemate": "Stalemate implies lack of action and I visualize our military program leading to quite the contrary. I visualize it leading to action in the foreign policy field." The Secretary said that what he visualized would lead to greater flexibility in our foreign policy rather than any kind of stalemate.

IV

The final major issue aired during the course of the McNamara testimony was the perennial question: Does the United States pursue a "win" strategy or a "no win" strategy? McNamara emphatically rejected the notion that the U.S. objective did not include the defeat of communism. He averred, however, "I do not believe we can achieve that victory by engaging in strategic nuclear war. I think that kind of stalemate will become increasingly more controlling with the passage of time." Stressing again his belief that the United States could not defeat communism by engaging in nuclear war, McNamara reiterated: "I do not believe we can achieve defeat of communism by engaging in strategic nuclear war. There are some who do believe that. I do not. I think it is very dangerous, as a matter of fact, for any significant number of our people to believe we can achieve defeat of communism by engaging in strategic nuclear war."

The Secretary was then asked: Accepting the fact of our nuclear superiority, and forced to engage in nuclear war by circumstances beyond our control, would our superior position allow this nation to win? McNamara replied:

No, sir; I do not believe we can, not in the normal sense of the word "win," because in my opinion there would be so much severe damage done to this country that our way of life would change, and change

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in an undesirable direction. Therefore, I would say we had not won. In another sense of the word "win" we would win. We would win in the sense that their way of life would change more than ours because we would destroy a greater percentage of their industrial potential and probably destroy a greater percentage of their population than they destroyed of ours.

General Maxwell B. Taylor, who had accompanied Secretary McNamara, was also asked to express his views on the matter of winning a nuclear war. He replied: "I quite agree with the Secretary, that when you talk about 'winning' a general nuclear war it is usually in a sense I do not understand. The losses on both sides would reduce these two world powers to secondary or tertiary powers."

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were then asked whether they felt it was necessary to maintain our superior strength in order to deter an attack and prevent destruction by the communist forces. McNamara's reply was a terse "always." To do this, the Secretary said, we would never be satisfied with an impasse. Technological progress is inevitable and "We must watch pretty carefully and pursue all the research and development programs you are concerned with. We do not have a balance. We have a dynamic offsetting situation which may change, not overnight, but in the course of a few years." It was during cross-examination in the Senate Armed Services Committee, however, that McNamara most clearly specified what he believed to be the real meaning of our present nuclear superiority: "It does give us a war-fighting and war-winning nuclear capability, in the sense that we are confident that we can completely crush the Soviet Union if forced to do so."[8]

V

One of the criticisms leveled at the Kennedy Administration strategy for general war which seemed especially to perturb Secretary McNamara was the accusation that the Defense Department was leading the nation in the direction of nuclear stalemate by placing undue reliance on an all-missile strategy.[9] In an interview early in February 1963, McNamara replied to his critics: "There is no justification for such claims. . . . The existence of the manned bomber is not a determining factor in the relative effectiveness in strategic strength of the United States and the Soviet Union."[10]

[8] *DOD Appropriations for FY 1964* (Senate), *op. cit.*, p. 90.
[9] *Washington Post-Times Herald,* February 4, 1963; see also Witze, *op. cit.* and Loosbrock, *op. cit.*
[10] *Washington Post-Times Herald,* February 4, 1963.

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In response to charges that failure to provide a sizeable manned bomber force in the future will make U.S. defenses inflexible, the Secretary asserted:

> To the contrary, the manned bomber itself introduces inflexibility in the 1970's when the Soviet Union will have more missiles which it could use against the United States. This is because you can't leave a bomber on the ground if an attack is imminent. You must have it in the air.
>
> On the other hand, mobile or hardened missiles can be held in their silos indefinitely and fired at the discretion of the proper authority.
>
> Missiles provide more flexibility than the bomber.[11]

McNamara also pointed out that whereas missiles could reach their targets in a matter of minutes, the bomber would take up to twelve hours. Then, too, the Secretary considered missiles to be more effective against most major fixed targets—missile and bomber bases, cities and air defenses—whereas bombers in the missile age were best suited to "mopping up" strategic targets and post-attack reconnaissance. In other words, in planning an optimum mix of weapons systems for given target complexes one must take into account the capability of a weapon to hit a specific target, and this capability is not necessarily inherent in the manned bomber to the exclusion of the missile.

Early in February 1963, one of Secretary McNamara's top planners, Assistant Secretary Alain Enthoven, speaking at Loyola University in California, explained in detail the rationale which underlay the Administration's strategy for controlled counterforce general war.[12] He stated that "The theory and practice of strategic bombing in World War II, the use of the atomic bombs, and the unconditional surrender policy left in their aftermath a widespread belief that war could only be total." Since then, however, total war between nuclear powers has come to mean total destruction. Thus, "It is my own opinion that with the widespread realization of this fact will come the general belief that all wars should be limited. At no time should we deliberately choose to fight an unlimited uncontrolled war."[13]

The Assistant Secretary also spoke about the balance between conventional and nuclear forces, citing the possibility of using conventional forces with a minimal risk of self-destruction. He went on to say:

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] See his address, "U.S. Defense Policy for the 1960's," delivered before the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs at Los Angeles, California, on February 10, 1963.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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As the destructiveness of nuclear war increases, and as nuclear weapon systems become less vulnerable to sudden attack, the effectiveness of the threatened use of nuclear weapons as a substitute for conventional forces will diminish, and we will have no sensible alternative to building up our conventional forces to the point at which they can safely resist all forms of non-nuclear aggression."[14]

Assistant Secretary Enthoven affirmed his strong support of civil defense as an indispensable adjunct to a strategy of controlled counterforce general war. He reminded his listeners that "most studies suggest that whereas several tens of millions might die from the blast and thermal effects of a nuclear attack on the United States, because of fallout the total deaths could well be over a hundred million in the United States alone."[15] Because of this potential hazard, the President had directed the Department of Defense to undertake an expanded civil defense program, whose first objective would be provision of fall-out shelters for all our population.

VI

In mid-November 1963 Secretary McNamara delivered a major policy speech before the Economic Club of New York.[16] Because the Administration would soon present its proposed FY 1965 defense budget to the Congress and the American public, the Secretary chose the occasion for a candid assessment of our overall military strength, the significant changes in military relations among the major powers which had taken place since the end of World War II, and likely future developments which would have a profound impact upon military planning and the use of force under various conditions of conflict.

The Secretary's opening remarks indicated that he was still deeply concerned over the wide divergence of opinion in the public sector over the basic strength of this nation and the precise objectives of the Kennedy Administration's military strategy. The nature of some of the controversies which had recently arisen would scarcely suggest, said McNamara, that "the participants are living in the same world." "Within the past few weeks, some critics have suggested that we have literally hundreds of times more strength than we need; others have accused us of risking the whole future of the nation by engaging in unilateral disarmament." He found this lack of consensus about our national

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[16] Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Document No. 148-63.

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military posture and objectives less than reassuring, and was forced to conclude "that we have failed to convey to some part of our audience even the broadest outlines, as we see them, of the problems that our military strategy and force structure are meant to address." He expressed the hope that his address would end the controversy and help to form a consensus at least on the broad issues of national security policy, the major alternative paths to their solution, and the "dominant goals, obstacles, costs and risks affecting choice."

The Secretary once again, as he had done at frequent intervals in the past, summarized the current status of the balance of strategic nuclear forces:

> The U.S. force now contains more than 500 operational long-range ballistic missiles—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris—and is planned to increase to over 1700 by 1966. There is no doubt in our minds and none in the minds of the Soviets that these missiles can penetrate to their targets. In addition, the U.S. has Strategic Air Command bombers on air alert and over 500 bombers on quick reaction ground alert. By comparison, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place about half as many bombers over North America on a first strike. The Soviets are estimated to have today only a fraction as many intercontinental missiles as we do. Furthermore, their submarine-launched ballistic missiles are short range, and generally are not comparable to our Polaris force. The Soviets pose a very large threat against Europe, including hundreds of intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles. This threat is today and will continue to be covered by the clear superiority of our strategic forces.

The full implications of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority, the Secretary continued, should act as a powerful deterrent to a planned Soviet surprise attack; even should this deterrent fail, remaining U.S. forces could destroy the attacker's society. "Deterrence of deliberate, calculated attack seems as well assured as it can be, and the damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces is, I believe, well worth its incremental cost." Convinced that the much smaller forces of the Soviet Union could not aspire to this capability, McNamara asserted: "I would not trade our strategic posture for that of the Soviets at any point during the coming decade."

Despite his confident mood, Secretary McNamara warned that the Soviet Union had, since the mid-1950's, substantially increased its strategic delivery capabilities and had progressively hardened and concealed its long-range missiles. Therefore, Americans would have to recognize "that strategic nuclear war would under all

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foreseeable circumstances be bilateral—and highly destructive to both sides." What were the primary implications of this new fact for the United States and the Soviet Union? According to the Secretary:

> Larger budgets for U.S. strategic forces would not change that fact. They could have only a decreasing incremental effect in limiting somewhat the damage that the U.S. and its allies would suffer in a general nuclear war. In short, we cannot buy the capability to make a strategic bombing campaign once again a unilateral prospect.

McNamara saw essentially the same situation confronting the Soviets: "enormous increases in Soviet budgets would be required for them to achieve any significant degree of damage-limiting capability. *The present Soviet leaders show no tendency to challenge the basis of the U.S. strategic deterrent posture by such expenditures.*" (Emphasis added.) This was the first time that any high official in the Kennedy Administration had stated publicly that the Soviet Union, preferring for the time being at least not to intensify the arms race, might be prepared to coexist with the West and acquiesce in a balance of nuclear power strongly favorable to the West.

During the past two years, the Secretary assured his audience, the United States had increased the number of warheads in its strategic alert forces by 100 per cent. In the same period the megatonnage of the strategic alert forces had been more than doubled. Because of this,

> further increases in strategic force size will at last encounter rapidly diminishing returns—which is largely an effect of the very large investments the U.S. has made in this area—should be reflected in future budgets. The funding for the initial introduction of missiles into our forces is nearing completion. We can anticipate that the annual expenditure on strategic forces will drop substantially, and level off well below the present rate of spending.

It was by no means his intent, the Secretary emphasized, to rule out the possibility of new technological breakthroughs, especially in the anti-ballistic missile field, which would require major new expenditures. In any event there would be the recurring costs of modernization.

In concluding his address, Secretary McNamara made the following important observation:

> Let us not delude ourselves with obsolete images into believing that our nuclear strength, great as it is, solves all of our problems of national security, or that we lack the strengths to meet those problems that it does

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not solve. . . . Let us be fully aware of the wide range of our military resources, and the freedom they can give us to pursue the peaceful objectives of the free world without fear of military aggression.

VII

It would have been entirely unexpected had significant changes been announced in our national military policy immediately following the accession of Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency on November 22. In fact, before the end of 1963, President Johnson assured the nation that the United States would maintain its pre-eminent military striking force throughout the 1960's.[17] As if to substantiate this pre-eminence, the Department of Defense, on the final day of 1963, released a brief information bulletin which announced simply that the last Titan II intercontinental missiles had become operational, thus giving the nation 534 ICBM's ready to fire.

At the end of 1963, Americans could feel secure in the knowledge of their nation's overwhelming nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and in the certainty that no rational adversary would risk either a surprise nuclear attack or a confrontation with this nation which might conceivably escalate into all-out nuclear war. If Secretary McNamara's predictions about the future were correct, the margin of present U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union would likely diminish in coming years. This does not mean, however, that a nuclear stalemate will inevitably result, for it is far more likely that a dynamic military situation will continue to obtain, if only because the pace of science and technology shows no perceptible signs of slackening.

The public testimony, speeches and press statements by Secretary McNamara during 1963 relating to the overall military policy of the United States represented the most forthright and comprehensive attempt in recent history to explain and justify an exceedingly complex military strategy and to analyze those forces at work in the world which will have a bearing on the success of that strategy.

In less than three years the Kennedy-Johnson Administration completed the main phases of a systematic reappraisal of the nation's general war strategy in order to design a strategy best suited to an era of mutual nuclear deterrence. There has been no sharp break with the past: current U.S. strategic war plans are distinguishable from the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of "Massive

[17] *Washington Post-Times Herald*, December 11, 1963, p. A 1.

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Retaliation" primarily by important shifts in priority and emphasis. The McNamara strategy has sought to incorporate some of the results of rational war game theory into the nation's strategic war plans, primarily as inducements to an enemy in the event nuclear war occurs. It is noteworthy that the success of the McNamara strategy depends to a considerable extent on providing maximum information to potential enemies about this nation's capabilities and plans, in the expectation that rational self-interest might induce an enemy to plan similarly.

One of the most important changes made by Secretary McNamara in the nation's general war strategy was to predicate all planning on the basis of a second-strike posture. By stressing relatively invulnerable forces, indestructible command and control networks, ultimate control of all forces in peace or war by civilian authority, and the controlled, deliberate and discriminating use of force, the McNamara strategy has helped to create a military climate which today seems more stable than at any time during the post-World War II era.

Secretary McNamara has had the courage to state that the facts of the era of mutual nuclear deterrence will soon prevent either the United States or the Soviet Union from attempting to win a general nuclear war in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, the possibility that general nuclear war might occur, despite all efforts to prevent it, has convinced the Secretary that an effort must be made to convince the Soviet Union of the rationality of a nuclear war fought for limited objectives. Realism in the age of mutual nuclear deterrence also demands that both sides plan to avoid, insofar as possible, direct attacks on each other's cities, and to seek an early termination of the conflict on conditions acceptable to the superior power. How one side would clearly recognize that it held the superior position after a limited nuclear exchange is not clear, nor does the public literature help to illuminate this perplexing question.

Secretary McNamara does not presume that a strategy so rational and subtle will be widely accepted in the span of a few years, but he seems confident that the wide margin of strategic superiority which the United States currently enjoys over the Soviet Union will probably remain secure for at least the next decade and should afford a relatively stable environment in which friends and enemies alike can carefully reflect on the wisdom of this nation's strategic proposals. If general war does occur in the

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future and the Soviet Union attacks indiscriminately, McNamara is confident that sustained U.S. strategic nuclear superiority would inevitably ensure the destruction of the entire Soviet society.

The Secretary of Defense has inferred from growing evidence that the end of the "quantitative" arms race may be near at hand. Based on present indications the Soviet Union does not appear desirous of challenging U.S. strategic nuclear superiority in an intensified arms race and may be content to build a relatively small and secure second-strike deterrent force. If this evaluation is correct, the Soviet Union may indeed be prepared to coexist for the time being with the West, despite a balance of power markedly unfavorable to itself. This may also indicate that the Soviets may no longer fear a U.S. first strike against them, except under circumstances of a grave threat to U.S. security on a scale similar to the Cuban affair in 1962. These developments may well portend a wide range of initiatives by both sides in the foreign policy field, leading perhaps to settlements of outstanding political differences and modest arms control and disarmament agreements. At the same time, however, there will likely be an intensification of the "qualitative" (research and development) arms race by both sides, each seeking to be the first to achieve the next quantum jump in weaponry, which could drastically swing the balance of power toward one side or the other.

Viewed in perspective, the changes in the nation's general war strategy introduced by the Kennedy-Johnson Administration since 1961 have preserved the best of past military thought while contributing important qualitative improvements, which in the short and long run are designed to perpetuate a stable military environment and reduce to a minimum the likelihood of general nuclear war.

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THE "NEW MYTHS" AND "OLD REALITIES" OF NUCLEAR WAR

by Chester C. Ward

IT has recently become fashionable to talk about the old myths and new realities of American foreign policy. The makers of new myths assert that a strategic stalemate has developed between the United States and the Soviet Union and that, therefore, nuclear war is unthinkable. Among the well-briefed realities being discarded is the all-too-real Soviet objective of world conquest. It is alleged that the Soviets themselves no longer seriously consider the attainment of this goal, particularly as it can be achieved only by the use of nuclear weapons. The time has come to assess the new and the old myths, the new and the old realities.

The Twin Assumptions of U.S. Strategy

Since the advent of sputnik, multimegaton nuclear weapons and the intercontinental missile, Western statesmen have gradually convinced themselves and their citizens of the "impossibility" and "unthinkability" of general war. President Lyndon B. Johnson offered perhaps the most forceful expression of this conviction in an address on March 24, 1964:

> Once upon a time even large scale wars could be waged without risking the end of civilization, but what was once upon a time is no longer so—because *general war is impossible.* In a matter of moments, you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million of our adversaries, or they can, in the same amount of time, wipe out 50 or 100 million of our people, taking half of our land, taking half of our population in a matter of an hour.
>
> So *general war is impossible* and some alternatives are essential. . . .
>
> Our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression, to preserve our honor without a world in ruins, to substitute, if we can, understanding for retaliation.[1] (Emphasis added.)

This "nuclear stalemate" theory appears to be accepted without question by a large majority of the scientific community cognizant of defense matters, by most intelligence experts, policy planners

[1]Address in Washington, D.C. to U.S. labor leaders. The press had been alerted in advance to expect an important Presidential pronouncement in this speech.

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and policymakers in the government, a majority of Congressmen, and nearly all editorial writers, radio and television commentators, columnists, intellectuals, and other opinion molders. Even many of the leading professional strategists and military experts seem to accept "nuclear stalemate" and the "impossibility of general war" as the basis for analyses of future strategic developments. A great number of Americans—indeed, the leaders and citizens of every Western nation—live in a world in which the "balance of terror" is self-perpetuating, for neither great power has the capability of breaking out of the strategic stalemate.

In this world of unthinkable thoughts little consideration is given to the possibility that the Soviets might have both the *intent* and *capability* to break out of the stalemate—and build forces designed to annihilate 150 to 180 million Americans and enough of the U.S. strategic force as to limit decisively the damage a retaliatory strike could wreak. By asserting that the Soviets lack the intent and capability, U.S. leaders can provide a reassuring hypothesis for major reversals in U.S. defense policies. That this assumption may govern formulation of national strategy and related policies and programs is reflected in the words and actions of White House and Defense Department officials. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, recently covered the intent and capability aspects of Soviet strategy in a single paragraph:

> The withdrawal of missiles from Cuba did more than end a specific crisis of great gravity. It also signaled an *acceptance* by the Soviet Government, for the present at least, of the existing nuclear balance. In that balance there is American superiority . . . but it is a superiority that does not permit any lack of respect for the Soviet Union. No safer balance appears possible at present. *No overwhelmingly one-sided margin is open to either side.*[2] (Emphasis added.)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asserted as early as spring 1963 that the era of mutual deterrence was approaching, but he declined to pinpoint its date of arrival.[3] By November of the same year, however, he not only affirmed that that era had indeed arrived, but expressed his conviction that the Soviets had no intention of attempting to upset the balance, and that neither side had the capability of doing so:

> Soviet acquisition of a sizable delivery capability against the U.S., and more significantly their acquisition of relatively protected forces, sub-

[2] "The President and the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964.
[3] *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriation, FY 1964*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Part 3 (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 109.

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marine-launched or hardened, has been long and often prematurely heralded. Its *arrival* at last merely dramatizes the need to recognize that strategic nuclear war would under all foreseeable circumstances be bilateral.

Larger budgets for U.S. strategic forces would not change that fact. They could have only a decreasing incremental effect limiting somewhat the damage that the U.S. and its allies could suffer in a general nuclear war.

In short, we cannot buy the capability to make a strategic bombing campaign once again a unilateral prospect. That must, I suggest, be accepted as one of the *determinants* affecting policy. *Another* is that the same situation confronts the Soviet leaders in a way that is even more intensely confining. In fact, enormous increases in Soviet budgets would be required for them to achieve any significant degree of damage-limiting capability. The present Soviet leaders show *no tendency* to challenge the basis of the U.S. strategic deterrent posture by such expenditures.[4] (Emphasis added.)

The adoption by the United States of the theory of stalemate "immunity" as a prime policy "determinant" postulates a new balance of power and a new basis for world peace. Indeed, the interpretations of evolving Soviet-American relations which are currently fashionable in the United States[5] are based on the twin assumptions that general nuclear war is unthinkable and that the nuclear stalemate is a virtually immutable fact of global life. It follows, according to this theory, that the Soviets can be wooed away from their goal of world conquest—especially if they find it necessary at some stage to resort to the use of force to achieve their goal. Although differing in particulars, these popular prognoses admit that communism (especially the Chinese variety) remains our enemy, that we must maintain our vigilance and strength, and that we shall have to put down (or put up with) uprisings, "wars of national liberation" and other forms of communist-inspired violence. But they hold out the hope that, since general war is unthinkable and the strategic stalemate immutable, we have time to promote peaceful solutions to the problems of the Cold War; that the Soviets, as they become "embourgeoisized," will become less belligerent; and that the two most powerful states will "converge," in economic and social if not political evolution.

[4]Department of Defense press release of an address by Secretary McNamara to the Advertising Council, May 6, 1964, which also contained the Secretary's address (quoted here) to the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1963.

[5]See, for example, Vincent Rock, *A Strategy for Interdependence* (New York: Scribners, 1964), and Amitai Etzioni, *Winning Without War* (New York: Doubleday, 1964).

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The exponents of this "gradualist" theory call upon the United States to put its own economic and social house in order. Only by such exemplary conduct can Americans hope to win the minds of men and compete with Soviet blandishments in the newly emergent areas. Hence it behooves us to overlook the Kremlin's occasional fits of temper and its actions in Berlin, Cyprus, Cuba, Zanzibar, Laos and elsewhere as perhaps necessary to answer Chinese accusations of "softness toward capitalists." Instead, we are urged to keep our eyes on the more important Soviet long-term policies of peaceful coexistence and honorable *détente;* to respond positively to Soviet "initiatives," especially in the areas of trade and arms control, lest the Soviets return to a "Stalinist line"; and to increase our efforts to arrive at piecemeal understandings with Moscow so that we can encourage the communists to accept the world order as it is and live at peace with noncommunists.

The twin assumptions of the unthinkability of war and the immutability of strategic stalemate form the basis for a radically new U.S. grand strategy. This strategy is being implemented by the planned unilateral reduction of U.S. strategic forces from a counterforce to what is essentially a finite deterrence posture. In earlier periods, it was generally assumed that safeguards had to be written into formal international agreements in order to protect disarming nations against a massive upset of the balance of power by a build-up of the adversary's strategic forces. Under the twin assumptions, however, the stalemated balance is already considered so well protected—especially in view of the absence of Soviet intent or capability to upset it—that U.S. counterforce disarmament may proceed. In effect, the *détente* substitutes for substantive treaty safeguards.

The Administration is firm in its belief that such a military strategy and force posture will accomplish high-priority national objectives. It will end the massive nuclear arms race and the fear of a planet-searing multimegaton exchange. U.S. leaders believe that such a strategy could become a basis for establishing a "world peace" which is both tolerable to the United States and the best obtainable in the present world situation. Such accomplishments undoubtedly justify incurring substantial risks. The magnitude of these risks can be measured on a *subjective* basis, within individual frameworks embodying personal values and judgments relating to philosophy, sociology and politics. The

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magnitude of risk can also be measured, however, by an *objective* analysis of the evidence which tends to support the twin assumptions, as against the evidence which tends to refute them and establish contrary intentions and capabilities on the part of Soviet leadership.

In view of the power, prestige and pervasive character of the "consensus" which supports the twin assumptions, it might seem presumptuous to call into serious question current U.S. strategic trends. Yet the survival in freedom of the United States and the lives of nearly 200 million Americans are dependent upon the correctness of these assumptions. The consensus can be wrong as well as right. With more at stake than ever before in history, it is essential that we consider all of the evidence which might refute the twin assumptions.

It is the purpose of this article to introduce some of this evidence and on the basis of it to present a radically different interpretation of the world about us, of the nuclear confrontation and of evolving Soviet-American relations. The assumption underlying this analysis is that a long-term nuclear stalemate is not automatic, but that the balance of power can over time be shifted to the side which seeks to defeat its adversary and marshals its resources and plans its strategy to this end. Using the same information available to those who form the consensus and who have arrived at entirely different conclusions, one may argue that the Soviet Union is planning deliberately to upset the nuclear balance of power and has embarked upon a "win" strategy against the United States which, if necessary, will culminate in a genocidal nuclear strike.

Recent Evidence of Soviet Intentions

No one can determine with absolute certainty the true intentions of Soviet leaders, yet analysis of Soviet statements and actions over a period of time provides some evidence as to their purposes. This evidence may be divided into three categories:

(1) A sustained Soviet development program designed to build a military posture capable of delivering a devastating attack on the United States: e.g., concentration of nuclear research and warhead development in the very high yield areas, concentration of delivery vehicle research on high-thrust, huge-payload rockets, and production of a disproportionate number of "soft" ICBM's and submarine-launched medium-range missiles. This program indicates a build-up of weapons systems especially adapted to

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counterpopulation targeting, supplemented by delivery systems capable of delivering the no-warning spearhead of a surprise strike via the South Pole, as well as delivery from submarines flanking the U.S. warning system.

In this connection, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 may be interpreted as the climax of the first—and abortive—Soviet effort to upset the delicate balance of nuclear power. About 1955-1956 the Soviet leaders apparently foresaw that, as a result of their lead in long-range missilery, the years 1962-1963 would be a period of optimum technological opportunity. Khrushchev looked to this period as the first in which the Soviet Union might challenge the United States directly. If they were unable to capitalize on the period of the early 1960's, the Soviets would probably have to wait another five to ten years for an equivalent opportunity.

Just as it took Hitler four or five years to build up his military forces prior to initiating war in 1939, it took Khrushchev roughly from 1957 to 1962 to prepare his military forces to challenge the United States. During his preparatory period, Hitler sacked well over a dozen of his top military leaders who were opposed to his war scheme. From 1956 to 1958 Khrushchev dismissed a number of his major political and military opponents, among them Marshal Zhukov.

In 1956-1957 the Soviet military budget was raised sharply to permit a substantial increase in funds allocated for research and development for advanced weapons. During this period, the decision was made to deploy more than 1,000 surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet Union. Similarly, medium-range ballistic missiles had been developed by the Soviet Union in the early 1950's and some 800 of these were deployed before the end of the 1950's for the purpose of holding Western Europe in hostage.

It is commonly assumed that the Soviets chose not to build the large intercontinental ballistic missile force which their capabilities could have made possible. Consequently, many in the United States still believe that the celebrated "missile gap" was nonexistent. However, if the Soviets had deployed not just one missile but four in each launching site, this re-load capacity would have enabled them actually to match the United States missile for missile. There is some evidence that the Soviets had such a re-load capacity.

The next requirement for a Soviet "win" strategy was the development of high-yield nuclear weapons. Soviet interest in these

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weapons first became evident in the 1958 Soviet test series conducted just before the unofficial test ban moratorium. When the Soviets broke the moratorium in 1961, they carried out the most massive program of nuclear weapons testing of the nuclear age. Furthermore, the Soviet Union tested operational weapons, both offensive and defensive, utilizing regular combat troops. From May 1961 to mid-summer 1962 the Soviet Union conducted the greatest military maneuvers of its history. What was Khrushchev's purpose in holding these tests and maneuvers at that particular time?

Attention should also be directed to the speech given by Marshal Malinovski at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961. This speech suggested Soviet understanding of the doctrine of preemptive war:

> Since modern weapons permit exceptionally important strategic results to be achieved in the briefest time, both the initial period of the war and the methods of breaking up the opponent's aggressive plans by dealing him in good time a crushing blow will be of decisive significance for the outcome of the entire war.

The same thesis was repeated in a more muted tone in Marshal Sokolovski's book, *Soviet Military Strategy,* the first definitive statement on Soviet strategy since the beginning of the nuclear age, which appeared approximately one month before the Cuban missile crisis.

If the missiles deployed in Cuba had been fully operational prior to their discovery, they could have tipped the delicate balance of nuclear power in favor of the Soviets. These missiles could have neutralized the United States command and control centers as well as much of the SAC bomber force. Their presence was not an isolated event but the final phase of a five-year program for strategic superiority.

(2) An intensified Soviet program of political and psychological warfare, propaganda and "negotiations," coordinated to create a favorable international environment for execution of the strategy—an atmosphere of *détente* designed to induce the gradual and unilateral counterforce disarmament of the United States and encourage the adoption by Washington of a "finite deterrence" strategy. Typical of this campaign was the Pugwash Conference in Moscow in November-December 1960, later supported by additional conferences between Soviet and U.S. representatives. Using the prospect of a nuclear test ban treaty and future disarmament agreements as bait, the Soviets persuaded U.S. repre-

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sentatives to support the scrapping of all existing U.S. "first-strike" weapons and the limitation of future developments to "purely retaliatory" systems, so as to reduce tensions and reassure the Soviets with regard to their "legitimate fears" of U.S. first-strike weapons.

(3) A major policy speech delivered by Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, in which he set forth the methods and objectives of world communism.

A Reinterpretation of Khrushchev's January 1961 Speech

In November 1960 representatives of eighty-one communist and workers' parties attending a communist summit meeting approved a major policy statement which has since become known as the "Moscow Manifesto." On January 6, 1961, in an address entitled "For New Victories for the World Communist Movement," Chairman Khrushchev gave the communist party organizations of the Soviet Union an official explanation of the proceedings of the November meeting and his own interpretation of the Manifesto.[6] He reported that "questions of war and peace were at the center of attention at the conference. The participants were fully aware that the problem of preventing a global thermonuclear war is the most burning and vital problem for mankind." (p. 62.)

At the time, the Western press gave considerable coverage to Khrushchev's address and Western statesmen and sovietologists prepared detailed analyses of it. Virtually all analysts concluded that the main theme of the speech was the overriding Soviet desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust and a preference for less destructive

[6]A comparison of the texts of the November manifesto and the January speech may be found in *Two Communist Manifestoes,* published by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (Washington, 1961). The text of Khrushchev's speech quoted in the following pages was originally published in *Kommunist,* No. 1, January 1961, and reprinted as Appendix III in *Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961.* Testimony of Stefan T. Possony before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 46 (Washington: GPO, 1961). Page numbers refer to Appendix III of the government document.

In the introduction to *Two Communist Manifestoes,* Charles Burton Marshall described the inner meaning of these two documents in the following way: "Those opposing Communist expansion are styled warmongers who are trying to thwart history and its law. The cold war is portrayed as totally their fault. Getting rid of the cold war means not accommodation with but the suppression or elimination of those disposed to stand in opposition to the Communist sweep. Disarmament is regarded as a weapon in the striving for Communist triumph. On our side the purpose and the hope may be to achieve agreements walling off military factors from issues in contention. That purpose and that hope are not reciprocated. Disarmament is to be 'an effective factor' in inflicting defeat on us."

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ways of overthrowing the capitalist world, i.e., through "peaceful coexistence" tactics such as wars of national liberation and economic and ideological competition. Yet, is it possible for one to interpret his speech differently? Is it possible that, by encrypting his address in Aesopian language and relying upon the traditional American reluctance to take a pessimistic view of an adversary's motives, Khrushchev managed to obscure the true meaning of his January 1961 address? Perhaps the very nature of his solution for "preventing a nuclear holocaust" enabled Khrushchev to communicate it to the elite of the Communist Party without worrying that the leadership or people of the democracies would also understand it.

Even had a Western expert on nuclear strategy and sovietology been successful in 1961 in deciphering Khrushchev's address as the doctrinal guide for a preventive genocidal strategy, his accomplishment would have made little difference. At most he could have proved that some of Khrushchev's words suggested a preventive genocidal strategy, but this would have been dismissed not merely as one of many possible interpretations, but as the most improbable of all. In any event, it would have been discounted as just "words" or "threats," unrelated to any action. Thus Khrushchev could afford to announce the doctrine in a speech carefully planned for world-wide dissemination. He counted on Americans not believing the one thing which of all things they least want to believe: that the Soviet Union had determined to destroy the United States by a nuclear attack.

Now that we have the advantage of three and one-half years of hindsight, a new attempt to interpret Khrushchev's speech is in order. In view of recent Soviet actions, outlined in the preceding section, his words take on added meaning—in evaluating ambiguous Soviet moves, supplying deficiencies in U.S. intelligence of Soviet intentions, and judging the effectiveness of any particular U.S. countermove to Soviet strategy. Probably the single most important passage in Khrushchev's address was this:

> Comrades, mankind has come close to the historic point where it can solve all problems which were beyond the strength of former generations. This also concerns the most vital issue, the prevention of a world war. The working class, which already leads a large part of the world—and the time will come when it will lead the whole world—cannot allow the forces doomed to ruin to drag hundreds of millions of people to the grave with them.

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A world war in present conditions would be a rocket and nuclear war, the most destructive in history. (p. 65.)[7]

It can be argued that by a simple process of inversion and implication, Khrushchev is able to describe a preventive genocidal nuclear strike in the innocuous terms of self-preservation, and at the same time avoid the moral issue which constrains the West from serious consideration of the preventive use of nuclear weapons—by *either side*. This is done by attributing the decision to "doom" the "forces" involved (identified in another passage as the United States) not to Soviet leadership but to "history." The Soviets, if they ever execute the sentence passed by "history," will merely be acting as the agent of "history." This is more fully explained in Khrushchev's general introduction to his address, where he demonstrates why the present "epoch is the epoch of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism":

Once it was customary to say that history was working for socialism; . . . *Today, it is possible to assert that socialism is working for history,* for the basic content of the contemporary historical process constitutes the establishment and consolidation of socialism on an international scale. (p. 53; emphasis added.)

Khrushchev, like all dedicated communists, accepts the operation of the "historical process" and its immutable determinations. He shows nothing but contempt for those who fail to carry out its mandate. No opposition based on moral questions or "world opinion" can be allowed to stand against the early execution of the mandate of "history." Thus three years after he had sent tanks and troops back into Budapest to crush the Freedom Fighters, Khrushchev declared that "had Soviet leadership not done so, we would have been fools, and history would not have forgiven us such stupidity." As for the United Nations, he added: "Let them keep it [the Soviet Hungarian action] for a souvenir." For such a man, the moral question of launching a preventive nuclear strike does not arise, for it is decreed by "history."

What sort of doom is it which the Soviet Union has committed itself, as the agent of history, to visit upon the United States? It is

[7]This important passage, as translated in the *World Marxist Review*, reads as follows: "Comrades, mankind has arrived at the stage in history when it is in a position to solve problems that were too much for the previous generations. This applies also to the problem of all problems, that of preventing world war.

"The working class, which today rules over a vast area of the world and in time will rule over the world, cannot allow the forces doomed by history to bring down hundreds of millions into the grave with them. For a world war in the conditions of today would be waged with missiles and nuclear weapons, that is, it would be the most destructive war in all history." Quoted from *Two Communist Manifestoes, op. cit.*, p. 53.

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a doom which will carry our people "into the grave," and it is to be executed by the Soviets so as to prevent a retaliatory response which would carry "hundreds of millions" of the "working class" with us. Is Khrushchev convinced that preventive action against the United States is essential? The Moscow Manifesto, which inspired Khrushchev's speech, declared that the United States has made itself into "the enemy of the peoples of the world." Khrushchev declares in his address that:

> The victory of the working class throughout the world and the victory of socialism will bring about the removal of all social and national causes of the outbreak of wars, and mankind will be able to rid itself forever of that dreadful plight. . . .
>
> Wars are chiefly prepared by imperialists against Socialist countries, and in the first place against the Soviet Union as the most powerful of the Socialist states. Imperialists would wish to undermine our might and thus reestablish the former domination of monopolistic capital. The task is to create impassable obstacles in the path of the warmongers. Consequently, *we can forestall the outbreak of a world war.* (p. 63; emphasis added.)

The above passages must be read with the key quotation, repeated here:

> The working class, which already leads a large part of the world—*and the time will come when it will lead the whole world*—cannot allow the forces doomed to ruin to drag hundreds of millions of people into the grave with them. (p. 65; emphasis added.)

Khrushchev may have concluded that the inexorable forces of history sweeping the working class to world victory will at some point—"no longer far off"—force the United States to resort, in the interest of national self-preservation, to the initiation of nuclear war. Khrushchev declares that the communist leadership is prepared for this development, which is calculated to be inevitable unless prevented, and has determined that the consequences cannot be tolerated, even though the war started by the capitalists would end in the wiping out of capitalism. He states:

> We know that if the imperialist madmen unleash a world war capitalism would be wiped out and annihilated by the peoples. But we are resolutely opposed to war, first of all because we are concerned for the destiny of mankind, its present and its future. We know that in the event of war it is the working people and their vanguard, the working class, that would suffer most. We remember how Vladimir Ilich Lenin formulated the question of the destiny of the working class. . . . Ilich taught that if we save the working man, the main producing force of mankind, we will save everything, but we will perish if we fail to save him. (p. 65.)

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Khrushchev repeatedly states throughout his speech that (1) the United States is planning to launch a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, and (2) the causes of war will continue to exist until the victory of the working classes is achieved "throughout the world." Thus he seems to be declaring that the historical mission of the communists is to destroy first the United States, which is "still the main economic, financial and military force of capitalism," and then all other capitalist governments. Khrushchev asserts that the only correct way to carry out this mission is by "a policy of active struggle against the imperialist warmongers." Warning that neither words nor prayer will do it, he declares:

> The possibility of preventing war is not something like a gift. Peace cannot be begged for; it can only be assured by active purposeful struggle. That is why we have waged and will wage such a struggle. . . .
>
> . . . Verbal exhortations will not contain the imperialist adventurers. There is only one way of bringing imperialism to heel, the unflagging consolidation of the economic, political and military might of the Socialist states, an all-out unification and consolidation of the world revolutionary movement and the mobilization of the broad popular masses for the struggle to prevent the danger of war.
>
> The CPSU and Soviet Government will continue with determination to do everything to enhance the military might of our country, since the imperialists continue the arms race. . . . (p. 66.)

The next section of the Khrushchev declaration sets forth his plan for securing the unilateral disarmament of the United States in nuclear weapons and all other weapons of wholesale annihilation. In this way, the Soviets can create optimum conditions in advance of the Soviet genocidal strike against the United States and prevent retaliation. In a speech which would receive world-wide publicity, he could not expose his plans for pressuring the United States into unilateral strategic disarmament—but he did give us a clue:

> Comrades, if the problem of all problems of our time is that of averting a new war, the most radical way of solving it is disarmament. . . .
>
> The struggle for disarmament is the most important factor for averting war. *It is an effective struggle against imperialism*. . . .
>
> . . . The struggle for disarmament is an *active struggle against imperialism, for restricting its military potentialities*. . . .
>
> The primary condition of progress in disarmament is the mobilization of the broadest masses of people and their *increasing pressure on imperialist governments*. (pp. 67-68; emphasis added.)

"Disarmament" to Khrushchev is not a bilateral procedure, but

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the unilateral "narrowing of the war potential of imperialism," primarily that of the United States.

Khrushchev's solution to the overriding problem of "preventing a nuclear holocaust" thus appears to be embedded in his speech. It may be paraphrased in the following manner, using his own words wherever possible: At some point in the "now very near" extension of communist "rule over all the world," it is inevitable that the United States will initiate a nuclear war "against the Soviet Union."[8] If the United States were to launch such a war, "capitalism would be wiped out and annihilated by the peoples." But the Soviet Union could not permit the United States to embark upon such a conflict, because "it is the working people and their vanguard, the working class, that would suffer most." According to Lenin's doctrine, the working man as the "main producing force of mankind," must be saved; if we can save him, "we will save everything, but we will perish if we fail to save him." It is therefore the duty of the Soviet Union "to protect the peoples of all countries from a new war of annihilation." To accomplish this, "we must do everything to enhance the military might of our country," while at the same time carrying on the fight for disarmament as an "active struggle against imperialism, for restricting its military potentialities." The action must be preventive and taken before hydrogen bombs begin to fall. Although for obvious reasons he does not carry his analysis beyond this point, Khrushchev's contemplated preventive action against the imperialists might well be in the nature of an overwhelming genocidal nuclear strike against the United States. Advance preparation must be taken to prevent U.S. retaliation or to reduce it to an acceptable level.

If this message was really contained in Khrushchev's speech, how could it possibly have escaped detection? It escaped our notice because few, if any, of the strategic and military experts of the West believe that the *preventive* use of strategic nuclear weapons could ever be justified on moral or rational grounds.

[8]During an interview in August 1964 with Chairman Khrushchev, Lord Thompson, a Canadian-born English newspaper magnate, asked the Soviet leader if he would favor a summit conference early next summer aimed at an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons in war. Khrushchev replied that "We would be ready. A new initiative would be welcome." He expressed doubt, however, that such an agreement would be completely effective. "The trouble is the losing side will always use nuclear weapons in the last resort to avoid defeat. If a man thinks he is going to die, he'll take any steps." (Associated Press dispatch from London, August 15, quoting an article in *The Sunday Times,* August 16, 1964.)

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Few consider that given the current nuclear stalemate, a "calculated win" is possible. Thus very little serious attention has been paid to such an "incredible" doctrine as the strategy of a "calculated win through a preventive genocidal strike."

Yet because we believe that the Soviet leaders would not adopt a strategy which on moral and military terms is incredible to us, we may overlook substantial and accumulating evidence that the Soviets may have indeed embraced this strategy and may have begun to acquire the means to execute it. Similar preconceptions blocked the prudent consideration of evidence available in the late summer and early autumn of 1962 to establish conclusively that the Soviets were breaking their official commitment not to deploy "offensive" missiles to Cuba. Americans are prone by their general optimism—virtually a national characteristic—to disbelieve unpleasant facts and to ignore warnings of an adversary's treachery. Examples are legion, but the outstanding ones are probably the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, the attack by Chinese "volunteers" in North Korea, and the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviets in 1961. Americans naturally find it difficult to believe that anything like a genocidal nuclear strike might be under preparation in the Soviet Union.

If the Soviets succeed in obtaining broad public support both within and outside this country for unilateral strategic disarmament measures on the part of the United States, they may not have to launch a preventive strike. By the time the Soviets are ready to launch their strike, the United States may have proceeded so far toward dismantling its counterforce capability that the only rational option open to it would be to forestall the Soviet preventive strike by preemptive surrender.

The fear that the United States might unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear arms while the Soviet Union engages in a massive build-up has long disturbed nuclear strategists, including Herman Kahn, who wrote in 1959:

> . . . The mutual annihilation theory [of thermonuclear war] can be successful in forestalling an all-out nuclear attack only if both sides completely accept it. If only the West "buys" it and because of this drops its guard, the negligence can be incredibly dangerous. . . . It is an open invitation to blackmail of the Munich type. Therefore, to the extent that the theory may not be true—or the Communists think it isn't—we should not weaken ourselves to the point where we are courting either "Pearl Harbors" or "Munichs." It is important to understand this problem objectively even if analyses aimed at doing so give an impression of callousness.

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The mutual annihilation view is not unique to the West. Malenkov introduced it in the Soviet Union several years ago. . . . A different view seems to have been held by Khrushchev and the Soviet military. They agreed that war would be horrible, but argued that this was no reason for the Soviet Union to drop its guard—that with sufficient preparations only the capitalists would be destroyed. With some modifications, their views seem to have prevailed.[9]

It is a fundamental truism of the nuclear age that the course of history can be governed by what each of the two superpowers believes about nuclear war. Since Kahn's warning, fast-moving technological developments have produced more awesome nuclear weapons, thus compounding the fear of "mutual annihilation." If a salvo of five-megaton warheads could produce consequences "too horrible to contemplate," a rain of fifty-megaton warheads would provide an even more self-satisfying rationalization for refusing to contemplate the consequences at all. Every increase in the destructive capability of nuclear weapons has brought a concomitant increase in the importance of the nuclear superpowers' respective beliefs as to whether such weapons ever could or should be used at all, and if so, how and when.

A Look into the Future

Khrushchev's doctrinal pronouncements in the January 1961 speech provide a logical climax to the communist strategy of protracted conflict in which the weaker party must act with the utmost caution until it overtakes its stronger capitalist adversary and can deliver the coup de grâce without serious danger to itself.[10] This Soviet strategic doctrine designed to achieve decisive nuclear superiority was not formulated in the midst of a crisis or designed to meet some future crisis situation. The concept far antedates not only the capability of executing it, but also any firm scientific assurance that the capability could be developed. We owe the

[9]"The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence," Stanford Research Institute *Journal,* Vol. 3, Fourth Quarter, 1959, p. 125.

[10]The rationale of the genocidal strategy has been explained best in the book by Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony, *A Forward Strategy for America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961):

"The logic of total nuclear war predominates throughout the entire conflict spectrum in the same manner as the law of gravity influences physical events.

"Protracted conflict and total war are dialectically related to one another. . . .

". . . *The techniques of protracted conflict are designed either to prepare for the climax of the decisive battle or to render this battle altogether superfluous.* . . .

"Protracted conflict serves to create the conditions in which the aggressor can risk the attack or issue the ultimatum for surrender, without exposing his own power base to devastation and destruction." (pp. 14-18.)

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rocket-thrust gap, now seven years old, to the fact that the Soviets apparently decided to gamble that a suitable hydrogen warhead would be available by the time the rocket was developed.

If we assume that the Soviets are capable of planning and executing a genocidal strike—and on their past record, this is a valid assumption—under what future global conditions might they resort to this strategy? The leaders of the USSR, looking ahead to the next five or ten years, might see a world in which current coexistence policies had reached a dead end; the Soviet agricultural system had proved incapable of feeding the people; the Soviet industrial system had failed to maintain the necessary growth rate and to produce sufficient capital and consumer goods; and only minimal gains had been made in wooing the Afro-Asian leaders. Realizing that the policy of peaceful coexistence, if continued, would result in further loosening of control over the satellites, loss of world communist leadership, and eventual extinction of communism as a dynamic force, Soviet leaders might well conclude that the future of Moscow-led communism could be secured only by the elimination of the United States. This, in turn, would make inevitable the collapse of the Free World and enable the USSR to reassert dominance over the communist movement and gain world hegemony.

Viewing the near future with greater optimism, the Soviets might foresee a series of U.S. defeats around the globe. The disintegration of NATO and alienation of France, together with gains by the communist party in Italy and increased friction between Turkey and Greece, might have led to the neutralization and later communist domination of Europe. A political settlement in Vietnam might have resulted in U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia. Taiwan might have "joined" Communist China. Japan might have been forced to adopt policies of accommodation toward Peking and Moscow. Large parts of Africa might have come under communist domination. The Soviets might then conclude that the United States would reverse its accommodation policies and launch a sudden strategic nuclear attack in order to "avenge" the impending U.S. defeat and deprive the Soviet Union of ultimate triumph. Even if the United States chose not to strike, the Soviets could not safely stop short of the total emasculation of U.S. power. Thus the best insurance against a U.S. "avenging" strike and against future strategic nuclear competition would be the execution of the preventive genocidal strategy.

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Strategic nuclear weapons, of the warhead power developed thus far only by the Soviet Union, now for the first time in history make possible the "assassination" of an entire nation. Communist doctrine seeks to avoid a nuclear exchange, but it has no inhibitions against the unilateral nuclear destruction of the enemy. If a surprise first strike can be of sufficient magnitude, a defender which had lost substantially its entire population and most of its retaliatory weapons, would be incapable, both physically and rationally, of making any effective retaliation. The use of this strategy either as a threat or as an operational strategy, might appear irrational to the Soviets only if it could not be implemented at acceptable cost. An ideal precondition to its use would be a substantial advance reduction in U.S. strategic capabilities brought about by U.S. unilateral disarmament.

U.S. Defense Trends

One feature of Soviet strategy is to maintain the current atmosphere of *détente* long enough to encourage the United States unilaterally to reduce its chief war-waging weapons. A discernible current trend in U.S. military planning appears to run toward the scrapping or deactivation of weapons systems capable of striking effectively at Soviet strategic (counterforce) weapons and thus to prevent their use against the United States or NATO countries.

At the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar held in April 1960 in California, Paul Nitze, now Secretary of the Navy, proposed that the United States strive for a strategic system that would make mutual deterrence more stable. The means of achieving this goal "is a series of unilateral actions designed to produce reciprocal action on the part of our allies and also on the part of our enemies."[11] This statement is similar to views expressed four years later by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. In the April 1964 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Gilpatric showed how the arms race might be tempered by complementary action—a "policy of mutual example."[12]

The Kennedy-Johnson Administration has developed a "dual approach" to military preparedness: it seeks to build strength and, at the same time, to achieve a *détente* with the Soviet Union via negotiation. To build strength the United States must forge

[11]"Power and Policy Problems in the Defense of the West," *Proceedings,* Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, April 24-30, 1960.

[12]"Our Defense Needs," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1964.

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a military establishment second to none, commensurate with its needs and obligations, yet not in "excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful." At the same time, the Administration is looking for new ways to control and abolish armaments in order to bring about a transition to a weaponless world.

This quest for peace enlivened by a deep concern over escalation, nuclear weapons proliferation and general nuclear war may, over time, reduce the margin of superiority which the United States has enjoyed throughout the Cold War. Since the Cuban missile crisis, the Administration has applied its energies primarily to the task of lessening tensions and promoting friendlier relations between the two blocs.

The Gilpatric and Nitze proposals which appear to form the basis of U.S. military policy, call for a strategic force consisting principally of an invulnerable and hardened Minuteman force and the sea-based Polaris. They pay only scant attention to the provision of air defense and the replacement of obsolete bombers. In brief, both Gilpatric and Nitze are prepared to settle for a minimum deterrent.[13] This posture may be achieved by retiring many "obsolescent" strategic weapons systems and not developing any new ones. The evidence that the United States is moving in this direction is substantial. It consists of the plan for the general phasing out by 1965 of all B-47's; the removal of strategic nuclear weapons from aircraft carriers; the failure to develop a follow-on bomber; the official insistence on the superiority of missiles over bombers; and the closing of the bases formerly used by the B-47's.[14]

[13]According to Roswell L. Gilpatric, U.S. strategic forces, tailored to a national strategy of "minimum deterrence," could by 1970 look something like this:

"A deterrent force, consisting only of hardened and dispersed land-based and mobile sea-based missiles, with all of the vulnerable, earlier-generation missiles deactivated and all manned bombers retired from active deployment. Such a force, comprised of weapons systems invulnerable to surprise attack, would be capable of destroying the centers of Soviet and Chinese Communist Society. . . .

"Manned interceptors with their ground-control counterparts and all other bomber defense and warning systems would be phased out unless the Soviets changed their presently indicated intention of concentrating their strategic power in missiles. There would be no production or deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems in the absence of Soviet moves to proceed beyond experimental installations of such systems."

[14]Professor Amitai Etzioni, in his book *Winning Without War,* describes the trend in U.S. defense planning in these words:

"The United States might complete its 1963 plans, which provide for increasing the number of nuclear submarines to at least thirty, carrying 656 Polaris missiles, and bringing the total number of Minuteman missiles up to 950 by 1968; and, once these are available and well protected, it could stop the production of more

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General Curtis E. Le May, in his speech to the Air Force Academy on June 3, 1964, expressed the view that technological superiority is the key to strategic advantage. A primary purpose of the Air Force's research and development budget is to "provide for the development of a broad base of technology for future strategic retaliatory weapons systems." Consequently, even though McNamara, Gilpatric and Nitze advocate in their speeches and writings broad research and development programs, the number of advanced weapons for strategic warfare reaching deployment or active duty in recent years has been very small. For the most part these advanced weapons systems have become the victims of cost-effectiveness trade-off considerations or the international political environment.

In a speech to the Democratic Platform Committee delivered on August 17, 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated:

> Let me assure you that your strategic forces are and will remain in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to insure the destruction of both the Soviet Union and Communist China, under the worst imaginable circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war. . . .
>
> We have, in fact, increased by 50 percent expenditures for military research and development over the level prevailing during the last four years of the previous administration. . . .
>
> I would like to mention just a few of the new projects and new weapons systems initiated or carried to completion during this Administration:
>
> The SR-71, a long-range, manned, supersonic strategic military reconnaissance aircraft, which employs the most advanced observation equipment in the world and flies at over 2,000 miles per hour and an altitude of over 80,000 feet.
>
> The new Nike-X, which will give us the option to deploy—if the national security requires it—the most advanced anti-ballistic missile yet conceived by any nation.
>
> The new A-7-A aircraft, which will give the Navy superior attack capability at more than double the range of the A-4-E that it will replace.

missiles and nuclear bombs. *At the same time, strategic bombers, which are rapidly becoming obsolete, could be phased out.* This would amount to a one-sided halting of the upward spiral of the nuclear arms race; the Russians would *then be expected to stop their production* after building a force that gave them a comparable sense of a secure *retaliatory* capability.

"Those who do not follow developments in the field of arms limitations closely may see in this plan the dubious fantasy of a 'peacemonger.' Let me therefore hasten to state that the plan was, *in effect, suggested by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1963; the figures cited are taken from his statement.* Actually, there are indications that the United States *is moving toward such a finite (as against growing) deterrent.* No new strategic bombers are to be ordered; and in mid-1963 the production of nuclear bombs was cut back. A further slowdown in the production of atomic weapons was ordered by President Johnson in January 1964." (pp. 184-185; emphasis added.)

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The Ex-10, a heavy, new type of torpedo for use against deep-diving, fast, nuclear-submarines.

The new main battle tank, which will give our ground forces armor superiority throughout the 1970's.

The revolutionary variable sweep-winged F-III fighter-bomber, a supersonic aircraft which has double the range and several times the payload of any previous fighter-bomber.[15]

The foregoing list is noteworthy, for only the SR-71 and the Nike-X will enhance U.S. capabilities for strategic warfare. The SR-71 was conceived prior to the Kennedy Administration and the Nike-X represents a new stage in the continuous development of a weapon that was first designed a decade ago. But even this "most advanced anti-ballistic missile" will only be deployed "if the national security requires it." In this connection it should not be forgotten that the Soviets have already deployed operational anti-ballistic missiles, a feat the United States cannot duplicate before several years have gone by—even if the decision to do so were made today.

Meanwhile, numerous weapons developments, which could enhance U.S. strategic capability, have been abandoned after vast sums of money have been invested in them. The latest weapon to be dropped was the Pluto, a low flying atomic-powered missile.[16] Whether the United States will maintain in the 1970's the strategic superiority it possesses today will depend on the weapons it develops and the weapons which the Soviets develop. If the Soviets refuse to follow our example of abandoning the development of advanced weapons for strategic warfare, the premises of Mc-

[15]*New York Times,* August 18, 1964. Much of the increase in the research and development budget comes from the inclusion of items, such as modifications of existing weapons systems, that were formerly accounted for in other parts of the DOD budget.

[16]Reporting on the cancellation of the Pluto project, the *New York Times* of July 13, 1964, informed its readers:

"The cause of the project's death is a combination of indecision, indifference and lack of support by the Defense Department. . . .

"The closing out of the once promising project is being carried out in embarrassed privacy, without so much as an official announcement from the commission of the death of the program. It was only in response to newspaper inquiries that the A.E.C. acknowledged the project had died earlier this month. . . .

"Pluto thus joins a growing list of projects—such as the Navaho intercontinental missile, the Seamaster jet seaplane, the nuclear airplane and the Skybolt missile —in which the Government had invested hundreds of millions of dollars only to cancel them before they emerged as useful weapons.

"In contrast to some of the other canceled projects, however, Pluto did not suffer from technical difficulties or from obsolescence due to other technological developments. There was general agreement, even among Pentagon critics, of the technical feasibility of building the missile."

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Namara's strategic predictions could turn out to be altogether wrong.

Risks and Costs

Could the Soviet Union gain world hegemony at the cost of a few hundred strategic missiles and little or no damage to the communist citadel? Khrushchev might have several reasons for believing that the United States will not strike back at all. First, he may be convinced that U.S. leadership is "too liberal to fight" even for vital U.S. interests, if such fighting carries with it the risk of nuclear war (a point he once made in an interview with Robert Frost). Khrushchev's Cuban missile gambit may have been based upon such an assumption. In moving his "first-strike" missiles clandestinely into Cuba, Khrushchev must have realized that, if his assumption were false, he was risking the destruction of the Soviet Union. The U.S. Strategic Air Command at that time could have carried thirty kilomegatons of explosive power over the Soviet Union, and could have completely saturated communist air defenses to deliver substantially all of its weapons to their targets.

When confronted by a threat of nuclear destruction from Soviet missiles in Cuba, U.S. leadership did not threaten the *first* use of strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. President Kennedy, however, did warn Moscow that the United States would regard a communist first strike from Cuba against any country in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union and would *retaliate* if necessary with nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev may have learned several lessons from the Cuban missile experience. First, the United States *would not be the first* to use nuclear weapons in a strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union. Secondly, the Soviets were warned that the United States *was* prepared to *retaliate* with nuclear weapons if its vital interests were endangered. Thirdly, Khrushchev may have concluded that Soviet power, insufficient to support the communist missile venture in Cuba, could not hope to serve Moscow's interests without being increased substantially. Hence, Khrushchev must seek to narrow the margin of superiority which had enabled the United States—once the SAC bomber force was at full alert—to force him to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba.

The United States, as demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis, was prepared to use its alerted nuclear forces in a situation in

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which it could probably have survived a nuclear exchange more readily than the Soviet Union. Khrushchev has undoubtedly asked himself: What would have been the behavior of the United States if the Soviets had enjoyed a margin of superiority, or even parity with the United States in strategic nuclear capabilities? If American leaders, as well as public opinion molders, were convinced that the use of nuclear weapons would end in the certain destruction of this country, it is unlikely that the United States would employ them against the Soviet Union either in a future crisis like the Cuban missile confrontation, or in response to a Soviet attack which had destroyed a major portion of North America. Thus deterrence would have failed.

Khrushchev's second reason for discounting the risks of his strategy is his belief that U.S. leadership will never order the use of nuclear weapons when their use will serve no rational purpose whatsoever, and will kill millions of innocent people. Could U.S. retaliatory weapons serve any rational purpose once they had failed in their primary purpose of deterring a Soviet strategic strike? Whether it would be rational to retaliate—once the *threat* to retaliate had failed to prevent the Soviet strike—would depend upon how much damage the Soviet strike had caused and what our retaliatory response could accomplish if it were unleashed.

What would a Soviet ten-kilomegaton missile attack, followed by a five-kilomegaton bomber strike, do to the United States and its people? The best answer is probably classified. But Arthur T. Hadley stated in 1961 that with the civil defense facilities and organization then available—and they are not substantially better now—a *five*-kilomegaton attack

> will kill about 140 million people, between 75 and 80 per cent of America's population, in the first sixty days. . . . The number of dead will continue to rise over a further period as long-term fallout, epidemics, lack of shelter, food and medical supplies all take their toll.[17]

Given the climate of *détente* and stalemate, there is little chance

[17]Arthur T. Hadley, *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control* (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), pp. 34-35. Hadley's study is based upon the findings of a Summer Study Seminar held in Dedham, Massachusetts, in 1960 under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Twentieth Century Fund. The participants included physicists, psychologists, lawyers, economists, mathematicians, political scientists and weapons specialists. Among those who took part were Donald T. Brennan, Hans A. Bethe, Morton H. Halperin, Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Leo Szilard, Victor F. Weisskopf and Jerome B. Wiesner.

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that Congress will ever appropriate the billions of dollars for civil defense and an anti-ballistic missile defense system needed to reduce substantially the effects of a Soviet first strike.

Therefore Khrushchev can estimate that his attack will destroy close to 90 per cent of our population. With most of our population dead, what rational purpose would be served by launching a retaliatory strike with our surviving strategic forces? If the 20 million survivors preferred to remain as survivors, they would forgo a retaliatory strike so as not to invite another Soviet attack. It certainly would not help the 180 million already dead. Even were the retaliatory strike to kill from 20 to 35 million Soviet citizens, why should we launch such a futile attack? They had no say in their government's decision to strike. As Paul Nitze recognized in his Asilomar paper:

> The principal problem . . . with this alternative, [an invulnerable second-strike purely retaliatory capability] is that it provides us with no rational military strategy if deterrence fails. . . . *If deterrence fails, the only reaction open to us is retaliation in support of a purpose that no longer exists—the purpose of deterring the enemy from taking the action they have already taken.*[18] (Emphasis added.)

Khrushchev's third reason for estimating that the Soviet Union may absorb less damage than in World War II is the probability that his high-yield weapons will knock out a large proportion of U.S. weapons systems and the communications, command and control systems, and kill those who can authorize retaliation.

The United States does not know and, in view of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, cannot discover what effect the explosion of 100-megaton weapons will have on our Minuteman missile system. For the next decade, these missiles will constitute the major part of U.S. deliverable strategic weapons. Considering the relatively small CEP (circular error of probability) and high yield of the Soviet weapons, it is quite probable that many U.S. missiles would be rendered useless by shock, electromagnetic pulse, or in other ways as yet unknown. The communications problem might be insoluble in the post-strike environment. This applies also to communications with Polaris submarines on station. There is also the question of who would be left alive with authority and facilities to issue the "fire" order. The highly complex U.S. precautions against accidental war have greatly complicated the problem of giving and executing the "fire" order. In the post-

[18] *Proceedings*, Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, p. 6.

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strike environment of a fifteen-kilomegaton attack, there will be little chance of executing complicated feats of command and control.

The greatest risk for Khrushchev in carrying out this attack is the danger of a "spasm" retaliatory blow launched by the United States before he has the opportunity to forestall it by "hotline" blackmail negotiations. Fortunately for the Soviets, the U.S. response doctrine is precisely calculated and highly flexible—and certainly not hasty. President Kennedy once indicated in an interview that he believed the Polaris force alone—by reason of its "invulnerability"—would permit the decisive pause to be prolonged "quite long."[19] The longer the pause, the more effective Soviet blackmail would be.

In planning for the possible execution of a preventive genocidal strike, Soviet strategists cannot ignore the risk that the United States might be able and willing to retaliate. But, for the reasons cited above, we cannot dismiss the possibility that they may be willing to accept this risk. If the initial surprise strike were sufficiently powerful, the extent and character of any retaliatory damage might conceivably be kept to an acceptable level.

The Soviets may also find reassurance that damage to the Soviet Union will be held within acceptable limits in the failure of the United States to develop any high-yield survivable missiles and also in the scrapping of so many U.S. manned strategic bombers that the United States can no longer count on saturating Soviet air defenses. Furthermore, the total number of Minuteman and Polaris missiles with small-yield warheads has been held to a relatively small force and the program announced in 1961 has already been reduced.[20] These U.S. retaliatory forces, assuming that com-

[19]See the interview given by President Kennedy at the White House on December 16, 1962, to news correspondents of the three broadcasting networks. The interview was reprinted in full in *U.S. News and World Report*, December 31, 1962, p. 56. President Kennedy stated:

"The fact of the matter is that the United States could wait quite long because we have missiles in hardened sites, and those missiles—even if there was a missile attack on the United States—those missiles could still be fired and destroy the Soviet Union, and so could the Polaris submarine missiles. . . . I think the Polaris alone permits us to wait to make sure that we are going to have sufficient in hand that he [Khrushchev] knows that we could destroy the Soviet Union."

[20]Dr. Harold H. Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in his testimony to a House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 11, 1964, adverted to the Department of Defense making "restraint decisions in strategic doctrine." Under questioning by Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (R., Mich.), Dr. Brown testified: "On force structure I would say that the decision not to make say three or four times as many Minutemen than we are actually making . . . has probably had an influence on the Soviets."

Mr. Ford: "That was a unilateral decision on our part?"

Dr. Brown: "Yes sir. There were, as you know, proposals to go up to . . . Minutemen, which were not accepted."

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mand and control was still operative, could only destroy Soviet cities.

By the end of the sixties, the Soviet Union will probably have strong anti-missile defenses deployed around such major cities as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. These defenses in all likelihood will have to cope with nothing but Polaris or Minuteman missiles, which have the least powerful warheads and the fewest penetration aids. The maximum number of Polaris submarines which the United States expects to have available for deployment at any one time is thirty-four; the remainder of the forty-one vessels will always be in overhaul or otherwise unavailable for deployment. Some of the thirty-four will not be on station, because of training, transit and porting requirements. The Soviets will undoubtedly sink some of them at the time of their ICBM strike. Not all of the Polaris missiles will be fired successfully; some of those that are fired will not even reach the Soviet active defense area; and there may be targeting complications as well as lack of coordination.

The Soviets, in accordance with their present plans, would have carried out a substantial evacuation of their cities, since they control the timing of the attack. Furthermore, the Soviet fall-out shelter program has been largely completed; ours has scarcely begun. Because of their passive and active defenses, but primarily because of the lack of a genocidal capability in the surviving U.S. weapons, the Soviets do not expect to sustain great population losses which might deny to them the gains achieved by their nuclear arms.

Soviet Strategic Capability

The Soviets have already built a strategic force that has largely neutralized the U.S. deterrent except for direct attacks on the United States. Do they have or can they attain the military potential for launching a genocidal strike against the United States?

Because of a vastly superior technology in the very high-yield areas, the most recent Soviet surface-to-surface missiles are at least twice as powerful as their immediate predecessors. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will exploit their superior rocket thrust to develop missiles capable of delivery over the South Pole.[21] These are ideal for the "no-warning" spearhead of a surprise attack, since U.S. ballistic missile early warning nets are oriented

[21]This is what Khrushchev meant when, admiring the new Soviet missile, he said: "You wait for it at the door, but it climbs through the window." United Press International dispatch from Moscow, December 4, 1963.

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north. The Soviets are concentrating on the highest yield strategic missiles—ideal for knocking out Minuteman missiles and killing millions of people. Furthermore, there are few indications that the Soviets plan to scrap any of their growing strategic bomber fleet. Armed with weapons of 100 megatons, these bombers would have a "free-ride" over the United States after a surprise missile attack. If Washington adopts a minimum deterrence posture, the United States would have no defense against these bombers, nor would it have any active defense against missiles. The Soviets have some 800 medium-range and intermediate-range missiles and nearly a thousand medium bombers to cover Western Europe, including Great Britain.

In sum, the Soviet Union at present holds world supremacy in the technology of strategic nuclear super-weapons,[22] a supremacy guaranteed by the Test Ban Treaty of Moscow; has predominance in high-yield warheaded missiles of intercontinental, intermediate and medium range; is the only country to have deployed anti-missile missile systems; has a monopoly of knowledge of the effects of high-yield nuclear explosions; has the second largest missile-carrying submarine fleet in the world; has a substantial number of hardened missile sites; has a substantial fleet of intercontinental and intermediate-range bombers, armed with bombs up to 100 megatons;[23] has the largest, most powerful and best equipped conventional forces in the world; and has far more numerous ground forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons than the United States and its European allies put together.

These Soviet advantages exist now. In addition, there is a very high probability that in the near future the Soviets will also possess: a monopoly of strategic nuclear weapons having a substantial counterforce capability; a monopoly of long-range air-to-ground ballistic missiles; a monopoly of nuclear-powered long endurance aircraft; a monopoly of nuclear-propelled space vehicles; and a monopoly of inner-space orbiting (with rendezvous capability) weapons systems. In their 1961 moratorium-breaking series of tests, the Soviets improved their yield/weight ratios in

[22]Testimony of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Reprinted in *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings* before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, United States Senate (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 273.

[23]The Soviets have not perceptibly reduced their bomber force as had been predicted; in fact they have developed supersonic bombers faster than Western observers thought they could.

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the very high yield areas by a factor of at least 5; and they must have increased this further in the 1962 series.

The deliberate and callous Soviet exploitation of the moratorium from 1958 to 1961 suggests strongly that the Soviets were preparing to achieve a genocidal posture while preventing the United States from making any significant progress in high-yield nuclear technology. Those realistic Americans who feared the Soviets might cheat during the "reciprocal test moratorium" worried about Soviet underground testing in the low kiloton range. But the Soviets were preparing for nuclear weapons experimentation in the highest yield warheads. Given the constantly improving guidance systems in their missiles, and their knowledge of the location of hardened U.S. missile sites, the Soviet test series stressed high-yield weapons far more powerful than needed for effective counterforce warheads, if counterforce only was to be the objective.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their testimony submitted to the Senate committees on the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, stated unequivocably:

> The USSR is ahead of the United States in the high-yield—tens of megatons—technology . . . and in the weight/yield ratios of high-yield devices. . . . if the Treaty goes into effect . . . the United States would not be able to overtake the present advantage which the USSR probably has in the high-yield weapons field.[24]

As early as 1960, it was recognized that the Soviets had the capability to produce hundreds of ICBM's. We are told that the Soviets failed to exploit this capability. But is it possible that the Soviets actually had four ICBM's located at each missile site? Or, on the other hand, is it possible that they were awaiting the testing of anti-population warheads in 1961 and 1962, the designing of techniques to rework old warheads into the larger new warheads, and the development of new types of missiles—for delivery by submarine and over the South Pole—required for the no-warning spearhead of the surprise attack? It would have been counterproductive for the Soviets to mass-produce missiles which would have been obsolete by the time the "no-warning" missiles and huge warheads were ready. Developmental tests of these more advanced missiles were conducted some time ago and were highly satisfactory. The production of enough submarines to carry a substantial number of additional "no-warning spearhead" missiles is also going forward.

[24] *Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, loc. cit.*

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Meanwhile, the deployment of any large number of missiles could be held up to protect the program from U.S. intelligence and to encourage adoption of a finite deterrent posture by the United States. The complete control over timing enjoyed by the aggressor enables the Soviets to coordinate all programs so that their strategic posture can be raised to full counterforce-counterpopulation in the shortest possible time to prevent discovery by the United States.

The Genocidal War Plan

It may be argued that a Soviet genocidal posture matched against a U.S. basic deterrent posture might not force U.S. capitulation by threat alone, since our countervalue capability would still be formidable. Indeed, in the face of a Soviet ultimatum, backed by a genocidal posture, it might be rational *to threaten* to launch our countervalue strike rather than to agree to surrender our strategic weapons. But it would *not be rational actually to launch them.* And no threat is ever credible if the party threatened (the USSR) is convinced that the execution of the threat would not be a rational act, and that the party making the threat (the U.S.) is not irrational enough to carry it out. Paradoxically, the more rationally the United States acts, the less credible is the threat to use its nuclear arsenal.

If the Soviets decide to implement the genocidal strategy, the following series of events is likely to occur: The United States is confronted with a Soviet ultimatum to surrender its strategic nuclear weapons. The communication is secret (to the President and his advisers only) and the terms of surrender are made in the form of a face-saving bilateral disarmament agreement. The demand is backed by a Soviet claim to possess a genocidal posture, and an offer is made to prove this capability by spot checks. This limited inspection convinces U.S. leaders of the truthfulness of Soviet claims. Although the United States still possesses a countercity capability, the Soviets warn that an attempted U.S. preemptive strike would be detected in advance and would bring an immediate Soviet strike. Even if the United States strikes first, the Soviet strike in response would result in the annihilation of the U.S. population. If it is clear in advance that a U.S. decision to launch a strike—even a first strike—with essentially countercity weapons would trigger the annihilation of the American people, and would not block the road to Soviet hegemony, the only rational con-

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clusion would be for the United States to accept a "negotiated settlement" of the "disarmament problem" under pressure of the Soviet threat. U.S. leadership could persuade itself that Americans would be much better off by meeting the Soviet "disarmament" demands. Moreover, "the world" and "mankind" would be better off by avoiding the huge nuclear exchange with its incalculable effects. Thus the goal of Soviet genocidal strategy could be attained through an ultimatum to Washington to disarm.

Can the Minimum Deterrent Deter?

Many Americans are attracted to the idea of reducing military spending by amounts such as the $12.8 billion a year suggested by Gilpatric.[25] There is no sense in buying more than enough, they reason, and they are constantly assured through the news and opinion media that the United States does indeed have "enough" strategic weapons and delivery systems in the Polaris and Minuteman systems alone. They are told: "Regardless of the design of any Soviet ABM system . . . the Soviets will know that we will continue to have the capability to penetrate and to devastate the Soviet Union if a retaliatory blow is required."[26]

How much is enough? Before any American can make his own judgment on how much military strength is enough he is entitled to know what "options" will be open to Soviet leaders and to the United States if this strategy of minimum deterrence is adopted by Washington and becomes irreversible. According to the testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara,[27] the United States could, with 1962 techniques, rework up to sixty megatons each the nuclear warheads for delivery by B-52 bombers. Yet the Administration's plans to phase out these bombers (after 1972) and its reluctance to develop any advanced manned bomber systems will strip the United States of the greatest factor of "net superiority." It would take well over 10,000 Minuteman missiles to replace the manned bomber potential delivery capability, yet only 1000 are scheduled.

The United States is not only stripping itself of all its massive nuclear strike capability, but also of that other factor of "net

[25]Gilpatric, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

[26]Testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara in *Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, op. cit.*, p. 104. To carry out such a devastating retaliatory blow, the United States would have to possess near perfect intelligence of the deployment of Soviet strategic forces.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 101.

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superiority"—a *variety* of delivery systems. The United States will have remaining only the small payload solid-fuel Minuteman and Polaris missiles for delivery vehicles. The limited capability of even the latest types of these missiles in carrying penetration aids makes them vulnerable to even the least sophisticated anti-missile defense systems.

The only operational element of "superiority" left to the United States will be in numbers of small (relative to the Soviets') warheaded missiles. One of their sixty-megaton missiles would be the equivalent in destructive power of many U.S. Minuteman or Polaris missiles. At present the United States claims a "superiority"—meaning "numbers" superiority—of four to one. Assuming that this ratio of missiles is accurate and that the Soviets permit it to continue (if they should choose *not* to exploit their capability of producing large numbers of missiles), they would have a missile-delivered destructive power capability equal to or greater than ours by virtue of the far greater yield of their nuclear warheads.

The current U.S. trend toward a finite deterrence posture is a unilateral act. It is not part of an agreement under which the Soviet Union would also hold its strategic nuclear forces to a similar force level. Nor is it even part of an "interlocking unilateral disarmament" scheme: the Soviets have not made even the smallest unilateral gesture toward adopting a finite deterrence posture. In the case of the cutback in plutonium-enriched uranium production,[28] the Soviets at least announced they would take reciprocal action, although there was nothing "interlocking" about this move and absolutely no verification was offered by the Soviets. Thus the trend toward unilateral counterforce disarmament of the United States lacks mutuality. The United States is taking a "unilateral initiative," which need not be revealed explicitly to the American people nor confirmed by the United States Senate.

During the Cuban missile crisis the United States was able to mount an airborne alert which could have put almost 100 bombers over the Soviet Union. In addition at least 2,000 U.S. bombers were on full alert and could have been airborne in less than ten minutes. We also had scores of heavy nuclear attack aircraft based on U.S. Navy carriers which would have complicated Soviet de-

[28]The Soviets, by retiring obsolete plants and concentrating on more efficient facilities, will actually increase the production of fissionable materials.

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fense problems. We had strategic missiles in Turkey, Italy and England, in close range to the Soviet heartland, and Western Europe and Northern Africa were covered with a network of U.S. airfields on which were based fighter aircraft with nuclear capability as well as light bombers. In a future crisis, under the minimum deterrence posture, the United States will be without weapons capable of destroying Soviet strategic weapons or of making a credible first strike. If we disarm ourselves of counterforce and first-strike weapons and the balance of strategic military power is shifted against us, we will have little choice but suicide or surrender if Khrushchev delivers an ultimatum calling on us to disarm.

It may fairly be asked: Could we not threaten Khrushchev with the use of our Polaris and Minuteman missiles? The threat would be useless, because the Soviets would not believe it, for under a minimum deterrence posture an attempted U.S. first strike could not knock out a sufficient number of the Soviet superweapons which in retaliation would wipe out our population. Polaris and Minuteman, given their relatively small warheads and the small number we plan to deploy, simply are not the most effective counterforce weapons. Furthermore, we do not know the exact locations of a sufficient number of strategic Soviet targets.

The defense posture toward which the Administration's programs are moving may invite the Soviets to launch a nuclear strike against the United States on a "calculated-win" basis. Even if the minimum deterrence posture could function successfully under optimum assumptions of survivability, command, control and targeting in the post-attack environment, it still could not provide a credible deterrent against a Soviet annihilating surprise attack. The Soviets, although they might be concerned, despite the reasons illustrated above, that the risk to their cities was very great, might still make a net gain by launching the genocidal strike.

The Case Against the Genocidal Strategy

One of the strongest arguments against the Soviet genocidal strategy is the difficulty of secretly developing and deploying the huge, soft missiles, and the possibility that, if detected "in time," a Soviet program of this size and nature inevitably would trigger a U.S. reaction. The question of secrecy is complex, as is any probable U.S. reaction to a premature detection. The Soviets had little difficulty in keeping secret from us the three years of

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intensive and elaborate preparations for exploiting the nuclear test moratorium, or the shipment across the USSR and 7,000 miles of ocean and the unloading at Cuban ports of at least forty-two offensive missiles. Nor were we well prepared by intelligence for the launching of Sputnik I or the testing of the first ICBM's.

The United States would need far more accurate and swifter intelligence than it has ever secured on any previous Soviet program. Yet the fact that crucial items are developed unseen in Soviet laboratories vastly complicates the intelligence problem. The relatively long lead-time components, such as guidance systems and complex electronic parts which would have entered serial production earliest, are small and can be produced under conditions of the highest security. Sub-assemblies could also be accomplished in secrecy. The only part of the process vulnerable to the best type of intelligence the U.S. has demonstrated thus far would be the final assembly and emplacement stages.

Their closed society and nine million square mile land mass enable the Soviets to conceal and disperse their missiles. Soviet strategists have warned us of the danger of having only "fragmentary intelligence data" on counterforce targets.[29] The United States lacks enough information on the precise locations of land-based Soviet weapons and on the production rate of strategic-missile-carrying submarines. Also, there is a strong tendency among U.S. strategists to overrate the effectiveness of technical intelligence collection methods.[30] Admittedly, U.S. intelligence techniques are improving, but their capabilities for all-weather and nighttime reconnaissance are still marginal. In the past, the Soviets have been able to conceal their major strategic moves from us, regardless of the magnitude of their preparations.

Assuming that the United States nevertheless detected the Soviet build-up and the Administration was spurred to action, at what point between the initiation of the Soviet program and a surprise attack, or delivery of an ultimatum to us, would the United States still have time to catch up? Upon detection of the Soviet build-up, U.S. leaders might react by assuming that the additional Soviet first-strike missiles constituted no new threat to us. Indeed, this threat would be more ambiguous and not so

[29]Thomas W. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 475-478.

[30]The United States will not be alone in securing useful data from space satellites. Intelligence gained in this manner by the Soviets would facilitate their first counterforce strike.

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imminent as the threat posed by the clandestine deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba, inside the U.S. warning net. Even assuming that U.S. leadership recognized the threat of the Soviet secret first-strike missile program to be more dangerous than that posed by the shipment of missiles to Cuba, recent experience indicates that the U.S. reaction might not be a determination to try to catch up with the Soviet program.

In recent years, whenever the U.S. government has been confronted with an unexpected Soviet nuclear threat, whether the threat was technological or operational in nature, our immediate concern was not so much with the Soviet action but with our alleged failure to do enough to remove the "anxieties" prompting their action. This reaction is linked to the widespread belief that nuclear weapons are inherently evil—"we must destroy them before they destroy us." Our reaction to Soviet betrayal of the test ban moratorium was not to seek to regain our former supremacy in nuclear technology, but to engage in additional technological disarmament by seeking a test ban agreement which would automatically guarantee the permanence of Soviet supremacy in high-yield nuclear weapons. Our reaction to the Cuban missile threat has been to accelerate the phasing out of strategic nuclear bombers which in 1962 composed about 90 per cent of the U.S. capability of meeting the Soviet threat. The end product of the Cuban missile crisis was more disarmament negotiations and a second test ban.

The only measure which could force the Soviets to abandon their strategy would be U.S. reentry into the counterforce-counter-population arms race with a massive crash program. Here again, a U.S. decision to act is problematical. During the past few years, the United States has apparently decided to withdraw unilaterally from the strategic arms race, even though the Soviets are expanding their nuclear strike capabilities. The United States has retained few "hedges" to permit our reentry, if necessary, into the race. Without such hedges as the development of advanced weapons systems; provision for sudden mass production of high-yield, hardened, accurate missiles and advanced types of manned bombers; conversion of large numbers of surface vessels, naval and commercial, into carriers of Polaris missiles; an instantaneous and prolonged airborne alert of more than one-half instead of less than one-eighth of our remaining bombers; active and passive defense measures, and other essentials to a pre-strike mobilization

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base, reentry into the strategic arms race might be a high risk, if not an impossible undertaking.

Years of lost lead-time on advanced weapons systems can never be regained, as we learned in our futile attempts to overtake the Soviet lead in rocket thrust, a lead first evident in 1957 and unrelinquished in 1964. Nearly four years of lead-time has already run out for development, production and deployment of advanced counterforce systems. The B-47's can never be redeployed to the European and African air bases from which SAC forces used to surround the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that IRBM's will again be deployed in Italy, Turkey or England. The U.S. SAC airborne alert capability is downgraded with every U.S. bomber scrapped, every base abandoned. It will require years to deploy active missile defenses or to develop an effective system of passive defenses.

The United States would labor under the additional disadvantage that by the time the Soviets' mass production of first-strike high-yield missiles had reached the stage where we had a fair chance of discovering it, they could most likely complete their program within six months to a year, whereas we could hardly expect even the most urgent crash program to procure substantial additional counterforce capabilities in the time remaining. The Soviets could terminate the new phase of the "race" by launching a strike or by delivering the ultimatum. The above argument, based on the hypothesis of a relatively early discovery of the Soviet build-up, obviously applies with even greater force to a U.S. reaction to the completed build-up of a Soviet genocidal capability.

The Soviets do not need to achieve a full genocidal posture to acquire the capability to destroy the United States by a strategic surprise attack. They already have that capability. They have had it since they multiplied their nuclear explosive power by a factor of from 5 to 10 as a result of their nuclear test series in 1961 and 1962, and gained the knowledge to rework with the new techniques their older warheads. The only reason the Soviets need an improved genocidal posture is to eliminate or reduce to the lowest possible level the U.S. retaliatory strike which might otherwise be expected in response to a Soviet surprise attack against an unprepared and unalerted United States.

One of the Soviets' major advantages in adopting a genocidal strategy is that it is completely incredible not only to U.S. civilian leadership, but also to the most knowledgeable and realistic strategists and military experts in the West. If the latter were

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asked to evaluate inconclusive evidence of the existence of such a Soviet program, they would discount it because it would be so alien to their thinking. Even the "hardest" U.S. strategists can believe in a Soviet genocidal strike only as a purely intellectual exercise. Most strategists, because they are incapable of making an objective analysis of the merits of such a strategy from the Soviet point of view, reject the hypothesis that the Soviets may be preparing a genocidal strategy. It is difficult to bring oneself to believe that a Soviet leader is willing, if necessary, to be "the first in history to kill one hundred million people."

Conclusion

The only way the United States can avoid the stark alternatives of suicide or surrender is to halt the trend toward a minimum deterrence strategy, for as Paul Nitze argued in his Asilomar paper, "the principal problem" of this strategy is "that it provides us with no rational military strategy *if deterrence fails.*"[31] The minimum deterrence posture provides us with no rational military policy long *before* deterrence is put to any test of failure or success and gives the enemy the option—indeed the incentive—to alter drastically the strategic balance of power.

The present trend in U.S. military policy may ultimately end the nuclear arms race by the default of the United States, since strategic "superiority" will no longer exist. If the new U.S. defense trends become irreversible, the Cold War will be ended. There will be no more military opposition to communist expansion or aggression carried out under the strategic umbrella of the world's only nuclear superpower.

Once stripped of strategic nuclear superiority, we will have no second chance to rebuild the strength essential to survival in the nuclear era. There is a fatal difference between the conventional disarmaments of the past and nuclear disarmament. This difference has been most eloquently expressed by Winston Churchill:

> Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose.
>
> But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever.[32]

[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 6 (emphasis added).

[32] Taken from his message of May 3, 1963 to the Primrose League, a patriotic and Conservative organization of which he had been the Grand Master. Reported in the *Washington Post*, May 4, 1963.

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The United States can force the Soviets to abandon the option of a genocidal strategy only by creating a U.S. force posture so powerful and invulnerable as to convince future Soviet leaders that to launch a preventive attack would result in the most certain destruction of the Soviet Union. This posture must be maintained until the Soviet Union permits open inspection of military installations and tears down the iron curtain sealing off its society against the rest of mankind. An assured survivable capability of *delivery on target* of thirty kilomegatons, approximately what the United States possessed in 1962, and an adequate defense for the American people would probably be needed. The creation of such a strategic posture lies easily within our technological, industrial and financial capabilities. A capability of this size would force the Soviets to reconsider their decision to press on toward world conquest, for it could endure a Soviet preventive strike and still demolish the Soviet power base. Unwilling to engage in "adventurism," the Soviets would abandon their strategy and their goals —at least for as long as the United States maintained its strong and invulnerable military posture.

It will be argued that the entire thesis of this article is invalidated by failure to recognize the changes in the world situation since 1961, when Khrushchev enunciated his doctrine on world wars and a Soviet preventive genocidal strategy. The contention will be made that the hypothesis of the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy clings "to old myths in the face of new realities," and thus fails to recognize that the Soviet Union, while still "a most formidable adversary, has ceased to be totally and implacably hostile to the West."[33]

The failure to distinguish between Soviet doctrine and capabilities and Soviet propaganda can be fatal. Eras of *détente* have opened at various times in the past; but they closed as the tactical line shifted. It may be wise to ponder the concluding lines of Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961:

> The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, is, and shall be true to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. . . . It will always struggle for universal peace, for the victory of communism as we were taught by great Lenin.

It should be remembered that Khrushchev's speech, based on a theme of malevolence toward capitalist America, was given full

[33]From a speech delivered on the floor of the Senate on March 25, 1964, by Senator J. William Fulbright. *New York Times,* March 26, 1964, p. 12.

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publicity and world-wide distribution by the Soviets at a time marked by outward signs of a growing and unprecedented *détente*. The arrangement for the release of the RB-47 fliers had been timed to coincide with the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration. Messages of friendship were exchanged. The new U.S. President invited the Soviets to "explore the stars" together with us. So great indeed were the manifestations of *détente* that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was then asked whether he believed U.S.-Soviet relations were due for a major change. Now, more than three years later, his answer takes on new significance in the light of current proposals to discard as "old myths" the time-tested doctrine calling for safeguards before, and not after, the dismantling of U.S. strategic power, and to rely instead upon the "new realities" of an "honorable *détente*" with the Soviets:

> I would hope that we would not be unduly optimistic that relationships have basically changed just because of the events of the last, say, few weeks. One still has the manifesto of the Communist summit to read. One still has Mr. Khrushchev's January 6 speech to study.[34]

The late President John F. Kennedy appeared to have an intuitive appreciation of the importance of that speech by the Soviet Chairman. He is reported to have considered it to be "one of the most significant speeches ever made by Khrushchev—indeed, a Red blueprint for eventual world domination," and had directed the nation's top policymakers to read it.[35] It should now be read over again in the light of actual developments in Soviet scientific and strategic programs.

[34]Text of Secretary Rusk's news conference of February 6, 1961, reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, February 27, 1961, p. 302.
[35]*Time*, February 2, 1962.

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WEST GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY*

by Wallace C. Magathan, Jr.

SINCE shortly after the Second World War and the adoption of such major U.S. policies and programs as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift and the formation of NATO, American statesmen have repeatedly affirmed that "the security of Europe and the security of the United States are inseparable." Similarly, they have publicly acknowledged that the strength and location of West Germany make her indispensable to the defense of Western Europe, and that the defense of the border of West Germany is tantamount to the defense of the United States.[1] Given this official view of the strategic importance of Europe and in particular of West Germany, it is not surprising that the U.S. government has taken the leading role in devising measures, compatible with overall U.S. strategy, to ensure the security of the Federal Republic.

Yet the United States cannot treat West Germany as if it were American territory. Measures for the defense of the Federal Republic are basically a NATO responsibility. NATO policy and the force contributions of member countries determine the nature of any response to Soviet aggression. Since this policy is the result of compromise among fifteen nations, changes to it may be effected only by the laborious and lengthy process of obtaining a new consensus. Thus, a minimum requisite for change is agreement among the major NATO powers, on the strength of which the rest of the allies might be expected to follow suit.

In recent years, the Kennedy-Johnson Administration has sought to introduce changes in NATO's war plans and force levels. Taking into account growing Soviet capabilities, the Administration began in the early 1960's to revise its strategies for dealing with general war, for deterring wars of any size, and

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or policy of the Department of Defense or of any department or agency of the U.S. government.

[1]For statements on these aspects of U.S. policy, see, for example, Vice President Johnson, "Enhancing the Strength and Unity of the North Atlantic Community." Address before the North Atlantic Council, Paris, April 6, 1961, in *Department of State Bulletin,* April 24, 1961, p. 582, and Dean Acheson, "Withdrawal From Europe? 'An Illusion'," *New York Times Magazine,* December 15, 1963, p. 68.

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for preventing escalation of local or small-scale conflicts. Efforts to apply these changes to the NATO theater and to meet West European objections to the new policies have not been entirely successful. For example, Washington has requested NATO member-states to increase their conventional forces and, to allay European concerns about the availability of nuclear weapons in times of crisis, it has proposed the seaborne multilateral force. The West European NATO members, some of whom want a greater voice in the formulation of defense strategies, have flatly rejected the former and are unenthusiastic about the latter proposal.

The West European nations, in short, are deeply committed to present defense policies. These are such a part of the very fabric of European politics that it will take years of unremitting effort on the part of the United States, both within NATO and bilaterally with NATO governments, to adapt Western strategy to the growth of Soviet nuclear power and to the striking return to health of the European nations themselves. The alternative, to confront the Europeans with their responsibilities through withdrawal of U.S. forces, is as unacceptable as any attempt to continue the paternalistic attitude of the past.

In the American effort to revise NATO military policies, the position of West Germany is crucial. A favorable attitude by the Bonn government toward these changes might lead eventually to NATO's acceptance of current U.S. proposals. In this article, we will trace the development in recent years of West German defense policy through the pronouncements of Franz-Josef Strauss, former Defense Minister, his successor, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, and other government officials.[2]

U.S. Views on the Defense of Europe

The Kennedy-Johnson Administration has sought to revise NATO military policy in light of the increased long-range nuclear strike capability of the Soviet Union. Speaking to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa in May 1961, President Kennedy explained this point and indicated the need for the Alliance to strengthen its conventional capability "as a matter of the highest priority." He also suggested "the possibility of eventually establishing a

[2]For an earlier examination of West German defense policies, see my article, "Some Bases of West German Military Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1960.

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NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control."[3]

On the first point, the strengthening of conventional forces, Vice President Johnson had already put the North Atlantic Council on notice that "a vigorous and sustained effort to build up NATO's non-nuclear defenses will be required."[4] And in a talk to the Military Committee of NATO President Kennedy expounded further on what the United States had in mind: "NATO needs to be able to respond to any conventional attack with conventional resistance which will be effective at least long enough, in General Norstad's phrase, to force a pause."[5] In the months that followed, the United States continued to press the case for conventional forces. For example, in August 1963 Secretary Rusk argued that a balanced conventional-nuclear force structure, including powerful conventional forces, was needed to enhance the deterrent and cement the North Atlantic Alliance in periods of prolonged tension by providing a range of alternative responses. He also pointed out that the attainment of "certain force goals" approved by NATO "would represent a *first step* toward such a balanced military posture."[6]

The United States evidently remained unsatisfied with progress toward the accomplishment of this aim in the Alliance, for, in his first formal communication to the North Atlantic Council, President Johnson reiterated the theme:

> First among these [common] tasks is that of creating a balanced NATO defense posture, including powerful nuclear and non-nuclear forces, which will deter aggression with the force appropriate to the threat.[7]

The gist of the U.S. government's view was that NATO should command, as a minimum, sufficient conventional forces to be able to bring a Soviet conventional attack temporarily to a halt by nonnuclear means alone, and that the nonnuclear force goals of NATO constituted a first step toward the attainment of sufficiency. In other words, the United States visualized the combating of a Soviet nonnuclear attack, if possible, in two phases: first, a

[3] "The Common Aims of Canada and the United States," *Department of State Bulletin,* June 5, 1961, p. 841.
[4] "Enhancing the Strength and Unity of the North Atlantic Community," *Department of State Bulletin,* April 24, 1961, p. 582.
[5] *Department of State Bulletin,* May 1, 1961, p. 647.
[6] "The State of the North Atlantic Alliance." Speech before the Virginia State Bar Association, White Sulphur Springs, July 12, 1963, *Department of State Bulletin,* August 5, 1963, p. 193.
[7] *New York Times,* December 17, 1963, from the text of President Johnson's message to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO, December 16, 1963.

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nonnuclear action and second, as an extremity, after affording an opportunity for the Soviet Union to reflect on the risks of its course of action, a resort to nuclear weapons. The concept of phasing was important. Without it there was no rational basis for force requirements planning or for mustering the necessary popular support for the creation of additional conventional forces.

The Position of Franz-Josef Strauss

By the end of the 1950's NATO had become wedded to the concept of nuclear deterrence of armed aggression above the scale of minor actions or incursions. Major NATO nations regarded any serious effort to increase conventional forces as inimical to that concept. The French and British commitments to national nuclear forces (and concomitant reduction of conventional forces) clearly evidenced their convictions. As for the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO policies apparently accurately reflect its national interests; the defense policy of West Germany is, for all practical purposes, coterminous with that of NATO. All operational formations of the *Bundeswehr* (the West German armed forces) are committed to NATO. As the most exposed country in Western Europe, West Germany has been especially sensitive to any shift in NATO policy.

Franz-Josef Strauss, Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic from 1956 through 1962, argued against conventional war because of the devastation which it would wreak on Europe and the likelihood of its escalating to nuclear war in any case. Once unleashed, one could never bring it to a conclusion.[8] He disagreed with the U.S. view that the use of tactical nuclear weapons, such as the Davy Crockett, would touch off general nuclear war.[9] Nuclear weapons should not be shifted "to the rear in order to create

[8]Strauss warned: ". . . a conventional war . . . would produce such unimaginable destruction that one cannot consider it the lesser evil. We are against conventional war on two grounds:

"(1) Because its damage and devastation in Europe would be incalculable and probably irreparable, and

"(2) Because conventional war . . . contains . . . the highly probable risk that it would evolve into a nuclear war. . . .

"In our exposed geograptical position one cannot warn loudly enough against the concept that one could eliminate the atomic weapon and thereby open the valve of conventional war. If this valve were once opened, it would never be closed by anyone." From a speech by Strauss before a gathering of international students in Bonn, July 28, 1962.

[9]*New York Times,* August 4, 1962, Gerd Wilcke, "Strauss Bids U.S. Clarify Strategy." Wilcke observed that Herr Strauss' criticism of U.S. policy had "few parallels."

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elbow room up front for a conventional conflict." Perfection of these weapons permitted them to be placed up front so that "no real chance of success could be perceived for an attack." The risk for an aggressor must be incalculable and the capability of NATO forces such that "the risk begins immediately on the battlefield." Existence of a "threshold of risk" would encourage a potential aggressor to exploit it.[10]

Finally, he justified arming the *Bundeswehr* with nuclear weapons as carrying out a NATO requirement ratified by the German Parliament. Defending the German policy in the influential NATO military journal, *Revue Générale Militaire,* he quoted from the March 25, 1958 resolution of the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament):

> In conformity with the requirements of this defensive system [defense of the national territory within the framework of NATO] and in light of the armament of the prospective adversary, the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany ought to be equipped with the most modern weapons in order to be able to satisfy the engagements assumed within the frame of NATO and to be able to contribute effectively to maintaining peace.

He added that the NATO document, MC 70, produced by the NATO Standing Group, set out in detail for each country all forces, including those equipped with nuclear weapons, to be placed in service from 1958 to 1963.[11]

Strauss' plan called for a *Bundeswehr* ultimately consisting of 12 Army divisions, 28 Air Force squadrons and 22 Navy squadrons, with a total strength of 350,000. At the beginning of 1961, the *Bundeswehr* counted some 290,000 in its ranks; full strength was to be attained by 1963.[12]

In the summer of 1961 the West was in the grip of crisis over Berlin. To dissuade the Soviet Union from action inimical to the West, the United States urged NATO nations to increase the strength and readiness of their armed forces.[13] On August 18, Chancellor Adenauer informed the *Bundestag* that the crisis would force West Germany to increase its military forces, within

[10]From Strauss' speech, Bonn, July 28, 1962.

[11]"Armement Atomique et Bundeswehr," *Revue Générale Militaire,* May 1962, pp. 556-57.

[12]*New York Times,* June 29, 1961. The goal for the Army was 200,000; the Navy, 25,000; the Territorial Defense, 25,000; the Air Force, 100,000. *Wehrkunde,* December 1960, "Die Bundeswehr 1960" (anonymous), p. 607.

[13]See the report of Secretary Rusk's remarks before the North Atlantic Council, August 8, 1961. *New York Times,* August 9, 1961.

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the frame of NATO. In October, Minister Strauss, at a meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), announced the government's determination to lengthen the period of conscription from twelve to eighteen months and to increase the defense budget by DM 2.4 billion to DM 13.5 billion for 1962. This announcement, made in response to urging from Washington, was West Germany's contribution to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Berlin and German issues. These efforts were the subject of discussion between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer at their meeting in Washington in November 1961. In their communiqué they "also agreed on the necessity for maintaining and increasing the ability of the NATO alliance to cope with any military developments."[14] In January 1962, the Bonn Defense Ministry called up 42,500 recruits, thereby bringing the strength of the *Bundeswehr* to about 375,000, exceeding by 25,000 the force level planned for 1963. In March the German Parliament completed action on a government measure to lengthen conscription to eighteen months.

Thus, by early 1962, under the impetus of the Berlin crisis, the Federal Republic had laid the basis for greatly improving the capability of the *Bundeswehr*. Yet, in July, Strauss indicated that the Adenauer Government was prepared to do even more. In speaking before a gathering of international students at Bonn University, Strauss stated that the *Bundeswehr* "could not be enlarged beyond the present goal of 500,000 men." Reasons of manpower, material and finances, he said, precluded the government from putting more men under arms.[15] Shortly afterward, he implied that the Americans had requested the Federal Republic to raise the strength of the *Bundeswehr* to 750,000, and asserted that such a figure was "absolutely unrealistic."[16] German defense officials cited a need for an increase of DM 3 billion (to more than 18 billion) to push the build-up to 500,000 men in 1963.

[14]For the text of the communiqué see *ibid.*, November 23, 1961; also accompanying dispatch by E. W. Kenworthy, "U.S. and Bonn Set Stand on Berlin for Soviet Talk."

[15]*Ibid.*, July 29, 1962.

[16]*Ibid.*, Gerd Wilcke, "Strauss Bids U.S. Clarify Strategy," August 4, 1962. The German government emphatically denied the validity of Strauss' assertion. See *ibid.*, August 2, 1962. The figure of 750,000 is probably based on Secretary McNamara's observations that NATO Europe on the average only had 1.1 per cent of its manpower under arms compared to 1.5 per cent in the U.S. (See *ibid.*, December 15, 1962.) Taking 1.5 per cent of roughly 50,000,000 West Germans works out to 750,000.

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They claimed that it would cost DM 40 billion to maintain 750,000 men with necessary civilian and auxiliary personnel.[17]

The Federal government's decision to revise upward the ultimate size of the *Bundeswehr* constituted a major departure in defense planning. In effect, the government had returned to the original force level abandoned in February 1958, just prior to parliamentary approval of nuclear weapons for the German armed forces. Although the increase in personnel envisioned no change in the number of major combat formations to be assigned to NATO, it would permit an increase in manning levels of major formations and in combat and logistical support units. Despite its adherence to basic NATO doctrine, the Bonn government had clearly adopted measures to enhance the conventional capability of the military establishment. By December 1962, when Strauss relinquished his office to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the strength of the *Bundeswehr* had risen to 398,000. He could reply to his critics that ". . . West Germany [had agreed] to build the strongest conventional forces in NATO apart from the United States." He could also protest: "I am not against a pause or nuclear threshold."[18] He was not yet ready, however, to ask the government to provide the additional resources for the *Bundeswehr* implied by his remarks. Approximately 100,000 additional personnel might be required to put the German army on a roughly comparable footing with the U.S. Seventh Army in the important areas of nondivisional combat and service support and general readiness for sustained combat.[19]

The clue to the interpretation of Strauss' views is found in his upholding of the indivisibility of deterrence: "I am against a *public* discussion of either [a pause or a nuclear threshold] as a *fixed* element in Allied strategy, a discussion with the *inevitable* outcome that the credibility of *the* deterrent is weakened."[20] But where else, except in public, is the case to be made for the additional resources needed to increase Germany's armed forces? Yet Strauss believed that any public discussion of pause was tantamount to a breach of national security; it was his application of

[17] *Ibid.*, August 12, 1962, Gerd Wilcke, "Bonn Plans Rise in Arms Budget."

[18] *Ibid.*, Sydney Gruson, "Bonn Backing U.S. on A-war 'Pause'," March 1, 1962.

[19] The U.S. Seventh Army with the equivalent of 6 divisions has about 230,000 personnel. On a comparable basis the German army should have a strength of about 460,000 for an overall *Bundeswehr* total of 610,000. This figure can be nothing more than an indication; a precise figure would require a lengthy study and detailed comparison of the structure of both armies.

[20] *New York Times,* March 1, 1962, as quoted by Sydney Gruson (emphasis added).

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sanctions against *Der Spiegel* for publishing an article critical of his military policies (and, he alleged, containing classified information) that led to his forced resignation.[21]

Organizing Nuclear Support for NATO

President Kennedy's second recommendation for meeting the nuclear needs of the Alliance made at Ottawa in May 1961 was the establishment of a seaborne multilateral nuclear force (MLF).[22] It received little attention in the Alliance until the United States laid the full details of this scheme before the North Atlantic Council in October 1962. The MLF concept proved difficult to present for it was an extraordinarily complicated project on which there was no clear consensus in Europe. There were four broad possibilities for the organization of nuclear support in NATO: predominant reliance on the United States, reliance on national nuclear forces with varying degrees of commitment to NATO (up to the point of a *multinational* force irrevocably committed to the Alliance), reliance on a European multilateral force, or reliance on a NATO multilateral force. In many countries there was no agreement on which of the concepts was the most desirable, much less any basis for agreement in NATO itself. The smaller countries, which lacked any alternative or wanted no direct association with nuclear weapons, accepted Secretary McNamara's judgment that "the alliance has over-all nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it,"[23] and felt most secure under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Those countries which potentially were major contributors to the force were either deep in their own nuclear projects or, lacking any detailed blueprint from the United States, simply considered the idea unworkable. At bottom, there was concern over the problem of control—described as the problem of "fifteen fingers

[21]For a good discussion of Strauss' involvement in the *Spiegel* affair, which involved basic questions of freedom of the press and individual, see J. Emlyn Williams, "Recent West German Political Developments," *The World Today,* February 1963, pp. 71-77. For the article which triggered Strauss' actions see "Bundeswehr," *Der Spiegel,* October 11, 1962, pp. 32-55.

[22]See footnote 2. The proposal for an MLF was originally made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in December 1960. See paragraph seven, text of communiqué, December 19, 1960, in *Department of State Bulletin,* January 9, 1961, p. 40. It reads in part, ". . . the United States Government suggested the concept of an MRBM [medium range ballistic missile] multilateral force for consideration by the Alliance."

[23]Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community." Speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1962, reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin,* July 9, 1962, p. 67.

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on the trigger"—which was basic to any integrated force. Moreover, the United States refrained from pressing a solution; Washington seemed content merely to display a readiness to meet the European collective desire. In so doing it failed to provide a specific design for an MLF force around which European opinion could coalesce.

The original concept presented to NATO by Secretary Herter in December 1960, for a seaborne MRBM fleet under multilateral ownership, manning and control, was couched in general terms only. Both Strauss and Adenauer appeared to support it on the understanding that NATO would thereby become a supranational nuclear power.[24] They did not make clear, however, whether they considered that this would eventually entail the United States' yielding its veto over employment of the force. This issue raised thorny legal and strategic questions for the U.S. government, and its response was carefully calculated to promote two major tenets of U.S. policy, the coalescence of Europe and the unity of strategic nuclear action—while still leaving to the Europeans the fleshing out of the design. Thus, the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, in an address before the Atlantic Treaty Association in Copenhagen in September 1962 stated that the United States would not stand in the way of a "genuinely multilateral European deterrent, integrated with ours in NATO."[25]

Unlike the matter of decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons, the issue of long-range nuclear support for NATO was unfettered by doctrinal shackles. No fundamental change of NATO strategic policy was involved. It was argued that Polaris missiles on ships could accomplish the mission of offsetting the Soviet land-based medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM's) pointed at Western Europe. Indeed, the nuclear submarines assigned to NATO in furtherance of the Nassau Agreement permitted the dismantling

[24]In a speech to the officers of the *Bundeswehr* Strauss said that NATO should become an independent nuclear power. See *New York Times,* March 31, 1962, Sydney Gruson, "Strauss Decries Atom-arm Stress." Reporting on an interview with Chancellor Adenauer, C. L. Sulzberger indicated that the Chancellor had expressed the hope that the plan for a supranational NATO nuclear force would finally come about. See *ibid.,* "Looking West and East from Como—I," April 4, 1962. During this period of discussion on the MLF, Adenauer and Strauss remained firm on two points: the renunciation of the independent development of nuclear weapons and opposition to any further proliferation of national nuclear capabilities.

[25]"Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons from the Past," in *Department of State Bulletin,* October 22, 1962, p. 605.

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of the obsolescent land-based Jupiter missiles sited in Italy and Turkey.[26] Thus, discussion of the concepts for organizing nuclear support for NATO could proceed without time-consuming debates over strategy in the North Atlantic Council and among the NATO military authorities.

Interest in the multilateral force picked up sharply in West Germany following the Nassau Agreement. This agreement revealed the degree of President Kennedy's commitment to the multilateral concept. The rationale for the concept offered by the President was bound to impress the German government:

> The Nassau agreement recognizes that the . . . nuclear defense of the West is not a matter for the present nuclear powers alone, that France will be such a power in the future, and that ways must be found without increasing the hazards of nuclear diffusion, to increase the role of our other partners in planning, manning and directing a truly multilateral nuclear force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance.[27]

Von Hassel's Reaction to the Multilateral Force

In December 1962, Strauss turned over his office to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who had served for the previous eight years as Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein. Von Hassel reacted coolly to the question of altering NATO strategy in any basic way—echoing the views of his predecessor—but he quickly seized on the MLF concept as a means of cementing Alliance ties.

From the outset, it was clear that Von Hassel had little room for maneuver. When he took over the Ministry of Defense, the Press Service of Chancellor Adenauer's party, the CDU, observed that the move meant no change in policy and that the Federal Republic remained "tied to the existing obligations toward NATO and to the defense conception fixed unanimously by NATO."[28] Josef Dufhues, Executive Chairman of the CDU, remarked simply that there was no reason to change the defense concept of the Federal Republic in any essential way.[29] Adelbert Weinstein, military writer for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, concluded that "no German Defense Minister could pursue a

[26]For the text of the Nassau Agreement see "Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, December 21, 1962, Nassau," in *Department of State Bulletin*, January 14, 1963, pp. 43-45. On the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles, see question no. 7 in the "Transcript of Kennedy's News Conference," in the *New York Times*, January 25, 1963.

[27]"State of the Union," in *Department of State Bulletin*, February 4, 1963, p. 160.

[28]*New York Times*, January 10, 1963.

[29]*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 14, 1963.

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strategy different from that decided by the Federal Government."[30]

Neither did Von Hassel bring to the Ministry a sense of change. In his acceptance speech, he declared:

> On one thing you can rely. . . . Through the years I have justified the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany . . . to cooperate in the defense of the Free World precisely in the same manner as my predecessors. . . . I believe, therefore, that anyone who speculates on what the new man will do, is wrong if he thinks that we will suddenly . . . steer a new course.[31]

In his "Order of the Day" to the defense establishment, Von Hassel defined his aim as that of pressing to completion the task of building up the *Bundeswehr*.[32]

Chancellor Adenauer provided an indication of the policy framework in which Von Hassel would initially have to operate. In a major address before the *Bundestag* on February 6, 1963, Adenauer touched on the three major issues of defense policy, the multilateral force, the increase in conventional forces and the relationship of the United States to Europe. On the MLF he indicated that the government's decision to cooperate in developing MLF "plans into forces" was based on a desire "to share full responsibility" in the force and on the necessity for "deterrence [to] make any kind of war in the NATO area impossible." He declared that the Federal Republic would meet "the NATO demand for simultaneous strengthening of conventional armament in Europe principally by strengthening existing formations of the *Bundeswehr*." He then pointed out that a prerequisite for such action had been the earlier decision by the Parliament to lengthen the term of conscript service. The tasks of territorial and civil defense would call for increases in the defense budget. Finally, he pointed up the reciprocal nature of European and American security: "Europe knows that it cannot defend itself without U.S. support . . . the Americans know that the U.S. in the long run can remain free only if Europe retains its freedom."[33]

The new Defense Minister has vigorously supported these broad policies of the government. He has also remained faithful to the general propositions which he enunciated upon assuming office. Indeed, he has taken great pains to deny the existence of any differences of view between him and his predecessor or of any sub-

[30] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1963, "Wechsel in der Ermekeilkaserne."
[31] Press Release, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, January 10, 1963.
[32] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 14, 1963.
[33] For text see *ibid.*, February 7, 1963.

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stantive changes in NATO strategy. Despite Von Hassel's staunch support of governmental policies, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1963 for the first time since the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* cast no vote against the defense budget. This act suggests that the SPD, which hitherto has fought for increased conventional forces and a wider choice between nuclear "suicide" or surrender, has moved closer to the views of the government or the government has moved closer to the views of the opposition. There appears to be some truth in both suppositions.

Starting from the premises of the "unremitting threat of Bolshevism" and the fact that the East-West conflict covers all aspects of man's existence, Von Hassel asserts that the magnitude of the task requires a "common effort of Europe and America [to] bring about success." He specifically rejects the concept of Europe as a "third force," since Europe is dependent on overseas imports and "is much too small for the conduct of war under modern circumstances." With Strauss, he agrees that defense on a national basis is no longer possible. He visualizes Western Europe as the bridgehead of the Free World in which Germany has a particularly exposed position. Germany can tolerate no other policy than "the defense of every square meter of German territory commencing at the Iron Curtain." France possesses particular importance within NATO since "the defense of Europe can only be prepared and executed when the necessary space is available."[34]

Von Hassel quickly perceived the political value of the MLF. Prior to his trip to Washington at the end of February 1963 to confer with the highest officials, he termed the MLF an "opportunity still more closely to bind together the American and European continents."[35] The understanding which he reached with the U.S. government while in the capital was confirmed in the course of Ambassador Livingston Merchant's visit to Bonn in early March. The Joint Statement issued at the end of Merchant's trip recorded the fact that "Both Governments are of the opinion that this project is of outstanding political and military signifi-

[34]These statements by Von Hassel are taken from "Aktuelle Fragen der Verteidigungspolitik." Speech delivered before the conference "Mochschule und Landesverteidigung," Evangelische Akademie, Bad Boll, April 29, 1963. Press Release, Press Office, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, p. 1; *Bulletin des Presse—und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,* March 14, 1963, "Atlantische Partnerschaft," p. 421; and "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und Atlantische Verteidigung," *Wehrkunde,* July 1963, p. 347.

[35]Quoted by *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 25, 1963.

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cance for the Western Alliance."[36] On the military value of the force, in an article for the press written shortly afterward, Von Hassel observed that "Such a force would represent a considerable reinforcement of the atomic defense power of NATO in Europe."[37] In the same article he stated his preference that the force be assigned to SACEUR (as opposed to SACLANT).

His views on control of the force are clear: He does not want the MLF to evolve into a European force, since one of its principal values is in binding the United States and Europe closer together. But he does want to get France, as well as the United States, into the MLF; if the French will only join in return for the United States giving up the veto, he hopes the United States will agree to this—thus substituting a veto-free *multilateral* force for indefinite continuation of a veto-free French *national* force. Yet he realizes that such a change in the U.S. veto hinges on Europe's achieving the unification required to control nuclear weapons. Thus, in an interview with Adelbert Weinstein of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* he observed that "majority decision for political and military use of the force" was particularly important in view of the attitude of the French. "In the long run," he said, "we must endeavor to bring the French into the multilateral force. We must recognize that the French will never join this force so long as the effectiveness of its nuclear capabilities can be degraded by the veto." He had earlier indicated that while Bonn desired the force to be free of a U.S. veto, he was prepared to postpone this issue until such a time as the force was actually in being, whereupon a change from the system of unanimous decision to one of majority decision might be effected.[38]

Von Hassel has emphasized that his support of the MLF does not mean explicit abandonment of past German desires for land-based MRBM's. On the other hand, he has indicated that he regards the land-based MRBM issue as largely academic, and admits that substantial political obstacles stand in the way. Thus, in the above-mentioned interview, he told Weinstein that the Federal Republic would hold fast to its demand for MRBM's, which the MLF did not replace. One must confront the possible enemy with a "many-faceted Western defense organization," with "defensive weapons corresponding to the spectrum of Soviet offen-

[36]Quoted in *The Bulletin,* Press and Information Office of the German Federal Republic, March 12, 1963, p. 2.

[37]*Ibid.,* March 19, 1963, pp. 1-2.

[38]*Ibid.,* p. 2. For a discussion of the timing of such a step, see p. 306 below.

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sive weapons." He recognized that no such weapons were presently available, but allowed that "the Federal Republic of Germany would applaud when these weapons [MRBM's] were developed and produced." Finally, he accepted as a start an MLF with surface vessels, but desired to "hold open the door for the employment of submarines."[39] During the debate on the 1963 defense budget, he justified the government's decision to participate in the MLF on the basis that the force would be militarily significant: it would have more than 200 missiles with a range of over 2,500 miles, and in combination with U.S. nuclear submarines these "missile ships" would provide a "broad scale of deployment for the missile carriers." But in this same debate he threw cold water on the hopes of the MRBM proponents with an incisive observation on the practical political difficulties associated with actual deployment of a land-based missile:

> Presently, it is relatively pointless [*obsolet*] to argue over the matter since there are as yet no MRBM's. . . . were there such mobile, land-based MRBM's . . . then when they were transported to Europe there would immediately commence political strife with the communities in the neighborhood of which the land-based rockets were emplaced. Whoever argues for MRBM's must consequently recognize what sort of difficulties may in fact arise.[40]

In an address before a meeting of the Western European Union in June 1963, Von Hassel indicated that although the Federal Republic would not attempt to circumvent the restrictions of the Brussels Treaty and would never seek nuclear weapons, his government believed that the size of Germany's NATO commitment entitled it to participate in nuclear planning and decisions on the employment of nuclear weapons.[41] With regard to the question of MLF control, he observed that the concept of deterrence was incompatible with permanent retention of the principle of unanimity. This probably reflected, in part, Bonn's hope that the MLF would not be subject to the vetoes of the smaller European countries. For the immediate future, West Germany is more anxious to avoid these vetoes than a U.S. veto.

In January 1963 the Defense Minister had expressed his views

[39]Quoted by Adelbert Weinstein in "Verzahnung europaeischer und amerikanischer Interressen," from his interview with Von Hassel, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 25, 1963.

[40]*Deutscher Bundestag*—4. Wahlperiode—75. Sitzung. Bonn, May 9, 1963. Stenographischer Bericht, p. 3574. (Subsequent references to *Deutscher Bundestag* are to this document.)

[41]*Bulletin des Presse—und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, June 20, 1963, p. 938.

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on the U.S. veto when he disagreed with the concept of the European nuclear force envisaged by De Gaulle, since it "would be more likely to slacken than to strengthen ties between Europe and the United States." Western Europe could assume responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons only after unification. The U.S. proposal for a multilateral force takes account of "the present possibilities of nuclear partnership while leaving the door open to political development into a partnership on a more comprehensive basis."[42]

Von Hassel's views on the essentiality of the link to the United States, the need for European "unification" before Europe can assume responsibility for control over the use of nuclear weapons, and the desirability of French participation in the MLF are bound to affect the German position on the veto issue. Since the dominant German desire is for close ties with the United States, Germany will carefully assess U.S. receptivity to any change. Until the Germans conclude that the United States is willing to accept majority voting on the employment of the MLF, and until they believe that Europe has achieved the integral unification required to control nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to raise the question. It would also be unlikely for Germany to take such an initiative until she believed that abandonment of the U.S. veto might induce a French government to make the MLF rather than national forces the focus of its nuclear effort. Presumably such an opportunity would not arise until after General de Gaulle had stepped down as President.

The opposition SPD appeared to share Von Hassel's premises. In a talk on the *Nord-und Westdeutsche Rundfunk,* Fritz Erler, SPD military expert, said that West German security could only be guaranteed in closest cooperation with the United States and that "France was no substitute for our security problems."[43] During the debate on the defense budget in May 1963, the SPD approved the government's discussion of the MLF, which the party regarded as a means of (1) eliminating any suspicion of a German desire to develop her own nuclear weapons and (2) indicating the value which Germany placed on the closest link with the American nuclear potential.[44]

In retirement, Strauss has made clear his own preference for the European course, that is, a force based predominantly on the

[42]"Détente Through Firmness," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1963, p. 189.
[43]*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 18, 1963.
[44]See the statement by Fritz Erler in *Deutscher Bundestag,* p. 3564.

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French and British nuclear establishments. While he has not regarded this issue as one on which the unity of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union might be tested,[45] his views are, nonetheless, of great interest. In his first major speech on defense questions after leaving the Defense Ministry he said:

> So long as Europe has no nuclear weapons, Europe has no sovereignty. The only solution is to pool British and French nuclear weapons, fully supported by U.S. know-how to produce a European nuclear force under conditions of European political union which takes control of the force.[46]

This concept has little similarity to that suggested by McGeorge Bundy as a possibility at Copenhagen.[47] Based on national nuclear components, it would fail to meet a principal criterion for U.S. assistance, nonseparability of elements of the force into national components.[48]

Energetic German support of the MLF proposal suggests the importance which present German leaders attach to the lofty concept of Atlantic "partnership." The United States also hopes that the common desire for the safe control of nuclear weapons will act as a centripetal force for European unity. As a first-class force, the MLF surpasses the Strauss plan based on purely European national forces. The latter proposal, although predicated on European unity, passes through the way station of national deterrents when these limited resources might be better allocated elsewhere in the overall interest of the West. The MLF is the device through which the United States can make available its "know-how" to Europe without promoting the development of individual country deterrents. While still Vice President, Mr. Johnson held up this prospect when, speaking in Brussels in November 1963, he told the Europeans that evolution of the MLF toward European control as Europe moved toward unity was not excluded.[49] This statement led the Germans to conclude that a major factor in U.S. willingness to reconsider the veto would be the establishment of a genuine degree of European

[45]Strauss is the leader of the Bavarian-based CSU, an important component of the government's majority.

[46]*Wehrkunde,* July 1963, p. 387. Paraphrase by *Wehrkunde* of a speech by Strauss before the 12th Annual Conference of the European Documentation and Information Center, Escorial, Spain, July 8, 1963.

[47]See footnote 25.

[48]See the speech by Under-Secretary of State Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," in *Department of State Bulletin,* May 13, 1963, p. 738.

[49]Based on a quotation from Mr. Johnson's address by Max Freedman in "New Strength Coming for NATO," *The Evening Star* (Washington), January 18, 1964.

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unity. Von Hassel had already indicated that he regarded European "unification" as prerequisite to European control of nuclear weapons.

The question of the strategic sufficiency of the MLF is implicit in Von Hassel's position regarding a land-based, long-range missile. The negative American attitude toward these land-based missiles stems from several considerations, including concern over the possible deployment of such missiles predominantly on the territory of a single nation.[50] The availability of such a force to the Alliance in a time of crisis might well be open to question. This issue in a different way again raises the problem of the timing and mode of European unification.

The issue of the MLF's strategic sufficiency is probably best met through U.S. readiness to mesh planning for the employment of the MLF intimately with plans for the employment of our own strategic nuclear forces. In the final analysis these U.S. forces comprise the core of the military power of the West.

The Strengthening of the Bundeswehr

On the broad questions of NATO strategy, Von Hassel seems willing to accept less automatic reliance on nuclear weapons and to consider measures for increasing the staying power of the *Bundeswehr* without imposing undue stresses on German society. His general philosophy is contained in these words:

> . . . in the future we must increasingly concern ourselves with *long-range planning* . . . but without our having to make good the shortfalls of other alliance partners out of German manpower, and economic or financial strength. We consider that we are responsible for our part and that we should endeavor appropriately to influence our alliance partners without, however, taking it upon ourselves to make up their shortages.[51]

Von Hassel also seized every opportunity to make the point that his views were unchanged from those of his predecessor. This excerpt from his speech before the Conference on "Colleges and National Defense" at Bad Boll in April 1963 is typical:

> The defense concept of the Federal Republic of Germany was not the concept of a *single* man. The concept was that of NATO . . . not of a Minister, but of a Government; it was supported by a majority of the Parliament; all its points are in the budget, position for position. . . .
>
> I have frequently stated: the NATO concept has not changed; the German concept has not changed.

[50]Under-Secretary Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent," *op. cit.*, p. 738.
[51]*Deutscher Bundestag*, pp. 3569-70.

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On the highest level of generality his views do seem indistinguishable from those held by Strauss. Speaking before the Western European Union Assembly he said:

> The concept of graduated deterrence must lead neither to a division of deterrence into different phases, nor to a differentiation between conventional and nuclear systems of defense. Such differentiation would open to the attacker the possibility of action with lessened, limited or calculable risk. The potential aggressor must be unable to calculate the risk and chances of success of an attack, especially a small aggression.[52]

Von Hassel, however, is much more willing than his predecessor to spell out his ideas in detail. And in such elaborations one can detect some movement toward the proposition that a conventional attack need not be met immediately with the largest weapons of destruction available. In the same address to the WEU Assembly he defined the circumstances under which resort to nuclear weapons might be *necessary:*

> . . . if an opponent attacked with overwhelming forces with the aim of securing as much territory as possible . . . or if reinforcements could be destroyed in no other way or if the nuclear potential were endangered. The danger of nuclear escalation was present, but not automatic.

Then in an article in *Foreign Affairs* he defined the circumstances under which employment of a conventional response was *warranted:*

> . . . flexibility presupposes the capability of settling minor local conflicts without recourse to nuclear weapons, and of reacting adequately even in those stages of a conflict where the aggressor's ultimate aim cannot as yet be clearly recognized. . . .
>
> . . . the so-called "forward strategy" . . . calls for highly mobile forces which will conduct the defense as near as possible to the Iron Curtain with means commensurate to the attack and able to smash very limited enemy actions in the area without resort to nuclear weapons.[53]

Although Von Hassel thus contemplates a conventional response only to "very limited enemy actions," he has nonetheless opened the door to the concept of phasing. Once this concept has been accepted, there is a rational basis for increasing the strength of nonnuclear forces: the greater the strength of the available conventional forces, the longer the "pause."

The Social Democratic Party also sensed some such change

[52]Quoted in *Bulletin des Presse—und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,* June 20, 1963, p. 937.

[53]"Détente Through Firmness," *op. cit.,* pp. 190 and 192.

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might be impending. In the 1963 *Bundestag* debate on the defense budget, the main point at issue between the government and the opposition seemed to be whether or not a shift in Von Hassel's views had occurred. The Socialists were so convinced of the actuality, if not the appearance, of change that they proceeded to abstain on the defense budget vote rather than to cast their customary nay.

Speaking for the SPD, Fritz Erler asserted that while "the uncertainty of the risk remained an aspect of deterrence," there must be no automatic response with nuclear weapons and that "deterrence depended on the whole spectrum of defense and not alone on nuclear retaliation." He was convinced that his view was also shared by the Defense Minister and for that reason the SPD would abstain on the budget vote.[54]

In response Von Hassel admitted that those who had heard his views would agree that "Herr Erler's presentation by and large reflected the viewpoint of the present Defense Minister." But he went on to say that:

> There is no basic difference in the previous concept of the Federal Government, of NATO, as well as the present and previous defense ministers. . . .
>
> . . . between your concept, Herr Erler . . . and the prior concept of NATO and that of the Federal Republic of Germany, there exists only a difference in this or that nuance.[55]

Having disposed of this issue, the Defense Minister pointed out that this period was one of consolidation for the *Bundeswehr* following its rapid expansion—a policy which coincided with the government's determination to undertake no measures which would impinge on fiscal and manpower resources required to continue vigorous economic growth or preclude further gains in social benefits for the German people. "A magnificent external military defense is of no avail," he said, "if in addition to external security, internal security, *social security,* is not also in order."[56] The swift expansion of the *Bundeswehr* brought about by the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis necessitated a breathing spell for the armed forces in order to make up shortages in armament and personnel, particularly officers and noncommissioned officers. Von Hassel stressed that he would not increase the size of Germany's conventional forces beyond the

[54] *Deutscher Bundestag,* pp. 3560-61.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 3568.
[56] *Ibid.,* p. 3570.

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levels set by his predecessor. Aware of the economic and financial costs of carrying out this program, he remarked that he was attempting "to harmonize the desirable strengthening of the forces with the possibilities." He estimated that the period of consolidation would require from two to three years.[57]

The SPD was also pleased with Von Hassel's determination to establish the Territorial Defense forces[58] on an effective basis. The Defense Minister acknowledged that this was probably the only point on which he was placing more emphasis than his predecessor, but denied that his program represented any real change in policy. Strauss had simply been unable, under pressure of circumstances, to lend Territorial Defense any priority.[59] Certainly it had constituted a basic component in the structure of the *Bundeswehr* for years, and Strauss had made substantial progress toward creating the cadre of some 25,000 regular troops distributed throughout the Federal Republic.[60] Von Hassel's idea was to establish a Territorial Reserve of volunteers from the pool of trained conscripts discharged from active service with the *Bundeswehr*. The reservists were to receive weekly training and participate in frequent short exercises with a Territorial Defense unit near their homes. In periods of crisis the Territorial Defense could thus be brought rapidly to maximum readiness.[61] This concept also had the advantage of permitting the Federal Republic to add materially to its conventional strength without undue strain on the budget or manpower availabilities.

The SPD praised what it considered to be not only a defection from Strauss' overemphasis on nuclear weapons, but also a refreshing readiness on the part of the Defense Minister to discuss issues on their merits, to compromise rather than sharpen differences.[62] The friendlier relations of Von Hassel with the opposition have been carried over into the Defense Minister's relationships with

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 3569.

[58] The task of the Territorial Defense was to free regular troops for combat by providing rear area security units for the protection of vital installations, bridges, those areas where airborne landings were possible, and the like. The Territorial Defense was the only part of the *Bundeswehr* unassigned to NATO in peacetime. See the report of Von Hassel's interview with UPI in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 21, 1963.

[59] *Deutscher Bundestag*, p. 3573.

[60] See Helmut Schmidt, "Ein brauchbares Konzept," in *Die Welt*, August 17, 1963.

[61] "Détente Through Firmness," *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[62] See the remarks by SPD deputies Erler and Merten in *Deutscher Bundestag*, pp. 3565, 3566 and 3585.

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Secretary McNamara. During the debate on the defense budget, Von Hassel had denied the existence of any prior misunderstandings with Washington and stated that he was therefore unable to take any credit for eliminating misunderstandings. But the visits which have thus far taken place[63] do seem to have produced greater *understanding*. Two apparent themes of these exchanges are of particular interest here, namely, organization and structure of the U.S. and German armies, and Soviet military capabilities. The ministers charged their respective chiefs of staff, Generals Taylor and Foertsch, with continuing "studies of the structure of the forces required for implementation of the forward strategy and related tactical doctrine."[64] Following their latest meeting in Washington in December, there were indications that Von Hassel had gone some distance toward endorsing the U.S. view of lessened Soviet military capabilities and that Germany would support Washington's efforts in NATO for more conventional forces.[65]

The 1964 West German Defense Budget

Under Von Hassel the *Bundeswehr* has steadily continued the build-up toward a strength of 500,000 which Strauss had set as the goal. Von Hassel has frequently reiterated his intention to hold personnel strength at this figure.[66] Moreover, he has decided to postpone attainment of this objective from 1965 to 1968-70 to permit resolution of the problems of officer and noncommissioned officer shortages.[67] Whereas Strauss had planned for a 1963 strength of 443,000, at the close of 1963 the *Bundeswehr* stood at 404,000, an increase of only 6,000 over its strength at the

[63]In 1963: February (Washington), August (Bonn), and December (Washington).

[64]From the text of the Joint Communiqué in *The Bulletin,* Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, August 6, 1963, p. 1.

[65]*New York Times,* December 5, 1963, Jack Raymond, "Bonn Backs McNamara Estimate of Soviet Forces." For an authoritative expression of U.S. views, see the transcript of Secretary McNamara's address before the Economic Club of New York on November 18, 1963, in *Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register,* November 23, pp. 2 and 39.

[66]More recent information suggests that the current personnel target is somewhat higher. In a recent dispatch from Bonn, *Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register* Editor Leroy Whitman, who visited Germany as an official guest of the Defense Ministry, stated that ". . . the German Armed Forces . . . having reached a personnel strength of 420,000 . . . are still 100,000 short of the 520,000 needed to meet full NATO commitments." *Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register,* May 23, 1964, "German Forces Face Serious Manpower Problems," p. 38.

[67]*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 21, 1963.

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end of 1962.[68] Obviously the pace of the build-up had slackened.

The government's treatment of Von Hassel's 1964 defense budget provided further evidence of a slowdown in the rate of military expansion. The Cabinet permitted only a modest increase in funds for the Defense Ministry for 1964—from DM 18.4 billion in 1963 to 19.2 billion in 1964—far short of the DM 20.2 billion requested by Von Hassel, a figure which had already been anticipated at the time of submission of the 1963 budget.[69]

The higher figure was well within the resources of the Federal Republic, but Chancellor Erhard wanted to guard against jeopardizing the formula which had brought continued expansion of the German economy and prosperity to the German people. Barring any change in the international situation, future increases are likely to be equally modest.

For 1964 the Cabinet approved an overall national budget of DM 60.3 billion. This sum represented an increase of DM 3.6 billion over 1963, roughly proportional to the 6.4 per cent increase expected in the gross national product. The largest boost was in the sphere of social security; at DM 18 billion this was about 20 per cent more than was budgeted for social security in 1963. At the time the Cabinet approved the new budget, it warned that it represented a limit on German financial resources.[70] But later Finance Minister Dahlgruen announced the government's intention to *reduce* taxes by 6 per cent, or DM 2.0 billion. He estimated that this reduction in revenue would leave the budget slightly out of balance at DM 400 million. The purpose of the action, he said, was to stimulate the economy. The Chancellor's determination to hold to a course of economic expansion was evident in his deferral of a DM 600 million rise in benefit payments to war victims, despite considerable pressure from them to grant their demands. Erhard wishes to take no chances with the performance of the economy in the period leading up to the national elections in 1965. While Minister of the Economy, the new Chancellor had summed up his philosophy as follows:

> If the Federal Republic continues [to increase its income], it should be in an increasingly better position to meet the needs of defense without detriment to its obligation to increase the standard of living of the

[68] J. Andrae, "Haushalt der Bundeswehr 1963," *Wehrkunde,* February 1963, p. 104; *New York Times,* December 20, 1963.

[69] *New York Times,* Arthur J. Olsen, "A Record Budget Proposed by Bonn," November 20, 1963; J. Andrae, "Haushalt der Bundeswehr," *loc. cit.*

[70] *The Bulletin,* Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, January 1964, pp. 2, 3, and 7, and *New York Times,* November 20, 1963.

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German people and, above all, to increase social services. The expansive force of our economy creates the best conditions for success.[71]

Conclusion

Defense Minister von Hassel is deeply devoted to the concept of "Atlantic partnership" and the compelling need for indissoluble links between Germany and the United States. Germany's exposed position, the subjugation of a large portion of her national territory and populace to Soviet rule, Western Europe's relatively constricted space in view of the destructiveness of modern weapons, the indispensable character of Germany's economic relations with the Free World, the scope of modern technology and the unremitting threat from a powerful Soviet Union—all these considerations lead him to reject the idea of a self-sufficient Europe as a "third force."

Von Hassel's estimate of Soviet strength, together with the state of NATO's forces and his concern for the economic and social well-being of the German people, persuade him and the German government to support NATO's defense concepts which, he avers, are identical to those of his government as well as those of his predecessor, Franz-Josef Strauss. Von Hassel is fully committed to the goal of 500,000 men set by Strauss, but, unlike Strauss, does not see its attainment much before the end of the decade. Within existing force goals he will cooperate with the United States in improving the effectiveness of the *Bundeswehr* to fight conventionally and, while insisting on the need for nuclear weapons at the strategic, tactical and battlefield levels, he acknowledges the danger of escalation inherent in low-level resort to nuclear weapons. Accordingly, he publicly accepts the validity of a conventional response to very limited attacks and in situations where the intent of the attacker is unclear.

Von Hassel values the MLF as an instrument for cementing ties to the United States. He will bring up the question of majority voting for political and military employment of the force only when he deems the United States would be receptive to such a move and Europe has achieved the unification required to control nuclear weapons. France might then be induced to join the MLF. While he has not discarded the notion of developing a mobile, land-based MRBM for eventual incorporation into the

[71]Ludwig Erhard, *Prosperity Through Competition* (New York: 1958), pp. 198-200.

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MLF, he acknowledges the practical political obstacles in the way of such a system.

Von Hassel will work for a gradually more effective German contribution to the defense of the West, proportionate to German economic expansion and recovery from shortages of military-age manpower attributable to the war and the absence of Germany from the military scene during the decade after 1945. One can expect increasing German assistance within NATO for the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO allies to fulfill their conventional force goals. But Germany will not make up their shortages.

The basic assumption underlying German defense policy is continued steadfastness in U.S. purpose. Any altering of U.S. aims or commitments without explicit German understanding and acceptance would undermine present German policy and have incalculable consequences for German political stability and European and American security.

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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OR A DURABLE PEACE?

by Lionel Gelber

PEACEFUL coexistence, as Moscow expounds it, is a formula for political warfare without war, a slogan for peace that is also a battle-cry. A proposition that suits Soviet purposes, it has not been accepted in the West—yet only by mutual consent can the Cold War be concluded. The Soviet theory of peaceful coexistence is, from the standpoint of the West, a contradiction in terms. But time may provide us with a solution: the Soviet Union needs peace as much as any nation. The conditions of peace will be decided by that fundamental fact, not by the Kremlin's attempts to prescribe them unilaterally in advance.

The Quest for a Detente

What the Kremlin wants is clear. It would now like to attain the aims of Marx and Lenin by the methods of Gandhi. Yet non-violence, in a game being played for keeps, is not enough. In the vein of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter, Chairman Khrushchev has proposed the outlawry of war over most territorial disputes. But freedom is threatened so long as one party has hegemonic ambitions, and while freedom remains in danger there can be no durable peace. Even a limited *détente* could furnish a reprieve from war. There can, however, be no durable peace until the Soviet system is geared for one.

The hopes of mankind for peace, or at least a reduction of tensions, have been dashed more than once. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and the West lean periodically toward some *modus vivendi* because circumstances without precedent compel them to do so. Latter-day peacemaking will bear scant resemblance to what was done at Vienna in 1815 or at Paris in 1919. The Cold War has not been fought like traditional wars, and the modalities of settlement may be just as untraditional. In the global nuclear-missile age an armistice must *precede* large-scale hostilities and, as between the USSR and the West, there can be neither victors nor vanquished after negotiations are concluded.

Victory, even though deferred, remains the Soviet objective.

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Soviet leaders make no secret of this; it is the professed purpose of their peaceful coexistence strategy. Specific issues on the East-West agenda are not, then, the only stumbling-blocks; a limited *détente* is the most we can hope for until there is a change of heart in Moscow. Yet a limited *détente* will be better than none. The circumstances that have predisposed the Soviets toward a limited *détente* might in the interim acquire a momentum of their own. Like her adversaries in the West, the Soviet Union has shunned war lest it get out of control. But peace may get out of control if all does not go according to the Kremlin's plan. The very exigencies that have called forth a strategy of peaceful coexistence might reshape it.

Thus, in the long run, time may be on the side of the West. There are some, nevertheless, who would fix the label of appeasement on a policy of *détente*. They forget what appeasement was. Appeasers, with their counterparts among American isolationists, believed that friends were enemies and that enemies were friends; that the French rather than the Germans had, over the years, been the chief miscreants; that any warlike German designs were directed solely against the Soviet Union and that the West did not therefore have to unite and rearm; that, for justice to be done, allies in Western Europe and countries linked to the West in Central Europe should be sacrificed gratuitously. Similar fallacies have been echoed since World War II by fellow-travelers and nuclear disarmers; neutralists have articulated them with zeal. Still, among most people of the West the lessons of prewar years remain vivid.

Their application to current perplexities must be a cautious one. The Western Allies have bickered with each other; only a few pull their weight in the common defense. Until recently what alarmed them was not that the United States, their leader, would yield too much but that, rash and stiff-necked, she would be unduly rigid and belligerent. Appeasement was irrational in its betrayal of Western interests. The West is in no mood for an accommodation with the USSR that does not rest on the most rational of grounds.

Moreover, the West had to adapt prewar experience to a world contest of much greater dimensions in the postwar period. "Encirclement" was the bogey of the German Emperor, William II, before World War I; after World War II the Soviet Union provoked an encirclement of itself that stretched around the earth.

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When recurrent wars demolished the European balance of power, the Soviet Union sought to dominate the entire continent of Europe; she was thwarted when the West, under U.S. leadership and with the assistance of modern military technology, pitted its global strategy against her. Nor, with an aroused West to daunt her, could the USSR plunge headlong into the Middle East or penetrate the underdeveloped countries. Recent crises over Laos, Berlin and Cuba have confirmed the fact that the Soviet Union cannot extricate herself from the global vise into which the countervailing defenses of the West have pinned her. And apart from her own strength there is little within the Sino-Soviet imperium on which she can rely.

Moscow and Peking

Captive states are not the most enthusiastic of allies. The East European satellites, nevertheless, depend on Moscow to keep the Germanys divided and thus stave off the specter of another greater German Reich—while, for an inner counterpoise against Moscow, some also look to Peking. As dissension with Communist China perturbs the Soviet Union, her leaders, ironically, may discover that the West might yet be a less implacable foe than their own major ally.

Not that it is unusual for allies to fall out. If there has been surprise on this occasion, it may be due to an overrating of the ideological bond between Moscow and Peking. As an adjunct of power, such a bond is highly useful when employed against common foes. Yet doctrinal affinities, as Yugoslavia's early postwar quarrel with the Soviet Union revealed, are not paramount. East Germans would scarcely have rebelled in 1953, nor would Poles and Hungarians have done the same in 1956, if less drastic forms of divergence from a Soviet overlord had been available. But some communist states can follow their own bent. And when they do, it is the national interest, with them as with the USSR herself, that comes first. Ideology, as a secondary element, may be utilized abroad as far as expedient. When power is the primary element, it is considerations of power that must ultimately prevail.

For a while, to be sure, considerations of power together with doctrinal affinities did provide the Soviet Union and Communist China with common interests. Not since the turn of the century had there been so little to distract the Soviet Union on her East Asian frontiers. This situation emboldened her after World War II to promote with impunity the communist cause elsewhere.

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But now peaceful coexistence, as a more subtle program for communist hegemony in the nuclear-missile age, may be too crude for the West and not sufficiently crude for the Kremlin's own jealous Chinese disciples. Perhaps when the Communist Chinese originally deemed war with capitalist countries inevitable it was more the spirit of Machiavelli than of Marx and Lenin that incited them—the most sinister of expectations that, if the Soviet Union bore the brunt, Communist China would come out on top. Today, however, when all peoples might be consumed by global war, we seem to hear less of such cosmic levity. Instead, Communist China accepts recognition from Gaullist France and attempts to win Africans and Asians to her side. Her campaign against the Soviet Union and the West has not been toned down. Nobody knows how far a nation that is the greatest of "have-nots" will carry old territorial grievances against its much larger northern neighbor. But we can be certain that distraction in the Orient will inhibit the Soviets' freedom of maneuver everywhere else.

This may be one of those quandaries that grow the more perplexing the more one seeks to escape them. Chinese ill-will prevents the Soviet Union from acting with aplomb against the West; yet, if the Soviets act with the West, Communist China might gain the loyalty of communist parties elsewhere and the leadership of the East. Behind the facade of an intramural feud over ideology there is thus a Sino-Soviet dispute over power, over Moscow's own status in the Sino-Soviet imperium, and thus over Moscow's place in the world. For the moment, if this dispute accentuates factional quarrels within the walls of the Kremlin, the Soviet Union may vacillate between Peking and the West, wavering between reconciliation with the West today and defiance of the West tomorrow, switching the Cold War off and on. It is Moscow's own narrowing range of choice which might, nevertheless, distinguish new Soviet peace offensives from old ones.

Foreign affairs interact with domestic affairs: The Kremlin, seemingly caught in a strategic box, finds a related one on the home front just as confining. If Soviet agricultural production cannot be increased substantially, a greater proportion of industrial resources may have to be diverted from the manufacture of arms or even from experiments in space, and grain supplies may again have to be purchased from the West. Although the Soviets recently reported an improvement in domestic agriculture, there will also have to be supplies of another kind from the West if

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Soviet agricultural productivity is to be increased: the Soviet Union will need to import equipment to expand its agriculturally-related chemical industries under the seven-year program announced by Khrushchev on December 9, 1963. But the Soviet Union must have a lull on the foreign front before she can concentrate upon domestic problems. Until such time the West itself will remain divided over the extent to which some of the Cold War restrictions upon trade should be lifted.

Would the Soviet Union, after overcoming recent embarrassments and setbacks at home and abroad, be in a better position than ever to take advantage of the West? Uncertainty about the answer to that question will beset efforts toward a *détente*. However, the Soviet Union can revive her all-out Cold War policies only when the challenge of Communist China has waned; when captive states in Eastern Europe are more docile; and when the West has lowered its guard irrecoverably. Perhaps the Soviet people, having had a taste of the good life and wanting more rather than less, will make it difficult for any Soviet regime to backtrack.

It has been suggested that a *détente* with Communist China, rather than the Soviet Union, might be more advantageous for the West. But this is not a viable alternative. For one thing, if the Communist Chinese were more amenable to reason, the Soviet Union itself could deal with Peking and thus would not have to seek a *détente* with the West. Then, too, an accommodation between the USSR and the West may, in Moscow's reckoning, provide security to the Soviets against a belligerent and aggressive Chinese neighbor. If the West were to build up Communist China against the Soviets, it would only heighten Moscow's fears of the West and of Peking. We would have removed one of the Soviet Union's reasons for a *détente* with the United States. We would still live in a world in which the two nuclear giants stood armed against one another, while China, if she had not already acquired nuclear weapons, would be strengthened to the point where their acquisition perhaps lay within her capabilities. It is, above all, an accommodation between the two nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, that is of crucial importance to us.

Power and Ideology

The roles of power and ideology should be reassessed if it is the interplay between them that will determine the prospects for

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peace. Nor are they the only factors which will be affected by a *détente*. Its effect upon neutralists and the United Nations must also be considered.

Power cannot be eliminated. There may be a proportionate decline in arms establishments, but power to enforce agreements between rival camps and to handle third parties will have to be retained. World War II could have been avoided if, after World War I, the West had recognized power realities. In a negative sense that conflict vindicated a school of thought which had insisted upon peace through power as the surest way of protecting civilized society from surrender or war: this school of thought would be vindicated positively if the West, by arraying its power against the East, could induce the Soviets to take a more conciliatory course. The West now perceives that there is nothing automatic about a Free World order; it has to be supported at considerable risk and sacrifice. The Soviets may now perceive that the West will risk all to support it.

This would seem to be the lesson impressed upon Moscow by that most momentous of duels, the encounter between Kennedy and Khrushchev over Soviet missiles in Cuba. But this lesson has not been fully learned as yet. For after the Cuban showdown there was renewed emphasis upon ideological competition, a less devastating form of East-West strife. "Containment" and "positions of strength" were the verbalizations of an earlier concept of peace through power adapted to the postwar era; if that approach had not succeeded so well, Moscow and Peking would not denounce it with such venom. This concept remains valid. The Kremlin deludes itself if it imagines that it has, in ideological competition, a safe alternative through which it can loosen the grip of the West.

Peaceful coexistence will give ideological competition its chance, although its Soviet version sounds less than peaceful. Where national liberation movements are directed against the West rather than the communists, Peking backs them up; and in that sphere, too, Moscow may not allow the Chinese communists to reap all the benefits. Therefore the Soviets still bless, if only by rote, the revolutionary struggle of "subject peoples" against "foreign oppressors" and of "workers" against "exploiters."

Other inconsistencies are more far-reaching. Soviet communism may either coexist amicably with a rival system or conspire against it: the West cannot assent when there is an endeavor to do both.

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Peaceful coexistence assumes that the Soviet Union can live in the short run with the democracies of the West while attempting to communize them; it also assumes that the ideological and power elements in the East-West contest can be separated from each other. Neither assumption is correct.

Ideological competition is, to paraphrase Clausewitz, merely the pursuit of power by other means. Circumstances may enjoin upon the Soviets a tactic of *reculer pour mieux sauter;* but intended victims should not lend themselves to such an operation. It may serve the interests of the Soviet Union to have swords sheathed, but it will not serve the interests of the West wholly to cooperate in that gesture if the Soviets still covet the fruits of war—for which, with the presumed acquiescence of the West, political warfare may still be waged.

This is not to suggest that the idea of a *détente* is chimerical. The likelihood is that a real *détente* would be a manifestation of long-term trends in which, as they spread out and speed up, the Soviet Union herself might be caught and from which she could not subsequently back away. It may only be by small stages that tension can be relaxed. But piecemeal steps toward a durable peace will be better than none if one proviso is observed: all concerned must move in the same general direction when any such steps are taken.

We can begin to see the predicament in which the USSR might soon find herself. The Cold War cannot be unfrozen if she does not veer in the same general direction as the West, but rather, under the rubric of ideological competition, continues to seek the West's overthrow. The "struggle of philosophies," to which President Lyndon Johnson has referred, is not one about which the West can afford to be philosophical. The open societies of the West have scarcely had the same access to the closed societies of the Sino-Soviet imperium as the latter have had to the former. Perhaps such access can be dispensed with; the countervailing defenses of the West have been making their mark without it. This asymmetry between the "open society" of the West and the "closed society" of the East may thus handicap the West less than had been expected. Before the Nazis provoked World War II, they tried to demoralize the West. Western appeasement policies (with American isolationism to assist them) bore witness to the success which crowned their prewar venture in political warfare. U.S. leadership of the West in the nuclear-missile age has,

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however, reduced the prospects that the Soviets could use political warfare, at least in the short run, to disarm the West as Hitler did.

In view of the West's strategic superiority, ideological competition must be for the USSR not a concomitant of war but a substitute for it. She is looking for an exit from the dilemma in which she finds herself. Ideological competition might provide such a way out if the Soviet Union could define its ground rules as she pleases. But since she is not predominant, the West may have something to say about this. The realities of power can be flouted as little in the realm of ideology as in other realms of the world contest.

The Soviet Union will not bow to these realities with alacrity. There will have to be self-denying ordinances in both realms—power and ideology—if she does share with the West a common stake in peace. But the more she has to accept such ordinances in one realm, the less willingly will she accept them in the other. She may, instead, imagine that by drawing a line between two kinds of war, ideological and military, she can at no great cost still make herself predominant. But in the nature of things she cannot draw such a line.

The Free World offers the one example of how, if there is to be a durable peace, nuclear giants must coexist. Although rifts may yawn among them, all major countries of the Free World do, nevertheless, acknowledge comity with each other as their goal. Even when honored more in the breach than in the observance, there is an abiding consensus among Free World nations. Yet that sort of consensus is precisely what ideological competition, as conceived by the Kremlin, would reject. Moscow seeks not comity but a stranglehold on the West—one achieved now through political warfare rather than military conflict—that would enable the Soviet Union to refashion free societies in its own harsh image.[1]

Peace, declared Litvinoff, is indivisible, but it is precisely upon the divisibility of peace that peaceful coexistence as practiced by the communists is predicated. War can be war without the clash of arms; domination, even if attained through peaceful coexist-

[1]That is why the United States has been slow to equate the rise of military dictatorships in Latin America with the danger of hostile bases, on the Cuban model, linked with Moscow—or even Peking. The Germans, under William II and Adolf Hitler, could never acquire branch establishments across the Atlantic. But it has been harder to debar the USSR when ideological footholds can be transmuted into strategic ones. It is, nevertheless, when military dictatorships crush middle-of-the-road alternatives that the masses may turn to communism.

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ence, would still be domination. The Soviet Union has resisted domination by others; that others might resist domination by the Soviet Union is what the Soviet people, with duress as their own daily lot, may some day come to appreciate. There can be no durable peace as long as diverse ideologies must compete *à outrance,* no genuine coexistence until a false Soviet brand is dropped. Not that Soviet leaders would ever discard it explicitly, but what they do not pluck from the vine they can let wither.

Ideological competition cannot be sustained unless a crusading spirit is steadily fostered among the Soviet people. But in the wake of a *détente* such a spirit may vanish. There would be relief from tension abroad: relief from tension at home might be no less welcome.

The primacy of power over ideology could, at long last, bring all this to pass. Ideology may govern the use of power, but when power considerations are uppermost, these govern the use of ideology. Political warfare will be incompatible with the national interest if the Soviet national interest requires a *détente* between the USSR and the West. Sino-Soviet power forced the West to rearm. Now the Soviet Union, confronted by the West's power for peace, will have to make adjustments of her own if it is peace that she wants.

The Strength of the Weak

Changes elsewhere may also be in the offing. A *détente* might well have an impact on neutralists and the United Nations. The Test Ban Treaty indicated that the Soviet Union and the West will tackle peripheral issues first and, until distrust lessens, skirt those issues that involve the power structure of rival camps. The neutralists and the United Nations provide the two leading examples of peripheral issues. There might be cooperation between the Soviets and the West over such matters before they take up thornier problems.

The neutralists and the United Nations have exerted some influence upon the Cold War, but its impact has been greater upon them. With the origins of a *détente* they would, similarly, have little to do. But such a development could do more than anything else to alter their respective roles.

Not all the emergent peoples have shunned Cold War alignments. But all, aligned and unaligned, who dwell beyond the frontiers of the Sino-Soviet imperium have had their independ-

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ence underwritten by the power of the West. Most of them could have done very little to help maintain this power; the influence they exercised did not derive from the size of the contribution they could make but from the trouble they could stir up. For it was during the Cold War that Western overseas empires, badly shaken by World War II, received their *coup de grâce*. The Soviet Union, with or without Communist China, would have become the main patron of former dependencies if independence had been withheld. Here, then, is another contemporary paradox: Most of the emergent peoples lack power, yet the global power balance would have been upset if the communists could have taken them over.

Neutralism was the best policy for many of the emergent peoples. This presupposed that they would remain above the ideological battle. But this they did not all do. Some neutralists railed more at the West than at the East. They could get away with such "unneutral" behavior as long as the titans courted them. Indeed, one of the unique phenomena of the East-West power contest has been the strength of the weak.

Moscow cannot always count on neutralist support for her policies. Lately, during disarmament discussions at the United Nations, the neutralists have favored compromise solutions. Peaceful coexistence as Moscow proclaims it would reinvigorate their role as arbiters. The strength of the weak would, on the other hand, be diminished if ideological competition, as the continuing phase of the global power contest, were to subside. Afro-Asians have axes of their own to grind that are neither Soviet nor Chinese. Yet, like the West Germans, they may wonder whether they will have the same license to achieve their national objectives if the Soviet Union and the West reach an accord.

The anti-colonial stick with which they have jabbed the West has been whittled down. Soon, therefore, Moscow will no longer be able to exploit anti-colonial sentiments in Africa and Asia. Western overseas empires, as contrasted with the adjacent domains over which Moscow and Peking retain control, have in large part been liquidated. A tragic residual problem of Western imperialism in the southern half of the African continent remains unresolved. And yet, here again, the Soviet Union as a predominantly "white" country, wants what the West wants and what her own Chinese ally does not want as much—to prevent the division of mankind along lines of race.

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Even when the USSR vies with the West in offering economic aid to emergent peoples, she may have a burgeoning community of interest with it—one with which political warfare against the West would interfere. Although such a community of interest does not yet exist, industrialized nations do realize that they must attempt to prevent any further widening of the gap between themselves and developing countries. The industrial West as well as the Soviet Union will hardly relish the role of "milch cow" to the new states. The Soviet Union, although it may be overextended in a number of spheres, is suffering growing-pains rather than arrested growth. And overextension is a burden that a *détente* with the West would lighten.

In their penetration of more-distant lands, Moscow and Peking have been trying not only to outdo the West but to compete with each other. Communist China, with fewer economic surpluses, is not as well equipped as the USSR or the West for such a venture. If, however, Peking mixes race with ideology, she might exert a magnetic attraction on some of the other "have-nots." Through a realignment of colored peoples against white, under the Chinese banner, Communist China might contrive to reassert herself. Such a contingency would bedevil the future for the Soviet Union as well as the West. Only in unison with the West can Moscow combat it. But here, again, it will be difficult for the Kremlin to cooperate with the West as long as it wages political warfare against the West.

The West has not been of one mind on the topic of emergent peoples. Not only have the weak, thanks to propitiation by East and West, acquired an unreal strength; at various junctures the solidarity of the West has also been impaired. So eager at times was the United States, with an eye on Moscow and Peking, to cosset neutralists that during the Suez and Congolese crises she downgraded vital ties with major allies. In Western Europe the upshot was a more detached attitude toward U.S. leadership, as well as an accelerated drive toward the Common Market. To this motivation for European unity, American champions of an enlarged Common Market as a pillar for an Atlantic Partnership should have paid heed before General de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application and sought to have his own design for Europe adopted. Meanwhile, the United States has not found the very emergent peoples on whose behalf she has done so much any more responsive.

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The Future of the United Nations

A *rapprochement* between the USSR and the West might also affect the United Nations. In this international forum, as never before and as nowhere else, the weak could foregather, enhance their tactical strength and, as between East and West, bring it to bear. The United Nations was reduced to comparative impotence by the East-West feud; more recently it has been reduced to near-bankruptcy by a quarrel within the West, as well as between East and West, over its peace-keeping functions. Significant, too, is the fact that it has only been able to discharge these duties in territories—Sinai-Gaza, the Congo and Cyprus, but not Hungary and Tibet—to which the West rather than the East has enjoyed strategic access.

Peace-keeping is not a task that the United Nations will undertake lightly in the future. Nor were the interests of the West always served by its interventions as they might have been—though for that circumstance the East can scarcely be blamed. For in the General Assembly it is the weak and not the strong that hold the balance of voting power. Behind this facade, it is the West's own power for peace that has enabled the world organization to exist.

The main transactions of world politics could not be funneled through the United Nations during the Cold War; there may be more recourse to it if the Cold War is settled. Such a settlement will, however, also transform the global circumstances that gave the weak ascendancy in the General Assembly and a hold on the Secretariat. Their voting power in the Assembly will remain, but less can be done with this power when there are fewer rivalries to exploit among the strong. The world organization will reflect power realities more accurately when the strong regain the initiative within it; only then will the United Nations be able to live up to its potential.

The seating of Communist China could present a serious obstacle. Should this be arranged, the Security Council might be enlarged with nonpermanent seats allocated to other Afro-Asian members. But the Chinese seat would be a permanent one and would give Peking the prerogative of the veto. It was to spite the West that the Soviet Union cast many of her vetoes in the Security Council; it might be against both the Soviet Union and the West that Communist China would similarly make herself felt. Yet to attain influence in other UN organs, she would have

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to secure firm support from emergent countries. This she could not get by antagonizing them.

Peking's instrument of policy would be a counter-racism which white domination itself fanned in the Orient. Asian neighbors who may concur with this are the satellite and client states of Communist China as well as such other anti-Western countries as Indonesia. As for African countries (which have a numerical preponderance in the Afro-Asian bloc and which the Chinese seem to be trying harder than the Soviets to penetrate), a militant counter-racism would also appeal to the less moderate among them. But for the member-states of the Afro-Asian bloc, the refusal of Communist China to sign the partial nuclear test ban must have seemed ominous. Nor has Peking, by its actions in Tibet and aggression against India, endeared itself to most of free Asia. Communist China's assault on India may, in fact, have been as self-defeating as the Kremlin's missile gambit in Cuba proved to be. For that episode not only sharpened cleavages in the Sino-Soviet camp, it also brought the first faint glimmerings of common interest among the USSR, India and the West. Counter-racism, in other words, has not provided the answer to India's pressing economic and military problems. It may not provide the answer for those in the Orient who still take their cue from New Delhi.

If that is so, Communist China might, by her presence, have less of an impact on the United Nations than is anticipated. The weak would have to line up behind her before their tactical strength could be converted into real strength—into the substance of power within the world organization and beyond it. This they might hesitate to do, fearing that they might fall into the clutches of Communist China or at best lose needed economic assistance from the "white" nations. No such hazard lurks in a more modest neutral course. It would be better for the weak to take a place in the United Nations commensurate with their actual power, and better for the United Nations if the strong, with their greater responsibilities, did the same.

We should avoid the temptation to assign to the United Nations a role beyond its capacities. There are some in the West who would weaken the international organization—and even withdraw from it—if they could. For their part, the communists have sought to subordinate its machinery to their global objectives. The United Nations must be saved from its friends as well as from its foes.

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Out of the present organization may come a Parliament of Man, but such a development is far off. A world body composed largely of regimes that cannot speak for their own people cannot speak adequately for mankind—or serve as its conscience. NATO, to be sure, also includes authoritarian regimes who nevertheless do help, by their commitment to the West, to uphold a free world order. The United Nations, on the other hand, while a beneficiary of what the West does, has been assigned a task that cuts across rival ideologies. Its membership roster must therefore be still more diverse: democracies that speak authentically for their own people; dictatorships, Left and Right, which may not; and latter-day versions of benevolent despotism that might be more democratic if only they could. This is peaceful coexistence as it ought to be. The UN, with its hodgepodge of political systems, can be hardly representative of the world's peoples. Thus, we should not place an undue value upon the "conscience of mankind" as it speaks to us through the General Assembly, for to do so is to debase the values of the Charter itself.

To understate the case for the world organization would be as wrong as to overstate it. A balanced view of the United Nations must rest on the fact that it has been on the outer edge rather than in the center of the East-West contest, and that therefore it should not be asked to regulate forces at whose mercy it still lies. For some missions it is the most appropriate of international agencies; other tasks—e.g., a supervisory role in any plan for the "internationalization" of Berlin or the supervision of an arms agreement—could prove too onerous for it. If the UN is asked to undertake assignments beyond its capacity, more harm than good will have been done; peace itself might suffer. A dearth of funds is not all that frustrates the United Nations. It might rue the day on which it is granted more authority than it has earned, more than it can prudently bear.

There will still be much for the international organization to do. Though it falls short of the objectives set by its founders, the United Nations is no mere talking-shop. The work of the specialized agencies has been indispensable. Only such an organization as the UN could have policed accessible strategic trouble spots. Nowhere else can so many representatives of states East and West, aligned and unaligned, large and small, of every race, color and creed, discuss mutual problems so conveniently—or meet at all. There may be less to hamper the United Nations

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externally, and less to distort it internally, if there is a *détente* between the Soviet Union and the West. Until there is one, the functions of that body cannot be broadened.

Power for Peace

The most deadly feature of the global power contest is the arms race; no *détente* will be complete until the arms race is slowed down. It may be too soon to establish an international police force on a permanent basis; it may be too late to prevent France and Communist China from producing their own nuclear weapons. But with a *détente* the former may become feasible, and it may be possible to limit the destabilizing effect which two new nuclear powers would have on world affairs. In the war machines of East and West there is a strategic interlock: other states might be involved when dissidents take action. But if the nuclear giants have reassured each other beforehand, the peril may be less.

It is difficult at best for each side to provide such assurance. Yet when a few issues are settled, a measure of confidence may be created that would either expedite the settlement of other issues or permit some of these to be bypassed indefinitely. Over certain vexing questions it will be an agreement to disagree that can do most to promote a *détente*. Whatever is done, both sides will have to treat disarmament and security—a nexus that baffled statesmen after World War I—as opposite sides of the same coin. The satisfied powers of East and West may yet hammer out a framework of security in which to disarm. Their task will not be simplified if dissatisfied powers within the rival camps put the fulfillment of their national ambitions before the attainment of security for the world as a whole.

In this respect, it is not the problem of France which runs parallel to that of Communist China but the problem of the two Germanys. For it is the style of French policy rather than French national interest that worries her allies; the motives of the Bonn Republic, despite the good manners it displays in the councils of the West, may be more suspect. NATO's lines are drawn through a divided Germany; a greater Germany would probably submerge France and her West European neighbors, as well as the Common Market and the institutions that may issue from it. The Federal German Republic has, all the same, capitalized on Moscow's opposition to the reunion of the two Germanys under the auspices of the West, and the West has had to give

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priority to West German claims. As long as this situation prevails, the Soviet Union is unlikely to disarm.

This tangled skein can yet be unraveled. When the West urges that the two Germanys be reunited under its auspices, it does so not only because such a step might sap the foundations of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, but also because the West has feared that, unless it advocates German reunification, Bonn might strike a bargain with the Soviet Union and thus wreck the power balance on which the security of the West has reposed. It was the Soviet threat to the West that gave priority in the West to Bonn's claims. If Moscow is averse to this, the remedy is in its own hands.

War on two fronts—Bismarck's famous nightmare—spelled the doom of the Third Reich; now it is only through peace on two fronts that the Soviet Union can be secure. The USSR may shrink from a final break with Communist China on her Asian flank if she is confronted on her European flank with the reappearance of a unified Germany. A final break with Communist China may, nevertheless, be the price the Soviet Union will have to pay for that *détente* with the West without which disarmament can be neither extensive nor safe. By the same token, the more progress registered by the USSR and the West, the more difficult it will become for Bonn to obtain priority for West German claims—if the transition from a limited *détente* to a durable peace is obstructed by these claims.

Such a transition will be as intricate a process as any in which men have ever been collectively engaged. The imperatives of survival must prevail in the end. Using the concept of peace through power, the West has convinced the Soviet Union that peaceful coexistence is preferable to war. Now it must convince the Soviets that peaceful coexistence, Moscow style, does not make for a durable peace. Power for peace exercised by the West has already been persuasive. It should remain our policy until a durable peace has been achieved.

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THE SINO-INDONESIAN PARTNERSHIP

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON May 10, 1963, several hundred students in Bandung, West Java, touched off a wave of violence and destruction aimed at Chinese residents and their property, which rapidly spread to a score of other towns in West and Central Java and even to East Sumatra. The "May 10 affair," as the incident was called in the Indonesian press, occurred about six weeks after similar anti-Chinese outbursts in Tjeribon, West Java, and in Tegal, Central Java, but most observers thought that these tensions had abated in the wake of the state visit of Communist China's Liu Shao-chi to Indonesia in the middle of April. In the resurgent orgy of destruction after Liu's departure thirteen Chinese were killed and several hundreds wounded, while property losses were estimated at 4 billion rupiah (about $3.8 million).[1] The causes of the violence may be found in long-standing Chinese-Indonesian communal tensions aggravated by the plight of numerous groups in the chaotic Indonesian economy. But these tensions are of less significance here than the manner in which both the Indonesian and the People's Chinese government reacted.

Initially Indonesian officials spoke darkly of the continuing provocation of "racialist exclusivisms" prevalent among the Chinese in Indonesia, but by May 19 President Sukarno had found the real bête noire of the "May 10 affair." The riots, he

[1] *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), June 19, 1963 and *The Borneo Times* (Sandakan), November 29, 1963.

The Tjeribon riot, late in March 1963, was sparked when a judge of Chinese origin sentenced an Indonesian youth to seven years' imprisonment for having deliberately rammed with his car the motorcycle of a Chinese with whom he had been feuding over the affections of a local beauty. The Chinese youth was severely hurt and his companion on the cycle was killed. The announcement of the verdict caused Indonesians in the courtroom to attack Chinese spectators, and the melee soon turned into a city-wide riot. The riots in neighboring cities, and particularly those in May 1963, were not merely expressions of traditional anti-Chinese hostility but had anti-government overtones as well; e.g., in the riot in Tegal the mob also attacked and damaged a score of government buildings, and economic misery was definitely a factor in the violence of the Bandung students. In Medan, East Sumatra, students demonstrated for improvements in living conditions and set fire to a government building. Late in May the government announced that university lecture fees at public institutions of higher learning would be abolished and that special transportation facilities would be provided to students. It was denied, however, that these measures were taken as a result of the riots. *Indonesian Observer,* June 26, 1963.

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declared, had been engineered by "counter revolutionaries at home as well as by foreign subversives" seeking to topple the government. Sukarno identified these "counter revolutionaries" as members of two banned anti-communist political parties, the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party, and of other anti-government rebel groups. These elements, he stated, had "especially picked out the Chinese minority" for their nefarious schemes "because we have lately been in close contact with People's China."[2]

Sukarno's explanation was immediately taken up by Peking. Even before, on May 13, a spokesman of the Chinese embassy in Djakarta had declared that the embassy had "no intention" of making a formal protest. According to Peking the disturbances had a "very sinister purpose": they were "instigated by the imperialists" and "counter revolutionary groups" for the purpose of sabotaging Indonesia's "social order," "Sino-Indonesian friendly relations" and particularly Indonesia's recent attempt to forge "closer relations with the People's Republic of China." On May 21 the Chinese ambassador in Djakarta expressed the thanks of his government and people "for President Sukarno's stand and the measures taken by the Indonesian government to prevent a further spreading of the incidents. . . ."[3]

Considering Peking's vociferous opposition to earlier anti-Chinese measures taken by the Indonesian government[4]—opposition which included efforts by the Chinese embassy in Djakarta to incite local Chinese to resistance and bloody rioting and nearly resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in July 1960—its moderation in the "May 10 affair" may seem surprising. The fact is, however, that this moderation is but one indication of a notable new warmth in Sino-Indonesian relations which has been growing since the middle of 1962. The appointment, for the first time in seven years, of an Indonesian-born Chinese to an Indonesian cabinet post in early December 1963, and, shortly before, the lifting of the May 1960 ban on papers and periodicals published in Chinese, serve to confirm the development of a new working partnership between Peking and Djakarta which is of signal

[2] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* May 21, 1963, pp. 3-4.

[3] *Peking Review,* May 24, 1963, p. 20; *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 30, 1963, pp. 463-464; *Indonesian Observer,* May 22, 1963.

[4] For example, the banning of all "alien" (largely Chinese) retail shops from Indonesian rural areas by January 1, 1960.

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importance to developments in Asia and beyond. It is the purpose of this article to examine the reasons for and the problems and implications of this new partnership.

II

The principal factor in bringing Djakarta and Peking together has been the Malaysia issue. "Indonesia's just stand of opposing the neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia and supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of North Kalimantan [Borneo]," Liu Shao-chi declared during his Djakarta visit in April 1963, "constitutes a serious blow to the colonialists, old and new," and with it Indonesia "has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism" in Southeast Asia.[5] To understand the basis of the current *rapprochement* it is essential to consider in some detail the reasons why each government opposes the new Malaysian Federation which formally came into existence on September 16, 1963.[6]

As far as Indonesia is concerned, it is noteworthy that the opposition of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) to the formation of Malaysia preceded official Indonesian hostility by nearly a year. With more than two million members and additional thousands of followers in youth, labor, peasant and women's fronts, the PKI is one of the largest communist parties outside the bloc and, although it holds no policy-making position in the cabinet, one of its country's major power centers. When, in May 1961, Malaya's Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman first voiced the general idea of a Malaysian Federation, official Indonesian reaction seemed benevolently indifferent. Lord Selkirk, former British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, has remarked that in September 1961, when he informed Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio of the impending formation of Malaysia, Subandrio declared that this was "entirely a matter for the people concerned and did not concern Indonesia."[7] Its preoccupation with the final stages of the West New Guinea (Irian) campaign makes the Indonesian government's indifference understandable. Yet PKI publications were already expressing opposition to the Malaysia idea, and the plenary meeting of

[5] *Peking Review*, April 19, 1963, p. 9.

[6] In the following paragraphs I have developed a theme traced earlier in my "Indonesia and the Confrontation," *The Bulletin* (Sydney), December 14, 1963, pp. 23-26.

[7] *The Straits Times* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), October 14, 1963.

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the PKI's central committee in December 1961 formally condemned Malaysia as "but a form of neo-colonialism," an "unacceptable colonial intrigue," and an "attempt to suppress the democratic and patriotic movements" of the inhabitants of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah (North Borneo).[8]

There were several reasons for this PKI opposition. First of all, the Tunku, whose anti-communist views are well known, frankly conceived of Malaysia as a bulwark against the communist tide in Southeast Asia. His proposition was received sympathetically by Premier Lee Kuan-yew of Singapore who, shortly after coming to power in 1959, had fallen out with his communist and left-wing supporters. A small but united, economically viable and strongly anti-communist state, assured of British military support and located on Indonesia's doorstep, was hardly a development the PKI could view with complacency. Secondly, anti-Malaysia left-wing groups in Malaya itself, such as the Socialist Front, were approaching the PKI for help. Malaya's Minister for Internal Security revealed, in March 1963, that members of the *Party Rakyat,* a constituent element of the Socialist Front, had gone to Indonesia during the previous two years for PKI cadre training, and that PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit had instructed the 1962 Malayan Socialist Conference to pass resolutions denouncing Malaysia.[9] Through the Socialist Front, and later through the anti-Malaysia, communist-infiltrated *Barisan Sosialis* party in Singapore, the PKI maintained close liaison with A. M. Azahari's anti-Malaysia movement in Brunei and Sarawak. PKI organs lauded Azahari's band and its Indonesian "volunteers" as the "national liberation movement of North Borneo."[10] Long before Azahari's abortive rebellion in December 1962, the PKI had become the protected base area (in the sense of Mao's Yenan strategy) for the communist-directed anti-Malaysia campaign in Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya. Most of the opposition in these three territories comprised Chinese greatly influenced by Peking's schemes for cultural and political aggrandizement in Southeast Asia. The official Indonesian "confrontation" with Malaysia thus found common cause with Peking's minions in the Overseas Chinese community of the Malaysia territories.

[8] *Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity. Documents of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta, end December 1961* (Djakarta, 1962), pp. 58-61.
[9] *The Straits Times,* March 13, 1963.
[10] On Azahari's rebellion see J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia, Malaya and the North Borneo Crisis," *Asian Survey,* April 1963, pp. 173-181.

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But there was a third, and perhaps even more compelling, reason for the PKI's anti-Malaysia campaign. Throughout much of 1961 the party had been in a bind, its vociferous criticism of the government the year before having resulted in brief detentions for its principal leaders as well as suppression of party activity and publications by Indonesian army commanders. The PKI rode out the storm by leaning heavily on Sukarno, whose own position largely depends on preserving a power balance between the army and the PKI. But the crisis was symptomatic of serious organizational troubles in the party. The PKI's burgeoning numbers had raised problems relating to party discipline and the operation of its indoctrination program, while at the same time the army's close supervision of PKI activity, especially in youth and labor fields, threatened to "hollow out" the party. Early in 1961 a serious rift in party leadership appeared, in part over the Moscow-Peking dispute but primarily over domestic policy. PKI economic experts Sakirman and Asmu, along with Njono who leads the communist labor front SOBSI, favored a militant denunciation of the weaknesses of the government's economic policy and of army incompetence and corruption in order to capitalize on widespread discontent. But PKI Vice Chairman M. H. Lukman favored a more moderate policy, counting on a slow but steady drift toward a communist coalition government with the acquiescence of the more radical commanders in the armed forces. Aidit, though leaning toward the militants, seems to have been primarily concerned with preventing an explosion. Under these circumstances the anti-Malaysia campaign supplied the issue needed to restore unity and organizational fervor; by the close of 1962 the Malaysia issue had given the party a notable new momentum.

The PKI's resurgence was due also to Sukarno's support. After it became clear in June 1962 that Indonesia would acquire West Irian through negotiation—thanks largely to U.S. pressure on the Dutch—the PKI discovered that its hitherto largely isolated stand on Malaysia had become official Indonesian policy. Sukarno's espousal of the issue has been widely interpreted as an action in keeping with his strategy of perpetual crisis in support of the "unfinished revolution." Indonesia's President is forever discovering calamitous ills which can be overcome only by the nostrums he offers: the adoption of "Pantjasila" as the national ideology, the creation of the National Council, the establishment of "guided

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democracy," the "return" to the Constitution of 1945, the nation's acceptance of Manipol/Usdek as official guidelines of the state, the "People's Threefold Command" to liberate West Irian. But this explanation really skirts the fundamental reason for the anti-Malaysia campaign, which can be gleaned from a look at the government's economic policy.

In the beginning of 1962, as Indonesia mounted attacks on West Irian and as rice shortages became acute and foreign exchange reserves dwindled, the government called on the Indonesian masses to be prepared to make sacrifices. By mid-year, with the acquisition of West Irian assured, official statements promised that at the end of the confrontation campaign priority consideration would be given to economic improvement, especially to providing clothing and food. But in October yet another theme was heard: government statements then cautioned against expectations of rapid improvement and outlined new economic and financial problems that had to be overcome.[11] As early as June 1962, economic reform seemed to be imminent, involving a host of unpopular decisions such as retrenchment of the inordinately swollen bureaucracy and government services, rationalization of and technical improvements in production, imposition of labor discipline and wage control, and above all fiscal reform. American expectations that such economic reform would be systematically carried out had prompted the Kennedy Administration to put great pressure on the Dutch to relinquish their hold on West Irian. For the Irian campaign had shown that Indonesian leaders seemed prepared to wreck their nation's economy in order to pursue their foreign adventures. U.S. policymakers hoped that Indonesian acquisition of West Irian, accompanied by a new U.S. assistance program based on the recommendations of the Humphrey Report (drafted by a team of six American economic experts) would encourage the country to channel its efforts realistically toward mature growth.[12]

This expectation was, of course, entirely unrealistic. Neither U.S. policymakers nor the writers of the optimistic Humphrey

[11]See, e.g., the remarks of Trade Minister Suharto in *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* October 10, 1962, p. 2. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review: Yearbook 1963* (Hong Kong, 1963), pp. 128-129.

[12]U.S. Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, *Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic Aid. A Report to the President of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1963). For an excellent critique of this report see Willard A. Hanna, *Observations on United States Aid to Indonesia* (American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XI, No. 1, Indonesia).

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Report seem to have understood that structural changes or sustained and disciplined development efforts in the Indonesian economy are impossible today because they might seriously upset the present internal balance of power. Sukarno faces pressures from organized labor; from the ranks of the swollen bureaucracy, strongly represented in the National Indonesian Party (PNI) of which the President is the titular leader; from conservative Muslim leaders with sizable landed interests (which have all but nullified recent land reform measures); from national businessmen, propped up in the export and distributing trade by a host of preferments and protective measures and fearful of losing their precarious position in a supposedly socialist economy—to name but a few groups. He would have found it politically impossible to overhaul the tax system, curtail the oversized bureaucracy, create a more favorable climate for investment, rationalize the external trade machinery, formulate a more realistic development policy, and institute many other needed measures.[13] To Sukarno, and to those economic groups which particularly look to him for protection and leadership, the Malaysia issue offered itself as the most immediately available means to perpetuate the status quo and justify once again the postponement of hard and unsettling economic decisions. Dangerous as the anti-Malaysia campaign might be for the country's already chaotic economy, Sukarno no doubt felt confident that the United States would not permit its economy to collapse, despite mounting criticisms of Indonesian policy in the U.S. Congress.[14]

Finally the role of the Indonesian army must be considered.

[13]For a description of the problems and vicious circles of the Indonesian economy in this connection see Douglas S. Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy," in Ruth T. McVey, editor, *Indonesia* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 155-243, and J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Difficulties," *International Journal,* Vol. 17 (1962), pp. 399-413.

[14]This calculation proved by and large correct, even though Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, during his meeting with Sukarno in Tokyo on January 17, 1964, reportedly informed the Indonesian President that Indonesia's anti-Malaysia campaign was endangering further U.S. aid to Indonesia under a Congressional rider to the 1964 foreign aid bill. Although the planned long-range economic stabilization program for Indonesia, underwritten by the U.S. and an international consortium, is now to be held in abeyance, direct U.S. economic assistance continues. On November 22, 1963, it was announced that U.S. arms deliveries to Indonesia had been suspended since the previous September, but that shipments of spare parts for Indonesian Lockheed C-130 transport planes (now being used by Indonesia in her Sarawak border war with Malaysia) were continuing. A State Department spokesman refused to say whether the U.S. government would, in the future, approve or disapprove applications for licenses to export further spare part shipments. *The Straits Times,* September 26 and November 23, 1963. Since March 1964 no new U.S. aid of any kind to Indonesia has been proposed by the Johnson Administration, and Congressional disapproval has mounted.

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Neither Defense Minister Nasution nor Army Chief of Staff Jani are reckless military adventurers; their various bellicose pronouncements in the anti-Malaysia campaign have surprised many. Yet there are important reasons for the army's involvement. For one thing, after Sukarno had opened the campaign and mobilized the mass organizations under his control the army had little choice in the matter. Anything less than full endorsement of Sukarno's course would probably have caused a new breach between its commanders and Sukarno and the PKI—with the risk of civil war. Such a breach, so soon after the abortive 1956 uprisings of disaffected army colonels—which for several years gravely undermined the army's prestige and bolstered the PKI's attack against the army leadership—could hardly be a welcome prospect for Nasution and his associates. Moreover, while some observers have been inclined to ridicule official Indonesian pronouncements that Malaysia represents a threat to Indonesia, such a threat is nonetheless felt to exist. Army commanders, who fought the prolonged campaign against the "Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic" proclaimed in West Sumatra in 1958, have not forgotten that Malaya and Singapore, despite Indonesian protests, provided supplies as well as a sanctuary to the rebel leaders. They fear that from this protected base new insurrectionary movements might be launched in the future. In their view, a completely friendly and pliable Malaysia is a strategic necessity.

But perhaps the chief reason for the army's apparently enthusiastic involvement in the Malaysia issue arises from the unresolved problem of its internal organization. Ever since independence, efforts have been made periodically to modernize the army and upgrade its officer corps. In 1952 an attempt at such modernization led to a major political crisis and the fall of Nasution, then Army Chief of Staff. Since then any real solution has been postponed. Even the naval high command, early in 1962, declared that it needed only 40 per cent of its total complement of about 40,000 men. The navy's proposed reductions seemed to reflect an earlier army reorganization scheme based on rapid mechanization and training of highly skilled younger personnel and envisaging a compact force of at most 175,000, less than half the army's present size.[15] But the political consequences of a sizable demobili-

[15]Information provided by a high ranking official in the Indonesian Defense Department, whose name the author is not at liberty to divulge.

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zation would be unthinkable, and with the outbreak of the Sumatra rebellion in 1956, the desirability of a large infantry army appropriate for anti-guerrilla combat again justified postponement of reorganization. The Indonesian paratroop landings in West New Guinea and the prospect there of a new field for extensive guerrilla warfare further strengthened the opponents of reform.

By mid-1962, with West Irian about to come into the Indonesian fold, and with the Sumatra rebellion wiped out, modernization became a pressing question once more. It now assumed the appearance of a conflict between generations: older officers, many of them relying on reputations gained in the 1945-49 revolution and unwilling to accept retirement or adjust to the new role of the technocratic military specialist, confronted growing numbers of younger subalterns, many trained in Western war colleges and staff schools and ambitious for advancement in their service specialty. Under the circumstances some army officers have increasingly sought to maintain themselves through political connections, and a few are known to be sympathetic to the PKI. A further complication arose when, during the latter stages of the West New Guinea campaign, a new task was found for the army: "Operasi Bhakti," a civil development program. This program, in which army personnel are already being used extensively in public works and development projects, aroused strong resentment, especially among prestige-minded and specialized younger officers who have a different conception of the martial life. Only a new political-military crisis could justify postponing the issue.

In the dark days of 1958, Nasution had devised what he called a "momentum policy" which gave the army a new spirit and respectability by linking it closely with the Irian campaign while it moved against the rebels. Now the Malaysia issue makes possible the continuation of his "momentum policy." Once more the army's place is assured in a new national emergency, and it can justify postponement of the hard and dangerous decisions of internal reorganization. It is not surprising that in its confrontation of Malaysia the Indonesian army appears to be following the same tactics it used in West Irian: small groups of armed Indonesians, some of them belonging to paramilitary organizations and, reportedly, in uniform, have begun to operate in Sarawak as well as at several points along the Malayan coast, e.g.

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in Johore.[16] Nasution's own volume on guerrilla war provides a detailed tactical outline for this kind of campaign.[17]

III

Like the PKI, Communist China's leaders could hardly remain indifferent to the creation of an avowedly anti-communist state in the heart of Southeast Asia, an area that has always been of particular historic interest to China. The Chinese traditionally have considered the lands around Nanyang ("The Southern Sea," i.e. the South China Sea) as falling within the Chinese sphere of influence, and Communist China's expansionist policies in the area follow an established pattern. This is not the place to detail Peking's continuing pull on the 15 million *hua chiao* ("Overseas Chinese") in Southeast Asia through skillful manipulation and exploitation of clan and family ties, ethnic pride, political fears and economic self-interest. Suffice it to note that the 4.8 million Chinese in Malaysia (out of a total population of about 10.5 million) became a prime target of communist blandishments as the idea of a Malaysian federation gained support after 1961.

Illustrative of Communist Chinese activities are those in Sarawak, where a large majority of the 230,000 Chinese (total population, about 745,000) fell into line with the policies of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), an organization which the Sarawak government has described as the principal tool of the communist underground in the territory.[18] This communist apparatus has made its strength felt not only through SUPP but through the predominantly Chinese trade unions and through student organizations of the private Chinese schools, where a mixture of communism and Chinese cultural chauvinism has strongly leavened instruction. Convinced of Communist China's eventual hegemony in the Nanyang region, desirous of establish-

[16]*The Straits Times*, August 22, 23, November 19, December 19, 1963; *The Malay Mail* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), September 4, 1963; *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), November 17, 1963.

[17]Abdul Haris Nasution, *Der Guerillakrieg: Grundlagen der Guerilla Kriegführung aus der Sicht des Indonesischen Verteidigungssystems in Vergangenheit und Zukunft* (Cologne, 1961); originally published as *Perang Gerilja* (second edition, Djakarta, 1954). Nasution's treatise conceived of guerrilla war as an essentially protracted, highly mobile and intensely motivated struggle. It brings little new information to those familiar with the theories of guerrilla war of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap and Che Guevarra.

[18]Government of Sarawak Information Service, *The Danger Within: A History of the Clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak* (Kuching, 1963), pp. 25-33.

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ing closer ties with the Chinese mainland for business reasons, fearful of their position and of a possible "desinicization" campaign in a new Malaysian federation, the Sarawak Chinese community offered an ideal recruiting ground for the communist-inspired anti-Malaysia campaign. The Commission headed by Lord Cobbold to investigate the political wishes of the populations of Sarawak and North Borneo early in 1962, reported:

> The position in Sarawak is further exacerbated by the fact that the present Government in Malaya, which would clearly be an important force in a new Federation of Malaysia, is anti-Communist. In the absence of some project like Malaysia, the Chinese, with their rapidly increasing population and their long start over other races in education, could expect, when independence came, to be in an unassailable position in Sarawak. This, in turn, could put the Communists, with their highly developed organization to work on the fears and frustrations of the great body of non-Communist Chinese, in an equally unassailable position. The Malaysia proposals would interfere with this development. Communist elements have therefore worked ceaselessly to exaggerate the fears which the Chinese community as a whole and members of other communities have of Malay domination and to make capital out of every possible issue, e.g., special position for the natives, citizenship, national language and religion. They have also worked on the emotions of a large body of younger Chinese, who have been educated in Chinese schools, who are strongly nationalistic and who have feelings of frustration and anxiety about their prospects.[19]

In January 1963, only a few weeks after Azahari's unsuccessful coup in Brunei and Sarawak, Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, referring to Azahari's venture, expressed "the resolute support of the Chinese people for the just struggle of the people of Brunei." He declared that the latter had undertaken "a heroic armed uprising to win national independence and overthrow colonialist rule," a pronouncement prominently noted in the North Borneo press.[20] Significantly, Chou spoke these words at a banquet in Peking in honor of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. When a visiting Indonesian parliamentary delegation led by PKI Vice Chairman Lukman visited Peking later that year, Marshal Chu Teh, Chairman of Communist China's National People's Congress, reiterated that the Chinese people "firmly supported" Indonesia's struggle against "neo-colonialism propagated by the imperialists in the name of Malaysia."[21] By

[19] *Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak* (Dichetak Di-Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan oleh Thor Beng Chong, Pemangku Penchetak Kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, 1962), p. 8.
[20] See, e.g., *North Borneo News and Sabah Times* (Jesselton), January 4, 1963.
[21] *New China News Agency*, September 28, 1963.

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this time Chinese communists and Chinese youths wearing SUPP emblems were training with Indonesian "volunteers" and with the remnants of Azahari's "National Army of the Government of North Kalimantan" at various bases in Indonesian Borneo, and Indonesian military personnel were leading bands of Chinese and Indonesian guerrillas. Shortly afterward the Sarawak government announced that armed Indonesian terrorists had landed along the coast of Sarawak, and that Sarawak "Communists are giving the Indonesians their full and willing cooperation."[22]

In investigations of and deportation proceedings against Sarawak Chinese, the Sarawak government captured documents which left little doubt of Peking's hand in the anti-Malaysia campaign and the guerrilla war in Sarawak.[23] As a government spokesman put it:

> It is Sarawak's misfortune to have a well organized Communist group at work inside the country. This group is entirely Chinese in set up and its members owe their loyalty not to Sarawak but to the cause of international Communism and particularly to the forces of Chinese Communism. Their aim is to establish a Chinese Communist state right here in Sarawak.[24]

The same spokesman noted that in these documents captured from arrested subversives, "Considerable attention is being paid to imparting knowledge of guerrilla war tactics, with special reference to the work of Mao Tse-tung."

The pattern of collaboration between Indonesia and Peking-oriented Chinese has also become apparent in other parts of Malaysia, notably in Singapore, where underground communist activity has sought to capitalize on Chinese communal fears and frustrations. The communist-infiltrated *Barisan Sosialis* (Socialist Front) in predominantly Chinese Singapore has been the counterpart of Sarawak's SUPP. Through the *Barisan's* front organizations, particularly the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), contacts with Indonesia for a coordinated anti-Malaysia campaign increased substantially in the latter half of 1963. Shortly after an abortive strike in early October, the Singapore government banned SATU and arrested some of its leaders.

[22]*The Sarawak Tribune* (Kuching), May 1 and June 10, 1963; *The Straits Times*, October 19 and November 29, 1963. On May 10, 1964 the Sarawak government announced that it had smashed an attempt by two platoons of Indonesian terrorists to set up a "liberated area" in Lundu, east of Kuching, with the assistance of the Lundu branch of SUPP.

[23]See, e.g., *Sarawak By The Week* (Sarawak Government Information Service, Kuching), Week of October 28 to November 3, 1962, No. 44/62, pp. 1-4.

[24]*The Sunday Times* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), April 21, 1963.

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According to the Malaysian police, however, a number of SATU cadres fled to Indonesia, and other Malaysia "Communists maintain contact with Indonesian gunboats along the Sumatra coast which give them protection to land safely in Indonesia."[25]

In Nanyang University in Singapore, a Chinese institution, a large segment of the student body is strongly oriented toward Peking and closely allied in political action with the *Barisan Sosialis*. While in residence there,[26] the writer was impressed by Peking's effective exploitation of traditional Chinese cultural chauvinism and of youthful pride in the resurgence of a "New China," and also by the widespread appreciation of Sukarno and Indonesia as "progressive forces" struggling against the remnants of "feudalism" and "neo-colonialism" symbolized by Malaysia. This appreciation was evident despite some knowledge of the often harrowing conditions of the Chinese minority in Indonesia in recent years—reports of anti-Chinese outbursts were either discounted or else quickly attributed to "reactionary" sources. Peking's hold on this segment of the younger Malaysian Chinese community and its future aspirations was as conspicuous as the favorable image enjoyed by the Indonesian President and his policies.

Another major factor leading to the current Sino-Indonesian alliance is the covert but nonetheless real identification of the PKI with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Officially the PKI has refrained from siding openly with either disputant and continues to describe the dispute as a "family quarrel" which should be resolved "in a family spirit."[27] But various pronouncements of PKI leaders in 1963, which have been prominently cited by Communist Chinese publications, clearly indicate where PKI sympathies lie. For example, while Khrushchev has been seeking closer relations with the "fraternal government" of Yugoslavia, the PKI, in complete accord with Peking's policy, never seems to weary of denouncing Yugoslav "revisionism" and

[25]*The Malay Mail* (Singapore), October 16, 1963.

[26]The author served as Visiting Professor in Nanyang University, Singapore, from June to November, 1963.

[27]D. N. Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward for Full National Independence," *World Marxist Review*, June 1963, p. 16 and *Indonesian Observer*, January 21, 1963. Earlier, at the 1961 Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Aidit had been fulsome in his praise of the Soviet Union yet refused to join in the condemnation of Albania, declaring upon his return to Indonesia that the PKI "is an independent Marxist-Leninist Party which has equal rights with other Communist Parties, which is not led by any other Party." *Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity, op. cit.*, p. 80.

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urging other communists to oppose it.[28] Indeed, at a mass rally in Pyongyang, North Korea, in September 1963, Aidit even managed to accuse Yugoslavia of supporting "the imperialist scheme of Malaysia."[29] In this anti-Belgrade line the PKI joins the Chinese Communist Party in strict adherence to the 1960 Statement of Communist and Workers Parties issued in Moscow, in which Tito and Yugoslavia are specifically condemned. "Loyalty in practice to the Moscow Declaration and Statement is the most important yardstick of the purity of a Communist Party," Aidit has written.[30] Any deviation from this policy of fidelity to the 1960 Statement is condemned in PKI circles, as it is in Peking, and any attempt to alter the Statement is described by the PKI as having no authority unless it is approved by all the parties which originally signed it.

Equally revealing is the PKI's position on the critical issue of peace or war in communist expansion strategy. There is little doubt that the PKI favors Peking's "hard line." While acknowledging the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, PKI party leaders have stressed that "it must always be remembered that according to Marxism-Leninism peaceful transition must be considered 'an exception.'"[31] The PKI's militancy in urging "confrontation" of "neo-colonialism" has won the particular approval of the Communist Chinese; on October 16, 1963, for example, Radio Peking (but not Radio Djakarta or Radio Moscow) was able to report that Aidit in a recent speech in Bandung had urged Indonesia to "take the road of revolution against

[28]See, e.g., D. N. Aidit, *Berani, Berani, Sekali Lagi Berani!* (Djakarta, 1963), p. 50; Njoto, "Soal-soal Nasional dan Internasional," *Bintang Merah* (Djakarta), November 1963, p. 13; and *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), April 19, 1963. For a synopsis of the Chinese communist position on Yugoslavia see the brochure *Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), which contains editorials originally published in *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongyi.*

[29]*The Straits Times,* September 16, 1963. By early April 1964, the government-controlled Belgrade press was expressing its indignation over attacks by Indonesian newspapers and government figures on Yugoslavia, which resulted from the growing *rapprochement* between Djakarta and Peking. *New York Times,* April 9, 1964.

[30]Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward for Full National Independence," *op. cit.,* p. 16.

[31]M. H. Lukman, *Report on Changes in the Communist Party Constitution* (Djakarta, 1959; translated from the Indonesian and issued by the Library of Congress, Joint Publications Reference Service, No. 4411, Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 14-18. For a comparison with the Chinese communist position see *A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963.* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), *passim.*

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Malaysia."[32] From July to September 1963, Aidit traveled to a number of communist nations, including the Soviet Union and People's China. While his reception in the former country was politely cool, in Peking the PKI chairman found himself showered with eulogies and held up as an exemplary communist. Aidit was quick to reciprocate by denouncing anew Yugoslav revisionism and praising Marxist-Leninist purity.[33]

In December 1963, a plenary session of the PKI central committee adopted a resolution entitled, "Marxists-Leninists of the World Unite, Continue to Smash Revisionism!", which contained virtually the entire range of Chinese communist tactical and theoretical positions developed in the dispute with Moscow—expressed in the Chinese communist vocabulary. The resolution, for example, urged all Marxist-Leninist parties "to hold aloft six banners": the "banner of Marxism-Leninism against revisionism"; the "banner of revolution against capitulation"; the "banner of concrete peace against abstract peace"; the "banner of proletarian internationalism against great-nation egoism"; the "banner of unity against splitting"; and the "banner of revolutionary optimism against pessimism."

Another indication of the PKI's support for Peking has been its position in the Sino-Indian dispute. Aidit has criticized Khrushchev for continuing to fulfill his promise to supply MIG-21 jet fighter planes to India. Toward the close of 1963 he called on the "true Communists" in India to form a new Marxist party free from the influence of communists who lent themselves to "spying" for the Nehru government, i.e. the anti-Peking faction of the Indian Communist Party. This demand netted Aidit a vociferous denunciation by the Indian Communist Party's central committee, which warned its members not to allow themselves to be used by the sympathizers "of the Indonesians and Chinese" who were seeking to break up the Indian party.

The PKI's entente with Chinese communism is, however, only one aspect of a broader Sino-Indonesian ideological rapport today. Both countries appear to share a common political temper, a mixture of revolutionary nationalist *élan* and faith in the Marxist-Leninist millennium. Current Communist Chinese thought is messianic Leninism. Its militancy and zeal, in which

[32]Alex Josey, "Edging Aidit," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* November 14, 1963, p. 339.

[33]See *Peking Review,* September 13, 1963, pp. 26-39.

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memory of China's historic grandeur is blended with belief in the eventual victory of world communism, and its presumed boundless confidence in what the liberated energies of the masses can achieve by a mere exercise of the popular will, have contributed to the creation of a kind of revolutionary daring, a "voluntarist illuminism," in which "the subjective creates the objective."[34]

In President Sukarno's ideology, which serves as the official guideline for the development of his nation, the same elements predominate: a Rousseau-like mystique of revolutionary nationalism, heavy dosages of a romantic kind of Marxism, and an idealistic philosophy of will which bears a curious resemblance to that of Fichte.[35] A recent apologist of the Indonesian political ideology has explained that "reasoning by feeling" rather than by logic has come to be preferred in the Indonesian decision-making process. "It is recognized that rational and disciplined thinking, required when pursuing science, is not a behavior trait that has its origin in Indonesian culture, which has its chief focus upon spiritual and humanistic rather than upon material and exact values."[36] Western "materialism" and Oriental "spiritualism" aside, it remains true that under Sukarno's aegis the irrational and revolutionary dimensions of Indonesian political life have been accentuated as never before and are held up as national ideals. Thus Indonesia's President is wont to speak—with due acknowledgment to Benito Mussolini—of *vivere pericoloso* as a national policy. On December 5, 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio pointed up the practical implications of this approach when he declared in Djakarta that Indonesia was "deliberately neglecting" her economy so that she could concentrate on regaining the confidence of her "national identity" and on reviving the "iron spirit" of her people. It is hardly surprising that Aidit, whose principal aim as a communist theoretician and tactician has been to make PKI policy conform as closely as possible to Sukarno's nationalism, strongly endorsed "the spirit of 'skirting danger', of *vivere periocoloso*" as "a striking feature of the nation-wide movement to defend truth and oppose lawless-

[34]Stuart R. Schram, "Chinese and Leninist Components in the Personality of Mao Tse-tung," *Asian Survey*, June 1963, pp. 271-272.

[35]See, e.g., my "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," *Asian Survey*, July 1962, pp. 24-30.

[36]Selo Soemardjan, "Some Social and Cultural Implications of Indonesia's Unplanned and Planned Development," *Review of Politics*, January 1963, pp. 82-83.

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ness and arbitrariness, to struggle for the just demands of the people and expose the foul deeds of the enemies of the people."[37] Peking's Leninist militancy and anti-Western policies, accentuated by her dispute with Moscow, and her officially propagated revolutionary reconstructionist fervor, strike responsive chords among Indonesia's official ideologues and symbol manipulators.[38]

IV

Apart from its Leninist spirit and the combination of domestic pressures making for continuous Chinese communist militancy, it is clear that Peking's expansionist policies in Southeast Asia and the rest of the underdeveloped world are influenced by and feed back upon her dispute with Moscow. Opposition to Malaysia, together with support for Indonesia and the anti-Malaysia North Borneo rebel movement, is thus for Peking a kind of Asian test case of her ideological and tactical differences with the Soviets. Perhaps the most important feature of the new Sino-Indonesian partnership is that Indonesia not only appears to be willing to act as "front man" for the Chinese communist drive into the Afro-Asian countries, but in effect also as a pawn in the Chinese conflict with the Soviets. Early in September 1963, a pro-Peking

[37]Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward for Full National Independence," *op. cit.*, p. 11. See also D. N. Aidit, *Kobarkan semangat Banteng! Madju terus, pantang mundur!* (Djakarta: Jajasan 'Pembaruan', 1964), *passim.*

[38]It has been argued that the extensive symbol manipulation and sloganizing characteristic of Indonesian political life began around 1958, when the economic deterioration of the country notably accelerated; that this activity helps the government to solve its various administrative problems and gains it popular support by holding out the promise of future national achievements; and that, anyway, there is no alternative form of political activity open in Indonesia today. (Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders," *World Politics*, October 1963, pp. 79-97.) While one need not underestimate the uses of demagoguery in Indonesia, the above contentions seem debatable. In the first place the near Gnostic intensity of political symbol exploitation reaches to the very origins of Indonesian nationalism and was quite extensive well before 1958. Secondly, far from aiding the government in solving the country's problems, ceaseless sloganizing and symbolizing has helped to create conditions in which no solution is actually possible. Like the Malaysia issue, which is part of the same political temper, it has merely helped to prolong economic stagnation and postponed an inevitable confrontation with the serious problems of the Indonesian political economy. Hence, the continuing popular misery plays into the hands of the PKI. On November 19, 1963, for example, the PKI daily *Harian Rakyat* could report that people in areas of West Java were now eating mango seeds because they no longer could afford rice. The PKI has perhaps been the principal beneficiary in the long run of the process of government by slogan and symbol, a circumstance Feith completely fails to note. And after considering the train of popular insurrectionary movements since the country became independent, or the eight assassination attempts on Sukarno (Indonesia's principal symbol purveyor and manipulator), it is difficult to argue that Indonesians do not appear to see any political alternative to the present process of government.

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newssheet, *Ritorneamo A Lenin* ("Let Us Return to Lenin"), circulating among Italian communists in Rome, claimed that Peking was about to set up a new Communist International, of which Indonesia would be a principal member. Indonesian obsequiousness to Chinese communist wishes was reaching the point of the ludicrous. For example, at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization Conference in Nicosia, Cyprus, also in September 1963, Indonesian delegates so vehemently attacked the nuclear test ban treaty that the Soviet delegate justifiably expressed his amazement at the denunciation, since the Indonesian government had by then already signed the treaty.[39]

It was at the Afro-Asian Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, early in February 1963, that the new Chinese-Indonesian alliance perhaps first clearly showed itself. At the behest of Peking's and Djakarta's emissaries the conference passed a resolution extending official recognition to Azahari's "Unitary Government of North Kalimantan" and condemning Britain for its military suppression of Azahari's attempted coup in Brunei and Sarawak. Two months later Peking's gambit became even more obvious. From April 24 through April 30, some forty nations attended an Afro-Asian Journalists Conference in Djakarta, during which the discomfiture of the Soviet delegation was as conspicuous as it had been at Moshi. The Communist Chinese delegates managed to have the representatives from South Vietnam disqualified and, with the help of their Indonesian hosts, saw to it that virtually all resolutions and discussions dealt with strictly political, not technical or journalistic, matters. Again one of the resolutions voiced full support for the "right of the North Kalimantan people to self determination," and demanded that Britain give "immediate independence" to them. Denouncing U.S. "imperialism," which has become "the main bulwark of modern imperialism and the common enemy of the peoples of Asia and Africa," another resolution called for support for "the struggles of the Japanese people against the aggression and oppression by U.S. imperialism"; support for the people of South Vietnam in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys"; aid to Laos to resist "U.S. aggression and intervention"; and support for the people

[39]Reuter's dispatch, Rome, September 4, 1963; *ibid.*, Nicosia, September 12, 1963. Along with Indonesia, it was claimed the new Chinese Comintern would include the communist parties of North Korea, North Vietnam, Japan, Burma, New Zealand, Norway, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cameroon and Albania, as well as "strong minorities organized in the Indian, English, and Belgian Communist parties."

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of Angola and other African areas in their struggle against British imperialism and "colonialism old and new." Peking's militancy was responsible for another resolution which called "on all Asian-African governments and liberation movements to support the African people of South Africa to add violence to their methods of struggle."[40] One perceptive Indian journalist who attended the conference summarized his impressions in these words:

> Indonesia has become the Asian arena of the tactical conflict between the USSR and China and present indications are that China is winning the race as an Asian power, offering a more militant leadership in the ideological struggle against liberal democracy with its built-in limitations on the abuse of power. All over Asia there are signs that the patterns of power are slowly being regrouped by Peking-oriented propaganda into a struggle between the traditionally poor and the rich—and the Soviet Union in this realignment finds itself awkwardly teamed with the rich.[41]

Indonesia's new role as Peking's "front man" was even more blatantly revealed in the "Games of the New Emerging Forces" (GANEFO) held in Djakarta in November 1963. On February 8, 1963, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee had expelled Indonesia, barring her from participation in Olympic Games for an "indefinite period" because of her exclusion of Nationalist China and Israel from the Fourth Asian Games held in Djakarta the previous August. The Indonesian government immediately issued denunciations of the Olympic Games and formulated plans—based on Sukarno's antithesis which divides the world between "old established forces" and "new emerging forces"—for a new international athletic contest of its own, the GANEFO. The extraordinary tale of how various nations found themselves suddenly among the "new emerging forces" (even the Netherlands, having surrendered West New Guinea to Indonesia, was invited and sent a second-string team) cannot be related here; nor can we fully describe the widespread misgivings in international sports circles about what was obviously a politically inspired contest, particularly after Sukarno announced that "the International Olympic Committee has become the tool of imperialism."[42] Suffice it to say that in the end teams from fifty-one countries participated, although only a third of these had official status. From the start Peking, along with Indonesia, had

[40] *Indonesian Observer,* May 2, 1963.
[41] See the unsigned article, "A Journalist's Bandung," *United Asia* (Bombay), August 1963, pp. 589-590.
[42] *Indonesian Observer,* April 27, 1963.

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been GANEFO's most enthusiastic backer. Its media hailed GANEFO's "full display of the spirit of democracy and equality" in contrast to other international sports events which were deemed to have been "poisoned" by "imperialist elements."[43]

Peking's support for GANEFO was not an unmixed blessing for the Indonesians. After the games, the *Malayan Times* disclosed that the Indonesian government, by July 1963, had begun to worry about the financial burden of GANEFO, and through the mediation of the PKI had approached the Chinese communists for assistance in meeting expenses. Peking reportedly offered Indonesia 18 billion rupiah worth of foreign exchange in the form of Malaysian dollars, at a rate of about 350 rupiah to one Malaysian dollar, or a total credit of about 53 million Malayan dollars (U.S. $18 million). To hide from the world the fact that the Chinese were financing GANEFO, the Peking government, as part of the arrangement, agreed to destroy upon receipt the 18 billion rupiahs which Indonesia would pay in exchange for Malaysian dollars. But soon after GANEFO began, the Indonesians noticed Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese athletes spending large numbers of rupiahs. A quick check revealed these rupiahs to be part of the money Indonesia had sent to Peking and which Peking had promised to destroy. Reportedly some of the rupiahs also found their way to the coffers of the PKI, to certain pro-communist Chinese businessmen in Indonesia, and to some Chinese whose property had been destroyed in the recent anti-Chinese riots. Indonesian officials moved rapidly to withdraw the rupiahs, but the steady fall of the Indonesian rupiah toward the end of the year has been attributed largely to the effects of this sudden new glut of Indonesian money.[44]

The pressures of the Djakarta-Peking axis on the underdeveloped world, especially in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, have already begun to arouse resentment among some Afro-Asian nations. This is apparent from the reaction to the efforts of the partners to dominate the Afro-Asian labor movement. On June 21, 1963 Sukarno's Presidential Decree No. 116 stressed the great importance of holding a proposed Afro-Asian workers conference in Indonesia for "strengthening relations of cooperation and solidarity between the countries of the new

[43] *Renmin Ribao*, November 23, 1963, cited in *Peking Review*, November 29, 1963, p. 19.

[44] *Malayan Times*, November 21, 1963.

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emerging forces," and announced that all costs incurred in such a conference would be borne by the government. At the September 1963 Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization Conference in Cyprus, Indonesians and Red Chinese were active not only in rounding up supporters for the proposed Afro-Asian Labor Conference in Djakarta, but also in attempting to exclude the Soviets and their sympathizers from such a conference. A number of African delegations, however, resenting the Djakarta-Peking tactics, announced plans to proceed with a labor conference of their own. Even among Indonesia's neighbors there were strong reservations. The Rangoon paper, *The Nation,* described the idea as merely "a bid for the leadership of Afro-Asian trade unionism by President Sukarno," and as really having been inspired by China. The Philippines flatly refused to participate. S. A. Dange, chairman of India's badly divided Communist Party, characterized the Indonesian proposal as just "another move in the Sino-Soviet ideological struggle."[45]

Soviet opposition was also mounting. At the Soviet Union's Conference of Trade Unions in Moscow, in late October 1963, which was attended by delegations from about 100 countries including Indonesia, the Soviets attacked what they called "the Chinese plan" to establish an Afro-Asian trade union congress. They declared that a conference which would exclude "participation of representatives of trade union centres from other continents" and be held "without the Soviet Trade Unions" would not be worthy of support. Throughout September and October Djakarta and Peking had made efforts to wean Afro-Asian labor organizations away from the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), but with little success. When at last Indonesia's Afro-Asian Labor Conference opened in Djakarta—almost at the same time as the Soviet Conference of Trade Unions—only seventeen nations attended. With considerable embarrassment the conference concluded that a "full convention" of the Afro-Asian labor movement would be held in Djakarta in 1964. Despite the objection of the Soviet delegation the Djakarta conference decided that delegates from the WFTU would henceforth participate only as "observers" in the nine-member executive council which it established.

[45]For the data and citations in this paragraph I have relied on the highly informative article by Alex Josey, "An Indonesian Plot that Failed," *The Sunday Mail* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), October 27, 1963.

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While it is clear that many Afro-Asian nations see through and resent Peking's gambit and Djakarta's "front man" activities in what might be called "Afro-Asianism," Sukarno and the Communist Chinese continue their efforts undaunted. New Afro-Asian conferences are being planned in Djakarta for students, women, artists, seamen and others. Even an "Afro-Asian Catholic Conference" has been scheduled for late 1964. Peking evidently knows how to inflate Sukarno's aspirations of grandeur, and who can deny that the staging of one international spectacle after another in Djakarta serves to divert Indonesian thoughts from domestic stagnation and discontent? The "Games of the New Emerging Forces" had scarcely ended when Sukarno began calling for a CONEFO, a "Conference of the New Emerging Forces." "God willing," he declared on December 11, 1963 in Djakarta, "we will soon be organizing the CONEFO. All this is the realization of the third goal of the revolution—to build a new world free from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism." As if on cue, Peking also began to call for "a second Bandung Conference" of Afro-Asian countries similar to the one held in Indonesia in 1955. Another conference patterned on Bandung, Peking proclaimed, would "provide a suitable meeting place for the new emerging forces to compare notes" on the progress made since "the spirit of Bandung" first activated the Asian and African peoples "in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism."[46] Just as the first Bandung Conference gave Peking an opportunity to ingratiate itself with its suspicious Asian neighbors, so a "second Bandung" would mark Peking's steady expansion of influence in the Afro-Asian world today.

V

The domestic forces in Indonesia supporting the anti-Malaysia campaign are complex and compelling; they involve all the principal centers of power and their present precarious balance. Through the Malaysia issue these forces are working toward a partnership with Communist China. For Peking, in turn, Malaysia is a test case of her own militancy and ideological and tactical difference with Moscow. In its renewed attack on the Soviet Communist Party early in February 1964, the Chinese Communist Party's central committee again declared that "Communists are makers of revolution. If they refuse to make revolutions,

[46] *Peking Review*, January 17, 1964, p. 32.

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they cease to be Marxists-Leninists and become revisionists and such-like."[47] Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia feeds upon the Sino-Soviet dispute, quite apart from China's historic drive for hegemony in the area and the aspirations of the Overseas Chinese. Peking confidently proclaims that only the "first round" of the fight in North Borneo is over: "the North Kalimantan struggle is a component part of the liberation fight in Southeast Asia . . . . with internal unity, Indonesia's backing and the growing support of the peoples of Asia and the whole world," the "righteous cause" of the North Borneo rebels will triumph.[48]

Even as peace talks suggested by U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy were going forward in Bangkok, Indonesia was applying the tactics of Mao's "protracted war."[49] Sukarno has set in motion plans to ring Malaysia with protected bases in the Rhio Islands, in North Sumatra and along the east and west coasts of Borneo, in order to facilitate Indonesian infiltration. According to Malaysian Premier Tunku Rahman, Indonesian agents are forming covert armed units in Malaysia itself for revolutionary purposes. Sabah's Chief Minister, Donald Stephens, reports that Indonesian plantation workers in Sabah, especially the 17,000 living around the Tawau area, have been receiving ammunition and grenades from their homeland.[50]

Meanwhile, in the words of an official Indonesian pronouncement, "Indonesia feels . . . very unhappy that Malaya has lent itself, consciously or unconsciously, to become the tool of this undying and traditional policy of divide and rule in Asia by an allegedly retreating colonial power."[51] The price demanded for a cessation of the "confrontation" would seem to be the breakup

[47]*New York Times,* February 7, 1964.

[48]*Peking Review,* December 20, 1963, p. 25. See also the editorials in *Renmin Ribao,* March 27 and May 28, 1964 for continuing Communist Chinese attacks on Malaysia and support of Indonesian "confrontation."

[49]At the very moment that the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were meeting in Bangkok to lay the groundwork for a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute, the Djakarta headquarters of the Indonesian National Front (the central coordinating body of all political parties established by the government) issued instructions throughout Indonesia for the formation of "action commands" to "crush Malaysia." Local branches of the Front were urged immediately "to take up again the total confrontation campaign" against Malaysia. *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* February 7, 1964. Following the breakdown of the Malaysia summit conference in Tokyo on June 20, 1964, Indonesian guerrillas rapidly accelerated attacks in Sarawak and Sabah.

[50]*The Straits Times,* November 19, December 19, 1963; *The Sunday Times,* November 17, 1963; *Sabah Times* (Jesselton), November 21, December 5, 1963.

[51]Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., *A Survey on the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia* (s.l., 1963), p. 5.

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of Malaysia into its component units, or at least the withdrawal of all British and Commonwealth forces and compliance of the Malaysian leaders to the dictates of Peking and Djakarta. Yet, in view of the domestic pressures which prompted Sukarno to launch the anti-Malaysia campaign, it is likely that the Portuguese presence in Eastern Timor would soon be seized upon as a substitute issue should Malaysia accede to Sukarno's demands. Nor is Peking's own drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia likely to abate, even should Malaysia at once cease to be "neo-colonial." Hence a Peking-Djakarta partnership may be continued, particularly in further attempts to exploit "Afro-Asianism," as a mutually profitable venture.

Yet various imponderables may affect the Sino-Indonesian partnership. Djakarta's *rapprochement* with Peking is predicated upon the continuation of the precarious balance of power in Indonesia, and more especially upon Sukarno's pivotal position in that balance. At 64 Sukarno is old for an Indonesian of his generation. He has been ailing intermittently and there is no assurance that he will evade the assassin's hand indefinitely. Whether the partnership would survive Sukarno's demise is difficult to say. Even though both the Indonesian army and the PKI have a stake in the perpetuation of the Malaysia crisis and hence in Peking's support for the confrontation policy, a power conflict between them following the death of Sukarno seems quite probable. Before such a conflict erupts, however, the problem of containing the PKI may become acute. PKI-dominated trade unions, such as the oilworkers' union PERBUM, reportedly were responsible for sabotage of the Shell Oil Company pipeline installations in Borneo in mid-December 1963. Also, relentless PKI pressure on Sukarno to press with increasing vigor and regardless of risks the military confrontation against Malaysia is beginning to arouse concern in military circles.

The sudden mission of Adam Malik, Indonesia's new Trade Minister, to Moscow in late December 1963, presumably to ask the Soviets for urgent economic assistance, has been interpreted as a gesture to counterbalance Peking's influence, as has the visit of Anastas Mikoyan (then First Deputy Premier of the USSR) to Indonesia in the closing week of June 1964. A new Soviet economic assistance program as well as a new arms delivery to Indonesia, including an undisclosed number of transport planes, helicopters and air defense weapons, were then agreed upon, and

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Mikoyan pledged full Soviet support for Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" campaign. The latter assurance was reiterated during Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit to Moscow, July 10-16, 1964. It appears that the USSR seems quite ready to vie with Peking for Indonesia's favors, particularly in the context of Indonesia's own policy of revolutionary militancy in the whole of Southeast Asia.[52] For despite Indonesian suggestions that Sino-Indonesian trade be increased, the fact remains that Peking can be a trading partner of only limited value to Indonesia, particularly in providing the mounting food imports or the direct capital injections necessary to shore up Indonesia's tottering financial structure.

Finally, Indonesia too pursues what some of its leaders and ideologues believe to be an historic "manifest destiny" in Southeast Asia, based upon the imperial grandeur of ancient Indonesian states like Shrivijaya and Mojopahit which at various times claimed hegemony on the neighboring Asian mainland. Indonesia's interest in the Philippine-sponsored "Maphilindo" federation, which calls for political unity among Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, may be related to Sukarno's dream of fulfilling Indonesia's "manifest destiny." If the present Malaysian Federation were in fact to collapse, Communist Chinese expansionism might collide with an Indonesian nationalism fed by grandiose visions of ancient Javanese imperialism.

But these, for the time being, are still imponderables. For the moment the Sino-Indonesian alliance is the most significant new political development in Southeast Asia.

[52]For an analysis of Indonesia's new policy of seeking the revolutionary transformation of her Southeast Asian neighbors, in conjunction with Peking's own militancy in this area, see my "Exporting Indonesia's Revolution," *Eastern World* (London), July 1964, pp. 13-15.

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INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, 1953-1963

by Arthur Stein

THE establishment of cordial relations between Moscow and New Delhi constitutes one of the more significant political-diplomatic developments of the past decade. For the first six years of Indian independence, 1947-1953, Marshal Stalin, preoccupied with Europe and the Far East, for the most part dismissed India as little more than an Anglo-American satellite. But after 1953, his successors re-evaluated India's position and decided that she was following a genuinely "nonaligned" course between the two Cold War blocs. They calculated that India's policy and her prominence in the "third world" might prove helpful in the Kremlin's effort to break out from its "encirclement by the imperialist nations" and to promote the new line of "peaceful coexistence." Under these assumptions a complete reversal of the official Soviet attitude toward India took place during the mid-1950's.

Proceeding with some caution at first, the Government of India welcomed the changed Soviet attitude, and by the end of 1955 the two governments found that they shared a number of common interests. Each sought to enlist the other's support for its basic policies. Thereafter India approved and sought to encourage the trends toward liberalization within the communist world. Her increasing contacts with the Khrushchev regime eventually involved India in the affairs of the communist bloc: from 1957-58 onward the question of how to deal with India became a point of contention between the USSR and China.

This paper will survey, from New Delhi's viewpoint, the evolution of Indian-Soviet relations, beginning with the radical changes that occurred between 1953 and 1956. The policy adopted during those formative years by the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru remains largely unchanged in 1964.[1]

[1]Michael Brecher has summarized Nehru's role as the formulator of India's foreign policy: "It is he . . . who provided a rationale for India's approach to international policies since 1947 . . . and who carried the policy of non-alignment to the world at large. Throughout this period he has dominated the policymaking process. No one in Congress or in the Government ever challenged his control in this sphere. . . ." *Nehru, A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University

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The Formative Years, 1953-1956

Soviet Overtures. After Stalin's death the new Soviet leadership sought to bring about certain urgent domestic reforms and to create a new international image for itself by adopting the policy of "peaceful coexistence." In this context it was natural for the Soviets to reassess their attitude toward India, the largest and most populous of the newly independent states. While the Indian government was hardly representative, by Marxist-Leninist standards, of the country's working class and peasants, its policies in world affairs had been generally "progressive" since 1950. India had strongly supported the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations, had refused to condemn China's entry into the Korean conflict, and was critical of French policy in Indochina, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the American-sponsored military pacts in Asia.

The changing Soviet evaluation of the role of India and other newly-independent nations was evident in Premier Malenkov's address to the Supreme Soviet on August 14, 1953. He hailed India's "significant contribution" among the "efforts of the peace-loving countries towards ending the Korean War," and expressed the hope that "in the future, relations between India and the USSR will grow stronger and develop in a spirit of friendly co-operation." Two weeks later, as a harbinger of this new outlook, the amiable Mikhail Menshikov was appointed Soviet Ambassador to India.

At the ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) Conference, in February 1954, the Soviet delegate pledged economic assistance for those countries (India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt) which had advanced "the cause of peace." Soon thereafter, India entered into negotiations for a Soviet-built steel mill; plans for this project were made public in September 1954, and the agreement was signed in February 1955. After Chou En-lai's visit to India in 1954, the Soviet-influenced All-India Peace Council echoed support for a "united campaign for Asian solidarity based on the acceptance of Panchsheel," the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. From mid-1954 onward the Soviet press bestowed on India and its policies and

Press, 1957), p. 565. Brecher's observation is particularly true with reference to Indian policy toward the USSR. Only after 1959 did criticism, either from within or outside the Congress Party, have significant influence on some of Nehru's policies, but the basic relationship with the USSR has remained almost unchallenged.

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programs almost unqualified praise.[2] Soviet diplomats called for more Indian representation in important world councils, e.g., they recommended that India be given a position on the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

India's Response. Fortuitously for the Soviets, their overtures coincided with the U.S.-Pakistan Security Pact and the formation of SEATO. In contrast to their displeasure with the West, India's leaders were gratified by the new respect accorded them by the Soviets and Chinese. Nehru welcomed this improved relationship with the communist world. Unwilling to abandon India's "non-aligned" policy in favor of formal military ties to the West, he saw no course open other than arriving at a *modus vivendi* with the USSR and China. An understanding with the communist world would enable India to assume the diplomatic role of honest-broker between East and West, and enhance his bid for a share of Asia's future leadership equal to that of China.[3]

The Geneva Conference in the summer of 1954 afforded Nehru an opportunity to put the Soviet professions of good will to a practical test. Because of U.S. opposition to her participation, India was not officially represented at the conference, but Krishna Menon, India's Ambassador to the United Nations, played an important role behind the scenes. He let it be known that India would regard Soviet efforts to obtain a settlement of the Indochina question as an endorsement by Moscow of the Five Principles of Coexistence. The increasing rapport between India and the USSR afterward grew in part from India's satisfaction with the results of the conference.

Nehru was also impressed by the apparent Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito provided him a valuable listening post within the communist camp, and as fellow exponents of "peaceful coexistence" and "nonalignment," Nehru and Tito found common grounds for cooperation in the diplomatic sphere. After Tito's visit to India late in 1954, Nehru began actively to encourage liberalizing trends within the USSR.

[2]Soviet orientologists revised their pre-1954 opinions on India in accordance with the new government policy. A restatement of their views is contained in V. V. Balabushevich and A. N. Diakov, editors, *Novashaia Istoriia Indii* (*Modern History of India*) (Moscow: Eastern Literature Publishing House, 1959).

[3]When Nehru remarked that the U.S.-Pakistan Pact ". . . had disturbed the balance of power in the area," one observer questioned: "Was there a balance of power before the Pact? . . . If India wants a power balance in Asia does it mean that Mao and Nehru are contending for leadership of Asia, something Nehru has denied?" R. Nigam, "U.S.-Pakistan Alliance and India," *Radical Humanist*, March 28, 1954.

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Symbolic of improving Indo-Soviet relations was the exchange of a host of delegations—cultural, industrial, trade, agricultural, parliamentary—followed by the state visits of Nehru to the USSR and Bulganin-Khrushchev to India. Nehru's trip to the USSR, in June 1955, gave him a chance to exchange views with the Soviet leaders. Significantly, he was the first noncommunist leader permitted to speak directly to the Soviet people (he addressed an audience of 100,000 in Moscow's Dynamo Stadium). He commended the Soviet leadership for coming to an understanding with Yugoslavia and for signing the Austrian Peace Treaty. He balanced his praise for the steps the USSR had taken to lessen world tension by reminding the Soviets that their countries had had different historical experiences, and he urged each nation to respect the path chosen by the other to achieve its national objectives. He also inferred that Cominform interference in the internal affairs of other nations was inconsistent with the Five Principles.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin state visit to Afghanistan, India and Burma marked the first such peacetime trip by a Soviet head of state outside the communist world. Any embarrassment the ebullient Khrushchev's occasional anti-Western sallies may have caused his Indian hosts was more than offset by unqualified Soviet support on the Goan and Kashmir issues.[4] Bulganin proclaimed that "there is no justification for the Portuguese colony of Goa to exist on the ancient soil of India,"[5] while Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position on Kashmir in stronger terms than Soviet leaders had previously used. Nehru, speaking in Agra on January 3, 1956, expressed his gratitude: "I never asked them to do that but they said the correct things . . . and have expressed their opinion after due consideration and just deliberation."[6]

The de-Stalinization policy, inaugurated at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, was hailed by Nehru as confirming the Soviet trend toward liberalization. Speaking in the Lok Sahba (the lower house of Parliament) on March 20, 1956, he observed:

There can be no doubt that the CPSU Congress has developed a new line and a new policy. This new line, both in political thinking and on

[4]K.P.S. Menon, who skillfully carried out Nehru's policy as Ambassador to the USSR from 1952-61, appraises the improvement of Indo-Soviet relations in his political diary, *The Flying Troika* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). The extent to which the Soviet leaders were willing to go "in evolving a more stable basis of Indo-Soviet relations" is discussed by Sisir Gupta, "India and Russia," in *Current History*, March 1963.

[5]*Times of India*, November 28, 1955.

[6]*The Hindu*, January 4, 1956.

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practical policy appears to be based on a more realistic appreciation of the world situation and represents a significant process of adaptation and adjustment.

The dissolution of the Cominform on April 16, 1956 further convinced Nehru of the increased Soviet sensitivity to world opinion.

Nehru, whose policy toward the USSR seemed to be vindicated, felt that the "Soviet trend towards normalcy" should be welcomed.[7] At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in July 1956, he sought to persuade his colleagues that increased contact should be established between the two Cold War blocs. In short, Nehru's approach was to bind the Soviet Union (and China) to international obligations and responsibilities from which it would become increasingly difficult to withdraw.

Indian Involvement in Communist-Bloc Affairs

The processes of liberalization in Eastern Europe unleashed forces which, to use Isaac Deutscher's metaphor, complicated Khrushchev's problem of how to slow down his runaway train without derailing it. When the Hungarian crisis broke out, Nehru's primary concern was to keep the conflict localized. In the United Nations on November 9, 1956, India voted with the Soviet bloc against the General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary to be followed by elections under UN auspices.[8] From November 15 on, however, Nehru unequivocably called for the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary[9] and for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Hungarian people. Yet he refused to support the application of pressures by the UN to achieve these ends.

The Soviets were naturally pleased with India's initial response

[7] *Lok Sabha Debates,* second series, Vol. 1, No. 8, February 23, 1956, col. 817.

[8] Krishna Menon's vote was apparently made without direct authorization from New Delhi. Nonetheless Nehru endorsed the position taken by Menon and on November 15 told the Indian Parliament's Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs that an election under UN auspices might create a bad precedent (in relation to Kashmir). It is worth noting that almost all of the other nonaligned Afro-Asian nations abstained on the issue.

Some subsequent remarks by Nehru help to reveal his thoughts on Hungary: He acknowledged that while there were some "fascist elements" involved in the rebellion and some aid from outside, "the large majority . . . claimed freedom from outside control or interference." (*Lok Sabha Debates,* second series, Vol. 9, No. 4, November 19, 1956, col. 373.) On December 3, 1956 Nehru told the Rajya Sabha that Imre Nagy had been taken to a mountain resort in Rumania for reasons of health; he was incensed when he learned of Nagy's execution in 1957.

[9] The Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia jointly called for withdrawal of foreign troops from Suez and Hungary.

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to the Hungarian situation, but became somewhat annoyed at her attitude toward East European conditions in 1957-58. During this period the Soviet leaders pointedly reminded Nehru of India's many pressing domestic problems, particularly Kashmir. After Nehru expressed his concern, in May 1958, over worsening Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Khrushchev told India's Ambassador to the USSR, K.P.S. Menon, that India should not interfere in the affairs of other nations.

Nehru was also called to task late in 1958 for his provocative article, "The Basic Approach," in which he criticized all dogmatic ideologies, particularly communism. On "the growing contradictions within the rigid framework of communism," he observed:

> Its suppression of individual freedom brings about powerful reactions. Its contempt for what might be called the moral and spiritual side of life not only ignores something that is basic in man, but also deprives human behavior of standards and values. Its unfortunate association with violence encourages a certain evil tendency in human beings.[10]

Ironically, Nehru's purpose was not so much to denigrate communism as to justify the path of social and economic development being practiced in India. He felt it necessary to answer those skeptics within India who were enamored of the seemingly more spectacular achievements of the USSR and China. On behalf of the communist world the Soviet Ambassador to China, P. Yudin, scored Nehru's "approach" as in many respects indistinguishable from capitalism. Nehru's conception of socialism, observed Yudin, "does not say anything about land ownership . . . , Indian and foreign capitalists, how the poverty of the peasants and the workers will be ended, [or] how exploitation will be abolished."[11]

Events of immediate concern in Tibet and along India's Himalayan borders, from March 1959 onward, brought an end to Nehru's criticism of and doctrinal exchanges with the Soviet Union. Sino-Indian relations, worsening steadily since 1957, reached a critical juncture. For several years negotiations had been held secretly to discuss the undefined boundary in Ladakh, to the satisfaction of neither nation. From China's standpoint far more was involved than a border dispute; the conflict between rivals for influence in Asia was about to assume major proportions.[12]

[10]Jawaharlal Nehru, "The Basic Approach," *AICC Economic Review*, May 15, 1958.

[11]P. Yudin, "Can We Accept Pandit Nehru's Approach?," *World Marxist Review*, December 1958.

[12]For differing interpretations of the underlying causes of the conflict see C. N. Satyapalan (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1964);

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The Soviet Attitude Toward the Sino-Indian Conflict

Underlying Nehru's policy toward the USSR after 1957 was the hope that the Soviets would act as a restraining influence on the Chinese. Unfortunately for India, however, all was not well in the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Soviets were unable to guarantee amicable Chinese conduct toward India. The causes of Sino-Soviet friction are extremely complex, but among the Chinese grievances was the preferential treatment given to the "reactionary" Indian government. For example, in July 1958 the Soviets called for an immediate meeting of the Western Big Three, the USSR and India to resolve the Middle East crisis. Nehru accepted the Soviet invitation, but the proposal was turned down by the West. Also, in September 1959, the USSR, against Chinese wishes, pledged $378 million in economic aid for India's Third Five-Year Plan.

The first Soviet commentary on the Sino-Indian border dispute was noncommittal. The text of the TASS bulletin of September 9, 1959 called on the two governments to resolve their border problems and continued:

> The incident on the Chinese-Indian border is certainly deplorable. . . . The Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship. . . . Friendly cooperation between the USSR and India is successfully developing in keeping with the idea of peaceful coexistence.

The most significant sentence in the statement, the meaning of which was clearly understood by the Chinese if not then by the noncommunist world, intimated that the inspirers of the dispute were trying to discredit the idea of "peaceful coexistence."

Nehru's immediate public reaction was that "considering everything the statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the USSR to sponsor." Krishna Menon noted that it was the first time since the Russian Revolution that the USSR had spoken about a peaceful settlement in a dispute involving communist and noncommunist parties.[13]

Khrushchev's trip to Peking in October did nothing to heal the growing Sino-Soviet rift. His argument that improved Soviet-American contacts and peaceful coexistence were desirable and

George Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi* (London: Faber and Faber, 1964); Alastair Lamb, *The China-Indian Border* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[13] *The Hindu,* September 21, 1959.

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that "disputes should be settled by negotiations" fell on unreceptive ears. Shortly after his return from China there was a serious border incident in Ladakh in which nine Indians were reportedly killed. On October 30 Khrushchev, from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, expressed his sorrow over the casualties and said that "we would be happy if there were no more incidents on the Sino-Indian border." The Khrushchev statement was prompted by a personal message from Nehru carried by N. A. Mukhitdinov, a ranking Soviet official who had been in India at the time. Mukhitdinov met Nehru on a Tuesday, returned to Moscow on Wednesday, and two days later Khrushchev made his remarks in the Supreme Soviet.[14]

Thereafter Nehru distinguished clearly between the Soviet and Chinese brands of communism. In October he had remarked that Khrushchev was "eager and anxious" for an East-West understanding but the same desire for peace did not exist in Peking. The USSR had reached a state of normalcy and was a territorially satisfied power. By contrast "China had not gotten over the first flush of its revolutionary mentality."[15] In the Lok Sabha on November 27, Nehru said that "there is not any country in the world which cares more for peace than the USSR and none that cares less than China." He also emphasized that India was an "area of agreement" between the United States and the USSR. Nehru stressed in the Lok Sabha on August 18, 1960, that "it is a remarkable thing and it is worth considering how these two tremendous protagonists of the Cold War can yet have this friendly feeling for India." He welcomed the prospect of the two superpowers indirectly cooperating to assist India's development program.

Indo-Soviet relations were by no means free from disagreement after 1959. At the turbulent session of the United Nations in September 1960, Nehru would not back Khrushchev's plans to revise the Secretariat.[16] In addition, the two nations were at variance on the Congo issue: unlike the Soviets, India held that all aid to the Congo—financial, technical and military—should be channeled through the United Nations. When the USSR exploded a nuclear weapon on the eve of the Belgrade Conference of non-

[14]As reported by K. Rangaswami in *The Hindu*, November 4, 1959.

[15]*Ibid.*, October 22, 1959.

[16]Upon returning from New York, Nehru commended the communist leaders at the UN session for keeping in constant touch with him and expressing interest in his views. He contrasted the Soviet attitude with the relative lack of attention paid to him by Eisenhower and Macmillan. *The Hindu*, October 19, 1960.

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aligned nations, in September 1961, Nehru registered a rather strong protest.[17]

Nonetheless, on matters affecting the Indian subcontinent, India was able to get almost unreserved support from the USSR. The Soviet Union backed the Indian annexation of Goa by vetoing a UN Security Council resolution condemning India's action. Hours before the Goan take-over, the Soviet President, Leonid Brezhnev, on a state visit to India at the time, assured his hosts that "the Soviet people regarded with full understanding and sympathy the desire of the Indian people to achieve the liberation of Goa, Daman, and Diu."[18] On the Kashmir question the Soviet government was fully sympathetic, endorsing India's position and casting vetoes in the UN when called upon to do so in 1962 and 1963.[19] A Soviet veto was not necessary in the January 1964 Kashmir debate, as the United States did not press for a resolution.

Soviet-Indian ties were strengthened by the Khrushchev visit to India in February 1960, the pledge in February 1961 of an additional Soviet loan of $126 million toward Indian development, and India's purchase in April 1961 of Soviet transports to be used in the border areas. An agreement calling for Indo-Soviet "cooperation in research connected with the development of atomic power reactors" and for "reciprocal exchanges of scientific information and for visits of specialists in the various aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy" was signed in October 1961.[20] Concurrently, during 1960-62, Sino-Soviet relations were further exacerbated by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China, and by developments at the Bucharest and Moscow Conferences on communist-bloc problems.

However, when the Chinese attack in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) occurred on October 20, 1962, the Soviets did not immediately respond on India's behalf. In answer to a letter from Nehru, Khrushchev indicated surprise over the Chinese attack and advised against an Indian declaration of war. Khrush-

[17]Nehru, who had previously planned a state visit to the USSR, and Ghana's Nkrumah were selected to convey the regrets of the Belgrade Conference directly to Khrushchev. India continued to work for a permanent cessation of nuclear testing.

[18]*The Statesman* (Calcutta), December 18, 1961.

[19]With reference to the Soviet veto, one Indian journalist wrote: "It is possible to suspect that part of New Delhi's bitterness with American maneuvers in the Security Council is caused by the fact that this country has once again to be rescued by a Soviet veto. New Delhi would much rather that things did not come to such a pass; but when they do, it cannot be particular where it gets its veto." *Times of India*, June 27, 1962.

[20]*The Statesman*, October 7, 1961.

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chev himself was involved in a crisis of more critical proportions in Cuba, and sought to present a united communist front for bargaining leverage. The Cuban situation, seemingly, is the only explanation for the *Pravda* editorial of October 25 which endorsed Peking's cease-fire proposal of October 24, namely, that both sides respect "the line of actual control" and "withdraw troops to a distance of 12.5 miles from that line."[21] The editorial continued that the USSR would welcome Indian acceptance of the Chinese proposal as the basis for the beginning of talks.

While the *Pravda* proposal was unacceptable to Nehru, it was equally displeasing to the Chinese. In effect the Chinese demanded of Khrushchev a complete renunciation of Nehru, an act which would have undermined nine years of Soviet diplomacy toward India and would have represented a major concession by Khrushchev to his rivals for communist bloc leadership. With the passing of the Cuban crisis, Soviet leaders were under less constraint to withhold criticism of the Chinese military action. In an important address to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, Khrushchev openly rebutted Chinese charges of his "collusion" with the Americans in the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and his other "anti-Leninist, revisionist" policies.[22] With reference to India he reminded the Chinese that the Himalayan conflict benefited only the "imperialists." The conflict was strengthening the "reactionary" elements and weakening the "progressive" forces within India, and could have an adverse effect on India's policy of "nonalignment." These themes were elaborated by the Soviets in their polemical exchanges with the Chinese in 1963.

The Indian government welcomed the Khrushchev speech. Yet it was recognized that the USSR had been unable to restrain the Chinese, who had undoubtedly attacked India without Soviet foreknowledge.[23] At the height of the crisis India had been the

[21]Cited in the *New York Times*, October 26, 1962.

[22]Reprinted in *Political Affairs* (New York), January 1963. As the polemics intensified in 1963 the Chinese published an article, "What is the Cause of Disputes?," which directly linked the beginnings of their differences with the USSR to the fact that the latter failed to support China unconditionally in its border dispute with India in 1959. Khrushchev replied that "when the . . . conflict began in 1959 the Soviet leaders frankly told the PRC Government that . . . the development of the dispute into a large armed conflict was undesirable and fraught with negative consequences not only for Chinese-Indian relations, but also for the entire international situation." *Statement of the Soviet Government*, September 21, 1963, reprinted in *Current Soviet Documents*, October 7, 1963.

[23]Indian diplomacy was unable at this time to elicit from Moscow a stronger condemnation of the Chinese, for the Soviets were not yet ready to go this far. When an official of the Indian External Affairs Ministry went to Moscow and Warsaw for this purpose, the communist leaders were irritated. "It was enough,"

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recipient of substantial U.S. and British military assistance, while the Soviets were reluctant until the second week in November to offer even verbal support.

Other Aspects of the Indo-Soviet Relationship

Economic Assistance. Foreign economic assistance has been an extremely important consideration for India's economic planners. Early in 1954 the USSR indicated a disposition to aid in India's economic and technological development, especially in the building of basic heavy industry in the public sector. This offer took concrete form with the February 1955 pledge to assist in building a steel mill during India's Second Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet pledge to India's Second and Third Five-Year Plans totaled approximately $811.1 million.[24] This aid was almost entirely in the form of long-term credits at an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent, most of which is repayable in goods.[25] The USSR has advanced only about $6 million in nonrepayable grants, in contrast to the substantial percentage of American aid which is given in grant form. In addition to the Bhilai steel plant (now being expanded to a 2.5 million ton per year capacity), another significant Soviet undertaking is the recently completed heavy machine building plant at Ranchi, Bihar, scheduled to produce annually 75 per cent of the basic components of a two-million-ton capacity steel mill. Extensive finds have been reported by Rumanian and Soviet oil exploration teams, and a public sector oil refinery at Barauni, Bihar, is scheduled to begin production in 1964.[26]

recalled a bloc diplomat, "that Khrushchev had cut off almost all aid to China and called for the cessation of hostilities. What else could he be expected to do?" Told to the writer in New Delhi in February 1964.

[24]U.S. Congress, Hearings . . . Joint Economic Committee, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power,* 87th Congress, 2nd Session, December 1962, p. 474. Also see Government of India, *Second Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, 1956) and *Third Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, 1961); Wilfred Malenbaum, *East and West in India's Development* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959); and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Towards Developing Countries, 1953-63* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[25]One leading foreign economist in New Delhi recently pointed out that the Indian government had been studiously repaying Soviet loans on schedule. There is little concern by either the Indian or United States governments about meeting the repayment schedule on American loans.

[26]About 90 per cent of total communist bloc aid has come from the USSR. According to a Soviet estimate, the projects already in operation or being built with Soviet assistance will account for the following percentages of the total output in the public sector: iron and steel (not including the Bokaro plant), 25 per cent; oil extraction, 100 per cent; oil refining, 70 per cent, and electric power generation, 25 per cent. Quoted in *Times of India,* January 28, 1964. The only Soviet aid to Pakistan to date has been for oil exploration; $33.2 million in credits was extended in 1961.

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The Soviet government announced late in 1963 that its assistance for India's Fourth Five-Year Plan would considerably exceed the $500 million pledged to the Third Five-Year Plan. On May 1, 1964, the Soviets formally agreed to finance the construction of the Bokaro steel plant, a project that the United States had declined to support. Their outlay for the first stage of the Bokaro plant will be an estimated $300 million.

Over 1500 communist bloc technicians have gone to India since 1955 in connection with seventy-five projects.[27] They are generally well-briefed for their assignments and give their Indian counterparts good on-the-job training.[28] A substantial number of Indians also receive training in the universities, scientific institutes and factories of the USSR and Eastern Europe. No Indian trainee or student in the USSR is required to take any politically or ideologically oriented courses.

Nehru sought to foster a continuous Soviet interest in Indian development, for both political and economic reasons. He emphasized that "the value of their help is all the greater because they have given it not to a country that was subservient to them, but to a country which has an independent policy."[29] His successors will have to continue to reassure those in India who feel that the USSR has become too deeply involved in the economic activities and the planning of their nation.

Trade. India's trade with the USSR, only a trickle in 1953, now accounts for over 5 per cent of its present international commerce.[30] The recently signed Trade Agreement for the years 1964-68 calls for an average annual trade level double that of 1962.[31] This should make the USSR India's fifth most important trading partner. The Soviets have always emphasized the barter nature of the agreements, which in theory should ease the strain on India's critical balance of payments problem.[32]

[27]This estimate was provided in May 1964 by Simon Costikyan, social science analyst with the U.S. Information Agency. His figures exclude doctors and scientists at work in technical institutes.

[28]See John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962), pp. 295-299.

[29]*Rajya Sabha Official Record,* Vol. XXX:8, August 18, 1960.

[30]Annual statistics on Indo-Soviet trade are contained in the United Nations' *Directory of International Trade* and in Government of India, *Annual Statement of Foreign Trade of India.*

[31]Under the Agreement the USSR is to supply India with electrical, metallurgical, oil drilling, mining and roadbuilding equipment, airplanes, helicopters, rolled steel, nonferrous metals and chemical fertilizers. India's exports will include raw hides, jute, tea, wool, vegetable oil, cotton and footwear.

[32]It is not surprising that the political developments of the Sino-Soviet-Indian triangle are closely paralleled by changes in the volume of trade. For example, in

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Soviet Military Assistance. The procurement of Soviet military equipment by India in recent years has been a delicate and occasionally controversial issue in both countries. In 1955 military attachés were first assigned to the respective embassies in New Delhi and Moscow. As early as May 30, 1957, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that "there is nothing to prevent us" from purchasing aircraft from the USSR. In October 1960, as Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, an Indian delegation went to Moscow to negotiate the purchase of transports, helicopters and roadmaking equipment. In March 1961, it was announced that India had purchased eight AN12 transports from the USSR for use in the Ladakh area.[33] It has been estimated that by 1964 thirty AN transports had been purchased along with fifty MI-4 helicopters. Delivery is also reported to have begun on a $40 million purchase of Soviet "ground-to-air missiles with associated radar and training equipment and fixed launching installations."[34] Early in 1964 the Soviet Union turned down an Indian request to build a ground-to-air missile factory in India, but the Indian Defense Ministry is expected to renew the request.

In May 1962, New Delhi officially announced that the Soviets would supply some MIG-21 supersonic fighters and would build several factories to enable India to manufacture its own MIGs. After considerable speculation as to whether the MIGs would ever be delivered, the first consignment of four planes arrived in Bombay in February 1963. By October a total of six MIGs had been delivered, two of which were destroyed in a mid-air collision in December. Speculation in India and the West now centers on whether the Soviets will continue with plans for the factories. Project reports were completed late in 1963 for the airframe factory at Nasik, Maharashtra, and the engines plant at Koraput, Orissa; and a Soviet team was completing plans for a

1956 the USSR exported 257,000 metric tons of steel products to India and 429,000 tons to China; in 1959 Soviet steel exports to India remained almost constant, while those to China fell to 185,000 tons. United Nations, *Statistics in World Trade in Steel, 1960.*

[33] *The Hindu,* March 31, April 10, 1961. Some Indian crews went to the USSR and about forty Soviet pilots, navigators and mechanics came to India for several weeks to train Indian airmen in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. When asked in the Rajya Sabha on March 30, 1961, about the advisability of permitting Soviet pilots in strategic border areas, Nehru replied that "adequate protection has been taken to see that no secret information could leak out."

[34] *New York Times,* May 13, 1964. Correspondent Thomas Brady reported that "a closely-guarded missile-training center has been established in Baroda," and that more than fifty missiles have arrived. He estimates that "the total value of Soviet aid delivered or firmly committed to India is about $130 million."

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factory at Hyderabad to manufacture electronic equipment, including guided missiles.[35]

Yet there are indications that the Soviets are vacillating. The original cost estimates reportedly have "jumped from $143 million to a current figure of $336 million."[36] Of greater concern to the USSR are the long-term political implications of the project. The Indian government is likewise divided on the matter. It would prefer U.S. supersonic planes, but short of this, the prospect of MIG factories on Indian soil is attractive. The Indian Defense Ministry periodically issues press releases to remind the public that plans for the factories are progressing on schedule. As one Indian journalist observed: "It would not be easy for the Russians to quit the deal after all the fanfare about it, to the extent of it becoming a prickly issue with Peking."[37] The Indian Air Force and Finance Ministry are not enthusiastic about the arrangement. The particular concern of the Air Force is that the long-term commitment to the MIG program might enable the Soviets to wield undue influence in the future. As of March 1964, many details of the MIG factories project remained unsettled, and no final date had been set for its completion.[38]

The Communist Party of India. Nehru generally tried to separate his policy of friendly cooperation with the USSR from his dealings with the CPI. At election times he was extremely critical of the CPI, reminding the public of their violent tactics prior to 1951 and accusing the CPI of having foreign loyalties. His government's triennial Preventive Detention Acts have been mainly directed against the CPI, and communists have by and large been kept out of public services. The Soviet leaders on their part rarely objected to Nehru's attitude toward the CPI.[39] Over the past

[35]*Hindustan Times,* January 7, 1964.

[36]This appraisal was given by Selig Harrison in the *Washington Post* on December 17, 1963, shortly after General Maxwell Taylor had conferred with top Indian officials in New Delhi.

[37]*Hindustan Times,* February 17, 1964.

[38]In October 1963, it was announced that the airframe and engine factories would begin production in 1965. And on February 2, 1964, Y. B. Chavan, India's Defense Minister, remarked that all the speculation about whether the Soviets would complete the project was only "wishful rumors" created by those who did not want the program to materialize. Yet Soviet uncertainty was reflected by unwillingness to give an assurance that their specialists would be responsible for seeing the project through to the production stages. Also in February 1964, the Soviets asked that the loans for the project be repaid in an unprecedented seven-year period at high interest rates.

[39]One of the rare occasions on which the USSR sided with the CPI against the Nehru Government occurred as the result of a prolonged detention of CPI leaders under the provisions of the Emergency Act. The Soviets did not chide Nehru directly, but accomplished the same purpose by paraphrasing at length in *Pravda*

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decade they have had little public contact with their Indian comrades, preferring instead to identify themselves with the "left wing" of the Congress Party. Yet the CPI indirectly benefited from the steadily improving Indo-Soviet relationship, increasing the size of the party and its electoral strength until the Chinese border attacks of October 1962.

Since 1959 the Indian government has not discouraged CPI contacts with the USSR nearly as much as it has those with China. In 1960, for example, a delegation of five Soviet observers led by Suslov were granted visas to attend a CPI conference, while members of a Chinese delegation were refused visas. The final resolution of the conference reflected Soviet criticism of India's Congo policy, but on the whole reaffirmed CPI support for Indian nonalignment and the progressive elements of the Congress as represented by Nehru and Krishna Menon.

Factionalism, born of personal, regional and ideological differences,[40] has always plagued the CPI. It is now aggravated by the Sino-Soviet conflict. In recent years the Soviet-oriented group headed by S. A. Dange was gradually losing control over the "pro-Chinese" faction, and finally expelled the leftist dissidents from the CPI's National Council in April 1964. The final results of this schism cannot be predicted, but the possibility of a permanent division in the CPI further complicates India's already uncertain political future.

Conclusion

The observation that "inter-nation influence is far from a one-way affair"[41] is certainly applicable to the Indo-Soviet relationship

an editorial published in a special Republic Day issue of the CPI paper, *New Age,* January 27, 1963. The editorial had concluded: "We would like to remind Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues that by making such large scale arrests on the monstrously slanderous charges of their pro-China policies, the Government is putting out of action several of the most effective fighters against the anti-national policies advocated by the forces of right reaction."

The version of the editorial in *Pravda* (February 2, 1963) was substantially the same as that of the *New Age,* except that such pejorative words as "monstrously slanderous" were omitted or toned down.

[40]The history of the CPI has been documented in such studies as Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (New York: The Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley and Sons, 1956) and Selig Harrison, *India, The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). A detailed account of the CPI's involvement in the dispute between the CPSU and CCP is given by Harry Gelman, "The CPI: Sino-Soviet Battleground," in A. Doak Barnett, editor, *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[41]J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review,* June 1963, p. 421.

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of the past decade. New Delhi and Moscow have both sought to enlist the other's support for its basic policies and to a large extent both have succeeded.

On occasion both governments have felt discomfort over their mutual commitments and obligations. For example, since 1957 the Soviets have been subject to criticism within the communist world for helping to enhance the prestige of the "reactionary Nehru government," while India is periodically concerned lest the West think that she has moved within the Soviet orbit. Differences of opinion have existed and continue to exist between Soviet and Indian leaders, but these have not been permitted to undermine the overall community of interests between the two governments. Accordingly, the cordial Indo-Soviet relations established in 1954-55 have continued in an almost unchanged pattern.

The overtures by Stalin's heirs toward India were not intended so much to alter India's international behavior as to reinforce her policy of "nonalignment." Moscow was correct in believing that many other newly-independent nations in Afro-Asia would follow India's lead if "nonalignment" proved to be a viable policy.

On his part Nehru had to make "peaceful cooperation" attractive to the Soviets. The reciprocal state visits of 1955 helped to introduce the Soviet leaders to the outside world and tended to relieve somewhat their "state of siege" mentality. Nehru's endorsement of the trend toward liberalization helped to lend respectability to the Khrushchev regime. For several years India acted as an intercessor between the communist bloc and the West, but this role lost its premium when the Soviets established other, more direct, communications with the United States and Great Britain.

From 1957 on, India had relatively little to offer the USSR except for diplomatic backing on such matters as Soviet disarmament proposals and calls for summit meetings. With the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, however, the USSR increasingly looked upon India as a possible counterweight to growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and the Himalayan regions. After the Sino-Indian conflict came to the surface in 1959, New Delhi welcomed Moscow's indirect support on the issue. In addition, India continued to place a high value on the Kremlin's unreserved support of her position on Kashmir and Goa, as well as the increased flow of Soviet economic and technological assistance.

In the twilight of his career, Nehru was confronted with a general decline in India's influence abroad, and the fear that

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India was being diplomatically isolated among the Asian nations.[42] Domestically the subcontinent faces serious communal difficulties, the ever-perplexing Kashmir situation and many socio-economic problems. On the other hand, Nehru's successors are encouraged by the fact that both the United States and the USSR are contributing to the development of India's economy, and are interested, albeit for different reasons, in the stability of the Congress Government. This situation may cause occasional embarrassment to the Soviets,[43] yet India's leaders firmly believe that the USSR will make no fundamental shifts in policy toward India so long as the impasse between the USSR and China continues.

The passing of Jawaharlal Nehru, long the formulator of India's foreign policy, will probably have little effect on the basic Indo-Soviet relationship for which he was responsible. His immediate successor, Prime Minister Shastri, has pledged to continue Nehru's concept of "nonalignment."

Today Indo-Soviet relations are beset with few difficulties. Nevertheless, in view of so many unpredictable factors, it cannot be stated with assurance that "peaceful cooperation" will be the permanent norm between the two states. One can only venture to say that the USSR, even in the event of a future reconciliation with China, will be reluctant to throw overboard the results of ten years' efforts to develop good relations with India.

[42]India was a reluctant participant in the 1961 Conference of Non-Aligned Nations at Belgrade. But in 1963-64 she pressed for another Belgrade-type meeting (scheduled for October 1964 in Cairo) lest a second Bandung-type conference be convened first. Knowing that she could not block the convening of another Afro-Asian Conference, India then worked for the inclusion of the USSR at the forthcoming conclave (to be held somewhere in Africa in the spring of 1965). *Times of India,* April 11, 1964 and the *Economist,* May 4, 1964.

Although remaining adamant in its claim to be an Asian power, the USSR yielded to Chinese pressure and withdrew its demand to be seated at the next Afro-Asian Conference.

[43]The Soviets occasionally express concern that tendencies toward monopoly exist in the private sector, that the all-too-few reforms in agricultural landholding are not sufficiently implemented, and that India is still too dependent on Western capital. Good statements of the official Soviet outlook on India's economy are found in V. I. Pavlov, *India, Economic Freedom Versus Imperialism* (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1963) and G. Kotovsky, V. Pavlov and I. Redko, "Some Indian Economic and Political Problems," *New Times,* January 1964.

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THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT

by C. N. Satyapalan

NO country's international frontiers have attracted such world-wide attention in recent years as those of Communist China. This has been the inevitable result of the establishment of a strong centralized government in Peking. Chinese expansionism is a historical phenomenon. It reflects the cultural arrogance of a race that seeks to dominate and civilize other peoples coming in touch with it.[1] This compulsion to dominate, checked for more than a century by the intrusion of the West, has received a new stimulus under communism. The aggressiveness of a messianic ideology and the power of an authoritarian state have augmented the traditional urge for expansion. With regard to frontier questions, the attitude of the communists has been similar to that of their predecessors.

I

The Sino-Indian frontier is one of the most formidable natural frontiers in existence. Its history is long and complicated but mostly tranquil. Independent India inherited from the British a defined and peaceful frontier with Tibet[2] which conformed to universally recognized geographical principles, and important sectors of it had the additional sanction of international agreements. The unbroken peace of the frontier, lasting until recent times, was due to two reasons. First, Tibet, enjoying *de facto* independence, was friendly to India and formed a buffer between India and China. Second, the British controlled the politics of the border areas and were committed to the protection of the Tibetan status quo.[3]

[1]Professor Owen Lattimore observed as early as 1928 that the Chinese "are not passive, but thoroughly imbued with the instinct and spirit of domination, an expansionist people whose expansion has been temporarily checked by their inability to cope with better armed expansionists. . . . Wherever the Chinese have secured (if only for a few days) some measure of power and initiative, they have made it clear . . . in spite of the conflictions of domestic politics, that to their minds one of the chief functions of Chinese power is to assert Chinese domination—domination, not equality—over every race that comes within the scope of Chinese action." *Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers 1928-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 216-17.

[2]The frontier took its present form by 1914.

[3]See C. N. Satyapalan, "India's China Policy: The First Decade. An Analytical Interpretation" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1964), pp. 351-408.

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The disturbance along that peaceful border and the ensuing conflicts are indicative of Communist China's hostility toward India. The Sino-Indian border conflict is in reality a symptom of a broader political conflict—a systemic conflict—between the two largest nations of Asia. The real issue is whether India and China, representing two vastly differing ideological and political systems, can coexist in peace on the basis of equality and respect for each other's vital interests. It raises the fundamental question of the present and future role of India and China in Asia and indeed in the world.

The mood of China's new masters manifested itself at an early date in a declaration of hostility toward India's "bourgeois reactionary" government which, according to them, had already accepted the "role of the principal slave of U.S. imperialism in the Far East in the campaign against Communism." A campaign of calumny against India began in September 1949, on the principal theme that India was "colluding" with American "imperialists" in a "plot to annex Tibet."[4] Threats and blandishments were simultaneously directed at the Tibetans. The effect of this psychological offensive was to demoralize the Tibetans, who were left nervously uncertain about India's attitude. While assuring India of their intent to seek a peaceful settlement with Tibet based on respect for the latter's "autonomy," the Chinese prepared for "liberation."

Chinese military action against Tibet in mid-October 1950 brought forth strong Indian protests. Whatever China's justification for the "liberation," it constituted a threat to India's security. New Delhi therefore demanded that "a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful means adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty." India sought no "novel privileged position" in Tibet, but insisted that her "rights [which] have grown out of usage and agreements . . . should continue." It was pointed out that China's action "affected friendly relations" between the two countries which could subsist only on the basis of recognition of each other's "sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests." But China had already resolved to "defeat imperialist aggression . . . liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China." For her Tibet was a "domestic prob-

[4]Ho Ssu-Ching, "The Nehru Government cannot explain away the plot to annex Tibet," *People's Daily*, September 13, 1949, New China News Agency (NCNA), September 14, 1949, p. 54.

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lem," not an international dispute. Development of "normal" friendly relations, the Chinese insisted, must depend upon India's acceptance of the above position.[5]

China thus forced India to retreat from her stand on Tibet through an arrogant display of might accompanied by a torrent of abuses. In May 1951, China imposed on Tibet an agreement which marked the end of the latter's traditional isolation, autonomy, and independent relations with India. With it collapsed the structure of defense of India's northern borders which the British had so painstakingly built up over the years. For the first time in history, the trans-Himalayan regions came under the control of a powerful state basically unfriendly to India. Tibet was slowly transformed into a military outpost; the People's Liberation Army had come in to "consolidate the national defense."

Strangely enough, New Delhi did not protest the violent overthrow of the status quo which was consummated in the Sino-Tibetan agreement. Instead, the Indian government preferred to retreat behind the Himalayas and concentrate on strengthening the country's inner defenses. But the sub-Himalayan regions were now exposed to pressures from the north and the border itself was open to possible contention. Overawed by Chinese military power, the Government of India decided to use Tibet as a pawn to win Chinese friendship and to hope for the best.

The Chinese strategy proved so successful that the "liberation" of Tibet put India completely on the defensive. The continuation of commercial and cultural contacts with Tibet now depended on China's sufferance. India offered to negotiate with China as the sovereign power for permission to carry on trade and cultural relations with the "Tibet region." The Sino-Indian agreement of April 1954 was, from the Chinese point of view, calculated to end once and for all time India's political influence in Tibet and to preclude its recrudescence in any form. Furthermore, the incorporation into this agreement of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*Panch Shila*),[6] appears to have been a Chinese effort to bind India to their observance in regard to the "Tibet region of China." The concessions China was pleased

[5]See texts of Chinese notes to India in NCNA, November 17, 1950, pp. 135-36, 138-39.

[6]The principles in their present form were first expressed by Chou En-lai on December 31, 1953, at a reception for an Indian delegation which had arrived in Peking for negotiations on trade and cultural intercourse with Tibet.

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to grant to India—the right to "establish" trade agencies and the like, no longer guarded by Indian garrisons—were conditional upon India's prior acceptance of the Five Principles. For good reasons did the Chinese acclaim the agreement as a "definite victory for Chinese foreign policy."[7]

II

Chinese strategy on the Sino-Indian border question has closely paralleled the strategy which proved successful in forcing India's retreat from Tibet. The Chinese attitude became clear as early as September 1949, when they not only accused India of intrigues in Tibet, but also questioned India's right to declare a protectorate over Bhutan, and issued maps showing parts of India as Chinese territory. They did not, however, wish to raise all these issues at the same time. Tibet was first on the agenda. Its settlement was of immediate importance; the rest could wait. "One morsel at a time" is a cardinal principle of Maoist strategy.

Nehru rejected the shadowy claims of the Chinese maps in November 1950. "Map or no map," he declared, the McMahon Line is India's firm frontier in the northeast. He vowed that he would tolerate no transgressions across the Himalayas. Instead of raising the issue directly with China, the Government of India decided, in Nehru's words, "to make clear in every possible way what our frontier was in our opinion, clear in our maps, clear in our statements, clear to the world and clear to China and clear to our own people . . . and hold by it, stick by it."[8] The government felt that by holding to its own position "the lapse of time and events [would] confirm it, and by the time, perhaps . . . the challenge to it came, [the government] would be in a much stronger position to face it."[9] This attitude suited the Chinese, who considered it still premature to raise the issue.

During the 1954 Sino-Indian negotiations neither side directly raised the border question. So far as India was concerned, there was no border problem; her maps were clear and the boundaries were not subject to disputation. The Chinese were reluctant to accept the Indian position, but they did not question the validity

[7] *People's Daily* comment, NCNA, May 24, 1954, p. 224.

[8] Nehru in *Rajya Sabha, Rajya Sabha Official Report,* Vol. XXVII:13, December 9, 1959, col. 1984.

[9] *Ibid.,* col. 1985.

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of the Indian maps.[10] For them the problem had not become "ripe." A settlement based on "existing actualities" would have been highly disadvantageous to China. She could not accept the boundary as shown in Indian maps; she needed time to create conditions conducive to a "reasonable settlement."

More importantly, China wanted to experiment with her anti-imperialist united front strategy, based on the Five Principles, in which India was assigned an important role. She did not wish to undermine her strategy and embarrass her united front "partners" by raising prematurely the border problem. As Chou En-lai later explained: "The Chinese Government has always held that the existence of the border question absolutely should not affect the development of Sino-Indian friendly relations."[11] In keeping with this attitude, the Chinese offered casual and reassuring explanations about their maps in order to allay New Delhi's anxiety, and the slogans of the period, stressing the Five Principles, served to dupe the Indian public. The challenge did not come until after the Chinese had abandoned the line of "peaceful coexistence" in favor of an aggressive policy.

The progressive hardening of China's attitude toward India following the East European uprisings in late 1956 reflected both the developing ideological extremism in Peking and the incompatibility of Indian and Chinese foreign policy goals. By July 1958 it had become evident that the Chinese had come to view India as their chief ideological and political rival in Asia.

III

The Chinese, between 1954 and 1958, did not formally repudiate the boundary as shown in Indian maps, but neither did they formally accept it. They sought to challenge the Indian stand on the one hand by publishing maps of their own, and on the other through petty intrusions, squatting and road building. Wherever they faced no resistance they settled down, and Indian reconnaissance parties, allegedly intruders, were subjected to stern treatment. In July 1958 the Chinese announced afresh their maximum

[10]See *Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, February 1961), I.R., pp. 85-86 and C.R., p. 18; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1959-1962), Vol. III, pp. 62-63. Hereinafter, these two documents will be referred to as *Officials' Report* and *White Paper.*

[11]Chou's letter to Nehru, January 23, 1959, *White Paper I,* p. 53.

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cartographical claims on India. In August they secretly arrested and detained an Indian patrol party in Ladakh,[12] and in September they violated the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). On November 3 India was told that a "new way of drawing the boundary" of China would be determined "after surveys and consultations with neighbouring countries."[13] Nehru expressed puzzlement at China's attitude. There were "certain very minor border problems" awaiting settlement, he agreed, but there was no question of entertaining the absurd claims of the Chinese maps.[14]

China's position on the border question was for the first time clearly presented to the Indian government in a letter from Chou En-lai on January 23, 1959.[15] Chou pointed out that "historically no agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary [had] ever been concluded between the Chinese central government and the Indian government," that the boundary had "never been formally delimited" and that the border troubles of the preceding years were a consequence of this lack of agreement. The Chinese maps, he insisted, were consistent "for the past several decades, if not longer." He expressed "surprise" at the Indian delineation of the western sector of the border. Behind Chou's insistence on "formal delimitation" was the implication that a major territorial dispute was involved. He emphasized that the Aksai Chin area, through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway passes, had "always been under Chinese jurisdiction," and that the "illegal" McMahon Line had "never been recognized by the Chinese central government." While there could be no negotiations about the Aksai Chin area, which was China's, Chou implied that a negotiated settlement was possible on the McMahon Line, toward which China was willing to "take a more or less realistic attitude." Therefore, the Sino-Indian border dispute was not one that could be resolved on the basis of legal hair-splitting or of maps and counter-maps. The Chinese made it increasingly clear that a compromise political settlement taking into account "the existing actualities" would be necessary if the two sides were to achieve a "formal delimitation" of the border. Maps and legal arguments

[12]The Indian police party was arrested in late August and was detained for nearly two months before the Chinese notified the Government of India. See *ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

[13]Chinese note to India, November 3, 1958, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[14]Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, December 14, 1958, *ibid.*, p. 51.

[15]For Chou's letter, see *ibid.*, pp. 52-54.

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were nothing more than instruments of pressure and propaganda designed to facilitate a settlement acceptable to one or the other party.

The precariousness of India's security and her distrust of the Chinese were not solely due to the abortive anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet during the summer of 1959. The problem of the border, of the country's security, had always concerned the Indian government. It could not ignore the facts of geography; it was aware that two power systems were emerging and that, given their devotion to different ways of life and incompatible foreign policy objectives, they were likely at some time to confront each other on their common frontier.[16] The furious Chinese propaganda campaign unleashed against "Indian expansionists" during the 1959 Tibetan revolt reflected their ideological and political hostility toward India and their anger at India's firm stand on the boundary question. The invective was a prelude to the formal repudiation of the "imperialist made" boundaries of India and to the accusation that the Indian government was trying to benefit from the "fruits of British imperialism." Nehru himself realized that behind China's anger over India's reaction to the Tibetan tragedy lay "much bigger matters, which we have to face today, tomorrow and the day after."[17]

Chou En-lai's letter of January 1959 gave official notice that the Indian and Chinese positions on the border question were poles apart. Nehru refused to acknowledge the implication of Chou's letter and pretended not to understand him. Instead, he set out to convince Chou through detailed argumentation, supported by evidence, of the validity of the Indian position. He would concede only that "unfortunately there is some difference of views between our two Governments in regard to the delineation of the frontier at some places."[18]

This evasive reply provoked the Chinese into stating their position with greater emphasis and clarity. On April 18 Chou En-lai told the National People's Congress that "the undeter-

[16]Nehru observed in the *Rajya Sabha* on December 9, 1959: "Right from 1950, or at any rate from 1951, when the Chinese forces came into Tibet, we have had this problem before us. It has not come up before us this year or last year. We have had this problem before us and this developing picture . . . of two power states emerging, two power states coming face to face with each other on a tremendous border. . . . We may have differed in our minds as to when this will happen, whether in five years, ten years, twenty years . . . it was difficult to say. . . ." *Rajya Sabha Official Report,* Vol. XXVII:13, col. 1983.

[17]*Lok Sabha Debates,* second series, Vol. XXVIII:38, April 2, 1959, col. 9284.

[18]Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, March 22, 1959, *White Paper I,* p. 57.

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mined boundary lines between our country and certain neighbours are the results of many historical causes, first and foremost prolonged imperialist aggression."[19] Yet as late as August 7, 1959 Nehru dismissed Chinese maps as "not disputes about boundaries," but "merely Chinese brush painted over large chunks of another's territory."[20] On August 13 he asserted that the McMahon Line was "the firm frontier, firm by treaty, firm by usage, firm by geography."[21]

The Chinese displayed their impatience at India's reluctance to face "facts" by organizing a fresh spate of violence in Ladakh and NEFA, and resorted to various forms of pressure against India. They refused to recognize Ladakhi Lamas and Kashmiri Muslims in Tibet as Indian nationals, adopted measures to eliminate Indian trade with Tibet, imposed restrictions on Indian trade agencies, and started a propaganda attack in Tibet against the "Indian expansionists." Simultaneously Chinese propaganda called for the "liberation" of Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan and the formation of a Himalayan Federation with the inclusion of NEFA.[22] Large Chinese forces were reported all along the Himalayan borders. This strategy succeeded in forcing the Government of India publicly to acknowledge the existence of a border dispute with China. Nehru did so in Parliament on August 28.

The next move was Chou En-lai's letter of September 8.[23] Chou's letter was not a documented presentation of the Chinese case. Rather, it was a demand for renegotiation of the Sino-Indian border "taking into account the historical background" of "British imperialist aggression" on Tibet and Sinkiang and "existing actualities," with a view to legitimizing the fruits of Chinese aggression in Ladakh. That demand, as a careful reading of the *White Papers,* the *Officials' Report,* and Chinese pronouncements and actions suggests, was not based on law, custom, treaties or facts of geography or administration but rather on ideological, political and strategic considerations. The letter accused India of giving "formal recognition to the situation created by the . . . British policy of aggression" against China, and complained that

[19] *Hsinhua News Agency Releases,* April 20, 1959, supplement, p. 28.
[20] *The Hindu,* August 8, 1959.
[21] *Lok Sabha Debates,* second series,, Vol. XXXII:9, August 13, 1959, col. 2246.
[22] These developments were the subject of an adjournment motion in *Lok Sabha* on August 13. The *Rajya Sabha* discussed the situation on August 25. See also *The Hindu,* August 7, 1959 for a report.
[23] *White Paper II,* pp. 27-33.

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"Indian expansionists" were claiming more territory than the British had snatched away.[24]

In this letter the Chinese presented their case by using certain key phrases that recur in Sino-Indian exchanges: "existing actualities," "historical background," "undelimited boundary." China is determined to defend, to consolidate and to legitimize the "existing actualities" that she has by force of arms created in the strategic region of Indian Ladakh. The Chinese are fully aware that their only title to the territory under occupation is physical possession, for Chinese maps cancel each other out and the facts of geography, agreements, tradition, and past administration are against them.[25] It is significant that the Chinese have entered into legal arguments only when forced to do so by the Government of India.[26]

The Chinese *Officials' Report* was designed to make three points: One, the Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited through agreement between the two countries. Two, the boundary claimed by India was one "planned . . . by the British imperialists for the purpose of implementing its policy of aggression and expansion . . . and which only appeared for the first time in 1954 on official Indian maps as its territorial claim." And three, "there exists at present a line up to which each side exercises actual control." This line differed from the "traditional customary line" primarily because "India not only inherited the occupation by British imperialism of what originally was Chinese territory, but even in recent years further forcibly pushed its control into Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line. But China had not crossed south of the McMahon Line which she had never recognized."[27]

The Chinese *Officials' Report,* like Chou En-lai's two letters to Nehru, rejected much of the evidence submitted by India as "imperialist made." China pressed for the recognition of "present

[24]This is an important theme in Chinese propaganda. See *ibid.,* pp. 29 and 31 and *Officials' Report,* C.R., p. 187.

[25]See *Officials' Report,* pp. 41-70. For an evaluation of the Indian and Chinese reports on the boundary question, see Margaret W. Fisher *et al., Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 98-128.

[26]At the Officials' talks, "The Chinese Government showed no interest in the substance of the talks, as their astonishingly careless presentation amply demonstrated. The maze of internal inconsistencies, quotations out of context, and even blatant and easily discernible falsehood . . . make it obvious that China paid little or no attention to the preparation of their case." Fisher *et al., op. cit.,* p. 126.

[27]*Officials' Report,* C.R., pp. 186-87.

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actualities," which did not represent a fixed line, but were subject to alteration along with the extension of administrative jurisdiction. It is on this point that China resorted to international law in support of its territorial claims. This resort to legal reasoning henceforth plays an important part in the Chinese case against India.

The Chinese have made an attempt to equate "present actualities" with the concept of a "traditional customary line." A "traditional customary line," says the Chinese Report, is "not mechanically defined or predetermined by any geographic principle," but is "bound to undergo changes owing to political, economic and other reasons."[28] The area China has occupied in Ladakh, accordingly, falls by definition within the traditional customary line. By the same definition, the McMahon Line represents the "existing actualities," and hence the traditional customary line, in the eastern sector of the border. China's willingness to recognize the McMahon Line, therefore, stems from her position in Ladakh. Aware of the weakness of their case, the Chinese further argue that even a traditional customary line needs to be formally delimited through joint surveys and negotiations, resulting in an international agreement.[29] In the absence of such an agreement, the Sino-Indian boundary, they contend, "has no basis at all in international law."

In order to force India to accept this point of view and to negotiate a treaty with them, the Chinese have employed two techniques—military pressure and diplomatic maneuvering. By September 1959 the Chinese had thoroughly militarized their side of the border. According to Kuomintang sources, they had a 50,000-man army in Tibet backed by a network of strategic highways and airfields close to the border. They deliberately used graduated violence along the border, inflicting numerous casualties on Indian forces. The effect of these moves was to demoralize the peoples in the border areas and to shake their confidence in India's ability to defend them. On the diplomatic front, China has sought to undermine India's influence among the nations

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4, 177, 186-87.

[29] "A formally delimited boundary," says the Chinese Report, "must be one jointly negotiated (sometimes also jointly surveyed) by the countries concerned and with its alignment and location explicitly and concretely defined in a certain treaty form (usually the conclusion of a boundary treaty or agreement). . . . Boundaries not explicitly defined in treaty form are not formally delimited boundaries, though some of them may be traditional customary boundaries." *Ibid.*, p. 157.

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of Asia and Africa, and to exploit and exacerbate India's differences with some of her neighbors. She has also succeeded in recruiting, at least nominally, support for the concept of a formally delimited boundary from all the countries with which she shares a common border (with the significant exception of the Soviet Union).

Territorially, the basic objective of this politico-military offensive is to force India to surrender the strategic sector of Ladakh which China occupies. The enlargement of the area of dispute to cover the entire border, especially the McMahon Line, and the manipulation of tension are an essential part of this strategy. Every one of China's proposals, beginning with that of November 7, 1959 for a twenty kilometer withdrawal by both sides from the entire length of the border, underlines this objective. During his dramatic visit to New Delhi in April 1960, Chou En-lai sought to equate the western and eastern sectors of the border, and called for a "barter" transaction.[30] The Chinese approach to the border question has not changed.

In contrast to China's aggressive posture, Indian strategy has aimed at narrowing the area of dispute to the western sector where India was willing to seek a compromise. India sought to nullify China's claims south of the McMahon Line by creating a military posture sufficient to deter any Chinese adventures, by undermining China's position in Ladakh, and by mobilizing international pressures against Peking. Her military weakness vis-à-vis China clearly impaired the effectiveness of this strategy. Conscious of its strong legal case on the boundary question as presented in the *Officials' Report,* and aware of the larger and more fundamental issues involved in the Sino-Indian conflict, the Indian government decided to stand firm on principles, while always leaving a door open for an honorable negotiated settlement. China's bullying tactics only steeled the determination of the government not to yield.

IV

The course of the Sino-Indian border conflict subsequent to April 1960 conforms basically to the pattern outlined above. Its aggravation may be ascribed to the growing ideological and power

[30]The Aksai Chin, Chou declared, had been under Chinese jurisdiction "throughout history." With regard to the eastern sector, he said: "We will not cross that line [McMahon Line]. We have not put forward any territorial claims in this sector." He asked the Government of India to "adopt the same attitude in regard to the western sector." *The Hindu,* April 26, 1960.

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conflict between the two countries, in which India's friendly relations with both the West and the Soviet Union, her influence among the nonaligned, and China's corresponding frustrations are important factors.

In February 1961 Nehru declared that so far as India was concerned there was no border dispute, and no reason to negotiate on China's territorial claims. A border settlement was possible only after China broadly acknowledged India's position and rejected any idea of "horse-trading."[31] But China was militarily entrenched in the territory she claimed, and more than words would be necessary to persuade the Chinese to agree to an honorable settlement. The Indian government resolved to reply to China's military and political pressures by counter-pressures. The *Officials' Report* was published despite Chinese objections, and steps were taken to augment and improve India's military position along the border. The government decided to try to harass the Chinese with the same technique of slow and persistent nibbling which had resulted in the Chinese advance in Ladakh. New Delhi hoped that this type of operation, skillfully conducted by small bands of Indian troops and supplemented by mobilization of political pressure against China, would lead the Chinese to accept a reasonable settlement.[32] The aim appears to have been to make things so difficult for the Chinese in Ladakh that they would be left with the choice of negotiating on honorable terms or fighting in order to hold on to their conquest. The government discounted the latter possibility, for the international situation seemed to preclude a war which might not be localized. The initial success attending this strategy served to raise hopes in Indian government circles concerning its efficacy.[33]

Tension began to mount in the western sector of the border during the summer of 1961. On November 2, the Chinese asked the Government of India to "speedily change" its present "very erroneous and dangerous" strategy.[34] Later in the month they

[31]*The Hindu*, February 21, 1961.

[32]According to Krishna Menon: "We were building up our strength and hoping at the same time that China, once she discovers that we propose to extend our power in this part of our territory, would come to satisfactory arrangements." Krishna Menon, *India and the Chinese Invasion* (Bombay: Contemporary Publishers, 1963), p. 15.

[33]The *New York Times* reported on July 25, 1962 that Indian troops had already recovered from the Chinese about 3,500 square miles of territory. See also Krishna Menon, *loc. cit.*

[34]*White Paper VI*, pp. 1-2.

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warned that if India persisted in disturbing the status quo in the west, "the Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called 'McMahon Line' and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayas and their southern foot."[35] In the second week of January 1962, for the first time since August 1959, the Chinese conducted a small probing action south of the McMahon Line and repeated the earlier threat. On April 30, 1962 Peking warned that conflicts could break out all along the border. They lodged "the strongest protest" against alleged Indian "provocations" in Ladakh and demanded the immediate withdrawal of "Indian military posts and intruding Indian troops from Chinese territory." They also informed the Indian government of resumed patrolling on the Ladakh border in exercise of the "sacred right to defend China's territory and maintain the tranquillity of the border," and threatened to adopt similar steps along the rest of the border.[36] In June the Chinese government rebuffed India's offer to negotiate on the basis of Nehru's November 16, 1959 proposal, modified to allow China's continued use of the Aksai Chin road for civilian traffic. "Is China a defeated country" to accept such "unilaterally imposed submissive terms?", Peking asked.[37] Chou En-lai commented that it was "impossible" for China to withdraw from her "own territory." "No force in the world," he added, "could oblige us to do something of this kind."[38]

Thereafter, the border situation swiftly deteriorated. Tension between the two countries was heightened by two developments in the spring of 1962: the announcement in Peking in early May of a Sino-Pakistan agreement to "locate and align their common border," which according to India did not exist; and India's rejection of a Chinese proposal to negotiate a new agreement to replace that of 1954 on trade and intercourse with Tibet which was due to expire on June 3, 1962.[39] By late August the situation had reached a dangerously critical stage. On August 27 the Chinese government warned that it might "resort to self-defence,

[35]*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. The Government of India replied that if the Chinese crossed the McMahon Line, it would be considered as a further act of aggression which would be resisted.

[36]Note to India, April 30, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 37-39. The threat was repeated on May 11, *ibid.*, p. 40.

[37]Note to India, June 2, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

[38]Cited in note to China, August 22, 1962, *White Paper VII*, p. 36.

[39]For exchanges on these two issues, see *White Paper VI*, pp. 96-97, 99-105 and 188-222.

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and the Indian side must bear the responsibility for all the consequences. . . ."[40] There is enough evidence in the *White Papers* to suggest that China's massive attack of October 20, 1962 in "self-defense," was preceded by at least five to six weeks of preparation. During the final phase of preparation, the Chinese cut off all communication between the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa and New Delhi.

The impatience of the Chinese government at India's indifference to its claims south of the McMahon Line and her attempt to confine the dispute to the western sector was reflected in a note, virtually an ultimatum, delivered to India on September 13.[41] This reiterated Chou En-lai's November 7, 1959 proposal for a twenty kilometer withdrawal by both sides from the entire border and demanded that negotiations begin in Peking October 15. The Government of India rejected the proposal for the reason that it would leave "the aggressor who altered the status quo by unilateral action over the last few years, in possession of the fruits of his aggression." The government was, however, willing to hold discussions in order to "define measures to restore the status quo in the western sector . . . and to remove the current tensions in the area."[42] In view of India's firm stand, the Chinese found it necessary to reopen the entire border question and re-emphasize their maximum claims by creating tensions in the eastern and central sectors of the border as well. They started building up forces in the eastern sector in the second half of September, provoked a few border clashes, and notified the Government of India on September 20: "The Chinese frontier guards have been ordered to take the same defensive measures in the eastern and middle sectors as in the western sector."[43]

The first major border clash between the Chinese and Indian forces, foreshadowing the events of October-November, occurred along the McMahon Line on September 20. On October 3 the Chinese government suggested that "the most pressing question at present" was the eastern sector, which should be included in

[40]The Chinese note of August 27 warned: "The Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled through negotiations and the Indian Government's attempt to realize its ambitious territorial claims by force and to coerce China into submission is bound to fail. If the Indian side should overdo it, the Chinese side will have to resort to self-defence, and the Indian side must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom." *White Paper VII*, p. 43.

[41]*Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.

[42]Note to China, September 19, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

[43]Note to India, September 20, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

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the discussions that must be started "promptly."[44] New Delhi replied that it could not enter into any discussions "under duress or continuing threat of force," and demanded the termination of the latest Chinese intrusion.[45] China's planned aggression south of the sensitive McMahon Line prompted Nehru to instruct the Indian army on October 12 "to free Indian territory in the North East Frontier Agency of Chinese intruders." The Chinese, in the midst of preparing for military action to rectify the border situation, reassert their claims and call India's "bluff", found Nehru's statement timely. On October 14 the *People's Daily* reminded Nehru of the history of imperialist attacks on China and asked him to "pull back from the brink of the precipice." It warned: "If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict."[46]

V

These were the grim events leading to the massive Chinese attack on Indian forces along the Ladakh and NEFA fronts on October 20, 1962, which for the first time awakened the world to the seriousness of the crisis in Sino-Indian relations. Many explanations have been offered for China's conduct.[47] There are two facets to this question which, though integrally related, may be distinguished for the sake of clarity. The first concerns the pattern of political relations between India and China—identified as a systemic conflict. Fed by its own momentum and various international developments, this basic conflict is bound to run its course. The border dispute is only one instrument in the protracted war Mao Tse-tung has declared on India. So long as Sino-Indian relations are characterized by this relationship, periodic crises over their common border can be expected. Given no change in China's present attitude toward India, a peaceful negotiated settlement of the boundary question must await the time when India will have mustered enough industrial and military strength to claim equality with and evoke respect in Peking.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-98.

[45] Note to China, October 6, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 100-102.

[46] *People's Daily* Editorial, October 14, 1962, "Mr. Nehru, It is High Time for you to Pull Back from the Brink of the Precipice," *Peking Review*, October 19, 1962, pp. 6-7.

[47] See, for example, Norman D. Palmer, "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation," ORBIS, Winter 1963, pp. 513-27.

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So long also will China persist with her present methods and insist on India's surrender.

The second aspect has to do with the border question per se, and the politico-military strategy each side has adopted. The Chinese military action of late 1962 can be explained almost exclusively in terms of China's determination not to give up the Aksai Chin and the strategic highway so vital for controlling the difficult provinces of Tibet and Sinkiang. The Chinese did not contemplate a prolonged war with India for they realized it could not remain limited to the two countries. Besides, such a war would have been unrelated to China's immediate military and political objectives. The Chinese military action was an exercise in limited war in pursuit of limited objectives; in the context of the existing military situation along the border, the force employed was adequate for the purpose. At one stroke it restored the status quo in the western sector which Indian nibbling over the previous three years had undermined; reopened China's claims south of the McMahon Line which the Indians had ignored during three years of relative tranquillity in the area; and re-emphasized China's determined stand on the boundary question.[48] China exacted her long-standing demands—which New Delhi had rejected as too humiliating—by administering Indian forces a severe military setback, thus endangering India's security, reducing her influence with the Himalayan kingdoms, and tarnishing her reputation in Asia vis-à-vis China.

So far as India is concerned, the defeat was obviously the result of serious miscalculations at both political and military levels and of bad timing as well. The government had not yet reached China's level of sophistication in the art of relating one's military capability to political objectives. The military nibbling attempted by India in the strategic sectors of the border, although unavoidable under the circumstances, always carried the risk of Chinese reprisal. Without the capacity to wage a limited war, such a strategy was foredoomed to failure. To the government's failure adequately to grasp this elementary principle must be ascribed the debacle of October-November 1962. The type of military operation the Chinese conducted need not, as the Government of India feared, escalate into a broader war. India must quickly develop the capability to wage limited war, for such wars

[48]See Chinese notes to India of October 24, November 4 and November 21, 1962 in *White Paper VIII*, pp. 2-4, 7-10 and 17-21.

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fought with conventional weapons are in keeping with the strategic realities of the nuclear age. India's international diplomacy may win for her powerful friends and even arms in a time of emergency, but India cannot cope with China until she possesses adequate military forces.

The Chinese challenge is long-range and far deeper than the dramatized border conflicts indicate. Even though Nehru had talked incessantly about this aspect of the Chinese challenge since 1959, his government had failed to convey a sense of urgency to the people. The Chinese attack did what the Government of India could not do: it rudely awakened the nation to what Nehru called "this menace that threatens the freedom of our people and the independence of our country." India today faces an enemy, imperialistic and unscrupulous, for whom conflict is a natural state of affairs. To face down such an enemy is no easy task; it will require years of hard work and sacrifice. It must involve a clearer and more realistic conception of the problems of war and peace, and a better appreciation of the role and uses of power in international affairs. At issue are, in Nehru's words, "the survival of freedom and a free society in India."

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SINO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

by S. M. Burke

HOPE for conciliation between Pakistan and India has risen anew under the emotional shock of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's death. President Mohammed Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri have both expressed themselves in favor of a new relationship between their countries and tension has eased, at least for the time being. Should a *rapprochement* take place, it would certainly affect Pakistan's attitude toward other countries, especially Communist China. The change of leadership in India could then be regarded as the beginning of a fresh stage in both Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Pakistani relations. At the time of writing, however, these speculative thoughts furnish an insufficient base for prediction.

Pakistan's relations with China fall into three logical periods: (1) from 1949, when the communist Chinese People's Republic was established at Peking, to 1954, when Pakistan allied herself with the West for mutual defense; (2) from 1954 to 1962, when, following the Sino-Indian border clash, the United States and other Western powers rushed military assistance to India; and (3) from 1962 to the death of Nehru on May 27, 1964, which period witnessed Pakistan's alliance with the West under strain, her relations with India at their worst since Partition, and her relations with China at their most friendly.

I

There was no reason, during Pakistan's alliance-free years, why her relations with China should not have been neighborly. Pakistan was one of the first noncommunist countries to recognize the People's Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her. In 1950, when the question was first entertained, Pakistan supported the claim of the communist regime to the Chinese seat in the United Nations.[1] She abstained from voting upon the

[1]During the ten years that followed, the question was not substantively considered in the United Nations. The United States was able to find sufficient support in the General Assembly to have it postponed. There was no roll-call vote in 1951, and the pattern of voting for that year was therefore not recorded. During the

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General Assembly resolution branding China as an aggressor in Korea. During the same years, when Pakistan's trade with India came to a standstill because of a difference over currency devaluation, she was able to sell sizeable quantities of cotton and jute to China in return for welcome supplies of coal.

The turning point came in 1953-54. Economic and security considerations combined to compel Pakistan to look around for friends. The crash of primary commodity prices following the Korean boom, and the failure of food crops, confronted Karachi with the specter of famine. Tension with India remained high, and Pakistan found it impossible to keep pace in the armament race with her bigger rival without outside assistance. At about the same time, Secretary of State Dulles was looking for ways and means to stabilize the Chinese periphery after the cease-fires in Korea and Indochina. There was need for the West also to counter possible Soviet moves in the Middle East. India, the largest noncommunist country, was neutral. The United States thus turned not unnaturally toward Pakistan, the next largest noncommunist country on Asia's mainland. A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the United States was signed in May 1954, and this was followed by other commitments, principally to SEATO and CENTO.

II

China, which in 1954 might logically have treated Pakistan as a hostile neighbor, displayed remarkable patience and foresight at this development. What is even more noteworthy, China never recognized India's claim to Kashmir, though these were years of apparent Sino-Indian friendship.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nehru bitterly declared:

> It is an intolerable humiliation for any nation of Asia or Africa to degrade itself by becoming a camp follower of one or other of the power blocs. . . . we think they are both wrong [and] . . . are pursuing policies that are leading us to the brink of war.[2]

remaining years Pakistan, in deference to U.S. policy, voted for the deferment resolution seven times and abstained from voting twice (in 1952 and 1957). However, since 1961, when the question returned to the General Assembly agenda, Pakistan has voted for giving the Chinese seat to the People's Republic. The Ayub-Chou En-lai communiqué of February 23, 1964 reiterated that "the United Nations could not be considered to be fully representative of mankind until the rightful place of the People's Republic of China in the organization was restored."

[2] *New York Times,* The News of the Week in Review, April 24, 1955.

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But Prime Minister Chou En-lai was singularly mild and understanding:

> The day before yesterday, after lunch, I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would permit aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties.[3]

Chou En-lai invited Mohammed Ali to China, and the invitation was acted upon in 1956 when Mohammed Ali's successor, Prime Minister Suhrawardy, made a twelve-day goodwill visit to China and was cordially received by Mao Tse-tung and others. Chou reciprocated the same year, visiting Pakistan for ten days. During the Suhrawardy visit the Chinese premier declared to a Pakistani newsman at Peking that Pakistan's membership in SEATO did not mean that China could not be friendly with Pakistan. The two countries differed on some points but had many things in common. They had no conflict of interests.[4]

During Chou En-lai's visit these principles were formally embodied in a joint communiqué:

> The two Prime Ministers are of the view that the difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between their two countries. They reaffirm their earlier conviction that with a view to promoting further the cordial and friendly relations existing between Pakistan and China, due importance should be given to commercial and cultural relations between the two countries. They are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interest. . . .[5]

China's forbearance toward Pakistan was again tested in 1959 when, immediately after trouble broke out on India's frontier with China, President Ayub made an open bid for understanding with India on the problem of defense of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. In August 1959, following the Longju incident, Prime Minister Nehru for the first time expressed anxiety to the Indian Parliament regarding the border situation. Though Indian leadership had spoken disparagingly of the military regime in Pakistan, Ayub, placing the common good above personal considerations, lost no time in requesting a meeting with Nehru at

[3]George McT. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 57.

[4]*Dawn* (Karachi), November 1, 1956.

[5]*Ibid.*, December 25, 1956.

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Delhi on September 1. After the meeting the Pakistani president disclosed his thoughts to reporters:

> My submission is that whatever happened in the past, the time has now come when we should be thinking of having a rational and neighbourly relationship with each other. I have a feeling it will be in each other's interest, to your country and to my country. I, as a military man, can foresee one danger, and that is that if we go on squabbling in this way and do not resolve our problems, we shall be defeated in detail. History tells us that is how invasions had always come to this subcontinent.[6]

Early in 1960 he declared at Dacca, "The crux of the whole matter was that the armies of both the countries were continuing to face each other when they could have been released to defend their respective territories."[7] A few days later he said at Chittagong: "The need to have a joint defence originated from the basic fact that India and Pakistan lived in the same region which had to be defended after an understanding between the people of the two countries."[8] Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1960, President Ayub observed:

> As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that whenever this sub-continent was divided—and often it was divided—someone or the other invited an outsider to step in.[9]

Although Indian leadership remained unresponsive to Pakistani overtures regarding joint defense, Ayub's conciliatory pronouncements served temporarily to relieve tension between the two countries. Some border issues were settled and the Indus Water Treaty, resolving a twelve-year-old dispute potentially as dangerous as Kashmir, was signed in September 1960.

However, Pakistani hopes that the improved atmosphere would lead to a solution of the Kashmir question were soon dashed. The customary bitterness between the two neighbors reappeared in 1961. At Pakistan's request the Kashmir issue was once more

[6] *Hindu Weekly Review*, September 7, 1959.
[7] *Dawn*, January 22, 1960.
[8] *Ibid.*, January 25, 1960.
[9] "Pakistan Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, p. 556.

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debated in the UN Security Council in 1962, but even a comparatively innocuous resolution submitted by Ireland, urging the governments of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations, was vetoed by the USSR.

With Indo-Pakistani feelings still running high, an important new factor was added to the situation in October 1962. The Chinese routed the Indian forces in the Himalayas, and the United States and other Western countries rushed military assistance to India—over Pakistan's vehement objections that such action on the part of Pakistan's allies would further tilt the balance in favor of an already much stronger India. Under U.S.-British pressure India consented to talk with Pakistan about Kashmir, but six rounds of talks between December 1962 and May 1963 proved fruitless. Pakistan's referral of the Kashmir question to the Security Council in 1964 was also unproductive. Although the majority of UN members declared themselves in favor of the Secretary-General assisting the parties to negotiate a settlement, the proposal was not made the subject of a formal resolution because it was clear that the Soviet Union would bar it with a veto.[10] In the meantime riots and an exodus of refugees, especially after the theft of a holy relic in Kashmir in December 1963, produced the gravest situation between India and Pakistan since Partition.

III

When Ayub's bid for a defense understanding with India failed, Pakistan's thoughts turned toward a settlement of her own 300-mile-long undefined border between China's Sinkiang Province and that part of the State of Kashmir which is under the control of Pakistan.[11] The subject was first publicly discussed by Ayub in a news conference on October 23, 1959. He said that the Paki-

[10]The representative of Pakistan said: "We would also have liked a definite role to be assigned to the Secretary General to enable him to facilitate the progress and to ensure a fruitful result of these contacts [between India and Pakistan]." On the other hand the representative of India declared: "We have no iron curtain in our country. But I do not want him [the Secretary General] to come in the context of the Kashmir debate unless we both agree that he should come." Verbatim record of the Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV 1117, May 18, 1964.

[11]"Although China has preferred to employ peaceful negotiations in dealing with her frontiers with Burma and Nepal, at the outset of the Sino-Indian border dispute Pakistan was unclear about the Chinese motives and she strengthened her forces stationed in Hunza and Baltistan as a precaution against similar Chinese incursions into these areas." Nasim Ahmad, "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude," *International Affairs*, October 1962, p. 428.

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stan Foreign Office had come by a map which showed certain areas of Pakistan as part of China, and that Pakistan would approach China for a peaceful settlement of the question. After a series of slow-moving diplomatic soundings, Pakistan sent a formal note to China on March 28, 1961. The Chinese did not reply until February 27, 1962, when they proposed a provisional agreement pending the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan accepted the Chinese proposal on March 19, and a joint communiqué announced on May 3 that the parties had decided to negotiate. Shortly thereafter, Major-General N.A.M. Raza, who had already served as Pakistan's first Ambassador to Peking and had later successfully negotiated a boundary agreement between Pakistan and Iran, was again appointed Ambassador to China with full powers to negotiate a border agreement. On October 12, about a week prior to the Chinese attack on India, Sino-Pakistani border talks began in Peking. A joint communiqué of December 26, 1962 stated that complete agreement in principle had been reached on the location and alignment of the boundary. Finally, on February 22, 1963, it was declared that the parties had agreed upon a text describing the boundary alignment in detail. The agreement was signed in Peking on March 2.

Although these facts refute the aspersion that the idea of a border accord was collusively conceived by Pakistan and China after the Sino-Indian military clash of October 1962, it is clear that "the negotiations received an impetus after the Sino-Indian conflict and that was quite understandable because China like any other state could not afford to keep all her borders open to dangers."[12] But there is little justification in India's complaint that Pakistan has surrendered some 2,500 square miles of Kashmiri territory to China. The Indians themselves have contended that the border follows the main watershed.[13] The Sino-Pakistani settlement delineates just such a boundary, deviating only to give Pakistan 750 square miles of territory containing grazing grounds and salt mines which had been under the actual possession of the Chinese and where the Chinese had built roads and army

[12]Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the Pakistan National Assembly on July 17, 1963. The Chinese opened their massive offensive against India on October 20, 1962 and declared a unilateral cease-fire on November 21.

[13]"The Indian side also demonstrated that the boundary shown by them lay along the main watershed in the region and was the natural dividing line between the two countries." *Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, December 1961), p. 2.

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barracks and outposts. Pakistan, on the other hand, was not called upon to surrender any territory under her control.[14]

While Pakistan's allies are naturally concerned about her growing ties with China, the peaceful settlement of the border issue is not entirely without advantage to them. Hostilities between Pakistan and China would be a very different matter from hostilities between India and China. Since India is nonaligned, the Western powers were under no obligation to become involved in the fighting in October 1962. But if Pakistan's border were to be violated by China, the Western powers would have no option but to go to Pakistan's assistance, with the possibility that the conflict would escalate into a larger war.

Sino-Pakistani relations were improved in 1963 and early 1964 by a number of formal agreements and official visits and statements. A trade agreement between Pakistan and China was signed in January 1963, and a barter agreement followed in September. As a result of the trade agreement China became the biggest buyer of Pakistani cotton during the year. An air agreement in August 1963 has established the Dacca-Canton-Shanghai air service. There has also been mention of a Rawalpindi-Kashghar air link and the reopening of the ancient Hunza-Sinkiang caravan route closed since the communist take-over of Sinkiang in 1948.[15]

Initiating a foreign policy debate in the National Assembly on July 17, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto stated that since

[14]In an interview with the Associated Press of Pakistan on April 10, 1963, Premier Chou En-lai gave this interesting explanation for China's generosity in settling border issues with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan: "The reason is simple. Since the boundary questions left over by history are settled through friendly negotiations, and since China is bigger than these neighbouring countries and the border areas are mostly sparsely populated, China always made more concessions than the opposite party in the process of mutual accommodation in order to seek a settlement of the question." *Dawn,* April 11, 1963. The more realistic explanation is that by a show of reasonableness and generosity China hopes to gather the smaller countries of Asia under her leadership. *The Times'* special correspondent, reporting from Delhi, stated that both sides had made concessions in respect to their claims. However, he indicated the general result by heading his dispatch "Concession by China in Pakistan Treaty" and observed, "In order to accommodate Pakistan in her desire for that pocket, China has diverged from the principle of watershed on which she has based her claim in this area. . . . Indian criticism today of Pakistan's 'surrender' of territory ironically and even tragically underlines the fact that just such a settlement as this would have been fully acceptable in India before the news of China's furtive and deceitful occupation of territory which Peking knows that India claimed aroused a cry of 'aggression' here." *The Times* (London), March 4, 1963.

According to Alastair Lamb, Pakistan has been able to obtain from China a slightly improved version of the alignment which the British Indian government seems to have resolved to adopt in 1927. Alastair Lamb, *The China-Indian Border* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 175.

[15]*Dawn,* March 6, 1964.

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India's armed might had been menacingly bolstered by the Western powers, the situation facing Pakistan was more grave than ever; hence Pakistan was left with no course but to reshape her foreign policy. If India were to turn her guns against Pakistan

> the international situation is such today that Pakistan would not be alone in that conflict. . . . Attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia and therefore this new element and this new factor that has been brought into the situation is a very important factor.

He went on to say that assurances by Western powers[16] against India's aggressive use of arms provided by them were not sufficient because "in modern warfare it is almost impossible to find out who was the aggressor and who fired the first shot . . . . what use would it be to an annihilated Pakistan if the aggressor was found out later?"

When Bhutto visited Washington in October he was pointedly asked by reporters whether any definite understanding existed between Pakistan and China. He replied in the negative but observed that "in case of a conflict the area's geopolitics might come into play."[17] On the same subject Ayub said: "If we are attacked by India, then that means India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other Asiatic powers, specially China, would take notice of that."[18]

The last notable event in the current phase has been Chou En-lai's official visit to Pakistan in February 1964. Once again China placed Pakistan under a debt of gratitude. Abandoning her hitherto uncommitted posture on the all-important Kashmir issue, she moved entirely to Pakistan's side. The Ayub-Chou En-lai joint communiqué "expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan." "This is something," commented *Dawn,* "of which some countries sharing with us the common ties of Islam, and some coun-

[16]The formal assurance by the United States was contained in a public statement issued by the Department of State on November 18, 1962: "The United States Government has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the U.S. would undertake immediately in accordance with constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." *Ibid.,* August 3, 1963.

[17]*Ibid.,* October 9, 1963.

[18]*Washington Post,* September 12, 1963. On June 18, 1963, *Dawn* reported that Prime Minister Chou En-lai had assured a visiting Pakistani journalists' delegation that China "would defend Pakistan throughout the world."

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tries allied to us through pacts and treaties should be a little ashamed."[19] China's new stand on Kashmir is the more remarkable because it will be cited against China by those who advocate a plebiscite solution of the Taiwan issue.

IV

In the heat of current developments the basic fact that Pakistan has much more in common with both India and the West than she has with China tends to become somewhat obscured. Though Islam bears some superficial resemblance to communism in its advocacy of social justice and a universal classless society, it is in fact incompatible with communism since the latter is godless, subjects the individual to the state and rejects private enterprise and ownership.

Until 1962 Pakistan was regarded as one of the staunchest allies of the West. Ayub was given a standing ovation when he declared to a joint session of the Congress during his 1961 visit to the United States: ". . . if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan." In a television interview broadcast in New York on November 4, 1963, he told Arnold Michaelis: "We are friends of the West in all sincerity. We still are basically. If there seems to be any deviation from that, it is because of certain steps taken by the West which have jeopardized our security."

Even in the middle of acrimonious debates the deep affinity between India and Pakistan is often manifest. Speaking in the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1963, Mrs. Pandit said that India and Pakistan are brothers who "share a common history, a common language and a common struggle [for independence]."[20] Voicing thoughts strikingly similar to Ayub's, she said in the same speech: "We are fully aware of the tragic episodes of our past history when invitations to outside military powers have spelled ruin to all the inhabitants of the sub-continent." During the 1962 Kashmir debate in the UN Choudhury Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan drew attention to the fact that the two countries "are linked by their traditions, their common history and their common language."[21]

[19]February 26, 1964.
[20]*India News* (Washington, D.C.), October 18, 1963.
[21]Verbatim record of the Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV 1007, April 27, 1962.

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It is equally important to note the deep-seated emotions that prevent these natural friends from attaining harmony in their relations. Analyzing how Indians and Pakistanis view each other, *The Round Table* (London), in its March 1960 issue, penetratingly observed that

> it is broadly true to say that in many Indian minds the mere existence of Pakistan gives rise to a feeling of something like resentment. . . . to the Indian mind, with its characteristic tenacity of purpose and occasional inability to let bygones be bygones, the emergence of Pakistan is still something that ought not to have happened.

On the other hand

> the average Pakistani, although he may resent what he considers the injustice of India's actions, displays no animosity against the fact of her existence. . . . there is general acceptance of the fact that India is a larger, wealthier, and more important country than Pakistan. . . . The complaints that are made against India are directed . . . against her behavior towards Pakistan over particular issues, in which she is accused of using her wealth and power to gain her ends with little heed to the rights of this weaker neighbour.

Kashmir is the touchstone by which Pakistanis test India's intentions. According to Ayub:

> The thing that has embittered our relations with India is Kashmir. . . . I have pleaded with all humility with the Prime Minister of India, but I have not been able to get him to agree to the resolution, or proper solution of this problem . . . the present cease-fire line is just like a grip around our neck. That is the military meaning of the present situation.[22]

At the Pakistan Islamic Council for International Affairs, Foreign Minister Bhutto declared: "Let India arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir. We can then have not one but a dozen no-war pacts with her."[23]

An important consideration in the Pakistanis' feeling that India has no real desire to settle the Kashmir problem equitably is India's double standard for settlement with stronger China and weaker Pakistan. To China India has suggested that their border dispute be referred to arbitration or the International Court of Justice because "there could be no fairer and more reasonable approach than this proposal."[24] But India has remained unresponsive to Pakistan's offers to resolve the Kashmir deadlock

[22]Speech at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. Reported in *Dawn*, August 26, 1961.

[23]*Ibid.*, June 21, 1963.

[24]*India News*, March 22 and May 24, 1963.

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by the same methods. "It appeared," the Pakistani Foreign Minister has observed, "that India's conception of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute was that India should hold on to Kashmir and allow us to inherit the dispute with our people, dispute with the people of Kashmir and dispute with the people of China."[25]

V

Precisely because of their disillusionment with the West, Pakistanis are now wary of rushing headlong to the other side. They fully realize that China is courting Pakistan and other smaller countries mainly because she is seriously embroiled with the United States, India and the Soviet Union, and not because she bears any natural love for Pakistan. By now Pakistan has probably approached China as closely as she wants to go. During Chou En-lai's visit Pakistan made no concessions in return for China's support on Kashmir. After a lunch he had given in honor of the Chinese Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Bhutto was questioned on the state of Pakistan's relations with the United States. He replied: "Our relations are cordial and friendly. We are members of two alliances and there is a fund of goodwill and appreciation for the people of the United States of America."[26]

Unlike communiqués issued during the visits of Chinese dignitaries to many other Afro-Asian countries, the Ayub-Chou En-lai communiqué said nothing on the subject of Taiwan. On the differences between the United States and China, Ayub said that the Chinese leaders "had explained their difficulties and he had briefly expressed American views."[27] Asked whether closer relations with China would conflict with Pakistan's obligations to SEATO and CENTO, Ayub replied:

> I do not think they should. The object of SEATO and CENTO is that war should be prevented from coming to these regions. . . . Well if this freedom from trouble for this area can be obtained through good relations between neighbours, the object of SEATO and CENTO is being achieved.

Regarding the purpose of Chou En-lai's visit, Ayub observed:

> We all visit each other; the world is on the move. That is the pattern of life . . . it is a goodwill visit as well as consolidation of our neighbourly relations.[28]

[25] *Dawn*, May 10, 1963.
[26] *Pakistan Affairs* (Washington, D.C.), March 16, 1964.
[27] *Dawn*, February 22, 1964.
[28] *Pakistan Affairs*, March 5, 1964.

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At his own press conferences the Chinese Prime Minister affirmed that the question of a formal treaty between China and Pakistan did not figure on the agenda of the talks. Relations between Pakistan and China were so cordial that he did not feel it necessary to sign a treaty of coexistence between the two countries. He had received the assurance that SEATO and CENTO were defensive treaties, and "we believe what the Pakistan Government says."[29]

VI

It would thus be a misreading of the situation to conclude that Pakistan has gone over to China, and has become anti-Western or anti-American. The biggest factor in Pakistan's calculation remains fear of India. Pakistanis are apprehensive that the Western powers—though they would admittedly be dismayed if India attacked Pakistan and would do their utmost diplomatically to prevent such a catastrophe—value Indian goodwill far too much to do battle against India to save Pakistan. Some Pakistanis, asserting that China alone of the big powers would render their country assistance against India, have begun to demand that Pakistan substitute a defense alliance with China for the existing pacts with the West. More responsible circles realize that ideologically China is not a natural ally for Pakistan, and physically she is not in a position to guarantee Pakistan's safety against a Western-backed India. China, moreover, cannot compete with the Western countries in giving economic assistance to Pakistan. But it is not easy to answer those who advocate an alliance-free policy so that, like India, Pakistan too can have "the best of both worlds."

Western leaders have never made any secret of the fact that, as the largest noncommunist country in the world, India has a special importance in their eyes. While India pursued a policy of left-leaning neutralism[30] and the Western powers were giving military assistance to Pakistan alone, the situation was acceptably balanced. That balance has now been disturbed, and Pakistan

[29] *Dawn,* February 26 and 27, 1964.

[30] During Chou En-lai's four visits in the period June 1954 to January 1957, crowds of Indians would chant the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai, Bhai" ("Indians and Chinese are brothers"). In contrast, reflecting the contemporary Pakistani attitude, *Dawn* asserted that "only an infantile optimist would believe that there can be any permanent reconciliation between Communism and Islam." Cited in Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," *Pacific Affairs,* Fall 1962, p. 211.

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is trying to make up the difference by increasing her collaboration with non-Western countries.

The new look in foreign policy has by no means been limited to developments in Sino-Pakistani relations. The barter agreement with China was preceded by five such agreements, two each with the Soviet Union and Poland, and one with Albania. Similar agreements have been made with Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[31] Pakistan's cordiality with neutral countries such as Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Nepal and Ceylon has noticeably increased. And her long-standing poor relations with Afghanistan and the USSR seem at last to be improving. Diplomatic relations with Afghanistan have been resumed, an air agreement has been concluded, and the transit agreement has been renewed. An air agreement with the Soviet Union was executed on October 7, 1963. The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan predicted that this "would serve as a forerunner of Pakistan-Soviet collaboration in other fields."[32] The official announcement emphasized that "the USSR has, for the first time, granted rights to an airline to operate services through Moscow to points beyond. The P.I.A. will, therefore, be the first carrier to operate such services." The Pakistani Foreign Minister has stated that on the sensitive Kashmir question also "there has been a shift in the Soviet attitude."[33] On March 10, 1964 the Soviet Ambassador declared at Peshawar that Pakistan-Soviet ties were growing closer.

Another indication of Pakistan's new independence followed a State Department announcement in September 1963 that the United States had suspended a promised $4.3 million loan to Pakistan for airport improvement after Pakistan signed a civil aviation agreement with China. "Competent sources" in Rawalpindi declared on September 13 that, though cessation of American aid was not expected, Pakistan was not willing to take the risk of being caught unprepared and that experts had already been directed to study the consequences of aid suspension.[34] However, this incident apart, U.S. aid projects are proceeding smoothly in Pakistan.

[31]These barter agreements have resulted in part from a general desire by Pakistan to diversify her trade in view of what the Pakistani Commerce Minister has described as the "ominous implications" of the European Common Market. *Christian Science Monitor,* February 9, 1963.

[32]*Dawn,* November 30, 1963.

[33]*Pakistan Affairs,* March 16, 1964.

[34]*Dawn,* September 13, 1963.

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With the movement for coexistence generally gathering strength, and in view of the benefits of greater maneuverability which she now enjoys, Pakistan understandably would not wish again to put all her political eggs in the Western or any other single basket.[35] She has even less reason than before to be militantly hostile toward China. Should China commit aggression somewhere along her borders, Pakistan would not hesitate to discharge her responsibilities under the defense alliances of which she remains a loyal member.

While tactics might vary, inherent attachments remain. Pakistan still prefers to remain a good ally of the West and to become a close friend of India. A single imaginative and bold gesture on the part of India, the bigger and stronger of the sister nations, would immediately bring to the surface the deep natural affection which the people of India and Pakistan have for each other and magically lift the gloom that pervades the unhappy subcontinent. The burden of intense hostility which these closely related countries carry today is far too heavy to be endured indefinitely. If they do not settle down as good neighbors, the tension may one day become insufferable for either or both of them. Should hostilities break out, China, as the Pakistani Foreign Minister revealed in his National Assembly speech, might very well regard her own security threatened at the prospect of Pakistan's destruction. The result then could be a major war. It would be a war of strange alliances but, as the history of alliances and wars has shown—especially since World War II—the necessity to survive supersedes all other national considerations.

[35]The ruling Muslim League party announced as a part of its program on March 17, 1964 that it "supports the new dimension that has been added to the Pakistan foreign policy."

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POLITICAL POWER AND ECONOMIC THEORY IN "RADICAL" WEST AFRICA

by Kenneth W. Grundy

IN their efforts to arrive at "objective" prescriptions for the alleviation of underdevelopment, statesmen and scholars have, by and large, neglected the views of those most prominently and directly involved in the development of these states—the indigenous nationalists. The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the economic attitudes and theoretical predispositions of the officials of the three most "radical" or revolutionary ruling regimes in West Africa—Ghana, Guinea and Mali—and to examine the effects such theories have on the resulting political systems in these countries.

"Economic Independence" Through Autarky

One of the most persistent themes of post-independence African politico-economic theory is "the struggle for economic independence." Its essence is that virtually complete independence, somewhat akin to modern autarky, is not only desirable but possible. To Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's President, "political independence is but an empty facade if economic freedom is not possible also."[1] Thus, a juridically independent state cannot pursue really independent policies unless it is sufficiently developed economically to be able to control its own future without interference by other states—especially interference by the former metropole. Although this view may be widely shared throughout the world, absolute independence is, in fact, impossible. What all states are searching for is a relative measure of independence in order to assure their survival in crisis situations. Nationalists strive for self-sustaining economies which are not subject to the interests and dictates of others. The Africans' pursuit of "real" independence, as opposed to "nominal" independence, is essentially a search for a greater measure of independence which, they feel, can only be achieved through increased economic development.

[1]Kwame Nkrumah, "The Movement for Colonial Freedom," *Phylon*, XVI (Fourth Quarter, 1955), p. 407. A more complete treatment of Nkrumah's political theory appears in Kenneth W. Grundy, "Nkrumah's Theory of Underdevelopment: An Analysis of Recurrent Themes," *World Politics*, April 1963, pp. 438-54.

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The notion of economic independence goes hand in glove with the concept of "neo-colonialism."[2] To the radicals, neo-colonialism is a policy, devised by the Great Powers (usually the former rulers), of granting formal independence but maintaining the effective presence of metropolitan interests. Trade agreements, marketing arrangements, financial aid and technical assistance, as well as diplomatic maneuvers and the playing off of African states against one another are viewed as neo-colonialist practices.[3] These policies are regarded as no less effective, although more flexible and sophisticated, than the physical presence of Western political, economic or military personnel or institutions. The underlying assumption of the revolutionary elites is that imperialism and colonialism in their "new" garb are still the chief obstacles to national independence and development.

There are at least three kinds of neo-colonialism in African thought: military, political and economic. The latter variety, which allegedly seeks to perpetuate European control of African life through economic devices, most often comes under fire. President Modibo Keita of Mali thinks that the colonial powers, having lost their political hegemony, are determined to establish economic and cultural domination.[4] Similarly, Nkrumah contends:

> . . . the colonialist powers and their imperialist allies are beginning to advance a new, subtle theory—and a disguised one, at that—to safeguard their position in Africa and to beguile and bamboozle the Africans. They are prepared to grant political independence, but, at the same time, they are also planning to continue to dominate the African territories in the economic field by establishing control over the economic life of the newly independent African countries.[5]

From the radical viewpoint, neo-colonialism is a term which describes a new attempt to reassert traditional colonial objectives,

[2]For a discussion of the theory of neo-colonialism, see Guy de Bosschere, "Neo-Colonialism," *Présence Africaine,* X, No. 38 (1962), pp. 26-35.

[3]See Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community," *International Affairs,* January 1963, pp. 24-36.

[4]République du Mali, *Congrès Extraordinaire de l'U.S. R.D.A., 22 Septembre 1960, Le Mali continue* . . . (Bamako: Imprimerie du Gouvernement du Mali, n.d.), p. 15. For a brief examination of the political thoughts of the leaders of Mali see Kenneth W. Grundy, "Marxism-Leninism and African Underdevelopment: The Mali Approach," *International Journal,* Summer 1962, pp. 300-304.

[5]Kwame Nkrumah, *Speech Delivered by the Life Chairman on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary, 8th January 1960 of the Positive Action* (Accra: C.P.P. National Headquarters, 1960), p. 7. The most complete and anti-Western statement of Nkrumah's concept of neo-colonialism appears in his speech to the Conference of Freedom Fighters held in Ghana, June 4-6, 1962. See "Africa's Liberation and Unity," *Voice of Africa,* June 1962, pp. 3-14 and 40.

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namely, the subjugation of the indigenous peoples. Traditional colonial attitudes, the radicals contend, are disguised by superficial alterations in the former control patterns, but at heart the goals remain the same. According to this strict interpretation, neo-colonialism can only be applied to the activities of the former colonial powers. This is why radical Africans are unimpressed by the thesis favored by American and West European publicists and statesmen that since European colonial empires are virtually liquidated, Africans must turn to the West for protection against Soviet and Chinese communist colonialism.[6] The only colonialism Africans have known has come from Western Europe. They tend to identify the United States with the European powers, and sometimes regard Americans as neo-colonialists who are taking up where the weakened former colonialist states left off. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claims never to have been a colonialist power, most certainly not in Africa. It stresses the material progress of non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union. Africa's radicals point out that Soviet expansion into Asia and Eastern Europe brought in its wake modernization and industrialization. Outwardly they ignore the more distasteful by-products of Soviet expansion. To the radical elites, Soviet expansion since 1945 is hardly a relevant example of colonialism at all. Because Africans are more familiar with racially based colonial policies, they find it difficult to understand how the relationship between racially akin peoples can be colonialist. In their experience, colonialism involves a relationship of superior and subordinate based essentially on racial differences.

Neo-colonialism as viewed by Nkrumah and President Sékou Touré of Guinea is very close to the present Soviet concept of neo-colonialism. According to the Soviets:

> The imperialists are using new methods and new forms to maintain colonial exploitation of the peoples. They resort to whatever means they can (colonial wars, military blocs, conspiracies, terrorism, subversion, economic pressure, bribery) to control the newly-free countries and to reduce the independence they have won to mere form, or to deprive them of that independence. Under the guise of "aid," they are trying to retain their old positions in those countries and capture new ones, to extend their social basis, lure the national bourgeoisie to their side, implant military despotic regimes and put obedient puppets in power. Using the poisoned weapon of national and tribal strife, the imperialists seek to

[6] A discussion of this issue appears in Pierre Naville, "Is There a Soviet Neo-Colonialism?," *Présence Africaine,* IX, No. 37 (1962), pp. 102-108.

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split the ranks of the national-liberation movement; reactionary groups of the local exploiting classes play the role of allies of imperialism.

Imperialism thus remains the chief enemy and the chief obstacle to the solution of the national problems facing the young sovereign states and all dependent countries.[7]

Nkrumah's speeches reproduced in *Voice of Africa,* his trilingual international propaganda organ, ingenuously echo this passage. Compare the Soviet position with the following extracts from the Ghanaian President's speech to the 1962 Conference of Freedom Fighters:

We know that the colonialists are past-masters of the policy of divide and rule. They are quick to seize on tribal differences which they discover among us and use these to pit one group against the other. . . .

Now that African independence has been achieved over a large part of the continent and the national consciousness of Africans . . . is adding momentum to the struggle for independence, every kind of means is being used by the colonialists to arrest its progress and defeat its objective. They are attempting many methods, some sinister, some beguiling, to wreck our efforts. They strike antipathetic postures. On one side, they perform acts calculated to strike fear; on the other, they try to hoodwink us with fictitious gifts which superficially pander to our hopes and aspirations. . . .

Imperialism does not change its nature; it only changes its front. It still needs colonial appendages, whether in name or in fact, to exploit and, at the same time, to support its cold war strategy.[8]

Except for the class emphasis of the Soviet position, the two statements are similar in tenor, mood and style. Touré and the Malians endorse this general position. Some Nigerians, too, are beginning to embrace this view of neo-colonialism, as are some Senegalese and even some Ivory Coast youths.

The warnings of neo-colonialism were largely ignored by the ruling African elites before the Congo crisis of 1960-1963.[9] Prior to the attempted separation of Katanga from the Central Congolese state, neo-colonialism was an abstract concept with little meaning to individual Africans. But when Belgian, British and

[7]Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., October 31, 1961* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 44.

[8]Nkrumah, *Voice of Africa,* June 1962, pp. 4, 6 and 8.

[9]John H. Dalton, "Colony and Metropolis: Some Aspects of British Rule in Gold Coast and Their Implications for an Understanding of Ghana Today," *Journal of Economic History,* December 1961, p. 565. An examination of the positions of the various African states during the Congo crisis appears in Robert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Postcolonial Politics," in Laurence W. Martin, editor, *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 34-63.

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French mining companies sought to maintain their influence in the wealthy secessionist province, and the other Western powers looked on in apparent sympathy, Mali, Ghana and Guinea sharply amplified their charges of neo-colonialism.

It is not surprising, nor is it accidental, that the views of the radical modernizing elites coincide with Soviet conceptions of economic independence and neo-colonialism. In the first place, such concepts serve as simplified slogans which help to unify the people behind the modernizers. They furnish an ill-defined but nevertheless very popular objective, and an alien scapegoat to which setback and delay can be attributed. Second, the threat of neo-colonialism and the goal of economic independence provide the revolutionary elites with expedient justifications for their comprehensive approaches to economic and social revolution. Without such external threats and all-embracing norms they would find it difficult to secure the support of the masses. Third, for the same reasons, the modernizing elites are supplied with a rationale for the repression of internal political opposition and for the expulsion or detention of potential challengers to their own personal power. The Soviets support these two themes primarily to embarrass and weaken the West. The revolutionary Africans, however, employ them to reinforce their own power and motivate the masses toward predetermined goals. Nor can one discount the fact that in a number of instances the charges of neo-colonialism have some foundation.

Neither Communism nor Capitalism

The radical nationalists explicitly and emphatically reject both communism and capitalism as doctrinal foundations for their future growth. In Touré's words: "To attempt to interpret Africa's behavior in capitalist or Communist terms is to neglect the fundamental fact that Africa's present condition corresponds neither to the given facts of capitalism nor to those in the building of Communism."[10]

Although their vocabularies are Leninist and many of their policies are Marxist in content, the radicals have taken pains to explain that they are not Marxist-Leninists. First, they contend that Marxism is too materialistic and too atheistic—though such criticisms are largely *ex post facto* rationalizations for political preferences rather than explanations for the preferences. Second,

[10]Sékou Touré, "Africa's Future and the World," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1962, p. 151.

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Africans deny the relevancy of social class analysis and the class struggle for Africa. African socialism is essentially national socialism which repudiates international class solidarity and emphasizes national cohesion. Third, Marxism-Leninism is regarded as an alien ideology, relevant for Europe, but only partially applicable to Africa. What is needed, the radicals say, is not to make Africa Marxist, but to make Marxism African. Fourth, Marxism-Leninism is reputedly too doctrinaire, too all-embracing, too inflexible. Repeatedly, the radicals insist that ideology and doctrine must be avoided. They are more concerned with "action." Africans are prepared to utilize Marxism-Leninism selectively as an analytical tool and as a guide to the solution of given problems, but not as a total philosophy which purports to explain all social conditions.

The radicals advance moral and practical reasons for rejecting capitalism as an economic doctrine. In African minds, capitalism cannot escape its long association with colonialism. Viewing capitalism as an economic structure built essentially upon individual enterprise, Touré repeatedly equates individualism and, by implication, capitalism, with exploitation and theft.[11] One Malian official, in crisp Leninist terms, blamed the capitalist system for practically all of mankind's ills. Speaking of the "inevitable troubles that economic development leads to when it is produced by the intermediary of private capital," he declared: "The fratricidal struggles, the civil wars, the general degradation of human relations, oppression and social injustice are not the fate of men of one race or one continent; they are produced by a system that is born . . . in the course of an economic evolution determined by private profit."[12] It is not surprising that the revolutionary elites should reject capitalism on moral grounds, for their only experience with capitalism—the Western colonial variety—was, to them, unjust and exploitative. For the most part they were not permitted to participate in the system as capitalists, but rather, chiefly as low-paid laborers. The system was not intended to bring benefit to them, and their experience with it was usually unpleasant and degrading.

The revolutionary elites also contend that capitalism is inapplicable and impractical for Africa. There are few indigenous capitalists in Guinea and Mali, although Ghana has a small but powerful core of petty bourgeois merchants and craftsmen. Most

[11]Sékou Touré, *Toward Full Re-Africanisation: Policy and Principles of the Guinea Democratic Party* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959), pp. 64-65.
[12]*Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), January 17, 1962.

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of the revolutionary leadership rose to power through noneconomic channels—as intellectuals, labor leaders, petty governmental officers or professional political organizers. Thus, few African leaders have a material interest in the construction or perpetuation of an economic system they find personally distasteful and unprofitable. Because of their own individual and group interests, the leaders advance rationalizations for their anti-capitalist predispositions. Nkrumah, for example, contends that "Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation."[13] He asserts that "production for individual private profit . . . deprives such a large section of the people of the goods and services produced, while their needs and wants remain unsatisfied."[14] Moreover, there is little private capital available, especially sufficient accumulations to make large-scale investment possible. As one young Malian official frankly stated: "You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital."[15] Capitalism, therefore, was not considered by the revolutionary elites as a real option or a desirable objective for their independent countries.

Pragmatic Socialism

Although the revolutionary elites deny a commitment to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, or to any total ideological system for that matter, the economic policies pursued in Ghana, Guinea and Mali are substantively Marxist. An empirical and pluralistic approach to underdevelopment prevails, but the underlying philosophy is basically socialist.

In theory, African socialism is at once a modern approach to economic problems and a continuation of the traditional way of life. For example, Modibo Keita once advanced the following explanation for post-colonial African socialism:

> We are a country which has been colonized. . . . We have never therefore had an economy controlled by Africans; we have never had an economy controlled by Malians. In Mali the people of the villages work collectively. They have societies, called farming societies, which cultivate the fields of the village in rotation, and sometimes they have one collective field which they work and harvest to cover the common expenses. We consider it would be bad policy to break down this traditional pat-

[13]Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957), p. xvi.

[14]Kwame Nkrumah, *Building a Socialist State: An Address . . . to the C.P.P. Study Group, April 22, 1961* (Accra: Ghana Information Services, 1961), p. 2.

[15]"Malian Planner," *West Africa,* December 10, 1960, p. 1389.

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tern of collective life; on the contrary, we think it should be improved so that it can take its place in the pattern of present-day evolution.[16]

African leaders seek to build upon this feeling of communal solidarity found in the extended family or kinship group, to spread it through all segments of the population, and to apply it to national development. This can be accomplished most easily in Guinea and Mali where few people earn cash, few are urbanized, and individual property is relatively unknown.

Nkrumah emphasizes the modernizing aspects of socialism, for in Ghana both a substantial land-based middle class and an urban proletariat flourish. "At the present state of Ghana's economic development," the President has said, "the whole community must act in the national interest. In fact most of our major development has had to be carried out by the Government itself. There is no other way out, for our people lack the capital and the technical knowhow to embark on great industrial undertakings. We cannot agree with those who say that state participation is a denial of democracy."[17] Other arguments in favor of socialism abound—it is "democratic," "efficient," and offers a speedy therapy for economic ills. In his 1961 pamphlet, *Building a Socialist State,* Nkrumah briefly defined socialism in these words: "Socialism assumes the public ownership of the means of production—the land and its resources—and the use of those means of production that will bring benefit to the people. Socialist production is production of goods and services in fulfillment of the peoples' needs."[18]

The revolutionary elites are unable or unwilling to pinpoint the extent to which the state must enter national economic life. They want merely to amalgamate foreign and indigenous ideas into an essentially pragmatic, flexible, pluralistic and eclectic phenomenon called African socialism. The various theories of African socialism are not efforts to build a "scientific" socialism —a total metaphysical system which is to be applicable for all time and in all social milieux. Rather, they reflect and express the interests of the revolutionary elites at a given stage of their national development.

The tendency toward socialism in Africa is a product of many factors. (1) It reflects to some extent the traditional African way

[16]Modibo Keita, "The Foreign Policy of Mali," *International Affairs,* October 1961, pp. 436-37.

[17]As quoted in *The African and Colonial World,* February 1958, p. 4.

[18]*Loc. cit.*

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of life, and, according to the radical elites, the absence of divisive (primarily capitalistic) economic classes. Much of the economy is pre-capitalist, organized on cooperative or collective lines which make the transition to a more tightly organized socialism relatively easy. (2) African socialism develops naturally from the scarcity of investment capital. With rare exceptions, Africans lack a genuine interest in creating capitalism since there is no powerful indigenous capitalist class. (3) It is an outgrowth of anti-imperialist and nationalist sentiment as much as it is of economic necessity. (4) The African proclivity to socialism stems from the academic training and intellectual contacts of the West African ruling elites. Nkrumah and his advisers were educated largely in Great Britain and the United States. They had close personal ties with British socialists such as Harold Laski and Sidney Webb, as well as with British communists. Sékou Touré, Madeira Keita and Modibo Keita were exposed to French socialist and communist thought through the Êcole Normale William-Ponty in Dakar, the *Groupes d'Études Communistes* in various West African capitals, and the *Confédération Générale du Travail* in France and West Africa. (5) The revolutionary elites quickly found that the espousal of certain socialist norms was a political asset in mobilizing the masses for economic and social, as well as political, revolution. (6) Africans prefer socialism because they consider it a rapid road to economic development. Since they have neither capital nor the time to amass private savings, they turn to the state to orchestrate all sectors of the economy and to raise the necessary funds.

The radicals' defense of socialist theory and practice frequently is little more than rationalization for the adoption of a sociopolitical order which clearly works to their advantage.[19] Their fundamental sympathy for socialist prototypes is rooted in the character and composition of the new mass party regimes and the societies which they govern. Only in Ghana, of the radical states, is there a politically consequential indigenous capitalist class. None of these states has a well organized feudal class (as in Nigeria) to challenge the authority of the governing elites. Therefore, the revolutionary parties have not adopted traditional Western property-owning or bourgeois middle-class goals and aspira-

[19]I am indebted to Professor Vernon A. Aspaturian of the Pennsylvania State University for discussion and comment on many of the ideas treated in the following paragraphs. His own views are stated in his "Revolutionary Change in Underdeveloped Countries and the Strategy of the Status Quo," in Martin, editor, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-95.

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tions. The revolutionary regimes are composed of the numerically insignificant but politically influential Western-educated, bureaucratic and urban working-class segments of the population whose power does not emanate from solid material advantages or social privileges. During their rise to power, the radical elites exploited anti-colonialist and pro-nationalist sentiments to whip up revolutionary fervor and rally the peasantry to their side. But once in the saddle, they became aware that their political status was insecure. Lacking a broad power base resting on durable socio-economic foundations, they instituted measures to solidify their position. Their immediate objective was to protect themselves from the resurgence of traditional and alien political forces by emphasizing the merits of national unity and development, and undertaking programs of modernization.

In order to maintain their continued control of the government, the revolutionary elites sought to emphasize the central role of the state in national economic development. The chief sources of increased state power in an underdeveloped country are state ownership of the means of production and distribution and a centrally planned economy. Expansion of state economic power and activity not only expands the power of the ruling elite, but it also prompts a parallel expansion of the civil service. This, in turn, diminishes the possibility for revolution since the state employs university and high-school graduates, reduces their verve for upsetting the political status quo, and in general assures social stability by giving them a stake in the prevailing political order. Thus, like revolutionary ruling groups throughout the world, the Africans seek to make permanent their source of power by restructuring the socio-economic order to their own advantage.

By means of the increased centralization and control of economic life in Ghana, Guinea and Mali, the state, i.e., the governing elites, is coming to be recognized as the sole dispenser of benefits and rewards in society. By discouraging the formation of competing power centers springing from independent economic foundations, the ruling elites stabilize their effective monopoly of political enterprise. Elaborate single-party structures already dominate most organized youth, syndical and electoral activity. The elites are now attempting to add economic prerogatives to their entrenched political powers.

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Reconciling Foreign Investment and Decolonization

Communists repeatedly urge the African states to reduce their dependence on Western private and public investment. Similarly, the revolutionary elites' own notions of economic independence and neo-colonialism warn Africans to be wary of enticing "deals" offered by Western capitalists and their governments. Nevertheless, despite these ideological admonitions, and despite professed preferences for socialism, the ruling elites have turned to the West for aid and investment. Characteristically, they do not regard their search for foreign investment capital as a sacrifice of socialist principles.

In theory, revolutionary elites are predisposed to nationalize private enterprise. According to the Guinean leaders, "The nationalization of all the social activities and of the key economic activities is an illustration of the democratic nature of a regime, when we restore to the term *'democratic'* its real meaning, which is the authority of the people."[20] Although ideologically sympathetic to nationalization schemes, the ruling *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (P.D.G.) saw the need to tread lightly at first in dealing with private capital. The experience of the French commercial interests in Guinea was being watched by Western financial establishments representing potential sources of investment capital. The efforts of the government to control foreign-owned enterprise took the form of requirements that firms doing business in Guinea set up corporate headquarters in Guinea and reinvest a portion of their profits in the country. The establishment of the Guinean franc in 1960 presented additional barriers to the expatriation of profits and assets. More governmental controls were added in 1960 and 1961 when the assets of foreign-owned banks, insurance companies and two major utility companies were nationalized. However, the economically more important Western concessions producing bauxite, alumina and iron ore were treated with care.

One of the first measures instituted in the "decolonization" process sought to prevent excessive profits by the French enterprises which dominated the Guinean distribution system. A foreign trade agency, the *Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce,* was established in 1959 to direct all import and export operations. But the system did not function in practice as well as it was supposed to in theory. The inexperienced Guinean administrators

[20] *Horoya* (Conakry), March 17, 1962, p. 2. (Touré's italics.)

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were unfamiliar with quantity buying and distribution techniques. The operation was so inefficient and costly that, by May 1961, the *comptoir* system was abandoned as unworkable. To replace it, the government established several state-owned commercial enterprises, *sociétés nationales,* which have been only slightly more successful.

The fact that the P.D.G. had to discontinue the operations of the *comptoir* should not be dismissed lightly, for it has made an important impact on Guinean ideology. The *comptoirs* were a symbol of the application of a quasi-communist type organization of commercial relations. The party lost prestige as a result of the system's failure. It had placed its reliance on the *comptoirs* as an example of an "African" creation supplanting colonial structures, and to admit failure was an act of courage. In this instance, the Guinean cadre was unprepared for the task assigned it. If a bureaucracy can be developed boasting increased administrative skills, efficiency and a tradition of service, the same or a similar system may be successfully instituted.

Since the demise of the *comptoir* system, Touré has been more willing to cooperate with foreign private investors. FRIA, a $154,000,000 alumina consortium, is the only large private enterprise functioning in Guinea, and it has been a profitable operation. On the strength of its success, and the disappointing record of various state-run enterprises, Touré has recently encouraged more private investment by liberalizing the investment codes, and by providing a generally more sympathetic environment for capitalist interests. Mali's investment code was likewise revised in May 1962 to encourage foreign investments, and Ghana followed suit in April 1963 with a liberalized capital investment act.

Despite his ideological predispositions, or because of them, Nkrumah has not embarked on a comprehensive plan for the nationalization of foreign-owned business firms. He is acutely sensitive to the exigencies of African economic advancement, and he realizes that an uncompensated expropriation of foreign firms would not only severely cripple economic activity, but would discourage potential investments. For the same reason that capitalism is rejected as an economic system (because Ghana lacks capital and technical skills), Nkrumah is forced to admit that foreign capital and skills are imperative for Ghanaian development at this time. Consequently, the President has repeatedly disavowed rumors of impending

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nationalization.[21] Reconciling theory with practice, Nkrumah maintains that his government still seeks a socialist pattern of society, but that socialism can differ from one country to another. Although some private firms have had difficulties with the government, there is no solid evidence that the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) wants to drive them out.

The state has assumed responsibility for the operation of particular Ghanaian economic sectors. A state insurance company took over the life insurance business entirely. All transportation facilities have been combined into a single, state-run corporation. Imports and exports are effectively controlled by the state, and a proposed state import monopoly has been designed to establish machinery for the import, distribution and marketing of produce and food products. Banking facilities were centralized in the Bank of Ghana in 1957, and the state also bought out several foreign enterprises.

Nkrumah's desire to encourage foreign investment and his statements that economic and financial independence must be achieved by eliminating the last vestiges of the colonial economic system are not theoretically consistent. Obviously, foreign enterprises in Ghana are remnants of the colonial past. But foreign capital in some form is essential for Ghanaian development. This dilemma confronts all emerging states. Nkrumah has apparently disposed of the problem by dictating the terms on which he will permit foreign business to operate in Ghana, and those terms have not been easy. If foreign investors are unwilling to abide by the terms of their presence, they may be expropriated, unless, of course, Nkrumah feels that it is advantageous to grant more generous terms in order to attract increased capital investment. If Nkrumah becomes dissatisfied with the operations of foreign capital, nationalization looms as a real possibility.

The "Private Enterprise sector" is but one of the five sectors which are to operate side by side in Ghana.[22] The "State sector" contains all enterprises wholly state-owned and operated. The "joint State-Private sector" incorporates enterprises owned jointly by the government and foreign private capital. The "Co-opera-

[21]This policy was specifically embodied in the capital investment act of April 19, 1963 (especially Part 3—"Protection of Investments") and has been more recently included in Ghana's first Seven Year Development Plan (1963-64 to 1969-70) made public in March 1964.

[22]For an elaboration of these points see Kwame Nkrumah, *Overseas Capital and Investment in Ghana* (London: Information Section, Ghana High Commission, 1962), pp. 2-3; *Ghana Today,* April 11, 1962 and June 6, 1962, pp. 6-7.

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tive sector" contains all enterprises undertaken by cooperative organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The "Private Enterprise sector" includes those industries that are open to foreign private investors provided they accept two conditions: they must give the government the first option to buy out their shares, and they must reinvest 60 per cent of their net profits in Ghana. The "Workers' Enterprise sector" is open to private Ghanaian capital and limited to small-scale enterprises. Although this sector is reserved exclusively for Ghanaians, there is still little room for Ghanaian capitalists. Their role is to develop handicrafts such as cloth weaving, preferably through cooperatives or small-scale firms, "provided that they are not nominees or sleeping partners of foreign interests."[23]

No enterprise may exist which is jointly owned by foreign interests and individual Ghanaians. Except for the establishment of a minor petty bourgeois capitalist class, no indigenous capitalist class is sanctioned. The only capitalism which will coexist with state and cooperative enterprises will be foreign in origin. By this restriction on the cooperation of individual Ghanaians with foreign capitalists, Nkrumah has hit on a clever device to facilitate future nationalization or expropriation, and at the same time to reduce its internal repercussions. In states such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Nigeria, an alliance between internal and external private enterprise influences the policies of the governing regimes, and creates an indigenous class of entrepreneurs and managers who have a vested interest in the mollification and appeasement of foreign investors. Nkrumah wants to avoid this pattern before it becomes entrenched in domestic politics as it already is in other countries, particularly in Latin America.

The Republic of Mali offers perhaps the least promising atmosphere in West Africa for foreign investment. First, the *Union Soudanaise* Government seems determined to implement its socialist "decolonization" policy. Second, Mali, the most economically retarded territory under study, has a poorly developed economic infrastructure, a very small skilled and semi-skilled labor force, and few natural resources to be exploited profitably. Malian policies toward foreign commercial and industrial interests have not improved her chances of obtaining foreign capital.

Commerce plays an inordinately large role in the nonagricul-

[23]As quoted in "Ghana's Philosophy in Practice," *West Africa*, August 4, 1962, p. 841.

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tural sector of Mali's economy. Prior to 1961, much of the export, import, and domestic retail and wholesale trade remained in foreign private hands. Malians felt exploited, and were unwilling to defend foreign commercial interests. Thus, the single party's first move to consolidate its power was in the area of export-import trade. In 1961, the *Société Malienne d'Importation et d'Exportation* (Somiex) was created and given monopoly rights for the import of basic items and for the export of ground-nuts, thus diminishing the influence of foreign entrepreneurs. The move dovetailed nicely with the general decolonization program pressed by party militants.

In theory, the private sector of the Malian economy is supposed to play, at best, a limited and precarious role. Early in his regime, Modibo Keita asserted that private capital was welcome in Mali as long as it was invested where the government dictated—in industry. The *Code Malien* of 1962, designed to encourage foreign investment in industrial enterprises, offers potential investors the free transfer of profits and capital, a guarantee against tax increases for specified periods, provision of factory sites at no cost, and a no-strike pledge by Mali's only labor union. In return, private enterprises may function as long as they meet extremely stringent regulations, including the acceptance of governmental supervision of their management and price-fixing practices.[24] Consequently, little private investment has been attracted.

Several African countries—Ghana, Guinea and Senegal, for example—seeking to attract more foreign capital, have recently amended investment codes to facilitate expatriation of profits. This kind of increased competition among West African states for foreign investments may force Mali to modify her negative attitudes. One alternative is to join in the quest for foreign capital by revising her investment code. But Mali's sparse human and material resources and relatively deficient infrastructure weaken her competitive position. On the other hand, she might choose to nationalize the foreign firms which survived initial decolonization programs. A debate on this issue threatens to divide the outwardly monolithic *Union Soudanaise*. Modibo Keita, leader of the relatively moderate faction in the party, apparently favors the former alternative. The so-called radical faction led

[24]République du Mali, Ministère du Plan et de l'Économie Rurale. *Rapport sur le Plan Quinquennal de Développement Économique et Sociale de la République du Mali: 1961-1965* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 27-28.

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by Interior Minister Madeira Keita endorses a more militant approach to socialism.

In African states, as elsewhere, foreign investments present the governing regimes with a dilemma. On the one hand, they represent competing interests, convenient scapegoats, and possible enemies against whom the people can be mobilized. On the other hand, they are generators of economic activity which help to improve living standards and contribute toward the satisfaction of popular expectations. To discourage investment or even to encourage an exodus brings modern economic life to a standstill, as in Guinea from 1959 to 1961. Thus, to some extent the revolutionary elites *need* foreign private investment. The policies of Ghana seem to have been most successful in this regard. Investment continues without a reduction of the C.P.P.'s revolutionary rhetoric. Meanwhile, the country, the foreign investors and the party prosper.

The Political Utility of Central Planning

All three radical governments of West Africa administer comprehensive central economic plans. Ghana launched her second Five-Year Development Plan in 1959; Guinea's *Plan Triennal* was adopted at the P.D.G.'s National Conference in 1960; Mali's *Plan Quinquennal* was undertaken a year later.

Touré, in his report to the P.D.G. Conference in 1960, outlined the philosophy behind Guinea's plan. He emphasized that his regime was not a communist one, and that economic planning was not an exclusively socialist endeavor. In his words:

> Planning is not an appanage of only socialist regimes; economic planning is practiced by industrial trusts, by commercial monopolies, by all those who, in the end, are confronted by the forces of production. . . . Thus economic planning is not an exclusive attribute of socialist or Communist regimes; it is the foundation, as a science, of economic development.[25]

Accordingly, planning as an economic instrument—fixing goals and determining the means to be employed in attaining them—is simply a more efficient way of shepherding national resources to achieve predetermined goals. The primary consideration, which Touré failed to point out, however, is not "planning" per se, but central planning, directed by the national ruling party and

[25]Sékou Touré, *L'Action Politique du Parti Démocratique de Guinée. La Planification Économique (Plan Triennal de Développement Économique et Social). Tome V.* (Conakry: Imprimerie Nationale, 1960), pp. 296-97.

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aimed toward national goals. This is the feature which distinguishes central planning from *ad hoc* commercial, industrial or governmental economic planning.

The movement toward greater centralization of economic planning can be illustrated by Nkrumah's efforts to revolutionize the process. In his eyes, the prevailing Ghanaian approach is "too piecemeal." "Everything we do," he said, "must be related to our overall plan."[26] Nkrumah seeks to assure party control and direction of all future development plans, and to ensure that the economic policies of Ghana are properly related to the political objectives of the C.P.P. This approach exemplifies the essentially political content of the radical African approach to central planning. The plan is an instrument in the hands of the ruling elite by means of which it can mobilize the people behind its policies and thereby direct national economic advancement.

Perhaps the best example of the political and propagandist component of African economic planning is Mali's *Plan Quinquennal,* which provides for an overall 8 per cent annual rate of growth in gross domestic production.[27] The *Plan Quinquennal* first seems like a preposterous fiction, a product of a vivid imagination rather than a sensible plan attributable to realistic politicians. An objective glance at Mali's economic picture would suggest that sufficient capital for the planned expansion cannot be generated in the country. Mali is so economically retarded that even to triple expenditures for buildings and public works, as projected in the plan, does not constitute, in absolute terms, tremendous economic activity or social renovation. Yet the overall 8 per cent rate of growth envisioned by the planners can hardly be achieved in a five-year period—the economic infrastructure simply does not exist.

But the Five-Year Plan is not all imagination and propaganda. Some fundamental differences exist between economic planning in the colonial context and that required for post-colonial Africa. Colonial economic planning was a relatively ra-

[26]Nkrumah, *Building a Socialist State, op. cit.,* pp. 3-4.

[27]A full account of the Plan appears in the Party weekly, *L'Essor* (Bamako), January 15, 1962. See also "Mali's £90m. Development Plan," *West Africa,* October 7, 1961, p. 1103. Subsequent operation of the Plan is described in a three-part article, "Reconstructing Mali," *West Africa,* April 25, May 2 and 9, 1964, pp. 451, 483, 507; and in the author's "Mali: The Prospects of 'Planned Socialism'," in the forthcoming book, *African Socialism,* edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg.

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tional and calculating endeavor. It sought, above all, to channel available funds into the key sectors of the economy. If broader progress resulted, the colonial authorities were gratified, but there was little incentive to bring about a revolution in the prevailing social or economic system.

On the other hand, popular attitudes and aspirations are expressed in the economic plans of independent tropical Africa. No matter how grandiose plans may appear to the detached observer, they reflect and popularize the prevailing ideologies of development. As statements of goals, they focus expectations on what is thought to be a "scientific" economic program. The revolutionary elites treat central planning as a new framework for the achievement of immediate national political, social, cultural and economic development, as a "scientific" approach to problem solving, and as a means for preserving their own domestic political position. It thus serves as a necessary instrument by which a country can order its limited human and material resources more effectively to achieve predetermined goals, and it can assist the modernizing elites in the movement toward national unification. By rallying the masses behind a single, well-publicized plan, major social transformations can be realized and internal resistance minimized. A piecemeal approach to social change is more likely to spawn popular unrest. The concentration of economic and political power can be facilitated under the pretense of implementing a plan in which everyone has placed his hopes. Thus, without producing substantial economic progress in statistical terms, significant social changes are brought about which lead to the centralization of power and, it is hoped by the ruling elites, subsequent economic development.

Rapid Industrialization Through Agricultural Reorganization

What are the basic objectives of the "radical" economic plans? The real criterion is not the imprecise rhetoric of speeches and policy statements but the actual projects on which the governments' meager resources are expended. All African regimes normally stress the importance of eventual industrialization and agricultural reconstruction, but actual expenditures indicate that the bulk of development funds goes toward improving and expanding the economic infrastructure, which in turn eventually

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facilitates the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.[28]

In the short run, infrastructure and agricultural development are emphasized. But for the radical nationalists, self-financed industrialization is increasingly regarded as the indispensable long-term solution to Africa's economic problems.[29] The radical plans differ on how best to secure eventual industrialization. Any plan necessitates a revolution in farming and food distribution. The rural sector must shift from the production of agricultural commodities for export to feeding the growing urban populations and supplying raw materials to domestic processing industries. Restructuring plans call for large-scale mechanized farms directed by governmental officials. State farms in Ghana under Israeli and Soviet bloc technical guidance, and cooperatives and collectives in Guinea and Mali have been established to provide the central government with the means for industrialization. But in these programs farming interests are subordinated to state control, and traditional land patterns are superseded by collective ownership and management.

The emphasis on future industrialization is understandable. Continuation of the colonial system of primary production is distasteful to nationalists. They seek to enhance the power of the state and its economy. This cannot be accomplished, they feel, as long as their economy is dependent on foreign markets. Industrialization provides a more permanent base for economic development and independence, since industry is more easily identified with modernization and economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, the destruction of a single-commodity, agriculture-based economy and the substitution of an industrial one undermine old centers of power based on previous land control patterns. This, in turn, strengthens the ruling regime which creates and directs the new system. Thus it is in the political and economic interests of the revolutionary elites to foster industrialization.

Conclusion

Political and economic theories crudely reflect the interests of the groups and personalities expressing them. West Africans who

[28]Comparative statistics relating to African economic plans and expenditures appear in the *Economic Bulletin for Africa,* June 1962, p. 22.

[29]See, for example, Touré, ***Planification, op. cit.,*** p. 361. On the industrial aspects of the *Plan Triennal,* see pp. 361-65.

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control the organs of state and the apparatus of ruling political parties propose policies based on ideologies which further their own interests as they conceive them. It is not mere coincidence that the radical ideologies of Ghana, Guinea and Mali are similar. The most powerful political and economic groups in each country and in each ruling party stem from essentially the same socio-economic background. The radical regimes draw their greatest support from landless peasants, poor farmers, labor unionists, low-salaried clerks, governmental functionaries (the only prosperous segment of the revolutionary elites), youth groups and intellectuals. The ruling elites were outsiders in the pre-independence social order. They came to power on the strength of an appeal to the masses. With no stable base for their power other than the votes and mass actions that they could command, they sought to restructure society to their own permanent advantage. They have little interest in the maintenance of the predominant (or pre-independence) socio-economic order, and as a result adopt economic theories which advance the process of decolonization and socialist construction. As social and economic transformations occur in their countries, one or several ruling revolutionary elites or segments thereof may decide, in its self-interest, to arrest or retard the pace or reshape the direction and pattern of change. At the present time, however, there is no indication that such a course of action is contemplated, least of all one that is theoretically inconsistent with the African approach to development.

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THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN AFRICAN POLITICS

by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

THE emergence of a large number of independent African states during the past several years has raised serious questions regarding the political evolution of the continent. Western and communist statesmen must be concerned with whether these states, growing up in what is essentially a bipolar world, can avoid aligning themselves with one or the other bloc. These and other questions of political development and foreign relations can only be answered over time by the response of these states to their internal and external problems. Their response will, in turn, be influenced by their cultural heritage.

It is difficult to assemble a composite and accurate picture of the evolving African polities. After one pays lip-service to the "indigenous" forces at work in African societies, the discussion tends to revolve around largely intangible factors, for example, the amorphous concept of African nationalism, socio-economic drives such as industrialization and modernization, and official socialist doctrines. Yet only by a broader understanding of African social and cultural forces can we discern the likely evolution of African politics and external orientation. A serious investigation of African political trends will have to take into account the role of Islam.

Thus far, only a few political observers have mentioned Islam as a constituent factor.[1] This is surprising, for every historian of African affairs has acknowledged Islam as a vital historical force. Indeed, no history of Africa, North or South, can be complete without a thorough account of the various Islamic communities and dynasties on the East, Central and West African coasts. Even were we inclined to ignore the history of Islam on the continent, we must reckon with the fact that today one out of three Afri-

[1]Thomas Hodgkin seems to be one of those few. See his series of nine articles, "Islam and Politics in West Africa," *West Africa* (London), September-November 1956, and his review article, "Islam, History and Politics," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge), Vol. I, No. 1, 1963, pp. 91-97; see also William H. Lewis, "Islam and Nationalism in Africa," in Tibor Kerekes, editor, *The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 63-83, and Benjamin Rivlin, "Arab Africa in the Emerging African Community," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. XV, No. 1, 1961, pp. 42-51.

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cans is a Muslim.[2] Subjectively and objectively this is an important identity, both for the individual concerned and for his society.

While numbers per se may be misleading, they can be translated into political power as the democratic principle of "one man, one vote" gains wider acceptance. On this basis alone Islam as a factor in African politics calls for serious investigation. But beyond this, the participants in the political process of Africa have—or are thought to have—definite views about the New Order which they would like to introduce into their own societies. The mainsprings of the New Order are varied and heterogeneous. No one will question the Western origin of many of Africa's ideologies. Yet Western-inspired ideology is by no means the only basis of contemporary African political platforms; present also are elements derived from traditional visions and systems. It is within the framework of the traditional that the impact of Islamic thought becomes evident, at least in the Islamic African areas.[3] For better or worse, African leadership will have to draw on the cultural legacy of the distant as well as the more recent past. The role of Islam in the evolution of African politics —as a divisive or integrating factor—will be examined in this article.

I

The Islamic presence in Africa is as old and as "native" as it is in Asia and the Near East. This does not mean that African Islam is in all ways similar to Islam elsewhere, or that its evolution in its African environment followed the patterns clearly observable in other areas. Precisely because the independent evolution of African Islam has given it a distinct identity within its own milieu, a recapitulation of the historic process by which Islam became a permanent African phenomenon seems appropriate.

[2]Accurate figures are impossible to obtain. The available statistical works are for the most part out of date. My estimate is based on a careful computation of figures available in the following sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1955* (New York, 1956), L. Massignon, *Annuaire Du Monde Musulman* (Paris: Press Universitaires De France, 1955), and *The Europa Yearbook, 1963* (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1963), Vol. 11.

[3]This is an extension of David Apter's characterization of recent developments in Ghanaian politics, where "it may turn out that it is neither the racial nor socialist nor liberal views that eventually come to prevail, but rather the enlarged and modified traditional ones. . . . What Ghana may be passing through is not socialism and authoritarianism in the form of a parliamentary government . . . but on another level, modernization and neo-traditionalism in the name of socialism." See his *Ghana in Transition* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. xiv; see also T. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London: Muller, 1957), pp. 169-186.

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Investigation reveals three distinct routes and three corresponding "carriers" by means of which Islam was introduced to the African continent. The great Arab conquests of the seventh century brought Islam to North Africa, where it has remained a permanent fact. This invasion represents the Arab phase of the Islamization of Africa as well as the Arabization of that portion of Africa which became Islamic. But while North Africa became both Islamic and Arab, nevertheless, for obvious economic, commercial and, later, religious reasons, it retained its intimate connection with sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa, then, has a dual personality: its "Arab" personality which pulls North Africans to the Arab world, and its "African" personality which draws them to their African counterparts. The Algerian government's recent insistence on settling its dispute with Morocco within an "African context" illustrates both the reality and the political implications of the dual personality of the North African states.

Because of the thorough Islamization and Arabization of the North African shore, the basic political and social institutions of the region assumed a distinct Arab-Islamic character. As a result, the North African area has been viewed more often than not within the broader context of the Arab world and, up to a certain point, within the Islamic world, which has its epicenter in the Arab East. Yet historically we know that this was not always the case. Just as Arabization and Islamization drew North Africa irrevocably to the Arab world, its geographical position and the rhythm of its social and economic activity meant that it would be equally influenced by events and actions that took place to the South. The Sahara, until the end of the nineteenth century, served as an effective link between Africa North and South rather than as the barrier it is often thought to have been.[4] Two of the most powerful Islamic movements of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had their origins as well as their first dynamic capitals not in Africa North or South but in the border area between.[5] Thus

[4]A good summary of the role of the Sahara in inter-African developments is provided by I. William Zartman, "The Sahara—Bridge or Barrier?," *International Conciliation*, No. 541, January 1963, pp. 3-13; see also E. W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), *passim.*

[5]These movements were the Murabits and the Muwahhids. The Murabits originated in lower Senegal and founded the present city of Marrakesh, which they made their capital. The location of the city is quite suggestive: it is strategically situated for purposes of control of both parts of the Murabit empire—Iberian and African. The Muwahhids kept this city as their capital for the same purpose. The original recruits to these movements were Berbers from the Atlas and anti-Atlas and some Africans from the Sahara. See P. K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 541-548.

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an intimate connection exists between Africa North and South in spite of their ethnic and racial divergence.

II

Almost coeval with the Arab military invasion of North Africa was a more peaceful incursion into East Africa. This penetration of the eastern coast was not unprecedented, however, for the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula had always maintained contact, commercial and otherwise, with this area. History also teaches us that the East African coast was so well known to the Arabs on the eve of Islam that Muhammad, in the course of his propagation of the faith, sent emissaries to the Ethiopian monarch and also sent a number of Muslim converts to that kingdom to escape local persecution. Some of these early emissaries apparently remained behind even after the triumph of Muhammad in the Peninsula.[6] Evidently the interaction of the East African coast with the Arabian Peninsula was continuous and important for both communities. Thus it is not surprising to find that the Arabs, once converted, went to Africa as Arab Muslims. Yet the evidence strongly indicates that these early Arab Muslim merchants and settlers lacked the religious zeal which characterized their brethren elsewhere, and did not actively seek the conversion of Africans with whom they came in contact. Their interest was largely confined to the economic sphere. The early efforts of the Arabs at conversion, if there were any, did not materially change the religious orientation of East Africans. In other words, the relationship between the Arabs, who had become Muslims, and their African clientele remained ephemeral and mutually profitable but did not affect the spiritual outlook of Africans.

Sometime in the eighth century of the Christian era, a group of Arab Muslims crossed to the East African coast not for profit or trade, but in search of a more peaceful haven and a permanent home. It was at this time that the Umayyad Dynasty, with its capital in Damascus, sought to wipe out the supporters of the rival claimant to the Islamic caliphate (supporter of the fourth Islamic Caliph Ali) and adopted drastic measures against the "heretics." As a result of this persecution, a significant number of supporters fled the Peninsula and settled along a narrow strip of the East Coast. They became known as the Zaydiyyah—so named after their chief Zayd, a great-grandson of the Islamic

[6] *Ibid*, p. 114.

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Caliph Ali. Yet this substantial incursion into East Africa, as far as can be determined, failed to produce any large-scale conversion of Africans. The Islamic community remained faithful to its origins, sought as little contact with the host community as possible, and did not proselytize.

In the tenth century, another wave of Muslim migration took place. Unlike the first community which historically and ideologically would be classified as Shia (partisans), the second community was Sunni (Orthodox). Carrying on their old conflicts, the two communities clashed, and the fresher wave succeeded in driving the earlier settlers into the interior of Africa where they were ultimately assimilated by the more numerous African Bantus. The victorious Sunni Muslims settled in East Africa and established closely-knit communities and "urban" centers to serve their needs. The city of Mogadishu, for example, was built initially by this second group of migrants. This latter group followed the same course of action as the first and abstained from proselytizing among Africans. In the absence of African conversions, the community necessarily remained small, although it had strength in its "international" contacts extending beyond the East African coast. Its relationship with the Arabian Peninsula continued, and in those early years both territories were, in a sense, "home."

A third wave of migration had its origin in the present city of Shiraz (Persia), and thus these Muslims were styled Shirazis. Like the first wave, the Shirazis were considered by their coreligionists heterodoxical Muslims, and when they encountered the established Islamic community on the East Coast their relationship was an ambivalent one. Ever since, the two communities have maintained their separate existence, enlivened by the tension inherent in an orthodox-heterodox relationship which has prevented the social and political cohesion of the community as a whole. While this is an "historical" schism, its current relevance is apparent in Somali and Zanzibari politics where party differences tend to reflect the original sectarian differences and hostility.[7]

This third group of migrants adhered to the tradition of their predecessors and refrained from any overt act of proselytization. The successive waves of migrants, in other words, failed to produce an indigenous African Muslim community at that time. Yet in due course such a community did emerge, mostly through a

[7]Reginald Coupland, *East Africa and Its Invaders* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 15-40. See also Michael Lofchie, "Party Conflict in Zanzibar," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 185-208.

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slow process of interaction and intermarriage with Africans. Even as a mixed community, however, it remained relatively small and primarily confined to the narrow strip along the horn of Africa. This continued despite a final wave of migration—of Sunni Muslim Arabs from the present territories of Musqat and Oman—that took place in the nineteenth century, when the Omanis succeeded in assuming control over the coast of East Africa.[8]

The negative attitude of the Arabs toward proselytization notwithstanding, there is at present a large Islamic community on the East Coast of Africa which is politically and socially influential. It includes Arabs (or Arabized Africans), Indians and Africans. The Africans now outnumber both groups as the result of an important stimulus from new immigrants from India who throughout the twentieth century have assumed a most active and systematic role in converting Africans. On the East Coast, and in the West, this conversion has been accomplished by two groups, the Isma'ilis and the Ahmadis. Although the Islamic community on the East Coast is substantial in numbers, it is divided within itself in terms of basic doctrines, attitudes, orientation and background. The original settlers may have had good reasons to be antagonistic toward each other; but instead of working out a social and cultural compromise, they opted for the perpetuation of the original schism with its significant social implications. For example, the original communities tended to segregate themselves spatially and occupationally and interacted with each other in narrowly limited roles. Not only did they maintain this pattern of social interaction among themselves, but in essence they transferred their initial and personal schisms to the new African converts. In due course Africans were adopted by clans of the Arab settlers and, on the basis of such adoption, claimed descent from some ancient Arabian tribe and inherited its traditional attitudes and values.[9] Thus the initial dispute became rooted in new soil among people who had no conceivable connection either with the ethnic origin of the community or with its ideological dispute. Present tensions and conflicts within some of the East African

[8]Coupland, pp. 295-360. A brief outline of Arab settlements on the East Coast which stresses the religious factor is that of S. F. Mahmud, *A Short History of Islam* (Karachi: Karachi Branch of Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 442-444. See also Lyndon Harris, *Islam in East Africa* (London: Universities' Mission to Central Africa, 1954), pp. 2-6.

[9]This is clearly demonstrated in the excellent studies of I. M. Lewis, "Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (London, 1955 and 1956), Vol. XVII, pp. 581-602, and Vol. XVIII, pp. 145-160.

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states may be traced to this historic schism abundantly exaggerated through time and experience.

This brief discussion of the Islamization of East Africa sheds light on a number of significant points. In the first place, the "Arab" orientation of this area is self-evident. The Arab settlers on the East Coast continued to look to the Arab homeland for guidance and inspiration. At no point did they develop a positive African outlook. It is precisely in these African areas that social or religious movements originating in the Arabian Peninsula found fertile soil. In part, this "Arab" outlook may explain the early interest of Somalia in receiving aid and assistance from a country like Egypt. It also helps to explain why Egypt has succeeded thus far in playing a larger role in the affairs of some East African states[10] than in the affairs of the West African states.

Secondly, and more importantly, Islam remained essentially an Arab religion. The Africans who were converted to Islam were *ipso facto* Arabized. Historically, this meant the spread and use of Arabic and the connected sciences. It also meant that "reformist" Islamic movements were in fact "fundamentalist" movements originating in the Arabian Peninsula. The moderate success of the Wahhabi movement on the East Coast is partly explained by the "Arab" character of this area.

Finally, the later conversions of Africans accomplished through the organized activities of the Isma'ilis and Ahmadis, while enlarging the community numerically, added to the already existing tension. Both movements had their origin outside the Arab world, derived their strength and support for the most part from the Indian subcontinent and were consequently viewed by Orthodox Muslims with ambivalence and suspicion. In their organized existence in Africa today, they tend to perpetuate Indian patterns, to segregate themselves from other Muslims and to organize their community life separately. Educationally, economically and socially they remain aloof from their coreligionists—a source of tension which may ultimately affect the viability and cohesion of these East African states.[11]

This enumeration of divisive factors must not obscure the positive contribution of Islam to the area. The spread of Islam on the East African coast, as elsewhere, introduced a unique system

[10]Jacques Baulin, *The Arab Role in Africa* (London: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 31.

[11]George Delf, *Asians in East Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 5-7.

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of law, provided a basis for a cohesive social order, and furnished its adherents with an identifying ideology and culture which could, when properly manipulated, form the basis for a separate "national" existence. It is inconceivable to think of Somali nationalism or a Pan-Somali movement without this common identifying factor which sets members of the Somali "nation" apart from their "territorial" compatriots in Ethiopia or Kenya.[12]

III

The Islamization of the West and Central African areas, by contrast, is instructive, dramatic, and, from an Islamic standpoint, much more significant. Here, the major proselytization was the work of Muslims of an entirely different ethnic and racial group. Once the Arab forces overran the North African coast and subdued the population, Islam found little resistance. With the conversion of Berber tribes, strategically placed along the terminus of the Sahara trade routes and traditionally providing the link between Negro and Mediterranean Africa through trade, war or simple human movements, the task of Islamizing Negro Africans became largely their own. Toward the tenth century, the conversion of Africans began in earnest, though not always peacefully. It was the Almoravids (al-Murabitun), the first Berber dynasty to achieve effective political and military control over Northwest Africa, who first carried Islam southward by invading the interior and destroying the military power of the existing pagan states. Old Ghana was first defeated by a Murabit army and was ruled from 1076 to 1088 by a Berber dynasty. The ultimate destruction of Ghana, however, was to be accomplished in 1240 by the Negro Muslim state of Mali.

Until the advent of European control over West and Central Africa, the historic pattern of Islamic penetration, control and Islamization of the continent was to continue. Briefly, this pattern may be portrayed as follows: The conversion of a Berber or African tribe, traditionally vigorous and warlike in its southern pursuits, was often accomplished by a mystic who infused the tribe with a new ideology and moral system which, in turn, gave it "legitimate" impetus to expand. Under this religious impulse, the Berber or African tribe would attack the southern population and ultimately gain dominance over it. Wherever

[12]For an informative recent analysis, see I. M. Lewis, "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 147-161.

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effective political control was achieved, the mystics took advantage of the situation to proselytize, an objective greatly facilitated by the military and political success of Muslim power elites.[13] Moreover, Muslim political control encouraged the establishment of Muslim educational institutions devoted to the study of Islamic sciences and the Arabic language.

The mystic orders which originally stimulated the military expansion of the Muslims became the actual upholders of Orthodox Islam—with ultimately disastrous consequences for Islam itself. The whole fabric of African societies ruled by a Muslim elite was to a large extent woven by these Sufi mystic orders. It is their work that must be taken into account when dealing with the Islamization of African tribes. The Murabits and their monastic orders, the Qadiriyyah and its offshoot the Tijaniyyah, were in the main responsible for the conversion of Africans. Once converted, the African not only adhered to the tenets of Islam but became a member of a specific mystic order and, as such, undertook the role of the missionary among his own kinsmen. Militant methods of conversion were also utilized, and every military success brought fresh waves of converts. Historical evidence substantiates that the conversions of Africans represented the interplay of Muslim military control and Muslim social and cultural control through the mystic orders.[14] Through this combination, Islam became an African phenomenon, related to the Islamic world beyond, yet independent of it.

Three factors seem to have been responsible for making African Islam independent of Asian Islam. The first, suggested earlier, relates to the agents who carried Islam. For the most part, these were either Berbers or Africans. The mystic orders within the African milieu were dominated by an African leadership and the entire organization of the Sufi orders remained in African hands. In a limited sense, therefore, Islam was "nationalized" in West and Central Africa quite early. The second factor relates to the educational and cultural supporting institutions. For Islam to take root in any society, a knowledge, no matter how superficial, of the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet is essential. Historically, this has required the growth of Islamic learning and

[13]J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), is a convenient full-length treatment. Paul Marty's *Etudes sur l'Islam et les Tribus du Sudan* (Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux, 1920, in four volumes) is of course the most detailed and informative.

[14]T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam,* third edition (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publisher, 1961), pp. 315-365; Mahmud, *op. cit.,* pp. 432-440.

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the emergence of an Islamic educational elite whose task it is to care for the believers. Initially, Africans sent students to northern Islamic institutions for training or imported recognized Islamic scholars, but soon after the eleventh century the native institutions of learning were apparently adequate to meet the needs of the African Islamic community. The well-known institutions of Timbucto and Jenne competed successfully with the established institutions of Fez and Cairo. Thirdly, political and military power, while alternating between rival African contenders, remained in African hands. At no point in the long history of Islamic power did a non-African Islamic power succeed in asserting its claim for control over African Muslims. Thus the "political" independence of the African Islamic communities from Asian Islam provided them a degree of isolation and protection during their development of social and cultural institutions.

IV

Regardless of the way in which Islam initially entered Africa, the identity of the agents who introduced it, and the specific character it acquired in its African milieu, certain common characteristics underlie the Islamic system there as elsewhere. To that extent we are justified in speaking of an Islamic community. For through Islam, a social and political system and certain non-indigenous sets of social and cultural patterns were introduced into large areas of Africa.

If we were to single out the most decisive factor in the evolution of a distinct Islamic community in Africa—now fragmented into several states—we would have to point to the introduction of Islamic law. This was the determinant which shaped and preserved whatever uniqueness the Islamic community possessed anywhere in Africa and Asia, for it was on the level of law that Islam functioned, and in due course it was adherence to that law which served to set the Islamic community apart from other communities. Because of the all-pervasive nature of Islamic law, the colonial powers in Africa found it necessary not only to sanction it but even to extend its jurisdiction in certain cases to non-believers who happened to dwell in a predominantly Muslim area. Indeed, colonial judges were instructed to consider Islamic law "native" in contradistinction to statutory law.[15]

The application of Islamic law and the practice of rituals and

[15] J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 3-6.

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various other ceremonials were at the same time tempered by the African milieu. As would be expected, pre-Islamic practices —as in the Arabian Peninsula—survived the introduction of Islam and were incorporated by it, thus contributing to the distinct character of African Islam.[16]

The integration of society at the level of law was reinforced by the system of education mentioned earlier. Islamic education was imparted through the Mosque-Madrasah (school) institution and controlled by the upholders of orthodoxy—in the African system, the mystics. This carefully organized and centralized educational system not only solidified the community and gave it a unified cultural base, but also provided it with both symbolic and physical foci. The architecture of African Islamic towns clearly demonstrates the central role played by the Mosque-Madrasah in the African community.

Through the interplay of law and education, then, a distinct African Islamic community emerged. At one level, it was an African community; at another level it was related to a broader human community with which it had a common universe of discourse. On both levels it transcended barriers of race and minimized internal distinguishing and separatist forces. However, Islam also introduced an element of discord into the African community. For here Africans were divided spiritually, and while interacting in certain roles, they were nevertheless set apart by the Islamic system. The racial identity of the Africans was not—and is not now—sufficiently strong to sustain the unity of the African community. It is relevant to mention that Muslim anti-colonial outbursts had no racial undertones, thus reaffirming the Islamic view that the world is divided on "spiritual" rather than national or racial grounds.

Finally, no discussion of the Islamic contribution can be complete without some reference to its political legacy. A major failing of the Islamic community everywhere has been its inability to establish an acceptable principle of legitimacy which would rationalize the political process and result in orderly governmental succession. In the absence of this principle, the government

[16]J. N. D. Anderson, "Tropical Africa: Infiltration and Expanding Horizons," in Gustave E. Von Grunebaum, editor, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 261-283. A more specific study is Joseph Greenburg, *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1947). For a more recent discussion, see J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Christian Church and Islam in West Africa* (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1956), pp. 14-20 and 22-24.

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that obtained power generally lacked the institutions which would have effectively curtailed its authority and compelled it to use its powers for the public good. This is a legacy common to all Islamic areas. The present turmoil in the predominantly Islamic areas of the world, regardless of the degree of their Westernization, must be viewed in the light of the historic experience of the Islamic communities.[17] Furthermore, the tendency toward one-man control and concentration of power which characterized the early Islamic states influences those same areas in modern times. Given this heritage, we might have anticipated the centralization of power and the powerful executives characteristic of many African states today.

V

The successful occupation and pacification of Africa North and South by the French, the British and, later, the Italians had to be accomplished at the expense of the pre-colonial military and political elites in control of those areas. This meant that the occupation forces clashed with and ultimately subdued Muslim forces. The advancing European armies encountered basically conservative societies controlled by well-established elites and dynasties. But these societies had lost whatever dynamism they may have had in bygone days; they had evolved a peculiar feudal system which facilitated and perhaps was symptomatic of their fragmentation. Accordingly, they lacked the centralized political authority typical of earlier eras. Finally, the relations of these African Islamic communities with the rest of the Islamic world, admittedly tenuous from the beginning, were at their nadir. The channels of communication were closed, and the free flow of ideas which, at the turn of the century, might have sparked a reform movement in African Islam, enabling these societies to resist colonialism in the name of an Islamic ideology, was not obtainable.[18] For these reasons, European occupation was accomplished without great difficulty.

[17]In Africa, this failure enabled the theologians to play a crucial role and also enabled a Muslim pretender to carry out the doctrine of Holy War to its logical extreme, i.e., against fellow Muslims. See Trimingham, *Islam in West Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 138-143, and Jamil Abun-Nasr, "Some Aspects of the Umari Branch of the Tijaniyya," *Journal of African History* (Cambridge), Vol. III, No. 2, 1962, pp. 329-331.

[18]T. Hodgkin in "Islam and National Movements in West Africa," *Journal of African History*, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 324, notes some exceptions to this picture. The evidence, however, strongly suggests that Islamic Africa was quite unaffected by the Islamic reform movements, generally associated with the names of Afghani and Abduh, of the nineteenth century.

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The initial encounter between the European and Muslim forces had important implications for the later development of independence movements in the African Muslim areas: it set certain patterns which had considerable effect on the evolution of political parties and alignments in these societies. Since European control over territories with large or substantial Muslim populations had to be achieved by force, the initial resistance offered by the Muslims was, as a matter of course, led by the established political-mystic elites. Once in control, the European power had either to destroy the elite or win it to its side. Both policies were in fact adopted for different reasons. As the established elite came to realize that the struggle was hopeless and that perhaps some tangible benefits could be reaped from an active policy of collaboration with the occupying power, it laid down its arms. This was the case with the majority of the elites of African Muslim areas.[19] However, two exceptions to this pattern may be noted; both are important because they ultimately gave rise to different types of political movements.

The first is that of the Sanusi Order in Libya which clashed with the advancing French forces coming from Equatorial Africa, and later with the Italian forces coming from the North. The order was a young and militant one, a challenger of existing orders and elites, which emerged in response to internal social and political aspirations. But its emergence also happened to coincide chronologically with the advance of the Europeans. Since it had nothing to conserve, it continued its resistance until it was nearly crushed. During the Italian occupation of Libya, it had to function either underground or outside the political frontiers of the country. Because it led, symbolized and monopolized the resistance, no other national movement developed. When Libyan independence was achieved in 1951, the Sanusi Order assumed control.[20]

The second exception is that of the Mahdi Movement of the nineteenth century in Sudan. Like the Sanusi Order, this movement was young and militant and arose in response to specific

[19]J. Spencer Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 223-231. The pattern on the East Coast is somewhat different, but the results are substantially the same. See Roland Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), pp. 202-207.

[20]The origin and development of the Sanusi Order and its ultimate clash with the forces of occupation is ably surveyed by N. A. Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), especially pp. 48-72.

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internal forces. It too had nothing to conserve and consequently had no reason to submit to, or seek accommodation with, the advancing British forces of occupation. The result, as in the former case, was the destruction of the Mahdi Movement until the British reversed their policy in the 1930's and tried to rehabilitate it as a counterforce to the rising nationalist movement in the Sudan, which had a strong religious base.[21]

Elsewhere, however, the response of Muslim societies was weak and collaborationist. Once the initial resistance was crushed, both Britain and, later, France recognized the immense advantage to be gained by obtaining the support of the existing religious-political establishments. Accordingly, they initiated policies which were designed to win them over. For the British this meant the principle of "indirect" rule, whereby the established emirs (chiefs) supported by the theologians, were put in effective control of local affairs, education, some measures of taxation, and the enforcement of Islamic law. The secular arm of the state provided a sanction as well as a protection for the exercise and perpetuation of theological-feudal control.

The story of the Muslim religious orders in those parts of Africa under French control was quite similar. Although the initial pattern was one of suppression, it was later reversed by a policy of rehabilitation and actual cooperation between the political authorities and the socially well-organized mystic fraternities. The reversal of French policy—quite evident by the first quarter of the twentieth century—reflected a realistic reappraisal made by responsible French officers on the spot who discovered that the existing mystic orders offered a ready-made organization for the channeling of directives from the central authorities. The hold of the Sufi orders over the masses was indisputable, and the disciplined members of these fraternities were easier to control and manipulate through their own organizational hierarchies. In return, the French authorities perpetuated the privileges of the leadership, acted on their behalf to suppress internal challenges to their positions and, further, gave them full freedom to proselytize in pagan areas. Thus, not only were the specific interests of the French maintained and protected, but useful outlets for the energies of the Sufis were provided.[22]

[21]See P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), or the shorter account in his *A Modern History of the Sudan* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 75-108.

[22]V. Thompson and R. Adloff, *French West Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 571-579.

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In the light of this interaction between the colonial powers and the Muslim groups, it was inevitable that any resistance to the colonial regime meant also a challenge to the basic social and political system. Moreover, the resisting groups had to draw on ideology and inspiration derived from sources other than the "traditional" and appeal to those who were uncommitted. The fact that the "nationalist" leadership of many African Muslim communities was urban, Marxist, and drawn largely from the ranks of the proletariat can be explained by the alliance that was forged between the colonial power and the former political-religious elite, as well as by the objective changes in the socio-economic order. This situation bore little similarity to the anti-colonial movement in the Near East, where the "traditional" elite constituted an important element of the resistance groups.

Thus the organized Islamic community was not, in fact, a source of opposition to colonialism. In areas where Muslims were in the minority, they were largely unresponsive to the appeals of the nationalists.[23] Yet the Islamic community contributed positively, albeit unconsciously, to the growth of nationalist movements. It is readily observable that the success of mass-based political parties in Islamic Africa contrasts sharply with their failure in Islamic Asia. While we do not know the full reasons for this contrasting development, we must attribute it, at least in part, to the effective organizational preparation of the Sufi fraternities in Africa North and South, which have no parallel in the Arab East. (Turkey offers the closest parallel to African developments in relation to Sufi organizational preparation.) In the second place, Islam over the centuries provided a certain degree of cultural and social unity in various areas of Africa and bridged the barriers of tribalism and regionalism. Thus a common base for the nationalist movements was available and could be used as the platform for advancing particular programs. The nationalist leadership, in short, utilized the existing institutional framework and relied on its foundations, while giving it a new focus and a potent new ideology.

The success of the nationalist leadership reflects the ascendancy of the Young Muslims, whose attitude toward the traditional elite

[23]North Nigeria is the classic example. See James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 353-357. The Arab (Muslim and non-Muslim) immigrants seem to have been equally lukewarm to the appeals of the African nationalists. See also R. B. Winder, "The Lebanese in West Africa," *Comparative Studies in History and Society* (The Hague), Vol. IV, Part 3, 1962, pp. 296-333.

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and its values is decidedly hostile. Predisposed by background and training to reject what the traditional elite symbolizes, the Young Muslims have a different vision of the future. What this means in practice is that the nationalist leaders are more deeply concerned with the immediate social and economic problems of the times, with the development of their "particular" societies, and with the rebuilding of the institutions necessary to sustain them. The previous universalistic vision or pretension has been discarded by the Young Muslim leaders in favor of the more confined frontiers of the state.[24]

To accomplish their task, nationalist leaders in African Islamic areas—with some minor exceptions—have adopted policies calculated to emasculate the religious orders.[25] Not only have these orders been deprived of support, but their functions are being assumed gradually by the secular state. They are viewed today as the symbols of reaction and obscurantism which, if left to their own devices, will retard the rational development of the various African states.

Does this mean that the Islamic bases of African societies are becoming obsolete? Or could these foundations be utilized discriminately for specific purposes by the new elite? At present, there is no clear answer to this question. However, the Islamic background will be utilized by the new leadership in its quest for political and social integration even though this unity may be achieved eventually on a different plane.

The destruction of political Islam in Africa has not adversely affected its spiritual appeal to individuals. If anything, its political decline seems to have been more than offset by its spiritual expansion over areas which, up to the nineteenth century, were outside its legitimate frontiers. This requires a word of explanation. The imperial powers were in the main responsible for the pacification of the interior, and their tacit encouragement of the Sufi orders made it possible for these groups to venture for the first time into hitherto forbidden areas and to proselytize without fear. In the second place, the large-scale migration and movement of people across continents brought to the African arena new In-

[24]W. H. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

[25]Morocco and Guinea were the first to adopt such a policy. However, other African states made these orders obsolete by assuming their functions (educational and social). See for example, H. Barclay, "Muslim Religious Practice in a Village Suburb of Khartoum," *The Muslim World* (Hartford), Vol. LIII, No. 3, 1963, pp. 210-211. Also Hodgkin in *West Africa,* September 22, 1956, p. 727.

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dian Muslims who, from the very beginning, assumed the role of proselytizers. As proselytizers, they had the benefit of already existing techniques of religious conversion. In the African territories, as elsewhere, the Christian mission had become a prototype—it may be viewed as part of the larger process of Westernization—and its successful methods, techniques and organizations were adopted to tremendous advantage by the new Muslim proselytizers. The Ahmadis and Isma'ilis have followed, everywhere in Africa, the approach of the Christian missions to African conversions, and have functioned without the handicaps and taints usually accompanying the identification of the Christian missionary with the imperial government. Thus, not only have they appealed doctrinally to Africans, but they have also provided a social and educational base for the newly converted. Once converted, the African has acquired membership in a community as well as a religious system. He has the assurance of "belonging" to a world-wide community to strengthen him against the disruptive forces of "modernization" and its accompanying materialism.

But the Indian (and Pakistani) influx, while adding to the spiritual bases of the societies concerned, presents new tensions and conflicts. As heterodoxical Muslims, the newcomers have given to their converts a particular identity which is viewed with disfavor by the Orthodox and thus tends to divide the Islamic community. On the other hand, their Indian origin, though it impedes their absorption into the various states, adds a new dimension to the believers' African horizon. Indeed, the already tenuous links between African Islam and its Arab counterpart have been materially weakened by the Indian infusion.[26] Whether the contemporary Arab efforts in Africa will succeed in harmonizing the divergent tendencies of African Islam remains to be seen.

VI

The march toward independence by the African states—similar to developments in Asia—was in essence a series of isolated struggles waged by separate communities within specific frontiers delineated by the European powers. Some support was extended from sympathizers in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, but the major burden was carried by these communities themselves. The Islamic

[26]The growth of the Ahmadiyyah movement and its techniques are surveyed by H. J. Fisher, *Ahmadiyyah: A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). The study clearly brings out the non-Arab orientation of contemporary Islamic developments in Africa.

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countries in Asia which obtained their independence earlier were hardly aware of their connections with their African coreligionists; their support in the pre-independence period was consequently minimal and platitudinous and, when extended, was carried on under the banner of anti-colonialism. Since the achievement of independence, however, a feverish process of "rediscovery" is evident on the part of both communities, manifesting itself not only in the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations, but more significantly in attempts to strengthen cultural and economic ties and, if possible, political integration.

The earliest attempts at "rediscovery" were initiated by Egypt, in part as a result of her historical and geographical links with the continent and her cultural, if not political, leadership of Arab Islam, and in part because of her appreciation that the process of liberation was compatible with Arab national interests. Egypt has sought to involve the United Nations on the side of various African nationalist struggles for independence. More important, perhaps, is the active role she assumed in giving support, financial and otherwise, to the young nationalist movements of Africa. The extensive utilization of the Egyptian Broadcasting Service for the cause of African independence, by nationalist movements as well as by the Egyptian government, reflects Cairo's heightened interest in African affairs. Her eagerness to participate in international conferences concerned with African affairs has been evident since the convocation of the First African Congress at Accra in 1958. In fact, Egypt has made a point of attending every subsequent Congress, and by doing so has pointed the way for the Arab African states. For the first time in their history, the northern Arab states have become unequivocal about their African orientation, and their new commitment has precipitated a reciprocal concern in sub-Saharan Africa for some Arab-African causes, e.g., the support which Algerian nationalists received from the African community.[27]

The process of rediscovery has been aided immeasurably by common hostility to Western imperialism. But hostility is shaky ground on which to build a future. The need for a broader and more positive base points up the contribution that Islam can make. Once the northern Arab and sub-Saharan African states became fully aware of their interrelationship, the common base

[27]Abd al-Aziz Rifa'i, *The Evolution of Arab African Affairs* (Cairo: Kutub Qawmiyyah 237, 1963), in Arabic.

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had to be strengthened. Increasingly, therefore, the attention of all Islamic areas of Africa has been directed to the revival of Islam as a culture. Again Egypt discovered her unique role: housing the oldest established religious institutions, and having developed others that are reasonably modern, she has made it a policy to open her facilities to the African Muslims. Special departments in the Al-Azhar University have been organized to facilitate the admission of Muslim students from Africa and to train "missionaries" who could be sent to African areas. The state itself has created the novel institution of the "religious attaché," whose presence in the Egyptian embassies in Africa is an indication of the importance Cairo assigns to Islam in forging closer links with the African Islamic areas.[28] As a result of these efforts on the part of Egypt, and of the lesser efforts of the other North African states, large numbers of African students are to be found in Arab capitals. Moreover, numerous economic agreements have been concluded (particularly between Egypt and several African states) and diplomatic contact has greatly increased. During the summer of 1963, the majority of the heads of states of Islamic Africa were received as official visitors in Egypt.

Thus far these closer links have not substantially promoted the specific interests of the parties involved. For example, the attempts of the Arab states to check Israeli incursion into Africa have not materially affected the outcome except in Arab Islamic areas or in areas responsive to Arab Islam. Elsewhere, where Islam has been traditionally independent of its Arab origin, such efforts have been to no avail.[29]

In the sphere of international relations, Islam has not played a significant role. While the various regional groupings of African states evidenced some religious affinities prior to their dissolution at the Addis Ababa Conference of May 1963, they had been established on distinctly nonreligious grounds. It is possible that the religious factor might assume more importance in the future as a result of specific tensions within the African community. The Somali conflict with both Kenya and Ethiopia, for example,

[28]Baulin, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-65.

[29]Again our hypothesis concerning the distinction between Arab and African Islam is helpful in explaining the success of Israel's foreign policy in Islamic Africa and its failure in Arab Islamic Africa. Thus far, Israel's efforts in forging close links have been successful in West Africa but not, say, in Somalia (and until very recently in Zanzibar) or North Africa. On a broader scale, this may be compared with Israel's success with Turkey and Iran (not susceptible to Arab Islamic influence) and its failure with Pakistan and Indonesia.

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might bring to the surface the hitherto submerged religious factor in the determination of the foreign policies of the Islamic states of Africa. Its possible re-emergence might have serious implications for the posture of the Islamic states of Africa vis-à-vis the European and non-European powers involved in the global struggle.

The present frontiers of the African states reflect the interests of the European powers which originally drew them. Most African states are basically dissatisfied with these frontiers, and their dissatisfaction has already given rise to border and territorial disputes familiar to the students of early European politics. The irredentist claims of Morocco, the recent though apparently settled dispute between Mauritania and Mali, the conflict between Algeria and Morocco, and the conflict of Somalia with its neighbors represent only the beginning of what promises to be an era of recurring territorial disputes. While such conflicts may be settled within the framework of existing sovereignties, other solutions are available. A submergence of sovereignties within a larger entity might offer the participants hope for a more permanent solution and peace; Islam might be utilized by these states as a basis for a wider sovereignty.

While Islam and its civilization might thus play a unifying role among groups of states that share this common ground, by the same token it might impede an overall Pan-African movement should this ever become a serious possibility. As far as can be determined, Africans lack the necessary continental perspective which would enable them to achieve overall unity. A more feasible alternative—one in which Africans seem to have an interest—is the establishment of federations on a regional basis. The Islamic states of Africa possess a number of common qualities which would facilitate such mergers. The common civilization, common law, and common spiritual outlook of the believers and other unifying elements offer the basis for regional federations. Other factors which will continue to exert divisive tendencies cannot be ignored. But the memory of the past and the utilization of history by Messianic movements will lend the advocates of such a merger legitimacy and substantial support.

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Reviews

The Newest Myth: "Invisible Government" in Washington*

by Kurt L. London

Books reviewed in scholarly journals of international affairs usually are serious analyses and not sensation-mongering books of the "confidential" type. The book under review here, *The Invisible Government,* comes under the latter category. It is given space neither for its quality nor its "message" but in order to expose this ill-begotten concoction of unconnected facts, inconsistencies, insinuations and suggestive political pornography for what it really is: a dent in our national security and a comfort to our enemies.

The authors allegedly are concerned that the American people have not been told all there is to tell about U.S. intelligence. "The book is an attempt," they write, "within bounds of national security, to reveal the nature, size and power of the invisible government," and "to describe a hidden American institution which the American people, who finance it, have a right to know about." The authors do not seem to know the meaning of national security, for they have done their level best to piece together all the information they could obtain, from overt and not so overt sources, to present to the world as clear as possible a picture of U.S. clandestine operations. They have not altogether succeeded but they have found enough small pieces to create a mosaic which will be gratefully welcomed in Moscow and Peking.

The authors sanctimoniously pretend to defend "the people's right to know." There is no government in this harsh world which can afford to make the public privy to all it does in the area of international affairs. Woodrow Wilson's illusion of "open covenants openly arrived at" belongs to the never-never land of political fairy tales. As individuals, so governments must have the right to conceal if they wish to cope efficiently with their environment. There must be a limit to their confessions to the citizenry. The decisive factor is not the *right* to know but the *need* to know. If the people—and the authors—do not like this, insisting on "the consent of the governed," they must go to the polls, which is the democratic way of doing things. Once they have elected a government, that government is the only one they have and there is no choice but to trust it—or to criticize it *responsibly.* If they still do not like it, they must elect another one next time. If they do not want to wait four years, they might try to replace the American presidential system with the British parliamentary one so that they can throw out their elected representatives even before their tenure is up.

**The Invisible Government.* By David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. New York: Random House, 1964. 375 pp. $5.95.

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What is this fabled "invisible government?" It is a catchy but phony slogan for the United States intelligence services in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. It is, in the words of the authors, "a loose amorphous grouping of individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the visible government." Presumably the authors are afflicted with astigmatism because I, and certainly most other political observers, can clearly see what the authors call "invisible." The men and organizations they mention are all prominent officials who can be detected with the naked eye. They are drawn from the White House staff, the National Security Council and what is called the intelligence community, which consists of the CIA, the State Department, the Armed Forces, the Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI.

The CIA is the roof organization for American intelligence which, prior to World War II, was practically nonexistent. The members of the "Special Group" to which the authors seem to attribute sinister designs are as much in the public eye as any government leaders. There is nothing malign in creating compact groups of executives charged with certain responsibilities for carrying out specific policy decisions. A government too inflexible to create such organizational auxiliaries cannot do its job.

We know, by the authors' own admission, that none of the major policy decisions on operations such as Cuba, Guatemala or Iran were made by either the Special Group or the intelligence community. In every case the U.S. government, in the person of the President and in one case with the concurrence of the British government, has given its consent to proposals which the groups in charge had to implement. We know that the counsel for such action comes from coordinated and interested government departments such as State, Defense and the CIA. If the authors complain that these men keep their collective mouths shut and do not broadcast their intentions around the world, they are correct. Secrecy is not invisibility. The effectiveness of intelligence operations depends on secrecy.

I do not pretend, as the authors do, to know all about the intelligence operations of their "invisible government." It is quite possible that some of their revelations are true, but that does not absolve them from the guilt of having publicized them. Nor does the way in which they present their views absolve them from bias and innuendo directed against the intelligence agencies and the CIA. In some cases, such as that of Indonesia, they go so far as to ask their readers to swallow *non sequiturs*. For example, they seem to assume that the "soldier of fortune, Allen Pope," by the simple fact of his capture, set in motion (a) the release of 37,000 tons of rice to be shipped to Indonesia, (b) the lifting of an arms embargo and (c) a conference between John Foster Dulles and the Indonesian ambassador. Does this sound reasonable? Not to me.

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In the cases of Laos and Vietnam they oversimplify extremely complex situations. To present a picture in which the CIA "dictates" policy in these two Southeast Asian countries when the U.S. government in its entirety is concerned with their problems is utterly absurd. The Guatemala story makes a good spy thriller, but even if it were the truth (the authors quote discussions between Samoza and Ydigoras as if they had been present and taken notes) it misses the point the authors are after, namely, the denigration of the intelligence community. Again, in a chapter describing the alleged "Kennedy shake-up," they quote Messrs. Nixon and Udall, Eisenhower and Salinger verbatim; perhaps the authors of the "invisible government" discovered the secret of making themselves invisible and attended these discussions with an invisible tape recorder.

Their venom is particularly noticeable in the chapter called "The Secret Elite," in which they implicitly profess their dislike for John A. McCone. In mentioning Congressional opposition to his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence, they present the arguments of those who disapproved, not the majority which approved. (It is in this chapter that they call the FBI a part of the "invisible government!")

The intent of the authors to discomfit the CIA is particularly blatant in the chapter "A Grey Operation", which purports to describe the exchange of Cuban prisoners for medical supplies. The authors go to a great deal of trouble to drag the CIA into this deal, although there is little or no evidence that it actually was involved. Innuendo is a powerful weapon, as we all sadly remember from the McCarthy era.

As an academic person, I am revolted by the authors' attempt to alienate the academic community from the U.S. government, just when the government has at last reached the inevitable conclusion that it needs the cooperation of knowledgeable and specialized scholars to do research in the social and political sciences — research which by the nature of Civil Service requirements cannot properly be done in government offices. This is not a question of "hidden money," except in the minds of the authors. If the government requires a research job, there is nothing wrong if it asks academicians to do it. I took this for granted; apparently the authors do not. The MIT Center for International Studies has never denied that it did research work for the CIA. Why should it? The publications of this Center are sufficient proof that it is well equipped to do excellent work, especially in the field of communist affairs. Why single out MIT? There are many other universities that have undertaken studies for the government, "invisible" or visible, and they are none the worse for it. Their faculties have enriched their horizons and the government has had the benefit of their views.

Since the authors are afraid the intelligence community might elim-

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inate American freedoms — presumably because its members keep mum as they ought—they discuss the issue of controls. They do this from the point of view of Senator Fulbright—a view which is not shared by the majority of the Senate or any of the past three Presidents. The issue has come up from time to time, but the Senate has rejected overwhelmingly the proposal to create a Joint Intelligence Committee (after the model of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee) and the Presidents would almost certainly have vetoed any such resolution. The authors shrug off the existing Congressional committees simply because they do not like the "conservatism" of "the men in charge." They brush aside President Eisenhower's board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities set up in 1956 and President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of 1961. What else could be done to "control" the CIA? Establish yet another committee? There would be no point in this—only innuendo. Control is now exercised by the President and his delegates, special or otherwise, a Congressional committee and a committee of distinguished citizens. This is sufficient.

The authors take their "exhibits" where they can get them. They refer to former President Truman's critical remarks about intelligence operations which he made in a syndicated article on December 22, 1963. Yet it was President Truman who signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law, fully realizing what it meant when the law stated that the CIA was to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." This law clearly authorized operational activities without which no intelligence organization worth its keep can function. Moreover, the National Security Act was amended with the CIA Act of 1949, and this amendment spells out CIA Cold War activities in more detail. At that time, President Truman was still in the White House and was aware of the significance of the Act when he signed it into law.

The National Security Council or other responsible groups, so far as is known, never objected to these activities. Nor did President Truman's successors. This is as it should be, for those responsible for our security are not guardians of morality but of national survival. Besides, intelligence consists of analysis and operations; one cannot do without the other.

This book is full of unconnected issues, thrown together like a tossed salad, dressed with sensationalism and insinuations. Why should the authors write and an American publisher pay for the printing of this oversized pamphlet? Is it supposed to improve our government? Is it to "liberate" us from the shackles of CIA "serfdom?" Is it to accuse the United States government of irresponsible actions?

The best that can be said about this book is that it betrays the authors' lack of understanding of the intelligence process. Unfor-

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tunately, the authors do more than demonstrate their ignorance. They attribute sinister motives to our intelligence efforts and demand that dirty operational linen (it cannot help being dirty, for the Cold War is dirty too) be washed in public; they are ready to condemn but withhold praise where praise is due. This book may be a financial success in view of the current demand for spy fiction, but of one thing I am sure: it was not written with the best interests of the United States in mind.

How to Win Without Really Trying*

by Robert Strausz-Hupé

Professor Amitai Etzioni's writings have received wide and distinguished attention. In the July 6, 1964 issue of the *New Leader,* Senator Hubert H. Humphrey reviewed Professor Etzioni's latest volume entitled *Winning Without War.* Although the Senator voiced his disagreement on a few matters of detail, he praised the author as "idealistic but not visionary," and commended him on "his understanding of the complexities of world power relationships." Concluding his review, the Senator wrote as follows: "The policy which Etzioni advocates for United States strategy in military terms is in fact our policy. . . . In that sense the book is a solid support for the policies of the Johnson Administration." Since the appearance of this review article, its author has received the Democratic Party's nomination for Vice President. Thus his general approval of Etzioni's views merits the attention reserved for a statement of public policy.

Etzioni has summed up his "understanding of the complexities of world power relationships" in one sentence: "It is my central thesis that the relationship of the United States and the U.S.S.R. is changing in such a way that they are gradually coming to fulfill the prerequisites of competition under rules, and that several limited steps have already been taken to shift away from cut-throat competition." In his review, Senator Humphrey appeared to agree with this, the "central thesis" of the author. How valid is Etzioni's thesis?

In a "competition under rules" the first prerequisite is that both sides agree with the rules. Furthermore, it is necessary that both sides fully understand the rules on which they have agreed. It is perfectly possible that one side mistakes for a "rule" a condition which has obtained for a long time, simply because the other side, being temporarily unable or unwilling to change that condition, professes to abide by it indefinitely.

Wars have been fought under "rules" of this kind. Thus, for example, between September 1939 and May 1940, the European belligerents "competed" with one another under "rules" which restrained them from "cut-throat competition." They eschewed major engagements; on both sides the

**Winning Without War.* By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Doubleday, 1964. 271 pp. $4.95.

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casualties were few; and in the West neither side won or lost any territory to speak of. The British and French publics and, apparently, the British and the French governments accepted this condition as tolerable and lasting. They settled down to playing by the "rules" of the Phony War or *Drôle de Guerre*. When the Nazis had honored their agreement with the Soviets and conquered Poland, they were ready to change the "rules": They overran France and drove the British into the Channel.

In private business—and Etzioni borrows his analogy of "competition under rules" from American corporate practice—two or more firms may compete with one another under "rules" tacitly agreed upon. This contest, together with its more or less explicit "rules," is circumscribed by public opinion, especially the opinion of the customers, and other "rules" which the contestants neither have established nor can change, namely the laws of the land.

The United States and the Soviet Union may agree—or think that they agree—on "competition under rules" and on the avoidance of "cut-throat competition." Yet, here and now, there is no umpire to supervise the proceedings and, in case of violation, there is no one, be it public opinion or be it judicial tribunal, to interpret, enforce, rescind or declare illegal these "rules." Etzioni, alive to the need for such an umpire, proposes that in the fullness of time the United Nations be given the job of universal arbiter. With commendable realism, he concedes that in the foreseeable future the writ of the United Nations will fall short of that of a world government. Thus, following Etzioni's reasoning, for the time being we must repose our faith in a future-without-war upon the existing relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and its potentiality for beneficial change.

According to Etzioni, this existing relationship reveals the following characteristics: mutual deterrence, nuclear stalemate, and hence the increasingly cautious response by the two superpowers to challenges which, in pre-nuclear times, were wont to trigger war. The task now is to sublimate this existing relationship, admittedly somewhat precarious, into a more stable one. In order to do so, the Soviets and we must perceive one another no longer as enemies "locked in an unlimited conflict" but rather as rivals in a competition to be continued under rules; must formulate the rules, and set up the machinery which will enforce the rules. It can be readily seen that Etzioni's solution to the world problem hinges on the validity of his basic assumptions: one degree of error at the starting point may wreak navigational havoc far out at sea. Some of his propositions are based upon empirical considerations. Unfortunately, these are all too often far from explicitly stated—in any event, not explicitly enough to support his policy recommendations.

The most important stipulation sustaining Etzioni's thesis is the "global stalemate." Underscoring

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it, he writes: "The Communist Bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years." His second major assumption is closely related to the first: The nuclear stalemate not only exists as an objective fact, but also determines Soviet strategic thought. Etzioni finds that the Soviet Union has always been "extremely reluctant to endanger its survival in its expansionist efforts." Now, however, the peril of nuclear devastation counsels even greater circumspection. Although the communists are still set upon communizing the world, they are less willing than they have ever been to incur excessive risks.

According to Etzioni, the level of violence acceptable to Soviet strategy has been declining continuously in recent years. The Soviets tend to shun armed invasion and only sparingly use armed subversion; Soviet strategy is shifting toward the employment of nonmilitary and nonviolent techniques of conflict, such as political warfare, propaganda and economic penetration. To Etzioni, this change of instruments appears as the overarching fact about Soviet conduct; it can be ascertained from observed Soviet behavior. In order to grasp its full significance, we need not lose ourselves in the controversy over the exact nature of the political and social changes which have occurred in the communist bloc, such as the "liberalization" or "mellowing" of Soviet society. As Etzioni sees it, it is not enough to contemplate happily the observable "de-escalation" of Soviet strategy. The West must change its own strategy in order to take advantage of historic opportunity.

Etzioni defines the purpose of the U.S. policy of containment as having been either actively to encourage internal change in the Soviet Union or, according to another interpretation, to hold the West's position until forces working within Soviet society will have brought about the liberalization of the regime. In any case, if containment *has* been a successful policy and Soviet society *is* liberalizing, then the time has come to replace the Cold War and the arms race with some other form of East-West relationship. There can be no doubt that Etzioni deems containment an unqualified success. If "the communist bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years," the task is now to think of new ways to hasten the liberalizing trends within communist society, forestall a Stalinist reaction and terminate the Cold War.

Etzioni gives the Kennedy-Johnson Administration fair marks for trying to do just that. He writes: "Some such indication is given in the U.S. proposal for complete and general disarmament; still this proposal deals largely with questions of verification and enforcement of disarmament and has little to say about the nature of the political community the United States is aiming for, and the place it sees in this community for non-aligned, as well as 'mellowed' communist societies." Plainly, we ought to encourage communist societies to "mellow." Clearly, Etzioni *expects* communist society to "mellow,"

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provided the communists can be shown exactly where they will fit in and how they can play a fulfilling role in the "world of peaceful coexistence."

Etzioni advances a number of proposals for "community building activities" in which the Soviets might honorably and contentedly participate. Thus, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union "might more actively condemn the very small group of nations that attempt to hide inhuman autocracies behind the rationale of nonintervention" (*vide* South Africa). They might share in a global radio and TV network; they might cooperate in mass exchanges of students, teachers and political leaders; together they might explore space; and they might join as partners in geographical, weather, and medical research. Communist countries might be invited to participate in various regulatory bodies set up to guide the world economy, for "the more global institutions the Soviet-led camp is involved in, the more integrated the world community and the more stabilized peaceful competition becomes." Etzioni commends as right steps in this direction the ratification of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sale of American wheat to the Soviets, and the negotiations for increased consular representation in both countries. Thus, he notes with satisfaction: "The door was opened for an accelerated transition from duopoly to nonviolent competition, which could proceed on many fronts."

With judicial detachment, Etzioni examines the foibles of "duopoly." There is little to choose between Soviet behavior and American behavior in a bipolar, "duopolistic" world. Distraught, each side stares at the mirror image of the other. Good guys oppose bad guys; between deep black and luminous white, there are no shadings. Crudely, Americans view communism as unrelievedly evil; Soviet citizens, in turn, are haunted by the fear of capitalist aggression. The Soviets will not let us inspect their missile sites or the status of their national minorities; we will not let the Soviets intervene in the domestic struggle over civil rights.

As the power blocs dissolve, the gradualist approach toward peaceful-competition-under-rules gathers momentum, and the practice of "limited accommodation" issues into psychological disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union will come to "recognize that they have some common interests and responsibilities above and beyond their commitments to their respective allies."

Not so surprisingly, Etzioni takes a dim view of the Western Alliance. The Europeans are unhappy about America's absolute control of the deterrent, and the Americans will not give the Europeans a finger on the trigger or allow them to build their own deterrent. If the European allies were to develop their own deterrent, the United States "cannot allow the Europeans the capacity to involve the United States in a nuclear war." It must "dissociate" itself from them, this being "one function the 'hot line' between Washington and Moscow

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is designed to serve." In any case, the ties of NATO "will decrease, not increase as many in Washington hope and, which is worse, still expect."

This is Etzioni's world, the world of peaceful competition "under rules."

Let us first explore the cause-and-effect relationship of U.S. policy, i.e., "containment," and Soviet strategy. Then let us examine the capacity of communism to "mellow" sufficiently to make it possible for communist states, including the Soviet Union, to take their place in civilized world society and to compete peacefully in the world's work with the democratic states of the West. Clearly, it is the findings of this investigation which must decide how valid is Etzioni's thesis.

Containment has been not only a unilateral American foreign policy but also a formidable system of collective security. In Europe, the vast arc of Allied bases and the forward deployment of ready forces, backed by U.S. strategic air power, have confronted the Soviet Union. Throughout the last fifteen years, the strategic situation lacked precisely that attribute which would render plausible the essential assumption underlying Etzioni's "central thesis," namely, symmetry. The West enjoyed clear-cut strategic superiority; the Soviet leaders, Stalin as well as Khrushchev, fully grasped this fact.

The sum and substance of Soviet policy was the endeavor to annul the West's strategic superiority by a mix of military-technological and psycho-political strategies. In and out of season, Chairman Khrushchev has reiterated the prime objective of Soviet policy: the dissolution of NATO. With that candidness which more effectively than various communist techniques of deception has outfoxed the Western democracies, Khrushchev has spelled out the tactical steps leading to this goal: the dismantling of NATO bases, the removal of nuclear weapons from the European continent, and disarmament measures designed first to freeze and then to scale down the military-technological effectives which sustain the West's strategic superiority. All schemes for arms control and arms inspection presuppose symmetry. Such notions as "nuclear stalemate" and "balance of terror" signify an evenly balanced strategic relationship. Yet the East-West strategic relationship has been far from even. The West was strategically superior. It had to be. Throughout the post-World War II period, the Western democracies confined themselves to a defensive posture whereas the communists, militants of world revolution, remained on the offensive. At the heart of the East-West confrontation is the aggressor-defender relationship.

When Etzioni writes that "the communist bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years," he establishes the *conditio sine qua non* upon which the plausibility of his symmetric model of world politics and, hence, his central thesis depend. Exactly what does he mean by "barely"? In the last fifteen

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years, the communists have conquered large chunks of Southeast Asia, all of Cuba and all of Tibet, and penetrated deeply into Africa and Latin America. In the same period, the West has not succeeded in pushing back the Iron and Bamboo Curtain by one inch. In brief, the entire contest between West and East, sometimes nonmilitary, sometimes quite bloody, has been waged on the territory of the Free World.

For the West, the one and only compensating factor has been its strategic superiority. It does not require superior political-psychological insight to envisage where the West, defensively and reactively minded, would be now if the communists, aggressive and nimble, had commanded superior military-technological resources. Barring a miracle, the West would be nowhere.

The strategic superiority of the West has blocked the communist movement in that very area where it needed most to expand in order to retain its world revolutionary momentum, namely, Europe. Long ago, Lenin and Stalin realized that industrial Europe, especially Germany, had to be added to the Soviet base in order to tip the scales decisively against the capitalist order. Since then, the chronic malfunction of the communist economic system has greatly increased the need for additional resources which, for a variety of reasons, cannot be developed at home. In Europe, the single greatest reservoir of industrial hardware and technical intelligence is Germany. Hence the perennial attempt of the Soviets to yank West Germany out of NATO. The failure of this mission touched off the latent divisive forces which have always fermented in communist society. Forced to live at home, the communists have found it increasingly difficult to live with one another. Thus the West's strategic superiority, embodied in NATO, is the true author of the various communist "splits."

The communists, whenever they have been stymied in their expansionist ventures abroad and thus forced back into the economic mess at home, have abandoned the strategy of "flow" and switched over to the strategy of "ebb." They have professed themselves enthusiastically in favor of the "coexistence of systems" and "peaceful exchanges." To relieve shortages in the domestic economy, they have loosened state controls over the marketing of certain agricultural products. They have directed fraternal communist parties in capitalist lands to join with enlightened bourgeois factions in denouncing the "arms race" and, if feasible, to join "popular fronts" or even to enter coalition governments. In brief, they "liberalized."

The years have gone by; there have been many changes. But some of the "loosening" and "opening up" in the communist bloc as well as the widely advertised assertion of independence from Moscow by communist leaders abroad looks "old hat." Thus, for example, the Italian Communist Party, assuming the stance of autonomy, makes itself available for collaboration with the

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left-of-center parties—the "popular front." It is by no means clear why this maneuver should redound to the detriment of world communism and, in the long run, not accrue to the advantage of Moscow. Khrushchev has labored manfully to deepen the belief of Western publics that, this time, the *détente* is real and, if the "militarists" can be kept under control, is here to stay. The ample publicity which he gives to communist troubles need not be destined entirely for home consumption.

The spirit of *détente* has been played up far more in the West's free press, intellectual milieus and democratic parliaments than in the censored press and controlled one-party debates of the communist states. A cozy feeling of relaxation has seeped into NATO, aggravating the long-standing problem of its political future. More important still, bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have cast doubts upon the United States' determination to maintain its own and the West's strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. These doubts may be wholly unjustified. The fact that they are widely entertained by America's European allies grievously harms NATO. Thus the crisis of NATO, which Etzioni views as having been caused by uncontrollable changes in the balance of world power, well might have been engendered by no one else but the United States itself. Far from being inscribed in the nature of things, the disarray of the Western Alliance derives from policy decisions and realignments of domestic political forces in the United States.

Be that as it may, there is not the slightest reason in the nature of things why the United States should dumbly watch the "decrease of NATO ties" as if it were a natural event like an earthquake. The United States has many means at its disposal for strengthening NATO. In Europe, France included, the United States has millions of friends prepared to cooperate in this endeavor.

If the American people hold on to the fact that the West's strategic superiority has kept the communists at home, then they are likely to make the necessary effort to maintain it—no matter how heavy the costs. In this contest, the Soviets cannot compete, and it is we, not they, who can set the "rules." No wonder that the Soviets would like us to agree to a revision of the "rules" and to settle for strategic parity—until they have achieved a decisive military-technological breakthrough. In sum, Etzioni does not grasp the inwardness of the East-West strategic relationship. Hence he misunderstands the key problem of NATO. Incidentally, this key problem is posed neither by De Gaulle nor those "unpredictable" West Germans who, among all potential makers of trouble for the West, arouse Etzioni's deepest concern.

If my central thesis, namely, that the West's strategic superiority has kept the peace and is likely to keep it as far as we can see, is valid, then plainly *his* central thesis falls to the ground. Then we have to go about

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the business of hastening the "liberalization" of communist societies and finding for them a place in the world political community in a manner different from that suggested by Etzioni.

It is highly probable that Khrushchev's rule is based upon a compromise between the "soft-liners" and "hard-liners," the "reformists" and "radicals," or whatever we may call the rival factions in the Soviet Communist Party. In the West, two rival schools of thought built upon the assumption of the existence of such a balance within the top echelon of Soviet leadership argue with one another over the appropriate Western policy toward the Soviet Union and the other communist states. The first school holds that the Soviet government is seeking a lasting peace with the Western world and has all but formally abandoned plans for world revolution; that the development of "polycentrism" is irreversible; that a new generation of bureaucrats and managers wants to preserve and expand domestic economic gains rather than engage in risky ventures abroad; and that, in increasingly urbanized, industrialized and sophisticated Russia, ideological fervor is on the wane. This school of thought points to current Soviet behavior as evidence for the conclusiveness of its argument.

The other school of thought, too, observes Soviet behavior—and comes up with the opposite conclusion. Conceding that the motivation of the communist rank and file may have weakened considerably, and that internal difficulties have impeded the forward momentum of communist expansionism, this school holds that the Soviets, faithful to their operational doctrine, have adjusted their strategy to circumstances. It points to Soviet doctrinal statements which explain "peaceful coexistence" as a strategy for disarming the West while stoking "wars of national liberation" in the West's backyard. Most importantly, it takes its cue from well-briefed Soviet behavior in the military sector, namely, the allocation of a proportionately high and rising percentage of the gross national product to advanced weapons systems. It cites as evidence observed trends of the last two years: The Soviets are about to deploy an elaborate anti-missile system and very long range and more accurate missiles capable of carrying warheads of tremendous yields, if not of genocidal destructiveness; the Soviets maintain their lead in the technology of inner, militarily significant space. If this school of thought has deduced the right conclusion from current Soviet behavior, then the communists are up to their old tricks of deception, are seeking to demoralize the West by new twists of an old strategy, and are laboring to achieve military and technological superiority so overwhelming as to enable them to defeat or overawe the West.

Obviously, a Western policy based upon the premises of one school of thought would turn out to have been disastrous were the other school of thought proven to

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have been right. In one case, the "mellowing" of the communist system would have been thwarted and the Cold War needlessly and dangerously intensified; in the other case, the West would court military defeat, communist domination and perhaps physical annihilation of genocidal proportions. Both schools-of-thought have "facts" on their side—the "facts" of observed communist behavior as well as a wide selection of authoritative statements, especially by Khrushchev, which, too, must be classified as "behavior."

Unfortunately, an estimate of future Soviet behavior and developments within the communist bloc cannot be based exclusively on available evidence. It must resort to deduction. Future Soviet behavior is unpredictable. It is this fact which must govern Western strategy. Thus far, the West's strategy of deterrence has rested upon the assumption that the Soviet leaders, once they understand that Soviet aggression does not pay, will desist from aggression. Nevertheless, there is the danger that an "opportunity" such as a technological breakthrough, an irrational impulse or the very frustration of world revolutionary drive will propel them into action. Obviously, the "soft-liners" will be deterred from such a gambit more easily than the "hard-liners." The task is to deter a Stalinist rather than a reformist Kremlin. Hence, the West must retain its strategic superiority. This, too, is not a sure-fire formula. By dropping its guard, the West might encourage a neo-Stalinist reaction. On the other hand, the West's strategic superiority might provide the "hard-liners" with an argument for accelerated armament, and hence for the "de-liberalization" of Soviet society. Yet, here the communists come up against the absolute advantage of the West: the West can afford the arms race while advancing its general prosperity; manifestly, the communists cannot afford the arms race without running into even more grievous economic troubles. Even under the most favorable conditions—a monolithic bloc and ruthless exploitation of the satellite economies—the Soviets were unable to break the West's strategic superiority. They are unlikely to accomplish this feat under the present more complex and more restrictive circumstances.

It follows that among the alternatives available to the West, the safest is to hang on to its strategic superiority and thus to encourage and sustain the "reformist" faction in the Kremlin. As yet, the present party leadership may not have thrown its lot in irrevocably with that "reformist" faction. The maintenance of the West's superior posture will encourage such a development.

The West's power need not be increased to provocative proportions which might incite a Soviet response of desperation and lend plausibility to Soviet propaganda charges of "capitalist imperialism" and "aggressiveness." If it is possible to "signal" by unilateral measures our willingness to proceed further on the road to disarmament and arms control, then it should

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be possible by the discriminate development of weapons systems to convey to the Soviets our willingness to maintain a defensive posture and to abstain from a genocidal strategy. The Soviets, for their part, can "signal" their intention to ease the totalitarian yoke and to refrain from forays into our garden. They could breathe life into their Constitution. They could introduce free elections, at least on the party level, and thus ensure orderly succession to the highest places of government. They could, in accordance with their own party statutes and Constitution, provide for full debate of policies and legislation in the legislative branch which now serves as a mere rubber stamp for decisions made by the autocrat in the Kremlin. Abroad, the Soviets are free to evacuate Cuba, to raze the Berlin Wall, and to return to the status quo of, let us say, 1960 which Khrushchev himself hailed as the terminal stage of "capitalist encirclement." None of these measures would impinge one iota on the national security of the Soviet Union or even the integrity of communist institutions as provided for by the Soviet Constitution and the statutes of the Soviet Communist Party. Once such steps are taken, it will be time enough to turn to Etzioni's concluding chapter and ponder his more ambitious prescriptions for "community building activities."

What stands between a peaceful, a humane world community and mankind is the totalitarian nature of communist rule. Peace is not threatened by nuclear arms that might go off by their own volition or by that pathological hostility of which, if only "reason" were to reign supreme, cosmopolitan psychiatrists—the guardians of international sanity—could cure both the Soviets and us. The power of tyranny remains the one and only threat to world peace.

Etzioni does not dissimulate his partiality to the planned society. His denunciation of authoritarian practices falls most heavily upon those Western peoples whom he finds guilty of ethnic discrimination. Yet he does not see in the denial of democratic rights to the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that flagrant abomination which poisons the international atmosphere and rules out a durable agreement with the communist powers.

Etzioni exhorts us to win without war. I, too, propose to win without war. I offer a strategy which will enable us to do so as surely as any other strategy which the West can pit against an unpredictable future. Etzioni and I disagree not only about how to win, but also about what kind of victory the West ought to strive for. The American people might conceivably be assured of survival in Etzioni's brave new world. I doubt that they would find it to their liking, for it bears only a faint resemblance to that free and good society which, in spite of its imperfections, comes as close to the idea of human freedom as any society on earth, past or present.

Intelligent, erudite and sober, Professor Etzioni stands head and

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shoulders above the throng of scholars who now eagerly add their mite to the growing heap of accommodationist literature. He argues his case with rigorous logic. The effect is stimulating and pleasing—at least, as long as we are prepared to overlook his mistaken assumptions. His asides on the economic and psychological problems which beset the development of regional communities reflect his intimate knowledge of the history of European integration. Last, but not least, the general endorsement by vice presidential candidate Hubert H. Humphrey counsels close scrutiny of his offering. There is much in Etzioni's book that is worth pondering. Alas, his central thesis rests on no more solid ground than his untenable assumptions. For good and sufficient reasons it would be a disaster were the policy which Etzioni advocates for U.S. strategy to become entrenched as "our policy."

The End of Empire in the Middle East*

by Hans Kohn

From the early nineteenth century to the end of World War I the Eastern or Oriental question, as Middle Eastern problems were then called, was the central concern of European diplomacy. Most of the great international crises originated in the Middle East. Even today, when the newer problems of the Far East, Africa and Latin America claim our equal attention, those of the Middle East are still with us. For three hundred years the Islamic Ottoman Empire safeguarded the order and cohesion of a wide area which reached from southern Russia to Algeria, from the plains of Hungary to the Indian Ocean. At the end of the 1700's its power began to wane under the growing pressure of Russian and Austrian expansionism and with the reassertion of its Christian subject peoples. From 1830 to 1920 the progressive disintegration of the empire burdened Europe with the problem of fierce competition among the presumptive heirs for its vast territories. Today the Ottoman Empire is gone for good; under Mustafa Kemal the Turkish nation resolutely turned away from its Ottoman imperial past, whereas the Greeks remain even today fascinated with their Byzantine legacy. Though the empire has disappeared, its demise has not solved its problems, many of which were bequeathed in changed and changing forms to the present. Two recent books by American scholars deal with important aspects of the situation which arose out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the consequences of two great wars, in which the Mid-Eastern area played an important role.

The United States first became decisively involved in this area through its participation in World War I and in the Paris Peace Con-

**The King-Crane Commission. An American Inquiry in the Middle East.* By Harry N. Howard. Beirut: Khayats, 1963. 369 pp. $6.50.

Empire by Treaty. Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. By M .A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. 235 pp. $6.00.

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ference of 1919. There the issues involved in the fate of the defeated Ottoman Empire presented perhaps the most complicated problem. In Paris the victorious powers had to decide the fate of the Turks, the Armenians and the Arabs and to deal with the aspirations of the Greeks and the Zionists. In none of its many decisions did the Peace Conference show so little wisdom as in its plans for the disposition of the Ottoman estate. Faced by contradictory ambitions, imperial and native, President Wilson proposed to send an Inter-Allied Commission to the Middle East to investigate the conditions and wishes of the inhabitants and to report back. Due to lack of Allied unity, only the American members of the Commission under President Henry Churchill King of Oberlin College and Charles R. Crane, head of a Chicago manufacturing company and trustee of Robert College in Istanbul, with Professor Albert H. Lybyer of the University of Illinois as chief adviser, left for the Middle East at the end of May 1919. Their report, presented late that summer, remained without effect. It was not published until December 1922, unofficially, and 1947, officially. Yet a close study of the report and its recommendations is today of much more than purely historical interest. The Commission's attempt to ascertain the wishes of the peoples involved in an effort to accord them justice and to arrive at relatively lasting solutions represented a constructive contribution to the technique of peace-making. Unfortunately the disunity and mutual distrust of the victorious Allies in 1919 prevented them from making use of the method and its results.

Professor Harry N. Howard of American University, who has served in the Department of State as Chief, Near Eastern Branch, Division of Research and Intelligence, and later in Beirut, has been fortunate in having access to the unpublished papers of the members of the King-Crane Commission. By fully utilizing these primary sources, in addition to published material, he has written the definitive study of this minor yet significant event in the history of Middle Eastern policy. Many of the issues discussed in 1919 are still with us, and the book will serve the student of recent history as well as those interested in current international problems. Howard gives us much more than a detailed and superbly documented report on the origins and doings of the Commission; he provides a broad picture of Middle Eastern aspirations and conflicting trends from 1919 to 1923, leading to the Treaty of Lausanne.

While Howard concentrates primarily on the situation of 1919 and on United States policy, M. A. Fitzsimons, professor of history at the University of Notre Dame and editor of *The Review of Politics,* covers the period between 1919 and 1958 from the point of view of British policy. During those forty years Britain tried to accommodate her imperial needs to the changing realities of the world revolution, including the potent force of rising Arab nationalism. For the British policy of the time the author finds

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a new and felicitious name, "Empire by treaty." Fitzsimons writes with great clarity and great charity; his judgment is fair and unbiased; his conclusions seem to me irreproachable: "The British impact has had the revolutionary effect of modernizing the Middle East, a process that might have taken a more violent course in other hands. . . . Those who study the details of British-Middle Eastern negotiations are likely to be less surprised at the ending of British influence and more impressed by the fact that for so long a time it remained formidable beyond the magnitude of its supporting power."

After a brief introduction surveying the interwar years, during which Britain maintained a tutelary relationship with the Arab states, the author turns to the events between 1945 and 1958. These fourteen years witnessed a fundamental change in European-Asian relations. But whereas the British accepted this change in southern Asia with astonishing good grace and common sense, some of them regarded their influence in the Middle East as a continuing British mission. Sir Ralph Stevenson, British Ambassador in Cairo from 1950 to 1955, noted in *The Observer* in 1957 a "curious blind spot in the eyes of successive British Governments" in dealing with Arab nationalism. The same people who proved themselves on coming to terms with Asian nationalism vastly underrated its force in the Middle East. "How was it possible that the idea that Britain's oil supplies could be safeguarded only by continued political influence, if not actual control, could so warp our usually sound commercial and economic judgment? How will later generations be able even to believe that we hoped for Arab good will at the same time we thought to thwart their efforts to undo what they consider the greatest wrong done to them, the establishment of Israel?"

Britain's problem, Fitzsimons points out, is to gain Arab recognition of the fact that the Arabs and the British have a common interest in the security and marketing of Middle Eastern oil supplies. This should not be difficult in a "rational" world. But men are not too rational, neither in Europe nor in the Orient, if they are under the spell of the past. Britain has been trying since 1956 to make the best of existing situations, not to overthrow them. The typically British halfway house of imperialism as it existed between the two great wars, "empire by treaty," is no longer viable. The Arab leaders are no longer the old-fashioned figures under British influence with whom Britain could conclude agreements to avoid the burden of direct empire. On the other hand the new Arab nations are developing economically and are gaining confidence in their growing strength and national cohesion, which may allow them to discard some of their suspicions which derive from the Arab interpretation of the past.

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The U.S., NATO and the Defense of Western Europe*

by Alvin J. Cottrell

Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, established his reputation as one of the leading commentators on NATO affairs with his book *NATO in the 1960's,* published first in 1960 and revised in 1963. His new study, *Arms and Stability in Europe,* written in collaboration with David Windsor, a Research Associate of the Institute, adds greatly to his own stature and that of the Institute he heads. In many respects this is the most penetrating book on NATO military policy and strategy to appear thus far on either side of the Atlantic. Certainly no previous book has so successfully related NATO defense requirements to arms control in Europe.

The book is essentially the report of a study group comprising some of Europe's most distinguished scholars and soldiers (to mention only a few, General Beaufre, Hedley Bull and Michael Howard). Since one cannot possibly do justice in one short review to all topics covered in this comprehensive study, attention will be given to certain key Alliance problems treated by Buchan and Windsor.

The most important differences dividing Western Europe and the United States concern the appropriate strategic doctrine for the defense of Western Europe. The authors show from the outset that they clearly comprehend the source of European and American differences on this issue. In one passage, quoted here at length, the authors go straight to the heart of the debate over strategy and force goals: "At present the European governments seem anxious to invoke the likelihood of escalation from a local conflict on the Continent to a strategic nuclear exchange, in order to prevent a war in Europe from breaking out at all. This is an attitude which was born of the old military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, when Soviet conventional strength was matched by the strategic airpower of the United States. But the strategic advance of the Soviet Union has now led to an apparent conflict of interest between the European and American concepts of deterrence. To reinforce the credibility of its deterrent, the United States must concentrate on the possibility of controlling a nuclear war. In reply to the vulnerability of American cities, the United States invokes its strategic superiority, in order to convince Russia of a common interest in controlling the course of war, should it ever break out. But Europe has always been vulnerable, and the Europeans have a greater interest in emphasizing the uncontrollable nature of nuclear war, in order to preserve the credibility of such deterrent power as is available on the Continent.

**Arms and Stability in Europe.* By Alastair Buchan and David Windsor. New York: Praeger, 1963. 236 pp. $5.00.

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They fear that the American emphasis on control could on the one hand induce the United States to go to war too easily, but on the other that American caution, if it is misinterpreted by the Soviet Union, may conceivably invite a Soviet attack in Europe." (pp.11-12.)

The simple truth is that the European members of NATO, as the authors correctly indicate, have not been greatly interested in contemplating strategies which go beyond deterrence. Consequently, they have not viewed favorably strategic concepts which offer more flexibility or multiple options. In short, the European members see Alliance military strategy increasingly in terms of strategic nuclear deterrence, whereas the United States views NATO strategy much more in terms of the local defense of Europe should deterrence fail. When one keeps in mind that for our European allies a Soviet advance of several hundred miles may mean national extinction, it is at least understandable that they look with less enthusiasm on real "fighting" strategies. Much of their stated opposition to U.S. proposals for an increase in conventional forces is rooted in the geography of the Alliance. This is particularly true of the West Germans, who always consider the local defense of NATO against the background of the unique problem of defending West Berlin. But it is also true in varying degrees of America's other Continental allies. As one leading European analyst has observed, the position of many in Europe on defense and deterrence may be more easily comprehended in the United States "if we remember that geography has put 3000 miles of ocean between Europe and America and that Western Europe can be attacked by land with a variety of means, while the United States and Canada can be attacked only with the full-scale nuclear panoply."[1]

It is important to bear all this in mind as one inquires into the true meaning of the transatlantic dialogue over NATO strategy. Much of the debate over military policy has been conducted in a framework of unreality. Frequently the European allies advance arguments which do not constitute the real motivations for their policies and attitudes, and U.S. analysts and commentators accept them at face value and answer them in that vein. For example, we frequently hear it said that the Europeans no longer believe in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. This rationale for European attitudes is accepted by many American analysts despite the fact that most Europeans appear to see very little danger of direct Soviet military attack in the NATO area. In fact, America's European allies have persistently had a lower estimate of the local threat in Europe than has the United States. If one adds this low estimate of the threat to the continuing tremendous U.S. superiority in strategic delivery capabilities—even assuming that Soviet strategic advances have somewhat diminished U.S. deter-

[1]Francois de Rose, "Atlantic Relationships and Nuclear Problems," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1963, p. 482.

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rent capacity—the result would still appear to be a very effective deterrent. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that most Europeans, whatever they might say for public consumption, do not view the situation similarly.

None of the above should be interpreted as agreement with the European view on strategy and force goals. The American position favoring an increase in conventional forces is eminently sound, at least from a logical point of view. The Soviets are deterred from launching a direct assault on Western Europe—if in fact they have ever thought seriously about it—by the threat of escalation. In this context what they undoubtedly fear above all is becoming engaged in any military conflict, conventional or nuclear, with the United States, and not whether the U.S. response will be automatically nuclear or "semi-automatically" nuclear, i.e., that once such an engagement begins, its evolution will become unpredictable.

Thus the credibility of the Western deterrent is not likely to be diminished by placing increased emphasis on conventional weapons, contrary to the arguments of many European analysts. It is clear, however, that many Europeans either have not grasped this fundamental point or prefer not to acknowledge publicly that they do because of the economic and political implications involved. The authors, who are generally sympathetic to the need for a nonnuclear response, believe it is unrealistic to expect the European members of NATO to make the necessary economic and political sacrifices required to meet NATO's long-standing thirty-division force goal. Instead they advocate greater mobility of the forces available and the creation of territorial-type forces for local defense along with a greater effort to increase the ready reserve forces throughout the NATO area.

Turning to arms control measures in Europe, the authors with good reason warn that "any American move to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that affect European interests can be based only on a high degree of European confidence in the long term objectives of American policy and in the continuing integrity of the American commitment to the security of Western Europe. A consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance is therefore an essential prerequisite to any fruitful negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, if the latter is not to risk an estrangement of the countries of continental Western Europe which might make such agreements unenforceable. But on the basis of a united Alliance it would be possible for the NATO countries to attempt to create a greater stability in Europe: to repair the effects of the change in the strategic balance by making the military situation less vulnerable. . . ." (p. 225.) They see eventual stability in Europe as possible only through some kind of denuclearization. Commenting on denuclearized zones of the Rapacki type, they prudently observe: "A large denuclearized zone is in consequence only practicable when it forms part of a wider system of

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safeguards against surprise attack. Purely as a safeguard against accidents, which in any case can be prevented by other means, the price outweighs the gain." (p. 98.)

The book contains a thoughtful discussion of the all-important issue of the control of Western strategy. Regarding the multilateral force proposal, Buchan and Windsor believe its disadvantages outweigh its advantages. They point out that the force will not increase the political leverage of the European members in Washington; furthermore, they doubt that this scheme, for which they see no clear military requirement, can contribute much to solving the problem of political confidence between Europe and the United States.

The authors also thoroughly weigh the concept of an independent European deterrent and find little now to commend it. They view an independent European deterrent as disruptive in the present state of Alliance affairs, contending that it might be examined more thoroughly at some later time, perhaps when a clearer picture of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States emerges. "But to disrupt one of the most promising experiments in supranationalism [the European Community] that this century has witnessed, by reason of a vague equation between great power status and the possession of weapons of mass destruction, would be a profound tragedy." (p. 212.) The authors suggest that the most practical alternative within the present context of NATO relations would be for Washington to give the European allies an important role in strategic planning now, while continuing to work toward a broader agreement on the role they will ultimately play in the all-important decision to fire strategic nuclear weapons.

The study includes a number of novel proposals for the reorganization of NATO's central institutions, designed to improve the machinery for the planning of strategy and to give America's allies a primary role in NATO strategic planning. To achieve the former objective the authors propose the reorganization of NATO's Secretariat in order to convert it into an effective body for discussion and planning. They also recommend developing a substantial civilian-military staff, including high U.S. government officials, under the Secretary-General, who they say should continue to be a European. To rectify what they consider to be an unsatisfactory arrangement whereby SACEUR doubles as military adviser to the NATO Council, they propose the creation of a NATO Chief-of-Staff who would command a combined military planning staff. The Chief-of-Staff would be an American, but he would have under him three Deputy Chiefs-of-Staff — British, French and German — each of whom would have responsibility for an important aspect of NATO defense strategy. They propose also the replacement of the Standing Group by a NATO official of high rank who would be located in Washington. They contend that these changes would have the effect

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of making SACEUR an operational commander. Finally, since SACEUR would be responsible for the local defense of the NATO area, they propose that he be a European, possibly French.

In general the Buchan-Windsor proposals would orient NATO more in the direction of a European authority; they believe the organization is at present largely a framework for the projection of American policy. The authors would like to see the Western European Union (WEU) evolve into a European defense authority. SACEUR would, as indicated above, be a European command and SHAPE primarily a European headquarters, continuing, however, to take its orders from the NATO staff. Senior area commands would remain divided between European and American officers, but they would have more responsibility than now.

The authors mention the need for a second NATO Supreme Commander who would head a nuclear air command for Europe (SACAIR), and they urge that Italy be brought under the Central Area of NATO, thus integrating all WEU or EDA countries under a single command. The European Defense Authority, they contend, would make it easier for the Europeans to "adjust" to the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe if the United States eventually finds it necessary for economic reasons to withdraw some of its forces. These are far-reaching proposals designed to deal with the most crucial issues confronting NATO statesmen. They represent the best thinking of some of Europe's keenest analysts and should be given serious consideration.

Buchan and Windsor, unlike many currently writing on NATO who see its usefulness at an end and are only too ready to sacrifice the Alliance for the *"détente,"* are strong supporters of the continuation and strengthening of NATO. Thus a sense of urgency permeates their study, a sense of urgency that NATO members must act to transform an Alliance whose Charter was written in 1949, at a time when the political-military balance was radically different, into a relationship much more in consonance with the balance of the 1960's and 1970's. It is difficult to disagree with the authors' conclusion that "if the Alliance is to be renewed on terms which are equitable to all its members . . . in 1969, it will soon be necessary for the NATO governments to take a number of long-term strategic and political decisions." (p. 224.)

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Agriculture in Economic Development. Edited by Carl K. Eicher and Lawrence W. Witt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 415 pp. $10.00.

A compilation of writings which consider the relationship between the farming sector and the process of economic growth. Contributors address themselves to the theoretical aspects of agriculture in economic change, the problems of migration from farming areas to cities, the nature of international commodity agreements, the importance of land reform as a determinant of economic growth, and other aspects of agricultural policy and national development.

The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations. By Cora Bell. London: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964. 130 pp. 8s.6d. (paper).

The author assesses the importance which each of its partners have attached to the Anglo-American "special relationship" since the end of the Second World War, and discusses convergent and divergent interests in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Included are analyses of the Nassau Agreement and the question of collaboration in the development of advanced weapons systems, as well as Dr. Bell's evaluation of the future of relations between Britain and the United States.

In Defence of Politics. (Revised edition.) By Bernard Crick. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 199 pp. $.95 (paper).

In this concise study the author, a Lecturer in Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, attempts "to justify politics in plain words by saying what it is." In separate chapters Crick defends politics against ideology, democracy, nationalism and technology.

Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North America. By Angus Maddison. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1964. 246 pp. $4.50.

A British economist on the staff of OECD examines growth rates in the twelve leading nations of the West. He evaluates the causes of economic expansion in Continental Europe during the last decade in contrast to comparative stagnation in Britain and the United States. The study includes basic statistical data from 1870 to 1960 on Gross National Product, productivity, population, working hours, labor force, employment, investment and capital-output ratios.

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Financing the United Nations System. By John G. Stoessinger and Associates. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964. 348 pp. $6.75.

The authors trace the financial history of the United Nations, the League of Nations, and their specialized agencies. They analyze the budgetary and assessment problems involved in supporting peace forces such as those sent to the Gaza Strip and the Congo and consider a number of proposals for obtaining new sources of revenue to support UN activities.

The Historian and History. By Page Smith. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. 261 pp. $4.95.

Professor Smith traces the practice of the historian's craft from Biblical times to the present and evaluates the principal techniques of writing history. Included are chapters on historiography during the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, as well as a critique of the work of such modern historians as Spengler, Toynbee and Voegelin.

International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers. Edited by Roger Fisher. New York: Basic Books, 1964. 290 pp. $6.50.

A group of thirteen social and behavioral scientists, including Anatol Rapaport, Kenneth Boulding, Arthur Waskow, Morton Deutsch and Amitai Etzioni, express their views on particular assumptions or influences affecting decision-makers in an international conflict situation. These papers were originally presented at a conference in 1962 sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Liberalism. By L. T. Hobhouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 130 pp. $1.25 (paper).

This volume, first published in 1911 by the well-known British philosopher, remains one of the best statements of the essential principles of the liberal political creed.

Misalliance: A Study of French Policy in Russia During the Seven Years' War. By L. Jay Oliva. New York: New York University Press, 1964. 218 pp. $6.00.

In this well-documented study, Professor Oliva presents a detailed account of the elaborate intrigues and crossed purposes of French and Russian diplomacy as well as a reinterpretation of this period in European history. He believes that France, fearful of European isolation, misjudged Russian purposes and strength and discovered too late that the two nations held conflicting aims on such policies as the future of Sweden and Poland, the succession to the Russian throne and the peace terms.

New Nations. By Lucy Mair. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. 235 pp. $4.50.

A social anthropologist at the London School of Economics investigates the stresses and strains upon the societies of the developing nations caused by the impact of the technological revolution and the breakdown of the close-knit structure of village life.

Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey: Studies in Political Development. Edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 502 pp. $8.75.

The third in a series of seven books sponsored by the Committee on Comparative

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Politics of the Social Science Research Council, this volume seeks to account for the relatively successful modernization efforts of Japan and Turkey, and for the differences in their rates and patterns of modernization. The editors' aim is to show how specific institutions may affect political development. Among the specialists who contribute to this study are Robert A. Scalapino, Roderick H. Davison, William W. Lockwood, Peter F. Sugar, Masamichi Inoki and Richard L. Chambers.

Political Power: USA/USSR. By Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: The Viking Press, 1964. 461 pp. $7.50.

The purpose of this book is to compare the Soviet and American political systems and to answer three broad questions: What are the principal similarities and differences between the two systems? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each system? Are the two systems likely to become more similar or less so? Four subjects—political ideas, the system and the individual, political leadership, and policy-making processes—are treated to determine how well a political system functions. Several case studies deal explicitly with the ways in which power is acquired, exercised and limited in the two countries; with the assertion of civilian control over the military; and with specific aspects of alliance relationships and forceful intervention.

Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. By Peter C. Newman. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. 414 pp. $7.50.

One of Canada's leading journalists describes the Canadian elections of 1957 and 1958 and assesses Mr. Diefenbaker's performance as Prime Minister. The author evaluates the accomplishments and failures of the controversial Canadian leader, recounts the events which led to his defeat, and reports on other Canadian leaders with whom Diefenbaker served or competed for power.

The Universal Postal Union. By George Arthur Codding, Jr. New York: New York University Press, 1964. 296 pp. $6.50.

In the first comprehensive study of one of the oldest international organizations, the author examines the economic, technical and political factors which produced the Universal Postal Union and describes its operation. Chapter topics include the Union's secretariat, financing, membership and relationships with other international organizations. Professor Codding offers his critique of the UPU's structure and effectiveness in the light of present and future needs in the international community.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Battle at Best. By S. L. A. Marshall. New York: William Morrow, 1963. 257 pp. $5.00.

One of America's most distinguished writers on military affairs recreates eight critical combat actions of World War Two and the Korean War.

Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence. By Henry M. Pachter. New York: Praeger, 1963. 261 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Dr. Pachter traces the major developments of the two-week Cuban missile crisis, analyzes the basic considerations and objectives of the major parties, and draws some general conclusions about power conflicts in the nuclear age and the "rules" which may prevent escalation of future confrontations. The author, a professor of European affairs at The New School and the diplomatic correspondent

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of the *Deutsche Zeitung* (Cologne), includes some 100 pages of documents on U.S.-Cuban relations, the international law governing blockade, inter-American security, and the missile crisis.

Internal War: Problems and Approaches. Edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 339 pp. $6.50.

Thirteen distinguished political scientists, economists and sociologists explore such crucial issues as the nature and types of internal war, its pre-revolutionary conditions, aims and methods, the measures needed to cope with insurgency, and the long-term political, economic and social consequences of internal war. Contributors include Gabriel Almond, Karl W. Deutsch, Alexander Gerschenkron, Seymour Martin Lipset, Talcott Parsons, Lucian W. Pye, Thomas Perry Thornton and Sidney Verba.

Korea: The Limited War. By David Rees. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 511 pp. $10.00.

Mr. Rees, an English free-lance writer and contributor to *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Spectator,* has produced a substantial political and military history of the Korean War. Throughout, two themes predominate: how can the communist challenge be countered without precipitating general nuclear war, and how can the democracies wage limited war in the nuclear age when they have in the past resorted to a total, crusading response to defeat their global enemies?

The McNamara Strategy. By William W. Kaufmann. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 339 pp. $5.95.

An important contribution to the growing literature which describes the evolution in U.S. military strategy under the Kennedy-Johnson Administration. Professor Kaufmann discusses such topics as Secretary of Defense McNamara's strategy of flexible, controlled response; the implementation of this strategy even in the face of opposition from NATO allies; the Skybolt controversy; the reassessment of Soviet strength; the attitude of the Secretary toward arms control measures and the Test Ban Treaty; and the Secretary's cost-effectiveness approach to the development of projects and weapons systems.

The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. By Gordon A. Craig. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 538 pp. $2.75 (paper).

A review, covering a three-hundred-year period, of the influence exerted in German domestic and foreign policy by the Prussian-German army. Professor Craig describes the army's resistance to liberal and democratic reform movements and its successful maintenance of authority until it was outmaneuvered and forced into subordination by Adolf Hitler. He contends that the history of Germany during the 18th and 19th centuries could be regarded as one long constitutional struggle in which the opponents of constitutional reform, liberalism and democracy were the more effective fighters.

The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. By Caryl P. Haskins. New York: Harper & Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964. 115 pp. $3.50.

This book contains the substance of Dr. Haskins' 1961 Elihu Root Lectures for the Council on Foreign Relations. The author, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, scans the nature and the direction of the swift currents of science and technology as they affect U.S. foreign policy. Three lectures are

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devoted to technology and the new and "intermediate" nations, and two are devoted to the position of science in the Soviet Union and Communist China.

War. Edited by Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals. New York: Basic Books, 1964. 404 pp. $7.50.

A collection of twenty-one classic and contemporary writings by psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists on the subject of human aggression and international conflict. The editors, in their introductions and commentaries, stress the necessity for the development of an interdisciplinary view of aggressive national behavior.

War Safety Control Report. By Howard G. and Harriet B. Kurtz. Chappaqua, New York: War Control Planners, Inc., 1963. 103 pp. $3.00 (paper).

This report suggests that modern technology now makes it possible to assure the prevention of war. The authors recommend the establishment of an automated system that can, through advanced global electronic scanning, relay directly and instantly to a War Safety Control Center at the United Nations any deviation from peaceful technological activity or any other signs of warlike preparations. They discuss the designing and building of the system; the development of advanced large-scale information systems such as Tiros and air traffic control; and the problems of inspection techniques, international law and mobilizing public support.

III. United States

An American Epic. Volume Four. By Herbert Hoover. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964. 322 pp. $7.50.

Former President Hoover concludes with this volume his narrative of his activities in U.S. relief programs during and after the Second World War. The account draws upon hitherto unpublished materials, and includes chapters on relief activities in countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Mr. Hoover discusses the operations of UNRRA, UNICEF, CARE and other relief agencies, as well as his relationships with the British and other European governments between the outbreak of war in 1939 and the Hungarian uprising of 1956.

The Burden and the Glory. By President John F. Kennedy. Edited by Allan Nevins with a Special Foreword by President Lyndon B. Johnson. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 293 pp. $4.95.

Selections from President Kennedy's public statements and speeches during the last two years of his administration. These include the late President's second State of the Union message, his pronouncements on the Test Ban Treaty, his speech announcing the quarantine of Cuba, addresses delivered in Europe during his 1963 visit, and other major statements setting forth the Kennedy Administration's policy on domestic issues and foreign relations.

Congress: The Sapless Branch. By Senator Joseph S. Clark. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 268 pp. $4.95.

The senior Senator from Pennsylvania evaluates the ability of the Legislative branch to fulfill its constitutional functions and offers recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of Congress in the 1960's. Senator Clark discusses Congressional relations with the Executive, the process by which Congressmen are elected, seniority rules and the committee system, and the Congressional "Establishment."

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Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy. By Herman Finer. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. 538 pp. $7.50.

Basing many of his findings upon interviews with officials in the United States, France, Britain, Egypt and Israel, Professor Finer analyzes U.S. strategy and diplomacy during the Suez crisis. The narrative focuses upon the role played by Secretary of State Dulles in precipitating the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal and in altering the course of British, French, Egyptian and Israeli policy during the latter half of 1956. The author evaluates the impact of Nasser's action upon U.S. relations with allies, neutrals and the communist world. He is convinced that "if some other man had been Secretary of State, the results would have been much different and . . . more beneficial for America's national interests and for her moral influence with the rest of the world."

The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest. By J. Allen Broyles. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. 169 pp. $4.50.

A critical but not entirely unsympathetic inquiry into the John Birch Society's aims and actions. In writing this study, the author draws upon his discussions with leaders, friends and enemies of the Society, attendance at some of the organization's meetings in different parts of the United States, and analyses of the written documents of the Society.

The Purpose of American Politics. By Hans J. Morgenthau. New York: Vintage Books, 1964. 359 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Professor Morgenthau, in a series of essays, attempts to relate American values and goals to the problems confronting the United States in domestic politics and foreign relations. Chapters deal with such problems as governmental intervention, social reform, economic growth, the nature of the communist challenge, national power in the atomic age, and foreign aid as an instrument of policy.

View from the Seventh Floor. By Walt W. Rostow. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 178 pp. $4.00.

The Chairman of the Policy Planning Council discusses the process of foreign policy formulation and describes U.S. global strategy. Included are chapters on the problems of the North Atlantic area, U.S. relations with less developed states, guerrilla warfare in underdeveloped areas, and the East-West confrontation.

IV. Western Europe

Adenauer: A Critical Biography. By Charles Wighton. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964. 389 pp. $5.75.

A highly critical account of the policies of Germany's first postwar Chancellor. The author assesses Dr. Adenauer's influence upon the development of new political institutions, his attitudes toward German reunification and European integration, and his views with regard to the Soviet Union and the United States. The study includes chapters on Adenauer's early life and his career before becoming Chancellor of the Federal Republic.

British Political Parties. (Second edition.) By R. T. McKenzie. New York: Praeger, 1964. 694 pp. $3.95 (paper).

A revised edition of the standard work on the British party system. This edition, as its predecessor, will serve as a bench mark in the study of political parties in Britain. Its reaffirmation of the subservient relationship of the Labour Party

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Conference vis-à-vis the Parliamentary Labour Party will continue to enrage the far left wing of the Labour Party, as well as some young British scholars who seem to have dedicated their lives to proving this and other McKenzian theses wrong.

Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 378 pp. $8.95.

Professor Kindleberger tests hypotheses on the role of resources, capital, population increases, technological innovation, urbanization and agricultural modernization in the process of economic growth in two European countries over the last century. He compares the relative importance of these factors in each country in an effort to determine elements common to both and thus to provide an explanation for economic expansion or stagnation in a given period.

Economic Planning: The French Experience. By Pierre Bauchet; translated by Daphne Woodward. New York: Praeger, 1964. 299 pp. $8.75.

A former adviser to the Commissariat du Plan describes in detail France's methods of planning in a market economy. The study discusses the relationship between planning and the National Assembly and civil service, and appraises the role of industry and trade unions in the formulation and execution of programs for economic growth.

EURATOM: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications. By Jaroslav G. Polach. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1964. 232 pp. $7.50.

Believing that English-language studies on European integration have neglected to explain adequately why the idea of an atomic community has become a necessary and complementary part of the economic integration of Europe, the author has attempted to fill this gap by inquiring into the background of atomic integration, its nature, goals and outlook for the future. He hopes his evaluation will increase understanding of EURATOM's economic impact on European integration and on international economic, atomic and power relations in Europe.

Europe Ascendant: The International Politics of Unification. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 182 pp. $4.50.

Professor Liska assesses the resurgence of Europe in the mid-twentieth century and compares present trends toward European integration with earlier political configurations, including the Holy Roman Empire, the Concert of Europe and the German Confederation. The study considers Western Europe's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and the newly independent states of Africa and Asia.

France and Germany: The Legacy of Charlemagne. By Rene Lauret; translated by Wells Chamberlin. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964. 272 pp. $4.95.

In an attempt to refute the thesis that France and Germany are hereditary enemies, the author contends that their hostility dates at the most from the Napoleonic era and has been exacerbated by propaganda, diplomacy and the two World Wars. He also examines such problems as their different conceptions of militarism, nationalism and democracy, which viewpoints must be reconciled if a new unified Europe is to be created.

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France Reborn: The History of the Liberation. By Robert Aron. New York: Scribner's, 1964. 490 pp. $8.50.

One of France's most distinguished political analysts presents a detailed account of the events between D-Day, June 6, 1944, and May 1945, when the last Nazi troops were driven from French soil. The narrative contains the author's assessment of General de Gaulle's part in the liberation, including his organization of underground cadres and his efforts to maintain the authority of his government in a period of political and economic instability. It places emphasis upon the military history of the liberation as well as diplomatic contacts between De Gaulle and other Allied leaders.

King Edward the Seventh. By Philip Magnus. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964. 528 pp. $8.50.

Drawing upon previously unavailable materials in the Royal Archives, as well as private collections of documents, the author reviews the early life of Edward the Seventh and assesses the impact of the monarch upon English policy in the first decade of the twentieth century. His volume provides an important source of information about life in England during the Edwardian period.

A New Europe? Edited by Stephen R. Graubard. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. 658 pp. $8.50.

Several contributors, European and American, consider the nature of political, cultural and economic changes which have swept Western Europe since the Second World War. Among the topics examined are the effect of the Common Market upon economic growth, changes in class structure, European educational systems, relations with former colonies, the problems of parliamentary institutions, and the impact of mass production and consumption upon Europe.

What's Wrong with British Industry? By Rex Malik. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 96 pp. $1.25 (paper).

Mr. Malik reviews the problems facing key British industries in their efforts to meet overseas competition, as well as the question of providing rapid rates of growth in Britain. Included in the study are chapters on the chemicals, guided weapons, aircraft and electronics industries, together with the author's proposals for changes.

What's Wrong with Parliament? By Andrew Hill and Anthony Whichelow. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 102 pp. $.95 (paper).

An examination of the causes for the decline of parliamentary influence upon the Cabinet in the British political system. The study contains recommendations for changes in order to enable Parliament to scrutinize executive action in Britain more effectively.

Why Conservative? By Timothy Raison. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 144 pp. $.95 (paper).

A British journalist attempts to relate Conservative principles to major social and political problems confronting Britain, including education, defense, foreign policy, economic growth, and the future of the welfare state. Although primarily of interest to a prospective voter in Britain, the study contains insights into the philosophy and values of modern British Conservatism.

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Why Labour? By Jim Northcott. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 192 pp. $.95 (paper).

In a study designed to acquaint the reader with the policies and attitudes of one of Britain's major parties, Mr. Northcott considers Labour's approach to the problems of the welfare state, education, taxation, economic growth, nationalization of industry and foreign relations. He argues for the return of a Labour government to power in Britain.

V. Communist Bloc

Brotherhood of Silence. By Stefan Ilok with Lester Tanzer. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1963. 336 pp. $5.50.

A saga of the underground fight against communism in Slovakia. The activity of the underground "Church of Silence" inspires this story of anti-communist resistance and espionage written under a pseudonym by one of the Slovakian underground leaders.

Eastern Europe in the Sixties. Edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York: Praeger, 1963. 239 pp. $2.25 (paper).

A collaborative effort to interpret the major problems and developments in contemporary Eastern Europe on an "area" basis. The first six papers deal with domestic affairs: the new society, education, agriculture and the peasant, industry and labor, trade, and the political system. The other essays examine Eastern Europe's role in bloc relations and its relations with the noncommunist world.

A History of the USSR from Lenin to Khrushchev. By Louis Aragon. New York: David McKay, 1964. 684 pp. $12.00.

Published as a companion volume to Andre Maurois' *From the New Freedom to the New Frontier: A History of the United States from 1912 to the Present*, this work presents a reinterpretation of Soviet history based upon the principles expounded by Premier Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congresss in 1956. It defends the Soviet decision to send troops into Hungary during the 1956 uprising, upholds the Soviet view of the Marshall Plan as an instrument for U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of the European states, and asserts that NATO is an aggressive pact directed against the Soviet Union.

Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict. By David Floyd. New York: Praeger, 1964. 456 pp. $7.95.

Mr. Floyd, the London *Daily Telegraph's* specialist on communist affairs, traces Sino-Soviet relations from 1949 to mid-1963, probes the origins and issues of the rift, and provides 250 pages of key documents.

Peking and Moscow. By Klaus Mehnert; translated by Leila Vennewitz. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963. 522 pp. $6.95.

One of the Western world's leading experts on both the Soviet Union and Communist China examines the cultural, historical and ideological differences between the two communist giants and elucidates their significance for Western policy. The author concludes that the Chinese will strive to take over the international communist movement and, failing that, will continue to pursue their own strategy within the communist movement. He suggests that the West can best exacerbate the rift by remaining strong and united and by strengthening the economic and social fabric of the countries along the periphery of China.

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The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics. Edited by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1963. 444 pp. $6.00.

A collection of case studies designed to provide a description of operational instruments and methods utilized by communist parties in their efforts to seize power. Topics include Soviet industrialization and the underdeveloped areas; students and intellectuals in the Chinese communist revolution; nationalists, socialists and communists in India and Burma; communist techniques in Africa and Latin America; communist party activities in Spain, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Great Britain; communists in the C.I.O., and the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa and the Communist World. Edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace), 1963. 272 pp. $5.00.

The contributors to this volume of essays examine the efforts of particular communist states to establish their influence among the African states south of the Sahara, to consolidate their positions, and then to use these beachheads to advance their long-range goals. The authors are Alexander Dallin, Alexander Erlich, Christian R. Sonne, Robert and Elizabeth Bass, William E. Griffith, Richard Lowenthal and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

East Africa: The Search for Unity. By A. J. Hughes. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 278 pp. $1.25 (paper).

As a political correspondent in East Africa for the London *Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian,* the author observed at first hand the quest for unity which has been one of the principal aims of political leaders in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar. The author believes that if these states succeed in creating a federal structure for their nations, a useful example would be set for the whole continent. The study, completed in mid-1963, does not take into account the events of early 1964 which may have affected the author's estimate of the chances for a successful federative venture in East Africa.

Morocco: Problems of New Power. By I. William Zartman. New York: Atherton Press, a Division of Prentice-Hall, 1964. 276 pp. $7.95.

Professor Zartman examines Moroccan government and politics between 1956 and 1961. He addresses himself to five basic issues: the evacuation of American bases, the organization of the army, agrarian reform, Arabization of primary and secondary education, and the organization of elections. Employing the decision-making approach to the study of government, the author describes the complex relationships among the king, the parties, the several governments, the press, public opinion and external events.

The Somali Dispute. By John Drysdale. New York: Praeger, 1964. 183 pp. $4.95.

An adviser to the Prime Minister of Somalia during 1961-63, and a former British overseas civil servant, Mr. Drysdale is particularly well qualified to recount the events of the last two years relating to the border dispute between Somalia and Kenya. He appeals to African leaders to exercise restraint and good judg-

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ment in the settlement of border disputes in order to avoid the dangers of military conflict which could bring about the introduction of non-African military forces.

Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958. By Gordon H. Torrey. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press (for the Mershon Center for Education in National Security), 1964. 438 pp. $7.00.

Mr. Torrey, a consultant to the U.S. government on Middle Eastern political affairs, seeks to unravel the complicated maneuvering for power on the part of various political factions and the military in Syria. He pinpoints the factors which led to the failure of democratic institutions in Syria and to the union of Syria with Egypt in 1958.

Which Way Africa? By Basil Davidson. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 215 pp. $1.25 (paper).

Following a survey of the underlying social, economic and political ideas and beliefs of African nationalism, the author analyzes the likely trends in African politics. He perceives four dominant themes: the trend toward the one-party state; the preference for state capitalism; the tendency to seek a position of neutrality in regard to Cold War problems; and, in response to inter-African relations, the effort to secure continental unity of policy institutions.

VII. East Asia

Administration and Economic Development in India. Edited by Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler. Durham: Duke University Press, 1963. 312 pp. $7.50.

A collection of essays by American and Indian social scientists on the administrative and economic difficulties confronting India today.

America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur. By William L. Neumann. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 353 pp. $6.50.

Dr. Neumann, Professor of History at Goucher College, examines the ideas and attitudes which shaped U.S. policy toward Japan and the Far East during the past one hundred years. The author is highly critical of much of U.S. policy, especially during the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute. By Patrick J. Honey. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. 207 pp. $4.95.

This study of North Vietnam's position within the communist bloc opens with an assessment of the geographic, cultural and economic factors bearing on Hanoi's policies and brief biographical sketches of the DRV's Communist Party leaders. Mr. Honey, Lecturer in Vietnamese Studies at the University of London and one of the leading experts on Vietnamese affairs in the West, traces the tortuous course of Hanoi's relations with Moscow and Peking through DRV Party conflicts, the anti-French war, the de-Stalinization period, the 1960 Moscow Meeting of 81 Parties, the 22nd CPSU Congress, and the Cuban missile and Sino-Indian crises.

The Emergence of Malaysia. By Ronald McKie. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963. 310 pp. $4.95.

A description of the political, economic and racial climate in Singapore as that great entrepôt prepared to join with Malaya and the North Borneo territories

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in establishing the new state of Malaysia. The author also treats briefly the political situation in Kuala Lumpur and the external and internal problems which confront Malaysia.

Peking Versus Delhi. By George N. Patterson. New York: Praeger, 1964. 310 pp. $7.50.

In this study of Sino-Indian relations, the author assesses historical and cultural factors, political rivalries, Chinese and Indian claims, and the geopolitical influences which have brought these two Asian giants to the brink of widespread conflict. Mr. Patterson, a free-lance reporter for several English newspapers and periodicals, devotes most of his attention to the border issues between the two countries, but he examines such other important matters as the Korean War, the Bandung Conference, the personalities and philosophies of the leaders of the two countries, and the Communist Party of India.

The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. By George E. Taylor. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964. 325 pp. $6.95.

A study of some sixty years of Philippine-U.S. relations, written from the viewpoint of U.S. policy. Professor Taylor first traces the development of U.S. policy up to Philippine independence, stressing the emergence of Philippine nationalism; the U.S. political legacy in the islands; the problem of Manila's increasing economic dependence on the United States; and the effects of Japanese occupation and the postwar economic crisis. In the second half of his book, the author deals with the problems of economic growth; the interrelationships of Philippine defense and U.S. security; the increasing importance of the middle class, intellectuals and the military; and the search for a national identity and independent foreign policy.

The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study. By W. D. Reeve. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 197 pp. 30/-.

A former adviser to the government of the Republic of Korea discusses constitutional development, foreign policy, public administration, foreign economic aid, and economic development under the presidency of Syngman Rhee. A final chapter is devoted to developments under the post-Rhee governments.

Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy. Edited by William Henderson. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. 273 pp. $6.75.

A collection of eleven papers on U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. Charles Wolf, Jr., writes on the "value" of Southeast Asia to the United States; Frank N. Trager on the communist challenge; John M. Allison on U.S. diplomacy and the limits of policy in the area; Russell H. Fifield on SEATO; Amos A. Jordan on U.S. economic and military assistance programs; and Paul M. A. and Genevieve Linebarger on the psychological instruments of U.S. policy. John F. Cady, Roger M. Smith, Clifford Geertz, David Wurfel and William Henderson are the other contributors.

Southeast Asia in United States Policy. By Russell H. Fifield. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963. 488 pp. $6.50.

A broad study of the evolving political, economic and military situation in Southeast Asia and the difficult policy choices open to U.S. statesmen. Special attention is devoted to Communist Chinese strategy, SEATO and the problem of

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indirect aggression, economic instability, the need for more dynamic indigenous leadership, and the counterweight potential of Japan and India.

VIII. Latin America

Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution. By Dudley Seers and others. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. 432 pp. $7.50.

Two English and two Chilean economists evaluate the Cuban government's progress toward its professed goals—the elimination of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy. Mr. Seers has an introductory essay on Cuba's economic and social background; sections on agriculture, education and industry were written by Andrés Bianchi, Richard Jolly and Max Nolff, respectively.

Fidel Castro and Company, Inc.: Communist Tyranny in Cuba. By Manuel Urrutia Lleo. New York: Praeger, 1964. 217 pp. $5.95.

The provisional President of Cuba during the early months of the Castro regime, who resigned in the face of increasing communist control in Cuba, reports here on Castro's subordination of Cuban interests to support the Cold War objectives of the Soviet Union. He deplores Castro's mishandling of the island nation's economy and the loss of political freedom in Cuba, and calls for a military fight against communism in Cuba and elsewhere in the world.

Fiscal Survey of Panama: Problems and Proposals for Reform. By the Joint Tax Program OAS/IDB. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 212 pp. $7.50.

This is the first in a series of specialized studies of the fiscal problems of Latin American nations sponsored by the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. It surveys the taxation laws and practices and municipal finance policies of Panama and recommends reforms to assist the country to achieve fiscal stability as well as to promote the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Many detailed tables are included.

A History of Argentine Political Thought. By José Luis Romero; translated by Thomas F. McGann. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 270 pp. $6.50.

A survey of Argentine political ideas—set in the historical context of the country's social and economic development—from the colonial period, through the creole period of national organization to the rise of Peronism.

Latin America: World in Revolution. By Carleton Beals. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1963. 352 pp. $5.95.

A penetrating analysis of the industrial, social, demographic and intellectual forces of the twentieth century which, since the 1910 Mexican Revolution, have fomented revolution and unrest throughout Central and South America.

Quisqueya. By Selden Rodman. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. 202 pp. $5.95.

This history of the Dominican Republic from 1492 to 1963 contains a discussion of a U.S. policy dilemma in Latin America—the encouragement of progress and thwarting of communist efforts without being taken in by "bogus anti-communism." A physical description of the Dominican Republic and a bibliography of historical sources are included.

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Monographs and Reports Received

The Development of Latin American Private Enterprise. By Frank Brandenburg. Washington: National Planning Association, May 1964. 136 pp. $2.50.

East-West Trade: Its Strategic Implications. Analysis and Inventory of Congressional Documents, 1959-1963. By Samuel F. Clabaugh and Richard V. Allen. Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, April 1964. 104 pp. $2.00.

Nationalism and Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast, 1900-1950. By Ray Y. Gildea, Jr. New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1964. 34 pp. $1.00.

On the Appropriate Size of a Development Program. By Edward S. Mason. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 8, August 1964. 24 pp. $.75.

The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular Consent. By Andrew C. Janos. Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1964. 99 pp. $1.25.

Toward Trans-Atlantic Agricultural Policy Bargaining. A Statement by the NPA Agriculture Committee on National Policy and a Report by Lawrence Witt of Michigan State University. Washington: National Planning Association, June 1964. 19 pp. $.50.

Trade Relations between the Common Market and the Eastern Bloc. By John P. de Gara. Bruges: College of Europe, 1964. 103 pp. n.p.

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